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1	Introduction

1.1 Significance of the question
On Easter Day every year, millions of people celebrate the resurrection of
Jesus. But did this event really happen? The proclamation that it did stands
at the foundation of traditional Christianity, and throughout the centuries
there has been intense debate concerning its truth. The contemporary debate
is hamstrung by difficulties concerning whether it is in principle possible
to reason from empirical evidence to Jesus’ resurrection given its supposed
miraculous nature, and whether all the naturalistic alternatives can be eliminated (Novakovic 2016; Shapiro 2016; Allison 2005a, 2005b). There is a
lack of agreement concerning ‘what is the task of historical research and to
what extent can someone’s faith convictions influence her evaluation of the
available evidence’ (Novakovic 2016, p. 128).
Additionally, in spite of the vast amount of literature on the historical
argument for Jesus’ resurrection—which has been the focus of at least 3,400
academic books and articles written since 1975 (Licona 2010, p. 19)—it has
not yet been demonstrated in a single piece of work how all the naturalistic hypotheses can in principle be excluded. This problem is illustrated by
the large monographs by Wright (2003), Swinburne (2003), Licona (2010),
Bryan (2011), Levering (2019), and others. Although they make many good
arguments, they do not consider a number of naturalistic hypotheses and
various new combinations of them in recent literature, for example, swoon,
remain buried, intramental, and mistaken identity hypotheses (Eisenberg
2016), and sophisticated combinations of hallucination hypothesis with cognitive dissonance, memory distortion, and confirmation bias (e.g. Philipse
2012; Carrier 2014; for discussion of these combinations, see Chapter 7 of
this book). Now I am not claiming that demonstrating the exclusion of all
possible naturalistic hypotheses is essential for the historical argument or
for believing that Jesus resurrected—demonstrating that Jesus’ resurrection
is as good as (or better than) the currently available alternative naturalistic
hypotheses would suffice to show the rational permissibility (or reasonableness) of believing that Jesus resurrected. Nevertheless, where offering the
historical argument is concerned it would be better if the argument can be
made more rigorous.
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This book offers a new contribution by addressing these and other issues
using a transdisciplinary approach, that is, one which integrates different
disciplines—in this case, historical-critical studies of the Bible, psychology,
comparative religion, analytic philosophy, and theology—to create a new
methodology that moves beyond discipline-specific approaches to address
a problem. Utilizing an original analytical framework, I shall demonstrate
that a logically exhaustive list of categories of hypotheses in relation to the
claims of Jesus’ post-mortem appearances and the outcome of Jesus’ body
can be formulated—indeed, this would be the first monograph on Jesus’
resurrection to demonstrate a comprehensive coverage of all the categories of hypotheses. I shall show how such a methodological procedure contributes to the contemporary debate involving historians, philosophers,
and theologians concerning the recognition of miracles. I shall address all
these hypotheses and their combinations in detail and offer a corrective to
the problematic analyses that beset their supporting arguments in recent
literature.
In addition to the tools and methods of analytic philosophy, this monograph uses the methods of historical-critical biblical studies, such as a consideration of the religious, social, and cultural background of the earliest
Christians, their understanding of sacred texts, their religious experiences,
their interactions with surrounding cultures, and the challenges that they
faced. This monograph also incorporates insights from psychology and
comparative religion. It advances the assessment of the relevant evidence by
addressing recent psychological research concerning memory distortion and
philosophical discussion concerning miracles. It incorporates the perspective
of comparative religion by examining claims of resurrection in other contexts, including that involving cognitive dissonance in the case of the rabbi
(‘Rebbe’) Menachem Mendel Schneersohn (1902–1994), some of whose
followers claim his ‘resurrection’ in the context of religious ridicule and
scepticism (Marcus 2001). By engaging with various disciplines, this book
demonstrates how a transdisciplinary approach can be useful for bridging
the divide between biblical, theological, and religious studies and contributing to the discussions in each discipline concerning the resurrection of Jesus.

1.2 Introducing various theories concerning the origination
of the doctrine of Jesus’ resurrection
I shall begin by providing a brief historical overview of various theories concerning the origination of the doctrine that Jesus resurrected. These theories
will be discussed in greater detail in the rest of this book.
The claim that Jesus resurrected was controversial right from the first century. The New Testament hints at the difficulty the first-century readers had
with such a claim by portraying people scoffing it (Acts 17:32). Regardless of
whether the account in Matthew 28:11–15 is factual (see Chapter 6), it indicates that first-century Jews could think of alternative naturalistic theories,

Introduction

3

such as Jesus’ disciples stole his body. The debate with non-Christian Jews
concerning whether the body was stolen continued into the second century
(e.g. Justin, Dialogue with Trypho 108; regardless of whether Trypho was a
real historical figure, Justin’s work indicates that the objection he discussed
was present during his time). The early Christians also had to respond to the
claim (attributed to the early second-century Gnostic Basilides) that Jesus
was not resurrected but escaped crucifixion by miraculous powers:
He appeared, then, on earth as a man, to the nations of these powers, and
wrought miracles. Wherefore he did not himself suffer death, but Simon,
a certain man of Cyrene, being compelled, bore the cross in his stead; so
that this latter being transfigured by him, that he might be thought to
be Jesus, was crucified, through ignorance and error, while Jesus himself
received the form of Simon, and, standing by, laughed at them.
(Irenaeus, Against Heresies, 1.24.4)
The pagan philosopher Celsus, a prominent second-century opponent of
Christianity, raised a number of objections to the resurrection. For example, he claims that discrepancies are present in the Gospels’ accounts of
Jesus’ resurrection which render them historically unreliable and suggests
that the supposed eyewitnesses had hallucinations of Jesus (Origen, Contra
Celsum 2.60).
Christian scholars responded to these objections. With the Christianization of the Roman Empire in the fourth century the debate subsided, and the
attention given to the historical argument for Jesus’ resurrection declined
subsequently. Craig notes, ‘As the events connected with the origin of Christianity receded further and further into the past, arguments from miracles
and the resurrection rested necessarily more and more upon faith in the
accuracy of the biblical documents’ (Craig 1985a, p. 49). A challenge was
nevertheless raised in the seventh century by the Muslims, who defended
the hypothesis that Jesus escaped crucifixion as a result of divine intervention (see Quran, Surah 4:157–8; the so-called Gospel of Barnabas, which
proposes a similar hypothesis [see Ragg and Ragg 1907, ch. 217], is widely
regarded as a late forgery written after the Quran).
With the advancement of historiography during the Renaissance, the historical argument for the resurrection of Jesus received renewed attention.
Debate between sceptics and believers was revived and became heated during the so-called Deist Controversy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries after the removal of censorship laws in various parts of Europe. The
most popular naturalistic hypothesis among the sceptics at that time was
the theory that the disciples deliberately started a hoax by stealing Jesus’
body, and it was defended with new arguments by Deists such as Thomas
Woolston and Hermann Reimarus, the latter’s writings widely regarded as
the starting point of the so-called Quest for the Historical Jesus. Apologists such as Vernet responded with various arguments for the historical
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reliability of the Gospels. These include the argument that the Gospels
contain many references to proper names, dates, cultural details, historical events, and opinions and customs of the time and evince an intimate
knowledge of Jerusalem before its destruction, and the argument that many
eyewitnesses would have been available at the time of writing to verify their
contents (Craig 1985a, pp. 322–323). Philosophical arguments against the
plausibility of miracles were raised by the French rationalists and (most
famously) the Scottish sceptic David Hume (1711–1776), while evidentialisttype responses to Hume were offered by other scholars such as William
Paley (1743–1805). A number of quasi-theological and cultural considerations contributed to the subsequent decline in popularity of such responses.
These include Lessing’s (1777) famous ‘ugly great ditch’ between history
and faith (his claim that the accidental [i.e. contingent] truths of history can
never become the proof for the necessary truths of reason), the prevailing
mood of Romanticism in the nineteenth century, and the emphasis on subjective religious experiences by influential scholars such as Schleiermacher
and Kierkegaard. Lessing’s ‘ugly great ditch’ in particular has had a huge
impact on subsequent thinkers. Among these, Ernst Troeltsch (1898/1991)
argued that historical judgments are always probable and open to revision
(the principle of criticism). Many theologians therefore concluded that the
certainty of faith cannot be based on the results of historical study.
In the meantime sceptics continued to propose various naturalistic hypotheses. Interestingly, their proponents would often offer compelling arguments
against other naturalistic hypotheses in the process of advancing their own.
For example, the deliberate hoax hypothesis by Reimarus et al. was refuted
by German rationalists Karl Bahrdt (1784) and Heinrich Paulus (1802),
who defended the swoon (Scheintod) hypothesis (i.e. Jesus did not die on
the cross). These hypotheses were in turn refuted by David Strauss (1808–
1874). Strauss rejected the historicity of the Gospels’ account of the empty
tomb and offered an alternative naturalistic explanation for Jesus’ ‘resurrection appearances,’ claiming that the disciples sincerely believed that Jesus
was the Messiah and were deluded in thinking that he rose and appeared to
them. Strauss’ naturalistic intramental hypothesis was vigorously criticized
by Theodor Keim (1883), who argued that the appearances were visions but
they were miraculously caused by God in the form of heavenly ‘telegrams’ (I
shall call this the supernatural vision hypothesis).
Nevertheless, various forms of naturalistic intramental hypothesis continued to be proposed. In the earlier part of the twentieth century, it was
held by Albert Schweitzer, Rudolf Bultmann, and others. Bultmann (1965,
pp. 47–48), for example, thought that the ‘Jesus’ resurrection appearances’
refer to the experiences of the first Christians that were visionary and
internal, i.e. the conversion of their hearts rather than their witnessing of
a bodily resurrected Jesus. On the other hand, Keim’s supernatural vision
hypothesis was defended by Hans Grass (1956), who rejected the empty
tomb accounts but held that Jesus appeared in Galilee through visions.
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Meanwhile, neo-orthodox theologians who were strongly influenced by
Kierkegaard, such as Karl Barth (1956, pp. 334–336, 351–352) and Emil
Brunner (1952, pp. 366–372), affirmed that Jesus was resurrected miraculously, but regarded this conclusion to be held by faith without historical
argument.
Against all the above, Wolfhart Pannenberg (1968) dropped a bombshell
in German theological scholarship in the mid-twentieth century when he
used historical and philosophical arguments to defend the empty tomb and
the miraculous bodily resurrection of Jesus against the criticisms of Troeltsch et al. (see further the discussion on the problem of miracle in Chapter 8). In more recent years, similar arguments have been defended by many
scholars (e.g. Craig 1989; Davis et al. 1998; Peters 2002; Habermas 2003;
Swinburne 2003; Wright 2003; Licona 2010; Levering 2019).
These scholars would argue that, regardless of the ‘theological’ concerns
of Lessing, Barth, and others and whether faith depends on proving the
historicity of the resurrection appearances (Carnley 2019, p. 239), such
arguments can in fact be offered to show that Jesus’ resurrection is the best
explanation for the historical phenomena concerning the disciples’ claims
to have witnessed the resurrected Jesus and the disappearance of Jesus’
body, a phenomenon which in any case demands a historical explanation.
In response to Lessing’s ugly ditch, Troeltsch’s principle of criticism, and
the question ‘how can the certainty of faith tolerate what Wilhelm Herrmann called “the continually changing” results of historical study,’ it has
been replied that there is no adequate reason to think that the truths which
religious beliefs are concerned with must be provided with proofs that are
necessarily true. While humans desire beliefs which are logically impossible
to be mistaken, there is no adequate reason why God (if he exists) should
grant these with regards to matters of faith. It may be the case that God
exists but He does not provide a necessary proof because He wants to give
humans the space to make free choice with regards to faith, but this does not
imply that He did not leave behind any evidence to let people know about
his revelation in history. J.P. Moreland (1998, p. 263) argues that
God maintains a delicate balance between keeping his existence sufficiently evident so people will know he’s there and yet hiding his presence enough so that people who want to choose to ignore him can do it.
This way, their choice of destiny is really free.
Likewise, O’Collins (2016, p. 44), citing the theme of sufficient but not
overwhelming light which characterizes Pascal’s Pensées (nos. 394, 427,
429, and 461), observes, ‘The factor of relative concealment allows cognitive freedom to persist . . . we have enough light to make us responsible but
not enough to take away our freedom.’
On the other hand, O’Collins (2016) observes that it is not the case that
all the results are continually changing; moreover, changes often involve
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only secondary details (p. 90). Even though we do not possess a complete
historical record, nevertheless historians can ‘reach genuine certainties
about ancient matters such as the achievements of Julius Caesar and his
death in 44 BC’ (p. vi).
Mathematical calculations cannot demonstrate the existence and career
of Alexander the Great in the fourth century BCE. But converging historical evidence would make it absurd to deny that he lived and changed
the political and cultural face of the Middle East.
(p. 91)
While many historical truths cannot be demonstrated by mathematical calculations, philosophical logic, or repeated scientific experiments, they can
be established beyond any reasonable doubt (ibid.). He notes, ‘historical
experience and contingent truths have a power to shape and change human
existence. . . . Both within Christianity and beyond, the concreteness of
history repeatedly proves far more persuasive than any necessary truths of
reason’ (p. 92). Craig observes that Lessing conflated necessity with certainty and mistakenly thought that necessary truths are more certain than
contingent truths. Craig explains,
This is manifestly false, as the unsolved problems of mathematics like
Goldbach’s Conjecture, which is either necessarily true or necessarily
false, though no one knows which, shows. By contrast I have tremendous certainty that George Washington was once the President of the
United States, though this is a contingent historical truth. There is no
reason a contingent truth which is known with confidence might not
serve as evidence for a less obvious necessary truth.
(Craig 2007a)
Meanwhile, sceptical scholars have continued to defend naturalistic
hypotheses, with the intramental hypothesis appearing to be quite popular
(e.g. Marxsen 1970 [‘illumination’]; Lüdemann 1994 [‘religious intoxication,’ ‘enthusiasm’]; Trocmé 1997, p. 38; Crossan 1998; Price and Lowder 2005; Vermès 2008; Carrier 2014 [‘hallucination’]; Ehrman 2014).
A number of scholars have proposed the mistaken identity hypothesis. Suggested parallels include the claims of sightings of Bigfoot (Goulder 1996,
pp. 52–55) and UFOs (Martin 1991, pp. 92–95) and misidentification of
twins (Cavin 1993). Concerning the outcome of Jesus’ body, some sceptics
have suggested that the women went to the wrong tomb on the Sunday
morning while Jesus’ body remained buried elsewhere (Lake 1907) or that
the body was left unburied and eaten by dogs (Crossan 1994, pp. 152–158).
Alternatively, the body could have been removed by tomb robbers (Carrier 2005b, pp. 350–352), by Joseph of Arimathea (Lowder 2005, pp. 261–
306), or even by natural forces such as earthquakes (Allison 2005a, p. 204).
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Various combinations of naturalistic hypotheses have also been suggested,
such as a combination of swoon, remain buried, intramental, and mistaken
identity hypotheses (Eisenberg 2016) and sophisticated combinations of
hallucination hypothesis with cognitive dissonance, memory distortion, and
confirmation bias (e.g. Philipse 2012; Carrier 2014).

1.3 Introducing the relevant historical sources and
important concepts
1.3.1 Christian and non-Christian sources
Concerning the relevant historical sources, the misconception—popularized
in Dan Brown’s The Da Vinci Code—that the New Testament documents
we read today are significantly different from the ones in the first century
has long been debunked by scholars. Licona (2016, pp. 7–8) observes that
‘the wealth of manuscripts for the New Testament literature leaves us very
few places where uncertainty remains pertaining to the earliest reading or
at least the meaning behind it.’ (Shapiro’s (2016, p. 135) objection that
accounts of Jesus’ resurrection might have been added into the Gospels in
later centuries is refuted by this manuscript evidence.) Licona elaborates:
The manuscript support for our present critical Greek text of the New
Testament is superior to what we have for any of the ancient literature.
As of the time I am writing this chapter, there are 5,839 Greek manuscripts of the New Testament. A dozen or so of these manuscripts have
been dated to have been written within 150 years of the originals, and
the earliest (P 52) has been dated to within ten to sixty years of the
original. In contrast, of the nine Lives of Plutarch . . . only a few dozen
Greek manuscripts have survived. The earliest of these is dated to the
tenth or eleventh century, or roughly eight to nine hundred years after
Plutarch wrote them.
(ibid., Licona goes on to note D.A. Russell’s comment
that the Lives of Plutarch ‘have been the main source
of understanding of the ancient world for many
readers from the Renaissance to the present day’)
Various accounts of Jesus and the earliest Christians are also found outside the New Testament (Van Voorst 2000), such as in the Gnostic writings
(Franzmann 1996), the Arabic writings (Khalidi 2001), the Jewish Talmud
(Schäfer 2007), the works of other ancient non-Christian scholars such as
Josephus, Tacitus, Lucian, Celsus, and Phlegon (see later in this section), and
other early Christian writings dating from the ‘period of living memory,’
that is, the period from first to early second century within which people
who could have known one of the living apostles were still alive (Bockmuehl 2007). However, the accounts in the Arabic writings and the Jewish

8

Introduction

Talmud are late and should be treated with great caution. Additionally, the
contents of the ‘other Gospels’ such as the Gnostic Gospels and the Gospel
of Thomas indicate that their authors made use of earlier traditions which
can be found in the Four Gospels and modified them in accordance with
their religious philosophy (Gathercole 2015). These ‘other Gospels’ reflect a
certain chronological and cultural distance from the historical Jesus of firstcentury Palestine and were probably composed from the second century
onwards (ibid.). Many scholars have convincingly demonstrated that these
Gnostic Gospels are less historically reliable than the earlier Four Gospels
(Jenkins 2001; Hill 2010). While the Four Gospels are commonly dated
between AD 70–100 (Brown 1997), it has been argued that Mark and Luke
were written earlier, before the destruction of Jerusalem in AD 70 (Carson
and Moo 2005). Many scholars think that Matthew and Luke used Mark as
their source, together with at least one other source. It is also possible that
there were multiple recensions of the Gospels (as a result of multiple drafts
or authorial redactions to accommodate to different recipients), such that
Luke (for example) could have used an earlier or later recension of Mark
than the one possessed by Matthew (Licona 2016, p. 116).
Jesus’ crucifixion is attested by a number of ancient sources, both
Christian and non-Christian. Outside of numerous references in the New
Testament, it is mentioned in numerous early Christian writings and nonChristian writings such as Josephus’ Antiquities of the Jews 18.3,1 Tacitus’ ‘the most extreme penalty,’ Annals 15.44,2 and Lucian’s The Death of
Peregrine, 11. Aside from Paul’s letters, other documents in the first and
early second century—such as the Four Gospels, Acts, 1 Clement, Letters
of Ignatius, etc.—also claimed that various people witnessed the resurrected
Jesus. As noted earlier, some of these claims were discussed by Celsus, a
non-Christian philosopher who wrote an attack on Christianity titled The
True Word in c. AD 177–180, most of which was preserved in the rebuttal
by Origen written in AD 248 (Marcovich 2001, p. 14; Celsus’ attack on the
Gospels indicates that he did not accept them uncritically). An earlier nonChristian reference (c. AD 140) was made by the Greek historian Phlegon
in his ‘Chronicles,’ also preserved in the aforementioned rebuttal by Origen
(Contra Celsum, 2.59). It states, ‘Jesus, while alive was of no assistance to
himself, but that he arose after death, and exhibited the marks of his punishment, and showed how his hands had been pierced by nails.’ It is unlikely

1 While some scholars suspect that Christians may have distorted parts of Josephus’ reference to Jesus, the vast majority of scholars regard the references to Jesus as the brother of
James, Jesus as a miracle worker, and his crucifixion as authentic. For a balanced discussion
of the reasons for and against authenticity, see Paget (2001); Meier (1991–2016, Vol. 1,
pp. 56–88).
2 This reference in Tacitus is most likely authentic, for the Latin style is Tacitus’, the tone is
anti-Christian, and all the manuscripts of Tacitus have this passage (Meier 1991–2016, Vol.
1, pp. 90–91).
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that Origen fabricated what Phlegon wrote, given that it would have been
easy for his readers to find out and given the awkwardness of the phrase that
Jesus was ‘of no assistance to himself’ while alive.
1.3.2 Why are there not more non-Christian sources?
Licona (2010, p. 275) writes that it would be good if we had official documents from either the non-Christian Roman or Jewish governing bodies that
mention the report that Jesus had risen from the dead, which we do not.
Nevertheless,
What we do have is good. We have reports that Jesus had been raised
from the dead from at least one eyewitness (Paul) and probably more (the
Jerusalem apostles preserved in the kerygma). These reports are very early
and provide multiple independent testimonies, as well as testimony from
one who had been hostile to the Christian message previous to his conversion experience. The canonical Gospels probably contain some traditions
that go back to the original apostles, although these may be identified
with varying degrees of certainty. To the extent one is convinced that
Clement of Rome and Polycarp knew one or more of the apostles, their
letters may yield valuable insights pertaining to the apostolic teachings.
(ibid., pp. 275–276)
For those who wonder why not more non-Christian ancient authors mentioned the claims related to the resurrection of Jesus, Paget (2001, p. 615)
observes,
We know from subsequent history that Jewish writers were in the main
unwilling to engage polemically with Christianity in their extant writings, a point exemplified not only in later rabbinic writings, but also,
if we are to believe Photius, in the one writing he attributes to Josephus’ contemporary and enemy, Justus of Tiberias. It would be wrong
to assume that such people simply knew nothing about Christianity, or
that they were unacquainted with Christians. Their silence could have
been illustrative of their contempt for, or embarrassment about, Christianity, rather than their ignorance.
Therefore, it may well be the case that certain non-Christian ancient
authors felt embarrassed about the claims concerning the resurrection of
Jesus (e.g. they thought they could not explain them away convincingly)
and thus they chose not to write about them, unlike Celsus who thought
he could explain them away convincingly and chose to write about them.
In any case, we still need to consider the writings which we do have. While
many at that time would have mocked and dismissed the claim that Jesus
resurrected as superstition without further consideration of the evidence
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(cf. Acts 17:32; see Chapter 2), what is remarkable is that there were others who believed that Jesus resurrected and wrote about it. Given that the
latter converted because they were convinced that Jesus resurrected, their
writings would (of course!) be ‘writings of Christian ancient authors.’ The
crucial question that needs to be answered is this: what are the reasons that
compelled these people to believe and declare that Jesus resurrected and to
be willing to face persecution for it (see Chapter 3).
1.3.3 Are ancient mystery religions the sources for the New
Testament accounts concerning Jesus’ resurrection?
A popular thesis in the late nineteenth century was that of the history-ofreligions school, which claimed ancient mystery religions as sources for the
New Testament accounts concerning Jesus’ resurrection. Such theories have
since been abandoned by most scholars. Evan Fales (2001), a rare contemporary advocate of such views, argues that the best approach to understand the New Testament is to study Near Eastern mythical figures, such as
Tammuz, Adonis, Isis, and Osiris. He thinks that the Gospel of Matthew,
for example, should be read figuratively, and that Matthew main purpose
of writing was for social and cultural survival (Fales 2005, pp. 312–313,
333–334). Likewise, Carrier claims that the Gospel of Mark was intended
to convey symbolic rather than historical truth and that the empty tomb
was ‘educational fiction.’ He attempts to substantiate his claims by drawing parallels between Mark with contemporary writings and Old Testament
literature. He draws parallels with the Osiris cult and Psalms 24, suggesting
that Mark copied the phrase ‘who will roll away the stone’ from Genesis’
account of Jacob, and arguing that the empty tomb serves Mark’s reversal of
expectation motive (Carrier 2005a, pp. 156–163). He likewise draws parallels between the accounts of the empty tomb in Matthew with Daniel in the
lion’s den (Carrier 2005b, p. 360).
In reply, the nineteenth-century history of religion approach has been
widely criticized for its extravagant use of parallels with new discoveries
of manuscripts of Hellenistic religious texts and philological research on
Greek, Egyptian, Iranian, and other ancient religions. As Peppard observes,
‘certain terms, concepts, and narratives of Hellenistic religions were isolated and magnified according to their perceived resemblances to the New
Testament,’ and perceived resemblances were ‘framed as decisive influences
on the development of early Christianity’ (Peppard 2011, p. 15, n. 34). By
ignoring important differences, it is possible to draw literary parallels with
a large number of unrelated literature using speculative and imaginative
interpretations (Copan and Tacelli 2000, p. 166), and we have to be very
careful not to jump to conclusions based on literary parallels alone in the
absence of other evidence. Other scholars warn of parallelomania, defined
as ‘that extravagance among scholars which first overdoes the supposed
similarity in passages and then proceeds to describe source and derivation
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as if implying literary connection flowing in an inevitable or predetermined
direction’ (Sandmel 1962, p. 1). The fallacy of parallelomania can easily be
illustrated by examples. For example,
What if we told you about a British ocean liner that was about eight
hundred feet long, weighed more than sixty thousand tons, and could
carry about three thousand passengers? The ship had a top cruising
speed of twenty-four knots, had three propellers, and about twenty
lifeboats. What if I told you that this ocean liner hit an iceberg on its
maiden voyage in the month of April, tearing an opening in the starboard side, forward portion of the ship, sinking it along with about two
thousand passengers? Would you recognize the event from history? You
might say, ‘Hey, that’s the Titanic!’ Well, believe it or not, you would be
wrong. It’s the Titan, a fictional ship described in Morgan Robertson’s
1898 book called The Wreck of the Titan: or Futility. This book was
written fourteen years before the disaster took place, and several years
before construction began on the Titanic! (Robertson, WT, website).
Here is the point: just as the fictional account of the Titan does not
undermine the reality of the sinking of the Titanic, fictional accounts
of dying and rising gods would not undermine the historical reality of
the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus. The presence of parallels alone
proves nothing about borrowing or the historicity of Jesus.
(McDowell and McDowell 2017, p. 311)
Sandmel notes, ‘Paul’s context is of infinitely more significance than the
question of the alleged parallels. Indeed, to make Paul’s context conform to
the content of the alleged parallels is to distort Paul’ (ibid., p. 5).
The contextual considerations relevant to the writing of the New Testament go against the views of Fales and others. The Gospels’ authors
intended them as ancient biographies of Jesus rather than fiction (Burridge
2004). A biography can be defined as a form of historiography focusing on
the life and character of a single person (Litwa 2019, p. 53). Some sceptics
have excluded the Gospels from ancient historiography by claiming that the
Gospels’ authors did not weigh their sources (Miller 2015, p. 133). This
objection ignores the fact that (1) ancient historiography did not have a
single form with a single set of standards, (2) by writing in sober, nonpoetic
forms the Gospels’ authors distinguished their accounts from the dominant
mythoi found in (say) Homer and Euripides, and (3) the Gospels’ authors
weighed their sources in the sense that they strongly valued eyewitnesses
over hearsay (Luke 1:2) and were careful selectors of materials to include
and exclude from previous texts (Litwa 2019, pp. 6–7). Against the suggestion that the resurrection narrative in Mark’s Gospel is to be understood as a
parable, Bryan (2011, p. 166) notes that, while biblical echoes and allusions
were present, the author was rather careful to insert into his narrative of no
less than three references (15:40, 47; 16:1) that ‘known eyewitnesses whom

12

Introduction

he names really did see what happened.’ Contrary to Crossan’s theory that
the passion narratives are examples of ‘the Prophetization of History’ or of
‘the Historicization of Prophecy,’ Bryan (2011, pp. 205–206) argues that
Crossan misunderstands the role of Old Testament allusions: ‘the purpose
of such allusion is not, in general, to recount what has happened (that is the
role of the named eyewitness . . .) but to enable the community to understand what has happened.’
Establishing the genre of historiography by itself does not imply that a
limited number of non-historical details cannot be included or that claims of
eyewitnesses cannot be made up.3 Indeed, many examples from ancient historiography can be given to show the contrary (Litwa 2019, pp. 197–198).4
Of course, this does not prove that all the details in all historiographies are
unreliable; to decide on the reliability of the details we would need to weigh
them case by case in light of other considerations.
Litwa (2019) claims that the Gospels’ authors changed the details in the
original accounts concerning Jesus to make them look like historiographical discourses (p. 10), arguing that the ‘parallels’ do not prove that they
‘borrowed’ from historicized Greek myths, rather they indicate a shared
intellectual culture concerning what would be regarded as appropriate and
plausible in a story concerning divine-man (p. 92). If Litwa merely states
this without further argumentation, his argument would be guilty of committing the fallacy of begging the question against Jesus being truly such a
great person who fulfilled those expectations of his intellectual culture; in
particular, it would beg the question against Jesus being truly resurrected
as a vindication of the claim that he was truly divine (Loke 2017a). Litwa
therefore attempts to provide further argumentation to support his claim.
For example, he argues that the original descriptions of Jesus’ resurrection appearances were subjective visions which later came to be objectified and described as palpable events (e.g. able to be poked and prodded
by eyewitnesses, e.g. John 20:24–28).5 However, Litwa’s view fails to

3 Cf. Bryan’s (2011, p. 4) argument that the New Testament writers ‘did not merely insist on
it as a fine old story, their “myth” or “founding legend,” as a good Roman matron might
tell her children the ancient stories of Romulus. . . . Rather, they insisted on telling each
other, and anyone else who would listen, this very new story, even on occasion appealing in
its regard to named “eyewitnesses” (autoptai) or to what a particular follower of the Lord
“remembered” (emnēmneusen), as if they actually expected to be taken seriously.’ Litwa
would reply that the ancient Romans regarded Romulus as a real historical figure and that
mythic historiographies often claimed eyewitnesses as well.
4 For example, Litwa (ibid.) notes, ‘Lucian complained against many historians who falsely
declared that they had seen the events they described. In his True History, he exposed the
device in the historian Ctesias, “who wrote a history of the land of India and its characteristics, which [despite his eyewitness claim] he had neither seen himself nor heard from anyone
else who was telling the truth.” ’
5 Cf. Becker (2007), who likewise argues that the Easter experience of the earliest Christians
was perceived as a visionary occurrence affected by the Holy Spirit, while the epiphany-like
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 rovide an adequate explanation concerning how groups of the earliest
p
Christians could have ‘seen’ the ‘resurrected Jesus’ together in the first place
if these experiences were merely subjective visions, such that they came to
believe and testify to others that they had ‘seen’ an objectively and bodily
resurrected Jesus together (rather than they came to believe that they ‘saw’
Jesus’ spirit or believe that they hallucinated, etc.). I shall elaborate on this
argument against Litwa’s view in Chapters 3 and 4. (Throughout his book
Litwa also assumes that stories of miraculous resurrection, exorcism, and so
on are no longer plausible for modern scholars; I respond to this so-called
problem of miracle in Chapter 8.)
Litwa (2019) also claims that ‘recent scholarship has sufficiently demonstrated that Christian authors felt little inhibition about employing deceit
in the cause of what they perceived as true’ (pp. 207–208), stating, ‘as the
apocryphal Acts show, Christians regularly used fiction in the cause of truth’
(p. 262) and citing Ehrman (2012). He concludes, ‘we know that contemporaneous biographies readily mixed fact with fiction, especially when the
fiction had some profound moral or spiritual payoff,’ such as ‘eternal life’
(p. 208).
However, Litwa’s claim does not answer how the earliest Christians could
have come to perceive Jesus’ resurrection as true and view it as foundational
to their hope of eternal life in the first place. As argued in the rest of this
book, the best explanation is that Jesus did rise from the dead. Additionally, the apocryphal Acts mentioned by Litwa was written from the second
century CE onwards by Gnostics who (as argued in other parts of this book)
valued history far less than did the earliest Christians who authored the
New Testament. Moreover, the New Testament documents were written in
the first century CE, during a period when the apostles and their co-workers
or those people who knew them were still around and can be verified (Paul
was evidently concerned about forgery, which was why he practised the
signing of his own documents with his own hand to authenticate them; see,
for example, 1 Cor. 16:21; Gal. 6:11). Given the close connections between
the first-century Christian communities with these people, any attempts at
faking the writings of the apostles would have been easily discovered and
falsified. In the case of epistles, it is even more unlikely that any forger could
falsely attribute the author and also the audience without being detected
(Witherington 2006, Introduction; for other problems with Ehrman’s arguments see Witherington 2011).
Litwa himself notes that the Gospels’ writers were highly intelligent, and
their choosing to write in the genre of historical biographies indicate that
at the time of writing they would have wanted to write in such a way that

stories of Easter in the Gospels describe a later understanding of Easter. Gant (2019,
pp. 198–200) suggests that the disciples had subjective visions of Jesus as an exalted radiant
heavenly being which later expanded into belief that Jesus bodily resurrected.
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‘educated people would understand and accept as true, since more and
more educated and high-status people were joining the Christian movements’ (p. 9). He also notes, ‘generally speaking, if readers do not consider
a story to be “real,” they do not consider it to be plausible’ (p. 209). These
considerations imply that the first-century readers of the Gospels were concerned about truth, and this was known by the Gospels’ authors such that
they wrote in the genre of historical biographies. Given that these intelligent
authors would also have known that their readers were in a position to
verify and falsify some important details relevant to Jesus’ resurrection as
argued in the rest of this book (e.g. concerning the guard at the tomb, see
Chapter 6), they would not have made up those details.
Moreover, additional considerations favour the historical reliability of the
Gospels. For example, the fact that the Gospels use recent traditions and
that those which can be checked (especially Luke) are careful in their use
of sources indicates that the Gospels should be placed among the most,
rather than the least, reliable of ancient biographies (Keener 2003, p. 25;
for details, see Keener 2019). Additionally, while many of the examples of
historiographies and biographies discussed by Litwa were written at least
100 years after their subjects, the Gospels were written much closer to the
time of Christ, and biographies written within living memory of their subjects were expected to provide accurate information about their subjects
(Keener 2019). Furthermore, Allison observes that ancient Jewish readers
found their past in the so-called historical books of their Scriptures which
were understood as relating what really happened, and that there is evidence that the early readers of the Gospels understood them in that way as
well (Allison 2010, pp. 443–445). Habermas (2001b) notes that the historical nature of these texts stands in stark contrast with Dumuzi and Inanna,
Tammuz and Ishtar, and Isis and Osiris, who were not historical persons,
and that there are other great differences between these tales and the New
Testament.6 Given their ancient Jewish monotheistic context, the earliest
Christian leaders who insisted on worshipping only God the Creator would
have resisted the influence of these polytheistic legends where deification of
human figures is concerned (see Loke 2017a; contra Miller 2015, p. 129).
6 For example, with regards to the story of Osiris, Habermas (2001b, p. 79) notes, ‘Although
the story varies so widely that it is virtually impossible to put a single sequence together,
Isis rescues Osiris (her husband, brother, or son!) after he is cut up into fourteen pieces and
floated down the Nile River! She finds all of the pieces except one and resuscitates him by
any of several methods, including beating her wings over his body. In the ancient world, the
crux of the story is Osiris’ death and the mourning afterwards, not any resuscitation. Further, either Isis or Horus, their son, rather than Osiris, is the real hero. This myth is another
of the vegetation gods with a non-linear, non-historical pattern of thought. Moreover, Osiris
does not remain on earth after Isis performs her magic; he either descends to the underworld
or is called the sun. Even critical scholar Helmut Koester firmly states, “it is never said that
[Osiris] rose.” For reasons like these, it would be exceptionally difficult to substantiate any
charge of inspiring the New Testament teachings of Jesus’ death and resurrection.’
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Finally, the hypothesis of Fales and others does not account for the testimonies of those who claimed to have saw Jesus alive after his crucifixion
(Habermas 2001b), who were known to and could be checked by the readers of the earliest Christian writings, and who were willing to sacrifice for
the truth of what they saw (see Chapters 2 to 4 and Section 8.8 of this book;
contra Miller 2015, pp. 8, 15, 195–196).
In support of his claim that Christianity evinces similarities with pagan
religions, Carrier cites Justin’s (First Apology 21) statement,
When we say . . . Jesus Christ the firstborn of God, was produced without sexual union, and that he was crucified and died, and rose again,
and ascended to heaven, we propound nothing new or different from
what you believe regarding those whom you consider Sons of God.
Citing Justin, Miller (2015) claims that early Christians understood Jesus’
resurrection story as fictitious rather than historical in nature.
However, Justin’s statement (if understood the way Carrier and Miller
do) is questionable in light of the considerations mentioned earlier, and
it should be understood in light of his apologetic strategy which tries to
make Christian beliefs appear similar to pagans so as to justify his claim
that pagans should not persecute Christians (First Apology 24). Contrary
to Miller’s and Carrier’s understanding, it is arguable that in the rest of the
First Apology, Justin, being aware that ‘his argument hitherto could have
left his pagan readers with the impression that he is saying that there is no
difference between Christian doctrines and pagan myths’ (Minns and Parvis
2009, p. 139), proceeds to clarify by asserting the superiority of Christ in
contrast with the educative purpose of mythological writings (ibid., citing
22.4 and 54.1). In contrast with ‘the myths invented by the poets’ (54.1),
Justin pleads, ‘And it is not because we say the same things as these that we
ask to be accepted by you, but because we say what is true’ (First Apology
23.1b), insisting that ‘Jesus Christ alone has been born in a special manner
the Son of God’ (23.2a, emphasis mine). If Justin understood Jesus’ resurrection story as fictitious rather than historical in nature, he would not have
told the Jews the following, which presupposed that the Jews and earliest
Christians understood the claim of Jesus’ resurrection to be historical when
they disputed over whether Jesus’ body was stolen:
yet you not only have not repented, after you learned that He rose from
the dead, but, as I said before, you have sent chosen and ordained men
throughout all the world to proclaim that a godless and lawless heresy
had sprung from one Jesus, a Galilean deceiver, whom we crucified, but
his disciples stole him by night from the tomb, where he was laid when
unfastened from the cross, and now deceive men by asserting that he
has risen from the dead and ascended to heaven.
(Dialogue with Trypho, 108)
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1.3.4 Assessing the historicity of the New Testament
It has been noted earlier that the writers of the Gospels intended them as
ancient biographies. Nevertheless, the process of sifting through the Four
Gospels to determine which events attributed to Jesus can be traced back
to the Jesus of history faces various difficulties. To address these difficulties, historians have devised various criteria for determining authenticity,
such as the criterion of multiple attestation, the criterion of embarrassment, and the criterion of dissimilarity (Harvey 1982; Meier 1991–2016,
Vol. 1; Porter 2000). However, there are various limitations or fallacies
which beset these criteria and/or their applications (Keith and Le Donne
2012). For example, the criterion of dissimilarity, which claims that ‘we
may confidently assign a unit to Jesus if it is dissimilar to characteristic
emphases both of ancient Judaism and of the early church,’7 has been
widely regarded as fundamentally flawed in principle. As Harvey (1982)
argues in response to the prevalent scepticism following the second quest
for the historical Jesus, the culture in which Jesus lived must have imposed
certain ‘constraints’ on him, and he would have had to take into account
these constraints in order to communicate to his audience. Contrary to the
criterion of dissimilarity, it is far more plausible that an influential historical person should be in some ways indebted to his context (in the case of
Jesus, the first-century Jewish context) and that he should have impact on
his followers (the earliest Christians). Hence, other scholars have defended
the criterion of ‘double plausibility,’ that is, of context (Jesus and Second
Temple Judaism) and consequence (Jesus and early Christians) (Theissen
and Winter 2002).
Keith (2011) has proposed a ‘Jesus-memory approach’ as an alternative to
the aforementioned criteria approach but which likewise advocates a continuity between Jesus, his context, and his followers by using social memory theory. Citing French sociologist Halbwachs, Keith notes that the foundational
argument of social memory theory is that ‘memory is not a simple act of
recall, but rather a complex process whereby the past is reconstructed in light
of the needs of the present’ (p. 168). Keith holds to a continuity perspective of
this theory, emphasizing that ‘it is memory’s inherently social nature that enables it to preserve the past to an extent by transcending individual existence’
(p. 169). He concludes that ‘the overall implications of the Jesus-memory
approach are significant—they challenge nothing less than the distinction
between the historical Jesus and the Christ of faith’ (p. 177; see further, later).
Ehrman objects that the problems with Paul’s letters are that he did not
know Jesus personally and did not tell us very much about Jesus’ teachings
and activities, while the problems with the Gospels are that they were not
written by eyewitnesses but by highly educated Greeks in contrast with the

7 Quoted from Allison (2011, p. 3), who raises several objections against this criteria.
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earliest disciples who were uneducated and spoke Aramaic. Ehrman thus
claims that, as stories about Jesus spread, details were changed, episodes
were invented, and events were exaggerated (Ehrman 2014, chapter 3).
Contrary to Ehrman, I have argued in Loke (2017a) that what Paul’s letters
tell us is already sufficient for us to infer that highest Christology originated
from Jesus himself, and I shall argue in the next few chapters that Paul’s letters contain significant evidence for Jesus’ resurrection as well. Others have
argued that Jesus and the earliest disciples probably spoke Greek alongside
Aramaic (Porter 2011), that the primitive Christian community in Jerusalem
had Aramaic and Greek speakers who lived alongside one another from
the earliest days (Hengel 1990, pp. 9–18), that the Gospels have their basis
in eyewitnesses’ testimonies, and that the details are significantly preserved
(Bauckham 2006; see discussion in Chapter 7). Scholars such as Daniel
Wallace, Darrell Bock, Ben Witherington, Michael Kruger, and others have
replied specifically to Ehrman’s arguments and attempted a comprehensive
defence of the historical reliability of the New Testament.8 For the historical
argument for Jesus’ resurrection such a comprehensive defence is unnecessary, for as Pannenberg and others have argued, all that needs to be shown
is that the earliest Christian documents contain evidence of the conviction
of the earliest Christians concerning the resurrection of Jesus, and that
the origination of this conviction is best explained by Jesus’ resurrection.
Indeed, it is noteworthy that, despite disagreements about various aspects of
the New Testament, there is widespread consensus among historical-critical
scholars of various worldviews (including atheist and Judaist scholars) that
(1) Jesus died due to Roman crucifixion, (2) very soon afterwards, a number
of people had experiences that they believed were appearances of the risen
Jesus, and (3) the body of Jesus was missing (Habermas 2005, 2013). It will
be argued in the rest of this book that the best explanation for these facts is
that Jesus resurrected.
1.3.5 Introducing some important concepts for subsequent
discussion: earliest Christians, resurrection, natural,
supernatural
In this book, I shall use the term ‘earliest Christians’ to label those who claimed
to follow Jesus during the period from c. AD 30 (shortly after the crucifixion
of Jesus) to 62, when Philippians, the last of the earliest datable Christian
documents viz. the seven undisputed Pauline epistles, is widely regarded by

8 See, for example, www.ehrmanproject.com/. The historical reliability of the Gospels has
also been questioned by scholars of the so-called Jesus Seminar (Funk, Hoover and the Jesus
Seminar 1997; Funk and the Jesus Seminar 1998). However, their arguments and methodology have themselves been severely criticized (Chilton and Evans 1999a, 1999b).
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scholars to have been written.9 I have argued elsewhere (Loke 2017a) that the
Pauline epistles reflect the widespread Christological conviction among Christians from AD 30 to 62 and that they regarded Jesus as ‘truly divine,’ that is,
on the Creator side of the Creator–creature divide and of equal ontological
status as God the Father. Given the proximity of this period to the historical
figure of Jesus, a number of these earliest Christians would have known him
personally. In this book, ‘earliest Christian leaders’ refer to the Apostles, such
as members of ‘The Twelve’10 and Paul, as well as their co-workers such as
Silas and Timothy (for a discussion of the historical evidence of Jesus’ earliest
followers and their competitors [the Pharisees, the Sadducees, the Essenes, the
Samaritans, and others], see Meier 1991–2016, Vol. 3).
Some scholars have claimed that Christianity was wildly diverse at the
beginning of its history and that we should speak of ‘earliest Christianities’ rather than ‘earliest Christianity.’ They have argued, ‘throughout the
first century, and from the earliest evidence we have in Q, Thomas, and
Paul, there were many different groups that claimed Jesus as their founder’
(Cameron and Miller 2004, p. 20). Yet it is evident from the quotation that
even these scholars would acknowledge this common element among the
supposedly existent diverse groups: despite their differences they all claim
to follow Jesus (I address the arguments of these scholars in Chapter 3). By
using the term ‘Christians’ broadly to refer to ‘those who claimed to follow
Jesus’ rather than as ‘those who followed certain doctrines about Jesus,’
I avoid begging the question in my historical argument by not assuming that
Christians were those who believed that Jesus was bodily resurrected and
that this was the ‘orthodox’ view. I shall define ‘earliest Christianity’ as the
religion of those who claimed to follow Jesus during the period from c. AD
30 to 62; this definition leaves open the question concerning the extent of
diversity within this religion. In Chapter 3, I shall show, based on evidence
rather than definition, that there was widespread acknowledgement in earliest Christianity that Jesus was bodily resurrected.
There is widespread agreement among contemporary historical-critical
scholars that a number of people had experiences which they believed were
appearances of the resurrected Jesus shortly after his crucifixion and which
motivated their proclamation of the Christian gospel (Habermas 2006a,
p. 79). This conclusion has been reinforced in recent years by the arguments in N.T. Wright’s landmark book The Resurrection of the Son of
God (2003). In over 800 pages, Wright argues that the empty tomb and
the resurrection appearances ‘took place as real events . . . they are, in the

9 For the authenticity of these seven letters, see Dunn (2003); a number of scholars have
argued for the authenticity of other letters; see, for example, Carson and Moo (2005).
10 ‘The Twelve’ (ὁ δώδεκα) is a title referring to those who were selected by Jesus to be apostles from the beginning, rather than referring to the number of disciples (after the death of
Judas only 11 of these apostles remained); see Fee (1987, p. 729). In any case, the absence
of Judas Iscariot after the crucifixion is not relevant to the argument I will be making.
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normal sense required by historians, provable events; historians can and
should write about them’ (Wright 2003, p. 709). It is the ‘negative burden’
(p. 7) of Wright’s book to challenge the view of other scholars who have
interpreted the resurrection of Jesus as a non-bodily resurrection (see e.g.
Schillebeeckx 1979, pp. 320–397; who claims that the ‘resurrection’ is the
Christian community’s way of expressing its experience of God’s grace and
faith-filled conversion to Jesus). Wright provides an abundance of evidence
in his attempt to show that the term anastasis and its cognates (e.g. exanastasis) and related words almost always referred to bodily resurrection in
the ancient Mediterranean world among both pagans and Jews. (Anastasis
means ‘standing up’; this refers to the dead body which was normally buried
in a supine position [Gundry 2000, p. 118]. On this point, see also Wright’s
interaction with Crossan in Stewart 2006; Madigan and Levenson 2008;
Licona 2010, pp. 400–437, 543–546.) Wright notes the exception found
in the position ascribed to Hymenaeus and Philetus in 2 Timothy 2:17–18:
‘among them are Hymenaeus and Philetus, who have departed from the
truth. They say that the resurrection (anastasis) has already taken place, and
they destroy the faith of some.’ Wright states that this exception possibly
anticipated later Gnostic rethinking and the late second-century Letter to
Rheginos. Wright argues that this exception ‘used the language of resurrection to denote something to which that word-group had never before
referred’ (Wright 2003, pp. 267–270, 681). Wright (2008, p. 42) concludes,
‘that was a misunderstanding likely to occur, of the whole question, but it
doesn’t alter the overwhelming impression of unanimity.’
Wright’s analysis of ancient beliefs about life after death in both the
Greco-Roman and Jewish worlds has been criticized for ignoring counterexamples (Bryan 2011; Lehtipuu 2015). Nevertheless, in an important recent
study published in the journal New Testament Studies, James Ware (2014)
argues that the meaning of the earliest Christian formula’s (preserved in 1
Cor. 15:3–5) central affirmation that Jesus ‘has been raised (egeirō)’ (1 Cor.
15:4) provides decisive confirmation that the earliest Christians believed
and proclaimed that Jesus was bodily resurrected. In a similar vein, Cook
(2017) argues that, on the basis of the semantics of anistémi and egeirō and
the nature of resurrected bodies in ancient Judaism and ancient paganism,
one can conclude that Paul could not have conceived of a resurrection of
Jesus unless he believed the tomb was empty. ‘Consequently, according to
the normal conventions of communication, he did not need to mention the
tomb tradition’ (p. 75; contra Chilton 2019, p. 71, who neglects this point
when he claims that ‘in Paul, there can be no story of an “empty tomb,”
because there is not a reference to a tomb in the first place’). Cook notes,
this is not to deny that there was a spiritual or metaphorical usage of
resurrection words in the New Testament and early Christianity (Col.
2:12; 3:1; Eph. 2:5–6). The metaphorical uses in the deutero-Paulines,
however, are based on the image of the resurrection of Christ.
(ibid.)
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The reference to the spiritually dead (but physically alive) people in Ephesians 2:5 does not take away from Ware’s (2014, p. 494) point that, when
used with reference to the physically dead (as in Jesus’ case in 1 Cor. 15:3–5),
the term egeirō (‘raise’) refers unambiguously to the reanimation or revivification of the corpse. (This conclusion refutes the two body view of Carrier
[2005a] and others; see further, Chapter 6.)
It might be objected that the portrayal of Herod and some of his contemporaries being mistaken that Jesus was the resurrected John the Baptist
in Mark 6:14–29 could not have been referring to a revivification of the
corpse, since Jesus and John the Baptist are contemporaries. In reply, there is
no difficulty in thinking that the portrayal of those who said that Jesus was
John the Baptist raised (egeirō) from the dead (Mark 6:14) and Herod who
thought the same (v. 16) intended to convey a literal bodily resurrection,
since they might not have known that Jesus was a contemporary of John
(Lane 1974). There is no indication that these people had met Jesus before
or that they had thoroughly researched Jesus’ background; all that is stated
is that they had heard that there was a person known as Jesus who had
done some remarkable things (v. 14). Moreover, the context of that passage
says that John’s body was taken away by John’s disciples after his execution
instead of being retained by Herod (v. 29), and the body was said to have
been laid in a tomb (v. 29) without any indication that Herod knew where
it was. Thus it is reasonable to think that Herod, who executed John (v.
27) and ‘disturbed by an uneasy conscience disposed to superstition, feared
that John had come back to haunt him’ (Lane 1974) and thought that the
resurrected John was now known as Jesus and possessed miraculous powers. Thus, Mark 6:14–29 does not constitute a counterexample to Ware’s
conclusion.
In this book, the term ‘resurrection’ (and ‘bodily resurrection’) refers
to the understanding established in Ware’s article (‘revivification of the
corpse’) unless otherwise stated. It should be noted that such a revivification of the corpse does not exclude the possibility of the revivified corpse
retaining certain properties it had previously while acquiring certain new
properties. Thus, it is not a contradiction to think that the resurrected body
could have certain physical properties, such as being able to eat fish, while
also possessing certain transphysical properties (to use Wright’s terminology), such as being able to come and go through locked doors, as portrayed
by the Gospels and indicated by Paul’s use of the term ‘spiritual body’ in
1 Corinthians 15 (see the discussion on ‘better resurrection’ in Chapter 2,
‘solid evidence’ in Chapter 4, and ‘transphysicality’ in Chapter 5). A contradiction is defined as ‘A and not-A at the same time.’ ‘Going through locked
doors’ is not equivalent to ‘not being able to eat fish.’ Thus ‘going through
locked doors’ is not contradictory to ‘being able to eat fish.’ Likewise,
choosing to conceal oneself for a duration of time before revealing oneself
in another duration (see Chapter 5) is not a contradiction, since these events
took place at different times. This contradicts Chilton (2019, p. 69), who
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mistakenly thought that these depictions are contradictions, which led him
to unwarrantedly conclude that the early Christians’ differing conceptions
of the ways God governs the world produced different understandings of
the Easter event.
Chilton (2019, pp. 70–71) claims that those scholars who affirm Jesus
as raised in the ‘same’ flesh with which he died and regard Jesus’ resurrection as physical (citing N.T. Wright) ‘is unequivocally denied by Paul
himself in his discussion in 1 Corinthians.’ In reply, the word ‘same’ is
ambiguous; it can mean (1) numerically identical over time or (2) having identical properties. For example, saying that ‘Bruce Chilton is the
same person who wrote Resurrection Logic a year ago’ does not imply
that he possessed the same properties a year ago; on the contrary, he has
grown older and changed in other ways. Likewise, Paul’s analogy of the
sowing of seed (1 Cor. 15:36–37) for the resurrection indicates numerical identity over time: although the seed and the plant are qualitatively
different, they are numerically the same in the sense that there is continuity between them: the dormant plant that goes into the soil grows by
incremental measurable and observable steps into the plant (Davis 2006,
p. 57; Ware 2014, p. 486; this point is neglected by Welker 2007). The
distinctness which is emphasized in 1 Corinthians 15: 44–54 concerns the
different properties of the two stages of the one continuous thing and does
not imply their discontinuity (see further the reply to the ‘two body view’
and discussion of ‘flesh and blood’ in Chapter 6). Thus, those scholars
who affirm Jesus as raised in the ‘same’ flesh and regard Jesus’ resurrection as physical does not contradict Paul if what they are affirming is that
the resurrected body is in some ways continuous (numerically identical)
with the pre-resurrected physical body which takes on new (transphysical)
properties after resurrection rather than merely ‘comes back to his former
life’ (Chilton 2019, p. 225, n. 15).
Against the element of physicality of Jesus’ resurrection, one might object
by citing the portrayal of Jesus’ resurrection appearance to Saul in Acts
(9:1–9, 22:6–11, and 26:12–18) which indicates that only Saul saw Jesus
and heard distinct words while his companions did not. ‘The lack of an
intersubjective sharing of this experience, however, should warn us against
too straightforward and too simple attempts to testify to the objectivity of
the resurrection’ (Welker 2007, p. 462).
In reply, there is no indication in the text that Jesus was said to have
appeared to Saul’s companions. They only saw the light surrounding Jesus’
appearance to Saul and fell to the ground, which indicates the objectivity of
this appearance, but they were not said to have seen Jesus’ appearance itself.
If my three daughters were standing in front of me, I covered one of them
with a cloak, and all of them saw the cloak surrounding her but only she
saw that there was a luminous object on the inner side of the cloak while the
other two daughters did not see this, this does not deny that the luminous
object which she saw was physical.
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The notion of spiritual body explained earlier answers Carnley’s (1987,
p. 71) question of ‘what exactly it was that the primitive Christians were
trying to describe.’ Chilton (2019, p. 69) objects that any claim of normativity of Paul’s view of Jesus’ resurrection for the earliest Christians
would be misleading given that Paul’s disagreements with other authoritative teachers were notorious. In reply, it will be shown in Chapter 3
that it is Paul’s affirmation of the agreement between him and other
authoritative teachers concerning the Gospel, in a letter to those who
knew these other teachers and also knew of their disagreements on some
matters other than the Gospel, which provides such a powerful indication that they shared the same view concerning Jesus’ resurrection which
is fundamental to the Gospel. Carnley (2019, pp. 212–213) objects that
if Jesus’ resurrection is understood as a bodily resurrection and historical
event, it would be difficult to determine how the empirical experience of
his resurrection might differ from the experience of a mere resuscitation,
and it would call into question the actual death of Jesus. In reply, the
empirical experience of transphysicality explained in Chapter 5 indicates
that it was not the experience of a mere resuscitation, while the evidence
concerning the crucifixion indicates that Jesus could not have survived it
naturalistically.
In his writings, Wright has lodged a complaint against the use of the
words ‘natural,’ ‘supernatural,’ and ‘miracle.’ He writes, ‘The very word
“miracle” itself, and for that matter the words “natural” and “supernatural,” are in fact symptomatic of a very different range of possible worldviews from those which were open to Galilean villagers in the first century’
(Wright 1996, pp. 187–188).
It is true that the meanings of the words ‘natural’ and ‘supernatural’
have changed over time. Nevertheless, Collins (2018, section 10.A.2)
notes that even though these terms were not used by the biblical authors,
they did have ideas about causation and the causal properties of created
things, and the idea that God can add something new to the processes
he has made, such that, with such an infusion, the result goes beyond
what the causal properties of the created things would have produced.
For example, they were aware that virgins normally would not conceive
(Luke 1:34), but they believed that God can cause that to happen (Luke
1:35–37). Collins adds,
No one worth interacting with ever thought that God was normally
absent and that he intervened in a haphazard or arbitrary fashion. Further, the notion of ‘natural’ and ‘supernatural’ is a legitimate abstraction from the biblical materials and gives us a good sense of what a
sensible Galilean villager—such as Joseph, the fiancé of Mary—would
have understood.
(ibid.; see further the discussion on the problem
of miracles in Chapter 8 of this book)
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1.3.6 Introducing the difficulties that beset the
contemporary debate
Wright also argues for the resurrection being the most probable explanation
for the facts of the empty tomb and post-mortem appearances. Nevertheless,
many sceptics remain unpersuaded by Wright’s inadequate handling of the
naturalistic hypotheses. These sceptics claim to be able to think of many naturalistic alternatives to the resurrection, and it seems impossible to them that
one can ensure that all these alternatives had been considered and excluded
before arriving at the conclusion for the resurrection. As Dale Allison remarks,
Wright’s attempt . . . to dismiss naturalistic hypotheses is too brief for
my tastes, although more pages would still fall short; one just cannot
decisively eliminate all the unorthodox alternatives.
(Allison 2005a, p. 347, n. 583. Among the ‘unorthodox
alternatives’ he suggests are that Jesus’ body was stolen
and that the disciples experienced hallucinations.)
Similar arguments have also been made in debates on the resurrection of
Jesus. For example, in his exchange with Craig, Ehrman claims that he can
‘dream up’ 20 naturalistic alternatives concerning the empty tomb (Craig
and Ehrman 2006, p. 13). Habermas notes that there is a resurgence of interest in naturalistic hypotheses in recent years, observing that ‘the last couple of decades have produced more than forty suggestions favouring about
a dozen different alternative scenarios to account for the New Testament
report that Jesus was raised from the dead’ (Habermas 2001a, pp. 179–196).
Other historians claim that the resurrection ‘is not a matter which historians can authenticate’ (MacCulloch 2010, p. 93) and insist that it must be
approached as an article of faith concerning the mystery of God (Carnley
2019). Now Ehrman notes,
historians, of course, have no difficulty whatsoever speaking about the
belief in Jesus’ resurrection, since this is a matter of public record. For it
is a historical fact that some of Jesus’ followers came to believe that he
had been raised from the dead soon after his execution.
(Ehrman 1999, p. 231)
However, the disciples’ belief in Jesus’ resurrection is one issue, whether it
happened is another, and what explains it (if it did happen) is yet another. The
resurrection is supposed to involve supernatural causation if it did happen,
but a study of causation of the supernatural or spiritual realm is regarded
by many historians to belong to the discipline of theology rather than history (Webb 2011, pp. 78–79). Many historians would hold to a form of
‘methodological naturalism,’ which understands history ‘as description and
explanation of cause and effect of human events within the natural sphere
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alone, without making ontological claims beyond the natural sphere’ (Webb
2011, p. 79). The difficulty concerns whether it is in principle possible for
historians to reason from certain historical facts to Jesus’ resurrection.
Additionally, the issue of bias highlighted by Martin Kähler at the end of
the nineteenth century presents a challenge, which is emphasized by contemporary postmodernist thinkers. Kähler argues that, unlike other figures of
the past, Jesus has in every age exerted too powerful an influence on all sorts
of people and still makes too strong a claim on everyone. Thus, we cannot
have an unbiased historical record of him or an unbiased historian assessing
the record, and therefore the historical-critical project is completely undermined (Kähler 1892/1964, pp. 92–95).
In summary, the contemporary debate concerning the origination of belief
in Jesus’ resurrection is hamstrung by difficulties related to (1) the elimination of all the ‘unorthodox alternatives’ (Allison’s phrase), (2) whether it is
in principle possible for historians to reason from certain historical facts to
Jesus’ resurrection, and (3) the issue of bias.

1.4 The approach of this book
1.4.1 Concerning the elimination of alternatives
In this book, I shall use a transdisciplinary approach which addresses the
aforementioned difficulties.
With regards to the difficulty of eliminating all the ‘unorthodox alternatives,’ I shall demonstrate that all the possible naturalistic alternatives can
be essentially reduced to a few known ones, such that all of them are considered before the conclusion for the resurrection is made. Such a reduction
would be a useful first step towards eliminating all the ‘unorthodox alternatives,’ and it would add clarity to the discussion. By analyzing the structure
of the dialectic concerning the post-mortem appearances syllogistically, it
will be shown that all the possible naturalistic alternatives to Jesus’ resurrection concerning the claims of Jesus’ post-mortem appearances can be essentially reduced to a few known ones, as follows. (Note that hypotheses such
as the women went to the wrong tomb while the body of Jesus remained
buried elsewhere, tomb robbery of the body, and so on are alternatives concerning the empty tomb [see (7) to (9.2.2.2) in the following text], not the
post-mortem appearances. Hypotheses such as Jesus was raised from the
dead by aliens or angels are alternatives to God as the cause for Jesus’ resurrection [see Chapter 8], not alternatives to Jesus’ resurrection per se):
(1) Either (1.1) or (1.2) is true:11
(1.1) There were no people in mid-first-century (AD 30–70) Palestine
who claimed to have witnessed the resurrected Jesus (the New

11 Note that ‘or’ is taken in the exclusive sense in this syllogism as well as the next.
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(2.2)
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Testament accounts of such people are all legends: call this the
legend hypothesis).
There were people in mid-first-century Palestine who claimed to
have witnessed the resurrected Jesus, in which case either (2.1) or
(2.2) is true:
All of them did not experience anything which they thought was
the resurrected Jesus (no experience hypothesis).
At least some (if not all) of them did experience something which
they thought was the resurrected Jesus, in which case either (3.1)
or (3.2) is true:
All of these ‘experiences of Jesus’ were caused intramentally in
the absence of appropriate12 sensory stimulus (call this the intramental hypothesis; examples include hallucinations, ‘subjective
vision,’ ‘stimulus,’ ‘religious intoxication,’ ‘enthusiasm,’ and
‘illumination’).
At least some (if not all) of these ‘experiences of Jesus’ were caused
by an extramental entity, in which case either (4.1) or (4.2) is true:
For all these experiences, the extramental entity was not Jesus (for
example, they mistook another person for Jesus: mistaken identity
hypothesis).
For at least some (if not all) of these experiences, the extramental
entity was Jesus, in which case either (5.1) or (5.2) is true:
Jesus did not die on the cross (swoon/escape hypothesis: that is,
either Jesus swooned on the cross, exited the tomb and showed
himself to the disciples later [‘swoon’], or Jesus had secretly
escaped prior to the crucifixion, somebody else was crucified, and
Jesus showed himself to the disciples later [‘escape’]).
Jesus died on the cross (i.e. the extramental entity they experienced was Jesus who rose from the dead), in which case

(6) Jesus rose from the dead (resurrection).
The syllogism covers all the possibilities exhaustively. Although each of
the hypotheses noted in the syllogism has been discussed by others in the
literature, a logically exhaustive reduction of all possible hypotheses has
not been accomplished by any author before, hence my unique contribution
to the discussion. Such a reduction is significant in at least the following
respects.
First, while a significant number of scholars would agree that something was experienced by the disciples soon after Jesus’ crucifixion,
many would affirm with E.P. Sanders that ‘what the reality was that

12 ‘Absence of appropriate’ means absence of what was taken by the perceiver to be an extramental entity. For example, the perceiver thought that they saw or touched an extramental
entity, but there wasn’t any.
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gave rise to the experiences I do not know’ (Sanders 1993, p. 280). One
of the main reasons for this agnosticism is that many explanations seem
possible for these experiences. Based on the aforementioned syllogism,
however, we can know that essentially there are seven and only seven
possible categories of explanations concerning the claims of Jesus’ postmortem appearances, viz. legends, no experience, intramental, mistaken
identity, swoon, escape, and resurrection. It should be emphasized that
there are essentially no other possibilities apart from the ones listed
earlier(although various combinations of these possibilities are possible;
these combinations are considered in Chapter 7). The list is therefore an
important starting point towards answering the question, ‘What gave
rise to the experiences?’
Second, the list helps to ensure that all possible categories of hypotheses
as well as their combinations are considered before the conclusion concerning whether the resurrection is the best explanation is reached.
Third, by reducing the myriad of alternative theories that have been (in
Ehrman’s phrase) ‘dreamed up’ (or yet undreamed of) to essentially six, it
will be demonstrated in the following chapters that, once certain considerations are established, all the alternatives and their combinations can reasonably be excluded.13
All the possible naturalistic alternatives concerning the empty tomb
can likewise be reduced to a few known ones, as shown by the following
syllogism:
(7) Either (7.1), (7.2), or (7.3) is true:
(7.1) Jesus was not crucified (escape hypothesis).
(7.2) Jesus was crucified and he was not buried (unburied hypothesis).
(7.3) Jesus was crucified and he was buried, in which case either (8.1)
or (8.2) is true.
(8.1) The body of Jesus remained buried (remain buried hypothesis).
(8.2) The body of Jesus did not remain buried, in which case either
(9.1) or (9.2) is true:
(9.1) The body was removed by non-agent(s), e.g. earthquakes (Allison
2005a, p. 204), animals, etc. (removal by non-agent hypothesis)
(9.2) The body was removed by agent(s), in which case either (9.2.1) or
(9.2.2) is true:

13 I have previously explained in Loke (2009) that all the alternative naturalistic explanations
can be shown to fail once certain evidentially significant details in the Gospels (e.g. in Luke
24:36–43) are established. I now think that all the alternative naturalistic explanations can
be shown to fail even without having to establish those evidentially significant details (even
though I think a good case can still be made concerning Luke 24:36–43; see Chapter 4).
For details, see the following chapters.
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(9.2.1) Others removed the body, either
(9.2.1.1) Friends of Jesus (removal by friends hypothesis),
(9.2.1.2) Enemies of Jesus (removal by enemies hypothesis), or
(9.2.1.3) Neither friends nor enemies, e.g. tomb robbers
(removal by neutral party hypothesis).
(9.2.2) 
Jesus himself removed his body, in which case either
(9.2.2.1) or (9.2.2.2) is true:
(9.2.2.1) Jesus did not die on the cross: he swooned on
the cross and exited the tomb later (swoon
hypothesis), or
(9.2.2.2) Jesus died on the cross, rose from the dead, and
exited the tomb (resurrection).
This syllogism exhaustively covers all the possibilities. The significance of
such a logically exhaustive list of hypotheses is similar to that for the postmortem appearances.
First, based on the list we can know that essentially there are nine and
only nine possible categories of hypotheses concerning the empty tomb,
viz. escape, unburied, remain buried, removal by non-agent, removal
by friends, removal by enemies, removal by neutral party, swoon, and
resurrection.
Second, the list helps to ensure that all possible categories of hypotheses
as well as their combinations are considered before the conclusion concerning whether the resurrection is the best explanation reached.
Third, by reducing the myriad of alternative theories to essentially eight,
it will be demonstrated in the following chapters that, once certain considerations are established, all the alternatives as well as their combinations
can reasonably be excluded.
1.4.2 Concerning whether it is in principle possible for historians
to reason from certain historical facts to Jesus’ resurrection
Moving on to the next difficulty concerning whether it is in principle possible for historians to reason from certain historical facts to Jesus’ resurrection, one can ask the following question: Why cannot a historian—in
principle—argue that there are reasons and evidence for thinking that (I),
(II), (III), and (IV) are true:
(I)

There were people who claimed to have seen the resurrected Jesus
shortly after his crucifixion,
(II) they had some kind of experiences,
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(III) what they experienced was not caused intramentally but extramentally,
(IV) the extramental entity was not another person but the same Jesus who
died on the cross.
What follows logically from (I), (II), (III), and (IV) is
(V) Therefore, Jesus resurrected.
Hurtado thinks that historians cannot ‘prove’ that the resurrection of
Jesus occurred because history is based on analogies, and there is nothing
analogous to the resurrection14 (cf. the principle of analogy in Troeltsch
1898/1991). With regards to the case for or against the historicity of Jesus’
resurrection, Novakovic (2016, p. 128) thinks that the main difficulty is
caused ‘by the lack of agreement of what is the task of historical research
and to what extent can someone’s faith convictions influence her evaluation
of the available evidence.’ She explains,
for some, the term ‘historical’ means that an event took place in time
and space regardless of whether it is caused by natural or divine activity, while for others the term ‘historical’ is applicable only to the events
whose occurrence can be demonstrated with historical arguments based
on empirical evidence that are independent of someone’s religious
beliefs.
(ibid.)
Dale Martin (2017) argues that, while historians can reasonably affirm that
‘Paul and some other disciples of Jesus sincerely believed they saw him
sometime, somewhere after his death,’ historians cannot reasonably conclude anything about what these first Christians saw (p. 212), only that they
‘experienced a vision, or saw a figure from a distance they took to be Jesus,
or saw a play of light they later decided was the body of Jesus’ (ibid.).
However, with respect to (I), (II), (III), and (IV), historians do regularly
assess whether people made certain claims in history, whether people witnessed someone rather than saw a hallucination or mistook something else
for another person, and whether people died, and analogies to these can be
found. These are naturalistic explanations, and since it is uncontroversial
that such naturalistic explanations are suitable for historical investigation,
historians who are concerned about the historical origins of Christianity can

14 www.youtube.com/watch?v=RKS1WVdGURs&list=WL&index=25&t=635s. Hurtado also
raises a theological objection by saying that according to Acts 10:41 God only chose to let
the risen Jesus appear to some people but not all, and thus God does not intend to provide
a ‘proof.’ Hurtado fails to note that in Acts 1:3 and 17:31 ‘proof’ is mentioned with reference to Jesus’ resurrection. The lack of more evidence (e.g. appearing to all) does not mean
the lack of any evidence (e.g. appearing to some). Concerning the question of why the God
of the Bible does not provide more evidence, see the quotes by Moreland and O’Collins in
Section 1.2.
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and should assess them. In the following chapters, it will be shown that (I),
(II), (III), and (IV) can indeed be demonstrated with historical arguments
based on empirical evidence that are independent of someone’s faith convictions and religious beliefs.
Some historians might reply that the problem is that the supernatural is
supposedly involved in the resurrection.
However, the need to consider supernatural causation is not even present
up to the point of establishing (I), (II), (III), and (IV). Rather the need arises
only after conclusion (V), ‘Therefore, Jesus resurrected,’ is reached. It is only
then that we need to reflect on whether ‘Jesus resurrected’ has a natural or
supernatural cause (this is discussed in Chapter 8). There is no logical necessity that Jesus’ resurrection must be caused supernaturally. Against Ehrman’s
view that Jesus’ resurrection would have been impossible apart from the
miraculous action of a divine agent,15 Licona suggests the alternative logical
possibility of an ‘alien in a parallel universe whose doctoral project was to
deceive humans into believing he is divine’ (Licona 2014, p. 124)—this illustrates the point about lack of logical necessity mentioned earlier (concerning
the alien hypothesis, etc., see Chapter 8). Licona observes that ‘historians can
offer a positive verdict pertaining to the historicity of an event while leaving
its cause undetermined. This is a common practice of historians outside of the
guild of biblical scholars’ (Licona 2014, p. 122). For example,
Plutarch noted that, although the corpse of Scipio Africanus laid dead
for all to see, there were three competing hypotheses pertaining to the
cause of his death: He died of natural causes, he intentionally drank
poison and committed suicide, he was smothered by thugs while he
slept well.
(Licona 2014, p. 122)
Braaten (1999) writes, ‘the resurrection is to be considered an historical
event because it is the subject of reports that locate it in time and space.
It happened in Jerusalem a short time after Jesus was crucified’ (p. 155).
Establishing the cause of this event (if it happened) is distinct from establishing the event itself.
Therefore, there is no logical necessity that bars historians from reasoning from certain historical facts to Jesus’ resurrection—which they can in
principle do by arguing that there are reasons and evidence for thinking that
(I), (II), (III), and (IV) are true, as explained previously. On the other hand,
if a historian were to exclude a priori the possibility that Jesus’ resurrection
occurred, it would be to import unwarranted philosophical assumptions into
his/her judgment (see Chapter 8). Concerning the historical question whether

15 See the April 2009 debate between Bart Ehrman and Michael Licona at http://vimeo.
com/35235544.

30

Introduction

Jesus was observed dead and was observed alive—an empirical question!—a
historian should make his/her judgment based on historical considerations—
such as those which I will be defending in subsequent c hapters—rather than
assuming beforehand on the basis of unwarranted philosophical or theological assumptions whether Jesus’ resurrection is or is not possible and then
make his/her judgment on the basis of such assumptions.
Can a historian infer a supernatural cause for an event? With regards to
the assumption of methodological naturalism for the practice of history,
Licona notes, ‘the term “history” is itself an essentially contested concept;
that is, there is no widely accepted definition for the term’ (Licona 2014,
p. 119). Nevertheless, it is helpful to clarify that historical inquiry ‘concerns events in the past involving humans as agents’ (Webb 2010, p. 16),
the involvement of humans as agents distinguishes the discipline of history
from other disciplines which study the past (e.g. cosmology, which studies
the formation of galaxies).
Licona (2014) raises a number of objections to the assumption of methodological naturalism for the practice of history, viz.
1
2
3
4

Historians need not adopt a definition of history based on the least common denominator of beliefs among historians.
Methodological naturalism may handicap historians, preventing them in
some cases from providing a fuller and more accurate account of the past.
The boundaries between disciplines are somewhat artificial.
It is questionable whether methodological naturalism would have the
pragmatic benefit that its proponents desire.

With regards to 1, 3, and 4, issues concerning ‘the least common denominator of beliefs,’ ‘boundaries between disciplines,’ and ‘pragmatic benefit’
are of secondary importance. The more important issue is the quality of
justification offered for the beliefs, boundaries, and benefits in question, in
particular whether these assist or hinder the task of the historian in their
inquiry of the past. In this regard I consider objection 2 to be the most
important. Here Licona cites molecular biologist Michael Behe’s challenge
in the form of the following illustration:
Imagine a room in which a body lies crushed, flat as a pancake. A dozen
detectives crawl around, examining the floor with magnifying glasses
for any clues to the identity of the perpetrator. In the middle of the
room, next to the body, stands a large, grey elephant. The detectives
carefully avoid bumping into the pachyderm’s legs as they crawl, and
never even glance at it. Over time the detectives get frustrated with their
lack of progress but resolutely press on, looking even more closely at
the floor. You see, textbooks say detectives must ‘get their man,’ so they
never consider elephants.
(Behe 1996, p. 192)
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Licona also provides a thought experiment of ‘a number of spacecraft
suddenly land on Earth occupied with intelligent alien beings who are able
to communicate with us’ and argues that the study of human history can
include an engagement with the interaction with these beings even though
they are non-humans. Historians should not a priori exclude the possibility
of God interacting with humans.
In response, Behe’s illustration effectively shows how methodological
restriction can hinder one from finding out what happened in the past, and
Licona’s thought experiment is helpful for illustrating that history involves
humans but should be open to the possibility of interaction with non-human
persons. However, it might be objected that these examples do not really
address the reasons why many historians would opt for methodological naturalism and avoid the conclusion of a divine cause. Some of these reasons
are as follows: the difficulty of examining divine causation, the worry that
the acceptance of a divine cause for a past event would hinder inquiry, and
the worry about God-of-the-gaps explanation. I consider the first reason
to be compelling and I shall discuss it here; the other two reasons will be
discussed in Chapter 8.
Concerning the first reason and the illustrations by Behe and Licona, some
historians might object that elephants or aliens are amenable to empirical
confirmation, whereas an invisible God is not. Licona anticipated this objection and argued that, just as scientists regularly posit unobserved theoretical
entities (e.g. black holes, quarks, strings, and gluons) to explain observable
phenomena, historians can do the same. He also noted that, in any case,
ancient human agents, such as Pontius Pilate and Herod Agrippa, are
no more observable to modern historians than are ancient divine agents,
such as the three persons who appeared to Abraham and the angels who
appeared to the women at the empty tomb of Jesus. Since we have no
direct access to the past, all ancient history is known to varying degrees
through inference.
Elsewhere Licona (2010, p. 103) writes,
Although a historian does not have direct access to the past, a scientist
does not have direct access to the experiments she performed last year
in the lab but can only refer to her notes . . . physicists posit numerous
entities to which they have no direct access, such as quarks and strings.
Zammito comments that ‘an electron is no more immediately accessible
to perception than the Spanish Inquisition. Each must be inferred from
actual evidence. Yet neither is utterly indeterminable.’
Licona makes very good points. Nevertheless, there remains an important
difference between positing an unobserved physical entity and an unobserved supernatural entity. The difference is that one cannot examine all
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the appropriate intermediate causal processes linking (say) a divine cause
to the effects in the same way one examines physical mechanisms (Grünbaum 1991), since the former involves a nonphysical entity and is not a
natural law which can be tested, discovered, or controlled in the laboratory.
Furthermore, being a personal and free agent, God cannot be expected to
behave in ways similar to physical entities or natural laws. Additionally,
God is, according to the understanding of many monotheistic traditions, a
beginningless and timeless First Cause of the universe, and scientific observations cannot confirm or exclude an entity that is beginningless and timeless, since scientific observations are limited to the observation of processes
that occur in time. Therefore, science cannot confirm or exclude the existence of God in this sense. However, it can be argued that science can provide
the evidence which can be utilized by the premises of deductive and inductive philosophical arguments for the existence of God (for examples, see
Craig and Moreland 2009).
Insofar as the discipline of history models itself closely to science, it
would face the same methodological problems related to the confirmation
of God (rather than, say, an angel, a demon, or a previously unknown
naturalistic explanation such as an alien) as the cause of an event. Distinguishing between God and other causes belongs to the realm of philosophy and theology rather than history and science. Licona (2014, p. 124)
seems to agree when he says, ‘in fact, I cannot think of any strong “historical” reason for preferring God to an alien as the cause of Jesus’ resurrection.’ Philosopher Alan Padgett notes that if the resurrection of Jesus
happened at all, it is a past event which took place in space and time.
‘If Jesus rose from the dead, this event has a date, and it took place at a
certain location in space, just outside Jerusalem’ (Padgett 1998, pp. 303–
304). However, he goes on to note, ‘historical science is incapable of making a theological judgement about whether or not God could or did raise
Jesus’ (ibid.). To conclude that it is the God of Israel who raised Jesus
from the dead would require additional arguments from the disciplines
of philosophy of religion (including comparative religion; see Chapter 8),
and the study of these arguments is beyond the usual training given to
historians.
Rae (2016) complains that the methodological naturalistic method of historical criticism is incapable of discerning the work of God. This causes
the biblical scholar to investigate the Bible as if God is not active in history
and therefore to be unable to understand the Bible on its own terms. Evans
(1996, p. 349) notes,
Ironically . . . the historical assumptions governing this quest seem
designed to make it difficult if not impossible to recognize anything
really special about Jesus. If Jesus really performed miracles, or thought
of himself as divine, the assumptions of historical criticism would make
it nearly impossible to discern this.
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Now it is one thing to understand the Bible from within the conceptual
world of the text itself, with its affirmation of God who created the universe
and works out his purposes in history as emphasized by Rae (2005, 2016).
It is another thing to think about whether what is understood is true and
whether one can show that it is true. (One might make similar remarks
concerning the study of the Quran, for example.) The methodological naturalistic method of historical criticism should be understood as one of the
methods but not the only method available to the biblical scholar (Evans
1999). This method can yield many conclusions about the past, without
yielding everything that can be known about the past, such as discerning
whether God is at work. The latter would require philosophical and theological arguments which the biblical scholar can consult (see Chapter 8; for
an example of an eminent biblical scholar using such arguments, see Craig
Keener’s book on Miracles [2011]).
It should be noted that science and history do not own the monopoly
to truth concerning the past and present and that philosophical arguments
can lead to knowledge. It is a mistake to claim that conclusions not attainable by methodological naturalism are illegitimate (Evans 1999, p. 182).
Proponents of scientism might object by claiming that science is the only
way of knowing the nature of reality.16 Scientism, however, is susceptible to
the objection that scientism cannot be proven by science itself and that its
advocates ‘rely in their argument not merely on scientific but also on philosophical premises’ (Stenmark 2003, pp. 783–785). Moreover, the scientific
method itself requires various forms of philosophical reasoning, such as
deductive and inductive reasoning, for the development of its explanations. Additionally, science itself cannot answer the question ‘why scientific results should be valued’; the answer to this question is philosophical
rather than scientific. The criteria for a good scientific theory themselves
are philosophical in nature (Ellis 2007, Section 8.1; Loke 2014b). I have
argued in Loke (2017b) that the conclusions of those philosophical arguments (e.g. the argument for a Divine First Cause) which can yield answers
that are more epistemically certain than scientific discoveries should be
regarded as knowledge about reality on at least the same level as scientific
facts. While science is a way of knowing, philosophy is another way of
knowing.
McGrath (2018) observes the emergence and significance of the notion
of multiple situated rationalities, which affirms the intellectual legitimacy

16 In a helpful article, Mikael Stenmark (1997) discusses various forms of scientism and
observes that while the word ‘science’ has a variety of meanings, ‘what is characteristic of
scientism is that it works with a narrow definition of science . . . the advocates of scientism use the notion of science to cover only the natural sciences and perhaps also those
areas of the social sciences that are highly similar in methodology to the natural sciences’
(p. 20). Such a methodology typically involves a systematic study using observation and
experimentation.
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of transdisciplinary dialogue. Noting the notion of multiple levels of reality, McGrath explains that the natural sciences themselves adopt a plurality of methods and criteria of rationality, making use of a range of
conceptual tool-boxes that are adapted to specific tasks and situations,
so as to give as complete an account as possible of our world (p. 2). For
example, with regards to the scientific study of a frog jumping into a
pond,
The physiologist explains that the frog’s leg muscles were stimulated by
impulses from its brain. The biochemist supplements this by pointing
out that the frog jumps because of the properties of fibrous proteins,
which enabled them to slide past each other, once stimulated by ATP.
The developmental biologist locates the frog’s capacity to jump in the
first place in the ontogenetic process which gave rise to its nervous system and muscles. The animal behaviourist locates the explanation for
the frog’s jumping in its attempt to escape from a lurking predatory
snake. The evolutionary biologist adds that the process of natural selection ensures that only those ancestors of frogs which could detect and
evade snakes would be able to survive and breed.
McGrath concludes that ‘all five explanations are part of a bigger picture.
All of them are right; they are, however, different’ (pp. 59–60). Just as science itself brings together different explanations to help us see the bigger
picture, there is a need to bring together different disciplines that would complement one other in our attempt to gain a fuller understanding of reality.
I shall show in Chapter 8 that one can offer philosophical arguments for God
rather than demon or angel as the cause of Jesus’ resurrection. While science
by itself cannot identify a miracle, science can be used by philosophical argument to rule out certain naturalistic alternatives as one of the steps towards
identifying a miracle. For example, a recent study concludes that collective
hallucinations are not found in peer-reviewed medical literature, and that
‘collective hallucination as an explanation for the disciples’ post-crucifixion
group experiences of Jesus is indefensible’ (Bergeron and Habermas 2015;
see further, Chapter 4). The identification of miracle is truly transdisciplinary
and requires not only science but also history, philosophy, and theology.
In this book, it will be shown that the methodological naturalistic method
of historical criticism can yield the empirical conclusion that Jesus was crucified and was seen alive three days later (Chapters 2 to 7), that the cause
of this conclusion can be explained by philosophical considerations (not
restricted to the methodological naturalistic method) which indicate that
the best explanation is that God raised Jesus from the dead (Chapter 8),
and that this warrants the theological understanding of history as the place
in which ‘God is bringing about his purpose of reconciliation and new life’
(Rae 2005, p. 155; see Chapter 9).
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1.4.3 Concerning the issue of bias
Concerning the issue of bias, in reply to Kähler and the postmodernists, one
can concede that there might not have been any unbiased historical record
of Jesus written by completely neutral observers, and that the authors of the
New Testament documents could have been biased in favour of affirming his
resurrection. Nevertheless, the question that needs to be asked is what could
have caused the bias of these authors (if they had any) in the first place. As
will be argued in the rest of this book, the most reasonable explanation for
such bias (if any) is that Jesus truly resurrected. It should be noted that,
while the ‘appearances of Jesus’ are interpretations of certain experiences,
what caused these experiences still needs to be explained. Against the view
that ‘pre-resurrection’ Jesus is ‘historical’ while ‘post-resurrection’ Jesus is
‘interpreted,’ Jens Schröter argues that this dichotomy is false, for everything we say about the past is interpreted (Schröter 2014, p. 201). Schröter’s
position is consistent with an epistemological position known as critical
realism.
Critical realism affirms the existence of a real world independent of the
knower (realism). At the same time, it acknowledges that the only access we
have to this reality is through the human mind involving reflection, interpretation of information through a grid of psychological states such as expectations, memories, and beliefs, and the expression and accommodation of that
reality with tools such as mathematical formulae or mental models (hence
critical) (A. McGrath 2001–2003, Vol. II, ch. 10; Wright 1992, pp. 32–44).
Criticism realism takes into account of Evans’ (1999, p. 185) observation that the ‘notion of weighing evidence is quite complex. How evidence
should be weighted depends on, among other things, one’s assessment of the
honesty of a source and upon one’s general background beliefs, including
metaphysical beliefs.’ Evans also notes,
The facts cannot be settled in isolation from broader theories. Even
a criterion so apparently objective as multiple attestation cannot be
applied in isolation from one’s theories about the relations the Synoptic
Gospels have to each other and to Q (if Q existed), to the dating of the
fourth Gospel, to Thomas and to many other factors.
(p. 187)
With regards to interpretation, the ‘Jesus-memory approach’ advocated
by Keith (2011) emphasizes,
All memory is dually hermeneutical insofar as memory is a selective/
deselective process (some of the past is remembered and some is forgotten) and memories are, from the start, produced and organized
by language and thought categories that the individual has borrowed
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from his or her social context. In other words, there is no memory, no
preserved past and no access to it, without interpretation.
(p. 170)

Given this, the attempt to uncover solely the actual objective past by getting ‘behind’ the text is a facade, for all Jesus’ tradition and all memory is
an indissoluble mix of the past and the present. ‘The present would have
nothing to remember if it were not for the past; the past would not be capable of being remembered if it were not for the frameworks of the present’
(p. 170). Given that the actual past happened and some of it was preserved
through social memory, to discover ‘What really happened?’ one should pay
close attention to the Jesus traditions within their narrative framework in
the written tradition rather than dismiss all such interpretative framework
of the Gospels. While one needs to consider whether the past had been accurately remembered and interpreted, one should not assume that to discover
the past one has to remove all elements of interpretation, for
the interpretations of the past themselves are what preserve any connection to the actual past. If the influence of the actual past is observable
only through the present interpretations of the past that it enables, then
removing Jesus traditions from the written Gospels also removes any
bridge to the actual past.
(p. 173)
Le Donne (2009) observes that while a history unmediated and unrefracted
by culturally significant categories does not exist, historical Jesus analysis is
possible in virtue of the essential connection that exists between perceptions
of Jesus and interpretations of Jesus in the tradition, and cultural representations are constrained by the empirical reality of events and persons. He writes,
‘the historical Jesus is the memorable Jesus; he is the one who set refraction
trajectories in motion and who set the initial parameters for how his memories were to be interpreted by his contemporaries’ (ibid., p. 268). Therefore,
The historian’s job is to tell the stories of memory in a way that most
plausibly accounts for the mnemonic evidence. With this in mind, the
historical Jesus is not veiled by the interpretations of him. He is most
available for analysis when these interpretations are most pronounced.
Therefore, the historical Jesus is clearly seen through the lenses of editorial agenda, theological reflection, and intentional counter-memory.
(p. 134)
With respect to the critical process of knowing, Little insightfully observes,
There is no fundamental difficulty in reconciling the idea of a researcher
with one set of religious values, who nonetheless carefully traces out the
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religious values of a historical actor possessing radically different values. This research can be done badly, of course; but there is no inherent
epistemic barrier that makes it impossible for the researcher to examine
the body of statements, behaviors, and contemporary cultural institutions corresponding to the other, and to come to a justified representation of the other. . . . The set of epistemic values that we impart to
scientists and historians include the value of intellectual discipline and
a willingness to subject their hypotheses to the test of uncomfortable
facts. Once again, review of the history of science and historical writing makes it apparent that this intellectual value has effect. There are
plentiful examples of scientists and historians whose conclusions are
guided by their interrogation of the evidence rather than their ideological presuppositions. Objectivity in pursuit of truth is itself a value, and
one that can be followed.
(Little 2012, Section 3.2)
According to historian Brian Fay,
historians seek to describe accurately and to explain cogently how and
why a certain event or situation occurred. . . . For all the talk of narrativism, presentism, postmodernism, and deconstruction, historians
write pretty much the same way as they always have (even though what
they write about may be quite new).
(Fay 1998, p. 83)
It is true that the uniqueness of Jesus, which Kähler highlighted, might
make the task described by Little and Fay more difficult. Some scholars have argued that the attempts of modernity to uncover the historical
Jesus have been characterized by diverse conclusions which are largely
influenced by the socio-cultural, political, and religious (or anti-religious)
agendas of those engaged in it (Torrance 2001, pp. 216–217). Likewise,
the possession of different worldviews (e.g. atheist, theist) with their different understanding of ontology can influence their conclusions concerning miraculous claims such as the resurrection. Such differences in
agendas and worldviews might explain the lack of consensus concerning
whether Jesus resurrected. Nevertheless, this does not imply that the task
is in principle impossible or that every conclusion is as good as another
is. On the other hand, it is interesting to note that throughout history
there have been those who had confessed their bias against Jesus’ resurrection or who had approached it from a contrary worldview (e.g. Buddhism), but who changed their views after examining the evidence (e.g.
Morison 1930; Williams 2002). Cases like these refute the widespread
misconception expressed by Vermès (2008, p. 141: ‘To put it bluntly, not
even a credulous non-believer is likely to be persuaded by the various
reports of the resurrection; they convince only the already converted’).
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These cases also illustrate that bias or preconceptions concerning Jesus
can be overcome.
The case of professor Paul Williams, an eminent Buddhist historian and
philosopher who for over 20 years was a practising Buddhist himself, is
particularly illuminating. In a book which detailed his conversion from Buddhism to Catholic Christianity, he explained that he felt the force of the
evidence for the resurrection of Jesus. In his own words, ‘The evidence for
resurrection being the most likely explanation of what happened at the first
Easter is very strong. Most people do not realize quite how extraordinarily
strong the evidence is’ (Williams 2002, p. 20). After examining the relevant
historical evidence, he came to the following conclusion:
I am not convinced by alternative explanations of the resurrection. Thus
I have to accept that as far as I can see it is more rational to believe
in the resurrection than in the alternatives. . . . I have thus chosen to
believe. And my belief is based on reasons. I argue that it is a rationally
based belief that for me makes more sense than the alternatives.
(ibid., pp. 20–21)
Thus, it is not the case that the bias of the scholar and of the writers
of ancient texts17 would necessarily undermine the historical project concerning the resurrection of Jesus (although it is helpful to be aware of bias
in one’s reading, including the reading of my argument!). What matters is
whether the proposed hypothesis is able to account for the evidence, including the ‘uncomfortable facts.’18

1.5 An overview of the rest of the book
In this chapter, I have shown that historians can in principle argue for or
against the conclusion that Jesus resurrected. However, it is beyond the
discipline of history to adjudicate whether this event (if it happened) was
caused by God rather than, say, an alien or an angel. (This does not mean
that no good philosophical and/or theological reasons can be offered for
thinking that it was caused by God.) In the rest of this book, I shall demonstrate using historical arguments that the best explanation for the origination of the belief that Jesus resurrected is that it happened, and I shall
demonstrate using philosophical and theological arguments that the best
explanation for the occurrence of this event is that God raised Jesus from
the dead.

17 I address the issue of confirmation bias in Chapter 7.
18 For further discussion of other issues related to postmodernists’ critique of history as well
as responses to these criticisms, see, for example, McCullagh (1998); Thiselton (1992);
Wolterstorff (1995); Murphy (1997).
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It is beyond the scope of this book to go into the details concerning the
exegesis of all the relevant texts. This would require several monographs
and in any case it has been well covered in recent literature (e.g. Craig 1989;
Wright 2003; Allison 2005a; Licona 2010; Bryan 2011; Ware 2014). Instead,
I shall focus on the evaluation of the naturalistic alternatives to Jesus’ resurrection which have been discussed in the literature, using the transdisciplinary approach explained earlier. I have demonstrated that, other than Jesus’
resurrection, there are six and only six possible categories of naturalistic
hypotheses concerning the claims about Jesus’ post-mortem appearances.
In the following chapters, each of them will be evaluated against its alternative, as follows: legends hypothesis (Chapter 2), no experience hypothesis (Chapter 3), intramental hypothesis (Chapter 4), and mistaken identity,
swoon, and escape hypotheses (Chapter 5). I have also demonstrated that
other than Jesus’ resurrection, there are eight and only eight possible categories of naturalistic hypotheses concerning the outcome of Jesus’ body
viz. escape, unburied, remain buried, removal by non-agent, removal by
friends, removal by enemies, removal by neutral party, and swoon hypotheses. These will be evaluated in Chapter 6. I shall evaluate various combinations of naturalistic hypotheses in Chapter 7.
In short, I shall demonstrate in the following chapters that (I) ‘there were
people who claimed to have seen the resurrected Jesus shortly after his crucifixion,’ (II) ‘they had some kind of experiences,’ (III) ‘what they experienced
was not caused intramentally but extramentally,’ and (IV) ‘the extramental
entity was not another person but the same Jesus who died on the cross.’
As explained earlier, what follows logically from (I), (II), (III), and (IV) is
the conclusion that Jesus resurrected. In Chapter 8, I shall discuss the objections to Jesus’ resurrection based on its apparently miraculous nature. The
conclusions and implications of this book will be summarized in Chapter 9.

2	The earliest Christians
claimed to have witnessed the
resurrected Jesus

2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I shall examine whether there were people in mid-first-
century Palestine who claimed to have witnessed the resurrected Jesus.
To begin, it is recognized by almost all historians that Jesus of Nazareth
was crucified in c. AD 30, as attested by first- and second-century Christian
and non-Christian sources (see Chapter 1). As will be explained later, the
evidence indicates that the contents of those New Testament passages which
mentioned Jesus’ resurrection and numerous ‘eyewitnesses,’1 including individuals and groups of people, were proclaimed in the first century. These
include passages in the Four Gospels (Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John), Acts,
and the letters of Paul. In particular, the undisputed letters of Paul (Romans,
1st and 2nd Corinthians, Galatians, Philippians, 1 Thessalonians, Philemon)
were written from c. AD 50–62, approximately 20–32 years after Jesus’
death, and they reflect the beliefs of the earliest Christians from AD 30 to AD
62 (Hurtado 2003, pp. 85–86). No doubt a number of these Christians had
known the historical figure of Jesus personally. 1 Corinthians 15:3–11, which
listed a number of these ‘eyewitnesses,’ was written in c. AD 55. It states:
For I delivered to you as of first importance what I also received, that
Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures, and that He was
buried, and that He was raised on the third day according to the Scriptures, and that He appeared to Cephas, then to the twelve. After that
He appeared to more than five hundred brethren at one time, most of
whom remain until now, but some have fallen asleep; then He appeared
to James, then to all the apostles; and last of all, as to one untimely born,
He appeared to me also. For I am the least of the apostles, and not fit to be
called an apostle, because I persecuted the church of God. But by the grace

1 The word ‘eyewitnesses’ is placed in inverted commas here to indicate that these are the
people who claimed to have witnessed the resurrected Jesus. Hence, I am not begging the
question by presupposing that they actually witnessed the resurrected Jesus. Whether they
did witness the resurrected Jesus or not is discussed in the following chapters.
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of God I am what I am, and His grace toward me did not prove vain; but
I labored even more than all of them, yet not I, but the grace of God with
me. Whether then it was I or they, so we preach and so you believed.
This passage claims Jesus’ post-mortem appearances to both individuals (Cephas [i.e. Peter], James the brother of Jesus, and Paul) and groups
such as the ‘Twelve,’ the ‘more than five hundred brethren,’ and the other
apostles in 1 Corinthians 15:7, which is a different group from the Twelve
mentioned in 1 Corinthians 15:5 (Dunn 2003, p. 856, n. 136, cf. 1 Cor. 9:1,
5–6 [mentioned Barnabas]; Rom. 16:7 [mentioned Andronicus and Junias]).
The appearances began a very short period of time after Jesus’ crucifixion,
as implied by the third-day motif which is multiply attested (Licona 2010,
pp. 325–329: ‘After three days’ Matt. 27:63; Mark 8:31; 9:31; 10:34; ‘Three
days and three nights’ Matt. 12:40; ‘In three days’ John 2:19–20; ‘On the
third day’ Matt. 16:21; 17:23; 20:19; 27:64; Luke 9:22; 24:7, 46; Acts 10:40;
‘The third day’: 1 Cor. 15:4; Luke 18:33; ‘This is the third day’ [since the
crucifixion occurred]: Luke 24:21). A theological understanding of this motif
does not exclude a historical basis, which is argued for by Bruce (1977, p. 93):
The statement that it was ‘on the third day’ that Christ rose is based not
on any Old Testament scripture but on historical fact. Such an expression as ‘after three days’ (not to speak of ‘three days and three nights’),
used in predictions of the resurrection before the event (e.g. in Mk 8:31),
might have the general sense of ‘in a short time’; but after the event we
regularly find it dated ‘on the third day,’ because it was actually on the
third day that the tomb was found empty and Jesus first appeared in
resurrection to Peter and others.
It has been objected that the list of supposed eyewitnesses of Jesus’ resurrection in 1 Corinthians 15:3–11 could have been interpolated into 1 Corinthians by someone else after the letter was written. Others have objected
that, even if the list of supposed eyewitnesses was written by Paul in midfirst century, it could be that some (if not all) of the details (e.g. concerning
the ‘more than five hundred brethren’) were errors which either originated
from him or from others who passed the information to him. I shall address
these objections in turn.

2.2 Is 1 Corinthians 15:3–11 a later interpolation?
The first objection has been raised by Robert Price (2005), who claims that
1 Corinthians 15:3–11 contains a later interpolation.2 He argues that the

2 Price (2005, pp. 92–93) claims that his arguments fit some of the nine criteria for detecting
interpolations listed in Munro (1990) viz. (1) manuscript evidence, (2) perceived disparities
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Jacobean-Petrine polemics reflected in verses 3–11 are either alien to Paul or
anachronistic for him3 and claims that this polemics belongs to later period
polemics in the Gospel of the Hebrews, the Epistle of Peter to James, and
Luke-Acts (Price 2005, p. 93). Price notes that a few textual witnesses (Marcion, b, and Ambrosiaster) lack ‘what I also received’ in verse 3a, and suggests that either the scribes omitted these from the original to harmonize 1
Corinthians with Galatians, or added these to the original to subordinate
Paul to the Twelve (ibid.). He also claims that verses 3–11 do not fit well
with the context of 1 Corinthians 15, arguing that since the Corinthians had
already believed in Jesus’ resurrection (v. 11, 17), giving evidence for the
resurrection is out of place (p. 96).
In reply, on the one hand, Price’s arguments that the Jacobean-Petrine
polemics reflected in verses 3–11 are extremely speculative.4 As noted in
Chapter 1, it is possible to draw literary parallels using speculative interpretations with almost anything.
Marcion (followed by b and Ambrosiaster) could have omitted ‘what
I also received’ in verse 3a because of his high view of Paul. Other scholars
have shown that, contrary to Price, the statements in 1 Corinthians 15:1–
11 do not conflict with Paul’s claim in Galatians 1:11–12 that the gospel
he proclaimed was not received from a human source nor taught but was
received through a revelation of Jesus Christ. The reason is that Galatians
1:11–12 can be understood as referring to how Paul initially received the
gospel, that is, through direct revelation of Jesus. This does not preclude
other Christians subsequently telling him about a gospel tradition which
he later passed on to the church at Corinth. Price (2005, p. 74) objects by
claiming that Galatians 1:12 (‘Paul says what he preached was not taught

between the ideologies of the supposed interpolation and its context, (3) stylistic and linguistic differences, (4) fittingness with context, (5) relatedness of themes and concerns with later
literature, (6) literary/historical coherence with later literature, (7) external attestation, (8)
indirect textual evidence, and (9) motivation for interpolation. With regards to stylistic and
linguistic differences, Price (2005, p. 92) admits that this is inconclusive: while their presence
could be due to interpolation, they could also be due to pre-Pauline tradition taken over by
him (as many scholars have argued, see Section 2.3).
3 Price (2005, pp. 84–88, 92) argues for a gradual elevation of James in the traditions, until a
later interpolation was inserted in 1 Corinthians 15:7 saying that he saw the Lord.
4 For example, Price (ibid.) argues that the appearance ‘to all the apostles’ (v. 7), which
included Peter, implied a second tradition that ‘Jesus appeared to James first, then followed
by Peter and the other apostles’ to counter polemically that Jesus appeared to Peter first
(v. 5). In response, it could be that Jesus appeared to Peter first, and then to him again
together with ‘the Twelve,’ and after the appearance to James, he appeared again to Peter
together with ‘all the apostles,’ a larger group than the Twelve that includes others who have
been with Jesus from the beginning (Acts 1:21–22). If that is so, and if this passage were written to convey what actually happened, then verses 5–7 would be how the text would read.
It is unjustified to cut out a verse and interpret that the text implies a polemic when the text
could have merely intended to convey what actually happened.
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him by human predecessors’) contradicts 1 Corinthians 15:3 (‘he received
it from human predecessors’). However, Paul nowhere says in 1 Corinthians 15 that his preaching was entirely taught by human predecessors; he
was rather citing a summary of the resurrection appearances which was
also preached by other early Christians as evidence for Jesus’ resurrection.
Additionally, Galatians 1:12 does not say that Paul learned the entirety of
his understanding of Christianity, without remainder, by private revelation.
Surely the Damascus Christians who cared for and baptized him would
have spoken to him prior to the baptism (Davis 2006, p. 48). McKnight
further explains,
At Galatia, where Paul was being accused of being an abbreviator of
the Jerusalem gospel (and therefore wrong), Paul asserts that his gospel
did not come from Jerusalem but from Jesus Christ. In other words,
Paul is talking about the source of his gospel to the Galatians. On the
other hand, at Corinth Paul is seeking to demonstrate the essential continuity of his gospel with other apostolic expressions of the gospel and
the heritage his gospel has. However much Paul wanted to assert that
his gospel was independent in source, he did not shrink at the same
time from observing that the Jerusalem leaders ‘gave him the right hand
of fellowship’ . . . in other words, they approved of his independently
derived gospel. The gospel Paul preached was consistent with the gospel
of his predecessors; but the gospel Paul preached was not from them,
since Paul got it by direct revelation.
(McKnight 1995, pp. 69–70)
Sturdy (2007, p. 64), another rare scholar who has argued that the tradition of 1 Corinthians 15 is post-Pauline interpolation, claims that we would
not expect the Paul of 2 Corinthians 5:16 (‘even though we once knew
Christ according to the flesh, we know him no longer in that way’) to be
interested in formulaic traditions handed down about the Lord. In reply,
‘according to the flesh’ should be taken with the verb (‘knew’) rather than
the noun (‘Christ’) (Dunn 1998, p. 184). It refers to knowing Christ in terms
of outward appearance of worldly status; this was Paul’s pre-conversion
understanding of Jesus, which he now rejects (Keener 2005, pp. 184–185).
What 2 Corinthians 5:16 rejects is the evaluation of Christ in accordance
with the value system of this world; it does not reject an interest in knowing about Christ on the basis of testimonial evidence preserved in formulaic
traditions.
In reply to Price’s objection concerning fittingness with context, verses
3–11 can be understood as an attempt to establish the fact of the resurrection while the rest of the chapter explains the implications (Davis 2006,
pp. 48–49). Even though the Corinthians in general had already believed
Jesus’ resurrection, a number of them were sceptical about the resurrection
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(1 Cor. 15:12). It is therefore fitting for Paul to mention the evidence for
Jesus’ resurrection, on the basis of which he argues for the future resurrection of the believers. Paul’s argument can be understood as such:
Premise 1: If there is no resurrection of the dead, then Christ has not been
raised (v. 13);
Premise 2: But Christ has indeed been raised from the dead (v. 20, this is
established by the appearances mentioned in v. 3–11).
Conclusion: Therefore, there is resurrection of the dead.
On the other hand, the manuscript evidence is against Price’s speculative theory. The authenticity of verses 3–11 is recognized by virtually all
historical-critical scholars, as it is attested by all the extant copies of 1 Corinthians 15.
Price (2005, p. 92) admits that there is no extant copy of 1 Corinthians 15
that lacks verses 3–11, but he claims that this lack does not stultify his argument since there are no texts at all from the period during which he suggests
the interpolation occurred. He cites Ehrman as saying that theologically
motivated changes are to be expected in the first three centuries when both
text and theology are in state of flux (ibid., p. 97, n. 7). Price admits,
though snippets of my passage (including few if any of the ‘appearance’
statements, interestingly) appear here and there in Patristic sources,
these citations are indecisive, since writers like Tertullian and Irenaeus
are too late to make any difference, while in my view the date and genuineness of 1 Clement and the Ignatian corpus are open questions.
(p. 93)
In his reply to critics, Price claims that, just as it is not unreasonable to think
that when the Caliph Uthman had the text of the Koran standardized, he
destroyed all previous copies and their dangerous variants, the early Christian authorities did the same to biblical manuscripts as well.5
In reply, Price’s argument assumes that all the copies which contained the
original version of 1 Corinthians 15 (without v. 1–11) vanished without
leaving a trace in the subsequent records, which is implausible. Precisely
because early Christianity was in state of flux, no early Christian leader had
the authority of a caliph to ensure that all previous copies which contained
what Paul originally wrote were destroyed without leaving a trace. Trobish (1994, pp. 3–4) notes, ‘compared to any other letter collection . . . the
letters of Paul have survived in an enormous number of manuscripts that
provide a large number of variant readings.’ This contradicts Price’s idea
that there was a standardization process by early Christian authorities. The

5 https://sites.google.com/site/theemptytomb/davis. Accessed May 12, 2018.
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fact that ‘snippets’ of verses 3–11 appear in Patristic sources indicates that
this passage was known to various early writers (regardless of whether they
chose to cite the ‘appearance’ statements), including the ‘heretic’ Marcion in
the mid-second century. Various other portions of 1 Corinthians were cited
by Clement of Rome (late first century AD), Polycarp of Smyrna (writing
between AD 110 and 150), and the Shepherd of Hermas (c. AD 115–140)
(Gregory and Tuckett 2007). No interpolator of the late first–early second
century would have had the power and authority to alter all the copies of
1 Corinthians possessed by those different communities of varying (sometimes even opposing) theologies to which these writers belonged. Moreover,
to accomplish that feat would require an alteration of a large amount of
documents across diverse places. This would have to include the copies of
1 Corinthians available at that time, and these copies would have to be
searched from across the Mediterranean and altered without leaving a trace
in the surviving manuscripts from diverse places. This, evidently, is practically impossible.
One might ask, ‘could it be that the interpolation occurred very early (i.e.
prior to the end of first century), before copies of the letter spread to various
places?’ In reply, it should be noted that copies of the letters of Paul were
already circulated to various places during Paul’s lifetime. Gamble (1995,
p. 97) observes,
Galatians is addressed ‘to the churches of Galatia’ (1:2) that is, to several communities in a discrete region. . . . Similarly, the letter to the
Romans, addressed to ‘all God’s beloved in Rome’ (1:7) was directed to
different house churches in the city (compare 16:5, 10, 11,14, 15). . . . In
the cases of Galatians and Romans it was a matter of circulating a single
letter among different groups that together constituted the addressees. It
is likely that this was achieved not merely by a series of public readings
but by making copies: the first recipients of a Pauline letter were probably no better able than we to digest it at one reading and would have
wished to retain it for subsequent consideration.
Moreover,
There is compelling evidence that some authentic letters of Paul did in fact
circulate from an early time in communities other than those to which
they were originally addressed. The textual traditions of Romans and 1
Corinthians preserve clear indications that these letters circulated at one
time in generalized or catholicized forms from which their local addresses
(Rom. 1:7, 15; 1 Cor. 1:2), and perhaps other particulars (Rom. 16), had
been eliminated in favor of broad designations of their recipients.
(‘Those who are beloved by God’ [Rom. 1:7] and
‘those who are sanctified in Christ Jesus’
[1 Cor.1:2b]) (ibid., p. 98)
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Given that the copies were widely circulated soon after they were written,
the distortion would have to occur almost immediately after 1 Corinthians
was written and before the circulation occurred, that is, around AD 55.
In that case, it would still be true to say that its contents originated from
around the mid-first century, which is all that is required for the subsequent
steps of my argument for Jesus’ resurrection (see later). Otherwise, once the
copies spread to diverse places, it would have been practically impossible to
synchronize the alteration of the manuscripts in diverse places such that all
of them contained the interpolation, without leaving a trace of the original
version. Sceptics might object that many documents were indeed destroyed
later by Christians. In response, some of these writings did survive (e.g. the
Gnostic Gospels in the Nag Hammadi library), and we have many traces
of them in other early documents, for example the writings of early church
fathers. Moreover, one reason why many of the heretics’ writings did not
survive is that no one actively promoted the copying and preservation of
their writings as their adherents died off (see Gamble 1995, p. 127). By contrast, given the high regard the early Christians had for the writings of the
apostles, they would have been interested in preserving their contents. The
fact that no extant copy of 1 Corinthians 15 lacks verses 3–11 is therefore a
significant refutation of Price’s hypothesis.

2.3 Did the people listed in 1 Corinthians 15:3–11 really
claim to have witnessed the resurrected Jesus?
2.3.1 An outline of the considerations involved
As noted earlier, it might be objected that, given that a list of supposed eyewitnesses of the resurrected Jesus in 1 Corinthians 15:1–11 was written by
someone (say, Paul) in mid-first century, it could still be that some (if not
all) of the supposed eyewitnesses did not actually exist. Rather, the list could
have contained erroneous information which either originated from Paul
or from others who passed the information to him. De Jonge observes that
1 Corinthians 15:3–11 only contains a claim made by third parties about
Peter and the rest of the Twelve; it does not contain, for example, Peter’s
claim about himself in the first person such as ‘I have seen the resurrected
Jesus’ (de Jonge 2002, p. 41). How then can we know whether Peter and
the rest of the Twelve really existed and claimed to have witnessed the resurrected Jesus?
Before we discuss this objection further, it should first be noted that Paul
said that he received the gospel; he did not originate it, rather the Gospel
already pre-existed before he had any part in it (Gal. 1:13; cf. 1 Cor. 15:9;
Phil. 3:6). As Bryan (2011, p. 48) observes, the terms in 1 Corinthians 15:3
παραδίδωμι (‘deliver’) and παραλαμβάνω (‘receive’) echo the language in
which both Greek and Jewish traditions spoke of the faithful handing on
a true teaching (Bryan cites ‘Abot 1, Wis. 14:15, Josephus, Against Apion
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1.60). Moreover, the non-Pauline characteristics in 1 Corinthians 15:3–5 also
indicate that Paul is passing on a prior tradition (ibid.). Craig (1989, pp. 2–3)
summarizes the characteristics as follows: (i) the phrase ‘for our sins’ using
the genitive case and plural noun is unusual for Paul; (ii) the phrase ‘according
to the Scriptures’ is unparalleled in Paul, who introduces scriptural citations
by ‘as it is written’; (iii) the perfect passive verb ‘has been raised’ appears only
in this chapter and in a pre-Pauline confessional formula in II Timothy 2:8;
(iv) the phrase ‘on the third day’ with its ordinal number following the noun
in Greek is non-Pauline; (v) the word ‘appeared’ is found only here and in
the confessional formula in I Timothy 3:16; and (vi) ‘the Twelve’ is not Paul’s
nomenclature, for he always speaks of the twelve disciples as ‘the apostles.’
The aforementioned considerations imply that Paul received the information about the ‘eyewitnesses’ who had existed even earlier (Theissen and
Merz 1998, pp. 487–490; Allison 2005a, pp. 233–239; Licona 2010).6
Psychological studies have indicated that people are careful to form conclusions based on valid evidence when the topic is important, when the
costs of false confirmation are greater, and when people are held personally
responsible for what they say and care about their reputation among sustained relationships with known audiences, and that groups characterized
by scepticism tend to arrive at more accurate conclusions (DiFonzo and
Bordia 2007, pp. 166, 173–174). In the rest of this chapter, I shall utilize
these considerations for my subsequent discussion concerning the reliability
of the list of ‘eyewitnesses’ in 1 Corinthians 15:1–11.
2.3.2 The importance of the issue
The Corinthians were being told in the same letter that Jesus’ resurrection
was the basis of a religion for which believers were to be prepared to give
up their lives. 1 Corinthians 15:17–19 says,
And if Christ has not been raised, your faith is futile; you are still in your
sins. Then those also who have fallen asleep in Christ are lost. If only for
this life we have hope in Christ, we are of all people most to be pitied.
And in verses 30–32,
And as for us, why do we endanger ourselves every hour? I face death
every day—yes, just as surely as I boast about you in Christ Jesus our
6 Licona (2010, p. 319) notes, however, ‘Differences of opinion exist over whether “for our
sins” and “according to the Scriptures” in the first line belonged to the original tradition and
the same can be said of “on the third day” and “according to the Scriptures” in the third
line. Differences of opinion also exist over whether 15:5b–7 is part of the same tradition or
that Paul has combined two or more traditions.’ These differences of opinion do not affect
my argument in this chapter.
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Lord. If I fought wild beasts in Ephesus with no more than human
hopes, what have I gained? If the dead are not raised, ‘Let us eat and
drink, for tomorrow we die.’

2.3.3 There were sceptics among Paul’s audiences at Corinth
Reimarus had suggested that stories of the dead being raised in the Scriptures and the teachings of the Pharisees made it easy for Jews to accept the
apostles’ claim that Jesus had risen (Reimarus 1971, p. 2).
In reply, Bryan (2011, p. 9) observes that there were varieties of Judaism
in Jesus’ time, and some were sceptical of bodily resurrection. For example, the Sadducees asserted that ‘there is no resurrection’ (Mark 12:18–27;
par. Matt. 22:23–33, Luke 20:27–40; also Acts 23:8, Josephus Ant. 18.16)
(Bryan 2011, pp. 10–11).7 Some Jews (e.g. Philo of Alexandria, the author
of 4 Maccabees) taught only the immortality of the soul, without subsequent restoration into embodiment (ibid., p. 17).
Additionally, the restorations to life portrayed in Scripture (e.g. 1 Kings
17:10–24; 2 Kings 4:8–3; in the New Testament, the stories of raising of
Jairus’ daughter (Mark 5:21–24, 35–43 par.), the son of the widow of Nain
(Luke 7:11–17), and Lazarus (John 11:1–44) are subjected to the limitations
and weaknesses of life as we know it, and which would again end in death
(Bryan 2011, pp. 14, 37). Bryan cites Hebrews 11:35: ‘Women received
their dead by resurrection. Others were tortured, refusing to accept release,
in order to obtain a better resurrection,’ and he notes the contrast between
‘resurrection’ and ‘better resurrection’ and verse 39 which says that all these
people of faith still have not yet received what was promised. The ‘better
resurrection’ and the promise is the new mode of being portrayed by the
authors of Daniel 12:1–3 (‘shine like the dome of the sky’), 2 Maccabees
(7:9, 11, 14, 21–23, 28–29, 12:40–46, 14:46), and Wisdom 2–3, which
speak of what will finally happen to the faithful dead: it will no longer be
subject to the limitations of life as we know it (ibid., pp. 14–16). Such a
resurrection was claimed to have happened to Jesus by the New Testament
writers.
Beliefs about bodily resurrection were also present in ancient Zoroastrianism and paganism (Carrier 2009, chapter 3, noting, for example, that Celsus
mentioned a list of people whom some pagans believed resurrected, though
he himself was sceptical; see Origen, Contra Celsum 2.55, 3.26, 3.22). Nevertheless, Bryan (2011, pp. 30–31) observes that the existence of these stories does not alter the fact that many ancient pagan writers were against

7 Bryan (ibid.) notes that for them God’s judgment and retribution are sure, but they are not
after the individual’s death, or if they do come after death, then they come through one’s
descendants (Sir. 11:26–28 cf. Exod. 20:5).
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what these stories imply. Keener (2005, p. 122) observes that ‘educated,
elite Corinthians probably followed views held by many philosophers, such
as immortality of the soul after the body’s death. Many viewed the body as
earthly, the soul as heavenly (Heraclitus Ep. 9; Seneca Dial. 12.11.6), including some Jews (Wis 9:15–16; Sipre Deut. 306.28.2).’ Keener continues,
Some Greeks (like Epicureans and popular doubts on tombstones)
denied even an afterlife. Yet even Greeks who expected an afterlife for
the soul could not conceive of bodily resurrection (which they would
view as the reanimation of corpses) or glorified bodies. The closest analogies were old myths about deceased souls brought back from Hades;
annually returning underworld deities connected with spring vegetation; witches magically resuscitating corpses; and (most common in
novels) recovery from merely apparent death.
(ibid.)
The church at Corinth evidently included ‘converts’ to Christianity who
remained sceptical of the resurrection, as indicated by 1 Corinthians 15:12:
‘But if it is preached that Christ has been raised from the dead, how can
some of you say that there is no resurrection of the dead?’
The New Testament indicates the difficulties the first-century audiences
had with such a claim by portraying them as scoffing the idea (Acts 17:32;
regardless of whether this passage in Acts is historical or created by firstcentury Christians, it shows that this scepticism was present among the firstcentury people).
Even the apostles themselves were portrayed as rejecting this claim initially. ‘But these words seemed to them an idle tale, and they did not believe
them’ (Luke 24:11; see also Matt. 28:17; pseudo-Mark 16:11). These observations refute the idea that first-century people were all gullible enough to
accept the claim of bodily resurrection uncritically. (This does not deny the
fact that—as in all ages including the modern one—there would have been
a few people who were gullible in this sense, such as the portrayal of Herod
and some of his contemporaries who believed that Jesus was the resurrected
John the Baptist in Mark 6:14–29, as well as modern-day Elokists who
believe that Schneersohn was resurrected; see discussion in Chapter 7 in
which I compare and contrast this case with the apostles’ belief that Jesus
resurrected). Regardless of whether the account in Matthew 28:11–15 is
factual, it indicates that first-century Jews were capable of thinking about
alternative naturalistic explanations to Jesus’ resurrection by claiming that
Jesus’ disciples stole his body.
Moreover, Bryan (2011, p. 9) observes,
Even in the Scriptures, stories of the dead being raised are invariably
presented as exceptional. That, after all, is why they are interesting.
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And even Pharisaic hope was, of course, a hope for what God might do
in the future. As far as normal and present experience was concerned,
neither the Scriptures nor Pharisaic teaching will have altered the fact
that Jews just as much as Gentile invariably experienced the dead as
staying dead.

Graham Stanton also notes,
Miracles were not accepted without question in antiquity. GraecoRoman writers were often reluctant to ascribe ‘miraculous’ events to the
gods, and offered alternative explanations. Some writers were openly
sceptical about miracles (e.g. Epicurus, Lucretius, Lucian). So it is a
mistake to write off the miracles of Jesus as the result of the naivety and
gullibility of people in the ancient world.
(Stanton 2001, p. 66)
Additionally, from their writings, it is evident that the earliest Christians
were rational enough to debate (e.g. Gal. 2:11–21), to think about the evidence for their faith (e.g. 1 Cor. 15:6), to consider its consequences (1 Cor.
15:14–19)—such as having to face frequent dangers and martyrdom (1 Cor.
15:30–32)—and to persuade others to hold to their views.
Given these considerations, if someone in the first century claimed that
there were ‘eyewitnesses’ of Jesus’ resurrection, the earliest Christians would
want to check them out (see next section).
2.3.4 People were told to check out the purported eyewitnesses
and they had the means to do that
Sceptics question the standard of evidence most people followed back in the
first century, and they question whether the supposed eyewitnesses of Jesus’
resurrection were interrogated (Carrier 2009). In reply, Paul indicated to the
Corinthians what the standard of valid evidence was in 1 Corinthians 15:6:
to consult the ‘eyewitnesses’ themselves. Keener (2005, p. 124) observes that
similar appeals to public knowledge can be found in the writings of Josephus (Ag. Ap. 1.50–52; Life 359–62) and Cicero (Verr. 1.5.15; 2.1.40.103).
If there were indeed such ‘eyewitnesses’ as 1 Corinthians 15:3–11 claimed,
most of them would still be alive in AD 55; indeed, it was said that among
the ‘more than five hundred brethren,’ most of them ‘remain until now’
(v. 6). Bauckham observes that the commonsensical idea of ‘checking out’
these important ‘eyewitnesses’ is implicit in 1 Corinthians, a letter which
was intended for public reading in the churches. Paul is in effect saying in 1
Corinthians 15:6, ‘If anyone wants to check this tradition, a very large number of the eyewitnesses are still alive and can be seen and heard’ (Bauckham
2006, p. 308).
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Given the early date of 1 Corinthians 15:3–11, the Corinthians could
check with the eyewitnesses of Jesus, the eyewitnesses of the author of 1 Corinthians, and even with the author (Paul) himself about what he preached
to find out whether the message had been distorted or whether there were
indeed ‘more than five hundred brethren’ who claimed to have seen the
resurrected Jesus at once. Concerning checking with Paul, Gamble (1995,
p. 101) notes, ‘the tangled correspondence of Paul with the Corinthians, if
not typical, certainly indicates that Paul needed to and did keep track of
what he had written.’ Gamble also observes,
It is clear, however, that Paul relied heavily on letters to stay in touch
with and to supervise his congregations. There was, in fact, much traffic
in letters: Paul’s letters to the churches (more than the few that have been
preserved), the churches’ letters to him (compare 1 Cor. 7:1), and letters
used by other teachers on their own behalf in the communities (compare
2 Cor. 3:1, 2 Thess. 2:2). Paul’s associates, who served as his personal
emissaries and liaison to the congregations, often had a hand in his correspondence, not only as letter carriers. It was Paul’s custom to name
others together with himself as cosenders of his letters. This was probably not a formality but a reflection of the involvement of his associates
in the conception, if not in the composition, of many of the letters. The
evidence strongly suggests that Paul’s missionary enterprise had a corporate structure and a school dimension and that Paul and his associates
thought it important to formulate the apostle’s teaching in writing and
to employ those writings in the furtherance of Paul’s missionary aims.
(ibid., p. 99)
One might object that given that the details concerning the ‘five hundred’
(e.g. their names) are absent (Lindemann 2014a, p. 87), how would the
Corinthians be able to check?
In reply, on the one hand, the fact that we do not have these details at present does not imply that the first-century audiences did not have the details.
On the other hand, scholars have pointed out that New Testament writers
often omit details that must have already been known to them (e.g. Luke’s
omission of Mark 6:45–8:26) (Craig 1984). Other passages in 1 Corinthians
(e.g. 9:5) indicate that there were various traditional narratives about the
apostles and Jesus which would have been known to the Corinthians and
other early Christian communities (Jervell 1972). On 1 Corinthians 15:3–8
Gerhardsson (2003, p. 89) remarks,
Elementary psychological considerations tell us that the early Christians
could scarcely mention such intriguing events . . . without being able to
elaborate on them. . . . A preacher can begin with an outline but he cannot go on forever repeating mere outlines.
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Likewise, Allison observes that 1 Corinthians 15:3–11 contains only a bare
outline listing the individuals and groups to whom Jesus was supposed to
have appeared, without mentioning the details of the appearances. Allison
insightfully argues that since the Christians in Corinth (or anywhere else)
would not have believed based on the scanty information in 1 Corinthians
15:3–8 alone without knowing (or at least wanting to know) some of the
details (e.g. what did these disciples see? Did they touch Jesus?), 1 Corinthians 15:3–8 must have been a summary of traditional resurrection narratives
which were told in fuller forms elsewhere (Allison 2005a, pp. 235–239).
That is, Paul knew that these details were already in circulation in the form
of various traditional narratives which were known to his audiences (e.g.
the Corinthians), therefore he did not see the need to mention them. Wright
argues that these fuller accounts would have been required to provide the
material for which Paul and the others created a theological and biblical
framework and from which they drew further eschatological conclusions
such as the notion of the ‘spiritual body’ (1 Cor. 15:35–49). Hence, the existence of these fuller accounts with their details would have been required to
answer ‘why did early Christianity begin,’ and ‘why did it take this shape’
(Wright 2003, pp. 608–614).
It should be noted that the early Christian movement (though geographically widespread) was a network of close communication, the early
Christian leaders (which included the apostolic ‘eyewitnesses’) were quite
mobile, and it is very probable that Jewish Christians would have travelled
yearly to Jerusalem for festivals (Bauckham 2006, pp. 32, 306). Hurtado
observes,
A well-attested ‘networking’ was another feature of early Christianity.
This involved various activities, among them the sending and exchange
of texts, believers travelling for trans-local promotion of their views (as
e.g. the ‘men from James’ in Gal. 2:11, or Apollo’s’ travels to Corinth
in 1 Cor. 1:12; 3:5–9; 16:12), representatives sent for conferral with
believers elsewhere (as depicted, e.g. Acts 15:1–35), or sent to express
solidarity with other circles of believers (as e.g. those accompanying the
Jerusalem offering in 1 Cor. 16:3–4). After all, travel and communication were comparatively well developed in the Roman world generally,
among wealthy and a good many ordinary people, for business, pilgrimage to religious sites/occasions, for health, to consult oracles, for athletic events, sightseeing, and other purposes. ‘So’, as Richard Bauckham
observed, ‘the context in which the early Christian movement developed was not conducive to parochialism; quite the opposite.’ Indeed, in
that world of frequent travel and communication, the early Christians
particularly seem to have been given to networking, devoting impressive
resources of time, money, and personnel to this, and on a wide translocal scale.
(Hurtado 2013, p. 454)
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Given these considerations, contacts with the ‘eyewitnesses’ and hearing
the traditional narratives from them would have taken place naturally, and
investigative letters would not have been necessary (cf. Carrier 2009).
Price (2005) thinks that it is unlikely that someone could have counted
‘more than five hundred brethren’ and claims that this indicates the fictive character of a narrative. In reply, while an exact head count might be
unlikely, it is not difficult to estimate a number of ‘more than five hundred
brethren.’ For example, by looking at the audience present in a football stadium, I can be sure that the audience is more than five hundred even though
I have not taken a head count.
Price (2005, pp. 80–81) questions the reliability of the detail concerning
the ‘more than five hundred brethren’ by asking why it is absent from the
Gospels if it is part of an early tradition. Price rejects the explanation that
the Gospels’ authors were responding to another set of needs and situation,
for he thinks that the apologetic motives which scholars have suggested for
1 Corinthians 15 would have been present in the Gospels’ authors as well.
He argues that if such an overwhelmingly potent proof of the resurrection
as the appearance to the ‘more than five hundred brethren’ had occurred,
it would have been widely repeated from the beginning and be included in
the Gospels.
In reply, there are valid and invalid forms of argument from silence, and
Price’s argument is an invalid form of argument from silence. An argument
from silence works only when it can be shown that the silence would have
been broken if the conclusion were otherwise. Price’s argument is invalid
because it fails to meet this condition. To illustrate, Price fails to consider
the possibility that an oral tradition concerning the ‘more than five hundred brethren’ mentioned by Paul had already been circulated among early
Christians and known by the Gospels’ authors and their audiences, thus
the Gospels’ authors did not see the need to mention it. For example, suppose that the ‘more than five hundred brethren’ were with the 11 disciples
who ‘saw the Lord’ in Galilee, as portrayed in Matthew 28:16–20 (Robertson and Plummer 1911, p. 337). The author of Matthew might not have
thought it necessary to mention this detail but chose to keep the narrative
focused on the 11 instead. On the other hand, if the ‘resurrection appearance’ to the ‘more than five hundred brethren’ indeed occurred in Galilee,
many of them would have remained there, and this would explain why there
were only 120 believers in Jerusalem as portrayed in Acts 1:15 (cf. Acts 2:7,
which refers to them as Galileans). Against Lüdemann who claims that the
appearance to the five hundred brethren is a legendary reference to the event
of Pentecost, Craig (2000, p. 191) objects that most of those people were
still alive in AD 55 when Paul wrote 1 Corinthians, and hence they could
be questioned about the experience and correct the legendary developments.
Moreover, the event of Pentecost was fundamentally different from a resurrection appearance; in Acts 2:1–13 all the characteristics of an Easter narrative are missing, above all the appearing of Christ. Against this, Chilton
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argues that the narrative in Acts 2 is related to Jesus’ resurrection in the
sense that
the steady outworking of that theme during the course of the book of
Acts is skilful and programmatic, so that there is a broadening and at
the same time an intensification of the conception of God’s Spirit as
released by the resurrection.
(2019, p. 112)
However, Chilton confuses the effect of Jesus’ resurrection (‘God’s Spirit
as released by the resurrection’) with the appearance of the resurrected
Jesus, which is offered as a proof to sceptics of resurrection by Paul
in 1 Corinthians 15:6 as explained earlier. Thus, Chilton’s argument is
invalid.
2.3.5 Paul assumed responsibility and cared about his reputation
with his known audiences in Corinth, and the costs of false
confirmation would have been high
Paul assumed responsibility for the tradition which he passed on to the
Corinthians. He was evidently not a stranger to the Christians in Corinth,
and his tangled correspondences with the Corinthians indicate that he cared
about his reputation as an apostle.
Moreover, Paul claimed that this tradition was what other apostles were
preaching too (1 Cor. 15:1, 11). Paul’s statement that most of the ‘more
than five hundred brethren’ ‘remain until now, but some have fallen asleep’
carries the implication that Paul knew many of these ‘survivors’ (Bishop
1956, pp. 343–344). Various textual evidence indicates that Paul knew
others (e.g. James, Peter and other apostles; see Gal. 1–2) whom he listed
as ‘eyewitnesses’ of Jesus’ resurrection in 1 Corinthians 15 and that he had
personally met them and talked to them, and that he knew that the Corinthians knew them too (1 Cor. 1:12, 9:1–5). Sceptic psychologist Whittenberger (2011) objects that the report that a group of people saw Jesus
may have been generated by an individual disciple having a hallucination
not only of Jesus but of his fellow disciples together with him. However, in
such a case the report would have easily been falsified by the readers of 1
Corinthians checking with Peter and his fellow disciples. As Bryan (2011,
p. 54) observes,
Some among the Corinthians were certainly familiar with the teaching
of Cephas (1 Cor. 1:12). Evidently they knew who James was and were
aware of other apostles (15:8), and it is hardly likely that none among
them had ever heard any of them teach. In other words, the assertion of
eyewitness testimony made both by Paul and by the apostolic formula
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was easily open to challenge unless, as must have been the case, he and
the Corinthians knew perfectly well that it was correct.
Given these considerations, Paul would not have made up the list of supposed eyewitnesses, or passed on one which was made up by others and
which he himself did not know was correct.8 If these people did not exist
and claim to have witnessed the resurrected Jesus, falsification would have
been easy and the costs would have been high. The Corinthian Christians
would have discredited Paul and warned their relatives and friends about
Paul’s harmful hoax which tells people to risks their lives for a faith that
was based on the ridiculous belief of bodily resurrection supported by a
false list of ‘eyewitnesses.’ In that case, Paul’s letters would have been discarded, rather than kept as divinely authoritative writings by the Corinthian
Christians or considered to be ‘weighty and strong’ (2 Cor. 10:10) by his
sophisticated opponents in Corinth. As Peter Kreeft (2003, p. 74) succinctly
observes,
Paul says in this passage (v. 6) that most of the five hundred are still
alive, inviting any reader to check the truth of the story by questioning
the eyewitnesses. He could never have done this and gotten away with
it, given the power, resources and numbers of his enemies, if it were not
true.
Given the aforementioned reasons for thinking that what Paul says is
true, it is not incorrect to conclude that Peter, the rest of the Twelve, and
others claimed to have witnessed the resurrected Jesus, even though (as de
Jonge (2002, p. 41) observes) 1 Corinthians 15:3–11 only contains a claim
made by third parties.
2.3.6 Other early documents also mentioned Jesus’ resurrection
and various eyewitnesses
Aside from Paul’s letters, there are other documents in the first and early second century—such as the Four Gospels, Acts, 1 Clement, Letters of Ignatius,
and so on—which also claim that there were various eyewitnesses of the
resurrected Jesus. As Theissen and Merz (1998, p. 490) observe concerning
the tradition in 1 Corinthians 15:3–11, ‘The credibility of this tradition is

8 Concerning the existence of ‘The Twelve,’ other evidence includes multiple attestation in
Markan tradition, Johannine tradition, and the ‘Q tradition’ (Matt. 19:28 and Luke 22:30),
the diverse yet largely overlapping lists of names, the extremely early tradition in 1 Cor. 15:5,
as well as the argument from embarrassment relating to the role of Judas Iscariot as one of
the Twelve (Meier 1991–2016, Vol. 3, pp. 128–147).
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enhanced, because it is in part confirmed by the narrative tradition, which
is independent, and because in the case of Paul we have the personal testimony of an eyewitness who knew many of the other witnesses.’ Summarizing the work of Allison (2005a) and others, Licona (2010, p. 322) notes,
for example,
The appearance to Peter in 1 Corinthians 15:5 may be alluded to in
Mark 16:7 and is specifically mentioned in Luke 24:34, though not narrated. In fact, Luke agrees with the tradition in placing the appearance
to Peter chronologically prior to the group appearance to the disciples.
‘The fact that the name Peter is used in Luke 24:12 while Simon is used
in 24:34 again points to different sources or traditions.’ The appearance
to the Twelve in 1 Corinthians 15:5 is clearly narrated by Luke and
John. Allison provides another chart of this appearance in Matthew,
Pseudo-Mark (Mk 16:9–20), Luke, and John showing similar setting,
appearance, response, commissioning, and promise of assistance.
It has often been claimed by sceptics (e.g. Vermès 2008) that Paul’s account
of Jesus’ resurrection is not in agreement with the narrative traditions in the
other Four Gospels, which also do not agree with each other, and that the
apparent contradictions are irreconcilable. A typical list of apparent discrepancies is as follows (listed in Ehrman 2014, p. 134):
Who was the first person to go to the tomb? Was it Mary Magdalene
by herself (John)? Or Mary along with another Mary (Matthew)? Or
Mary along with another Mary and Salome (Mark)? Or Mary, Mary,
Joanna, and a number of other women (Luke)? Was the stone already
rolled away when they arrived at the tomb (Mark, Luke, and John), or
explicitly not (Matthew)? Whom did they see there? An angel (Matthew), a man (Mark), or two men (Luke)? Did they immediately go and
tell some of the disciples what they had seen (John), or not (Matthew,
Mark, and Luke)? What did the person or people at the tomb tell the
women to do? To tell the disciples that Jesus would meet them in Galilee
(Matthew and Mark)? Or to remember what Jesus had told them earlier
when he had been in Galilee (Luke)? Did the women then go tell the
disciples what they were told to tell them (Matthew and Luke), or not
(Mark)? Did the disciples see Jesus (Matthew, Luke, and John), or not
(Mark)? 1 Where did they see him?—only in Galilee (Matthew), or only
in Jerusalem (Luke)?
Sceptics argue that the lack of agreement between the details of the resurrection narratives in the Gospels, together with their attribution to Jesus’
teachings that have an excellent Sitz im Leben in the early church, suggest
that the details are the invention of the Gospels’ authors in accordance with
their own agendas (Casey 1996, p. 192).
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However, even if the authors did have an agenda, having an agenda does
not necessarily imply that the details recorded by the Gospels’ authors are
not credible. While having an agenda might have caused these authors to
invent these details to make their case more convincing, it might also be the
case that the authors did not invent the details but were convinced by them,
and thus they had the agenda to include these details in their accounts—
according to the needs of their audiences—to convince others also. The
sceptics’ assumption that ‘if a purported event meshes well with an author’s
redactional motive, then the author made up the event’ is unjustified, for
there is no reason why the occurrence of a given event cannot dovetail with
the author’s editorial purposes’ (Davis 2006, p. 54). The apparent lack of
agreement indicates that the stories were not carefully made up by a group
of Christians conspiring to tell the story of Jesus’ resurrection. Keener
argues that, even at their latest possible date of composition, the Gospels
derive from a period relatively close to the events, when testimonies that
had been given by ‘eyewitness’ remained central to the church, and at least
Luke seems to have had direct access to eyewitness corroboration for some
of his traditional material (Luke 1:1–4; Keener 2003, p. 32). The apparent
lack of agreement is what we would expect from first-hand accounts of a
shocking event given by eyewitnesses very soon after the event. As Wright
(2003, p. 612) argues,
The stories exhibit . . . exactly that surface tension which we associate, not with tales artfully told by people eager to sustain a fiction and
therefore anxious to make everything look right, but with the hurried,
puzzled accounts of those who have seen with their own eyes something
which took them horribly by surprise and with which they have not yet
fully come to terms.
Consider this: If Tom, Dick, and Harry witnessed a shocking event (e.g. a
tsunami) and each of them was asked individually to give an account shortly
afterwards, they would not have reported every single detail or in the same
way. Rather, each of them would emphasize different details as they told the
story with excitement. This is what we see in the Gospels. Wright (2003,
pp. 611–612) argues,
The very strong historical probability is that, when Matthew, Luke and
John describe the risen Jesus, they are writing down very early oral
tradition, representing three different ways in which the original astonished participants told the stories. . . . Irrespective of when the gospels
reached their final form, the strong probability is that the Easter stories
they contain go back to genuinely early oral tradition.
While the writers added in different details to the earlier sources (e.g.
Luke on Mark), they still included plenty of details which are embarrassing
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to their case (e.g. women finding the tomb, disciples at Emmaus not recognizing Jesus, etc.). As attorney Herbert Casteel (1992, p. 213) remarks,
these are ‘numerous details of the very type that false accounts would be
careful to avoid.’
Vincent Taylor (1953, pp. 59–62) argues that each early Christian community would preserve the memory of an appearance of Jesus to figures
known to that community and retain the memory of appearances with local
associations, and that the individual evangelists drew on one or the other of
these local traditions available to them. Thus, the diversity in the accounts
of the appearances constitutes no argument against their historicity. Taylor
explains this with regards to the women at the tomb:
Naturally, at different centres of Palestinian Christianity the lists would
differ. All agreed that Mary of Magdala was one of the number, but at
one centre the names of local women would be remembered, and at
another centre those of others. Luke’s (Caesarean) tradition preserved
the names of Joanna and Susanna, Mark’s (Jerusalem) tradition a second Mary and Salome.
(Taylor 1957, p. 652)
Bryan (2011, pp. 167–168) observes, ‘Matthew, on this view, will have
omitted Salome, because his community did not know her.’ He notes Bauckham’s suggestion that the differences in the women named at various points
in the evangelists’ narratives, far from being grounds for not taking them
seriously, may actually indicate ‘the scrupulous care with which the Gospels
present the women as witnesses’ (ibid.).
The suggestion by Brown and Taylor is consistent with the recent work
on memory and the historical Jesus by Le Donne (2009), who proposes
that typological memory representations are the means by which the perception and cognition of actual persons and events were rendered intelligible and remembered. These representations were subsequently subjected
to differential historical development in different tradent9 communities. He
suggests that the Gospel traditions preserve different ‘mnemonic trajectories’ that can be triangulated to identify an originating zone of ‘historical
plausibility.’
Therefore, instead of saying that these are the invention of the Gospels’
authors, the differences in details as well as the excellent Sitz im Leben of
the teachings can be explained as follows: each of the authors of the Gospels
chose from the pool of historical material (consisting of a collection of early
traditions) those details which fitted the particular needs of his audience and
told the stories according to his own style, thus explaining the differences

9 The Oxford English Dictionary defines tradent as ‘a person who hands down or transmits
(especially oral) tradition.’
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between the traditions (and also the differences between the Gospels’ resurrection narratives).
Sceptics often argue that one can see legendary embellishment in the later
accounts compared to the earlier accounts (e.g. the young man at the tomb
in Mark becomes an angel accompanied by earthquakes in Matthew) (Carrier 2005a, pp. 165–166).
There are a number of problems with such arguments, however. First,
the amount of details does not seem to follow a consistent pattern when we
compare the later accounts with the earlier ones. For example, following the
argument for embellishment, one might expect a larger number of eyewitnesses and resurrection appearances in the later accounts compared to the
earlier ones, but the opposite is the case: Paul’s account in 1 Corinthians 15,
which is the earliest, contains the greatest number of eyewitnesses (‘more
than five hundred brethren’) and the largest number of appearances. It is
more likely that the authors took into consideration the needs of the audiences when they decided the amount of details to include. Second, some of
the details can be understood as clarifications rather than embellishments.
For example, the inference that the ‘young man’ in Mark 16:5–7 is an angel
can be justified by the context, which describes him as dressed in white
and conveying divine revelation. He does not simply report what he found,
but gives it an authoritative explanation and goes on to convey a message
from Jesus himself, recapitulating what he had said privately to the Twelve
in Mark 14:28, and conveying not comment but command (France 2002,
pp. 675–679; compare the use of ‘young man’ for angel in Tob. 4:5–10, 2
Macc. 3:26, 33, etc., see Gundry 1993, p. 990). Thus, the latter account in
Matthew can be understood not as an embellishment but a clarification; in
other words, Matthew merely makes the identification of the young man as
an angel more explicit. Third, the inclusion of more details does not have to
be regarded as embellishment, rather, it ‘could simply be a matter of a later
writer adding new and truthful traditions that were known to his own community, purposely filling in the gaps’ (Habermas 2013, p. 477).
Concerning the apparent lack of agreement, Wright notes that first-
century writers who intended to tell others what actually happened took for
granted that they were not obliged to mention every event or every detail of
an event. Wright (2003, pp. 648–649) observes, for example,
‘when Josephus tells the story of his own participation in the various
actions that started the Jewish-Roman war in AD 66, the story he tells
in his Jewish War and the parallel story he tells in the Life do not always
correspond in detail.
Many of the differences between the Gospels can be explained by literary devices which were also employed by other ancient historians, such as
Plutarch (c. AD 45–120) (Licona 2016). In several biographies Plutarch
frequently covers the same ground, thus creating a number of parallels and
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editing his materials in ways similar to the writers of the New Testament
Gospels, compresses stories, sometimes conflates them, inverts the order of
events, simplifies, and relocates stories or sayings (Evans, in Licona 2016, p.
x). When it comes to the editing and paraphrasing of the words of Jesus, the
authors of the Gospels were far more conservative than the compositional
practice of Plutarch, or Josephus in his paraphrasing of Jewish Scriptures
(ibid.). Indeed, a comparison of the paralleled pericope of Jesus’ aphorisms
and parables shows a high degree of stability and reliability of transmission
(McIver 2011).
Sceptics question why many important details in the Gospels concerning
the resurrection do not have multiple attestations but were mentioned in
one source only. In particular, why they were not mentioned in the earliest
account in 1 Corinthians 15? Carrier (2005a, p. 151) argues that since 1
Corinthians 15 is a defence of the resurrection, Paul would have used all the
evidence he had; but he only gave a list of witnesses without mentioning the
earthquakes, etc., which suggests that there is no other evidence and thus
these details were invented later.
In response, the apostles often surprise us by what they fail to refer to,
even though it will serve their purpose (Allison 2005a, p. 306). David Wood
argues,
Creeds are designed to be concise so that they can be easily memorized
and communicated to others. If the ‘simplicity’ of the creed in 1 Corinthians means that Paul is unaware of the miraculous events surrounding Jesus’ resurrection, then the simplicity of the Nicene Creed (fourth
century AD) should mean that the writers are unaware of the Gospel
narratives.
(Wood 2008)
Given that Paul and the Corinthians knew the other ‘eyewitnesses’ (see earlier), and given the argument that the details were already in circulation in
the form of other traditions known by the Corinthians (Section 2.3.4), Paul
would not have perceived the need to mention the details, thus he merely
summarized them. As argued previously, some of these traditions were later
written down separately in the Gospels. While the Gospels were written
later than the letters of Paul, the resurrection traditions which were included
in the Gospels could have originated earlier than the letters of Paul, and this
would explain why Paul’s letters did not have to include many of the details
found in the Gospels (concerning whether the details of those traditions had
been significantly modified when they were later included in the Gospels, see
the rest of this chapter and Section 4.6).
Given that none of the New Testament writers was obliged to write a
complete account, one must be careful not to regard differences which
resulted from the incompleteness of the relevant accounts as contradictions.
(To illustrate the distinction between difference and contradiction: if I say
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to my wife on one occasion, ‘I am going to give you a rose’ and on another
occasion, ‘I am going to give you a red rose,’ there are differences between
the two statements, but no contradiction.) Now Vermès (2008, p. 106) complains that the number of Jesus’ ‘resurrection appearances’ greatly differ in
the various Gospels, noting that there is none in Mark (‘shorter ending’).
However, the fact that the author of Mark probably ends his gospel without
mentioning the resurrection appearances (Mark 16:8) does not imply that
he thought that they did not exist; on the contrary, he hinted that he was
aware of their existence in Mark 14:28. Another of the ‘flat contradictions
between the sources’ cited by Vermès (2008, p. 106) is that
the accounts differ regarding the number and identity of the women
who visited the tomb: one, Mary Magdalene, in John and Mark B; two,
Mary Magdalene and the other Mary, in Matthew; three, Mary Magdalene, Mary the mother of James and Salome, in Mark A; and several,
Mary Magdalene, Joanna, Mary the mother of James and other women
from Galilee, in Luke.
But Vermès fails to consider that, although John mentions only Mary Magdalene by name (20:1), her first-person plural language in verse 2 indicates
that she is speaking for more than one person: ‘we don’t know where they
have put him’ (Blomberg 2001; emphasis in original). None of the Gospels’
authors was obliged to provide a complete list of the names of the women
involved or a complete account of what the women were told to do. Thus
there is no real contradiction between the portrayal of telling the disciples
that Jesus would meet them in Galilee (Matthew and Mark) and to remember what Jesus had told them earlier in Galilee (Luke); there is no reason
why it couldn’t be both!
Ehrman complains that such attempts to resolved the differences require
‘a lot of interpretive gymnastics,’ and that
it is solved in a very curious way indeed, for this solution is saying, in
effect, that what really happened is what is not narrated by any of these
Gospels: for none of them mentions two angels! This way of interpreting the texts does so by imagining a new text that is unlike any of the
others, so reconcile the four to one another. Anyone is certainly free to
construct their own Gospel if they want to, but that’s probably not the
best way to interpret the Gospels that we already have.
(Ehrman 2014, pp. 134–135)
However, such attempts at reconciling the accounts, while widely disparaged by many biblical scholars today, are in fact utilizing methods recognized in historical studies. For example, historian Gilbert Garraghan (1973,
p. 314) writes, ‘almost any critical history that discusses the evidence for
important statement will furnish examples of discrepant or contradictory
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accounts and the attempts which are made to reconcile them.’ With regards
to the role of ‘imagining’ (the word Ehrman used), historians Paul Conkin
and Roland Stromberg (1971, pp. 214–215) note,
a historian, confronted with, and in some way baffled or disturbed by,
disparate phenomena that seem to give evidence for some human past,
begins to construct imaginary accounts or narratives, perhaps including within them several causal judgments, in an attempt to unify and
make some sense out of all the confusing phenomena; that he constantly
checks each invented story against a residue of acquired knowledge
(vicarious verification) as well as against the focal phenomena, that he
keeps up this game until he finds a story consistent with what he already
knows, and which gives some pattern to his phenomena (or most of
them); that his narrative also almost inevitably implicates other, as yet
unexperienced phenomena; that he then, either directly or by inferential, deductive chaining (desired phenomenon A necessitates B, and B
necessitates C, which if found will have the same evidential significance
as A) seeks out the specifically indicated evidence, knowing always that
one unpredicted and noncoherent phenomenon will falsify his story;
that he keeps restructuring his story until, finally, with the most diligent search of all evidence then available, he has so integrated the original phenomena and the induced phenomena as to have a quite unified,
plausible, and supported account.
Wenham (1992, p. 128) complains that many biblical scholars ‘give up
too easily’ instead of doing the necessary historical spadework:
Of course, the individuality of different writers must be respected, and
the distinctive aims of different works (where these can be discerned)
must be taken into account. Forced harmonizing is worthless. The tendency today, however, is the opposite—to force the New Testament
writings into disharmony, in order to emphasize their individuality. . . .
The harmonistic approach, on the other hand, enables one to ponder
long and conscientiously over every detail of the narrative and to see
how one account illuminates and modifies another. Gradually (without
fudging) people and events take shape and grow in solidity and the
scenes come to life in one’s mind.
Ehrman’s complaint that ‘that’s probably not the best way to interpret the
Gospels’ confuses (A) ‘interpreting the Gospels’ with (B) ‘showing that there
is no incompatibility between the Gospels.’ These are two distinct tasks. For
(A), one might ask for positive evidence to show that an idea is what a Gospel author expresses, but for (B) it is perfectly legitimate to suggest a possible scenario which a particular Gospel author may not have thought of, as
long as the possibility is not contradictory to what he expressed. Ehrman’s
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dismissal is based on a misunderstanding of the intention of (B)—such
efforts do not have to be perceived as attempts to understand what each of
the Gospel authors had in mind but rather as attempts to show that what
each of them has expressed is not contradictory to the other. ‘Not being
what a Gospel author had in mind’ is not the same as ‘contradictory to what
a Gospel author expressed.’ We also need to distinguish (B) ‘showing that
there is no incompatibility between the Gospels’ from (C) ‘showing that a
particular account of reconciling the Gospels is true.’ For (C), one would
have to provide evidence to show that a particular account is true. However,
for (B) it is sufficient to suggest a possible (not necessarily actual) scenario
that is not contradictory with the Gospels and then say, ‘for all we know,
this is how it could have happened.’ In response to those who argue against
the historicity of the traditions concerning Jesus’ resurrection, it is enough
to show that the arguments for or against the historicity of those traditions
are finely balanced and that these traditions remain broadly viable, in which
case a historian can then plausibly choose to accept them based on other
grounds (Wilckens 2002).
For all their apparent differences in the minor details, the Gospels’
accounts show sequential similarities concerning the main outlines of the
story with the early tradition in 1 Corinthians 15:3–8, such as concerning
Jesus’ death, burial, resurrection on the third day, appearances to individuals and appearances to the group of disciples (Allison 2005a, pp. 235–239).
The following is one logically possible scenario which takes into consideration the other details:10
Very early11 a group of women, including Mary Magdalene, Mary the
mother of James, Salome, and Joanna set out for the tomb. Meanwhile
two angels appearing in human form are sent; there is an earthquake and
one angel rolls back the stone and sits upon it. The soldiers faint and then
revive and flee into the city. The women arrive and find the tomb opened.12

10 Adapted from Casteel (1992, pp. 212–213); Bock (2002, pp. 394–404); Geisler and Howe
(1997, pp. 365, 377, 400).
11 Mark 16:2 says ‘when the sun has risen’, while John 20:1 states ‘Early . . . when it was
still dark.’ Geisler and Howe (1997, p. 377) harmonizes these two accounts by suggesting
that Mark 16:2 denotes early dawn (cf. Ps. 104:22), when it was still dark relatively speaking. Licona (2016, p. 171) suggests that ‘it is possible that it was “still dark” (per John)
when the women left for the tomb, and they arrived “after the sun had risen” (per Mark).
Everyone who has taken time to view a sunrise knows that the amount of daylight changes
significantly between ten minutes prior to sunrise and ten minutes after.’
12 Ehrman (2014, p. 134) asks, ‘was the stone already rolled away when they arrived at the
tomb (Mark, Luke, and John), or explicitly not (Matthew)?’ In reply, Wenham (1992,
p. 78) points out, ‘first century writers had to work without the help of such modern aids
as parenthesising brackets, and that, since Greeks care little about relative time, the use of
the pluperfect tense was much less favoured by them than by us. Often in the New Testament the aorist tense needs to be rendered by an English pluperfect. So Matthew 28:2 could
be inserted in brackets and translated with no impropriety: (And behold there had been
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Without waiting, Mary Magdalene, assuming someone has taken the Lord’s
body, runs back to the city to tell Peter and John.13 The other women enter
the tomb and see the body is gone. The two angels14 appear to them and
tell them of the resurrection. The women then leave to take the news to the
disciples.15 Peter and John run to the tomb with Mary Magdalene following. Peter and John enter the tomb, see the grave clothes, and then return
to the city, but Mary Magdalene remains at the tomb weeping. She saw two
angels,16 who ask why she is weeping, and Jesus makes his first appearance
to her.17 Jesus next appears to the other women who are on their way to
find the disciples. Jesus then appears to Peter. He appears subsequently to
the two disciples on the road to Emmaus, and then appears to a group of
disciples including all of the Eleven except Thomas in Jerusalem.18

13

14

15

16
17
18

a great earthquake. For an angel of the Lord had descended from heaven, and had come
and rolled back the stone, and sat upon it. His appearance was like lightning, and his raiment white as snow. And for fear of him the guards had trembled and become like dead
men.) . . . We may thus conclude that the earthquake took place before the arrival of any
women and that the terrified guards had already left by the time they arrived.’
John 20:2. Against this, Vermès (2008, p. 106) thinks that Mark 16:1–6 implies that Mary
Magdalene (together with other women) also heard the young man telling her that Jesus
has risen. In reply, the third person plurals (‘they,’ ‘them’) used in the passage might be
referring to the women as a group, but this does not exclude the possibility that a member
of the group might have left. Wenham (1992, p. 128) notes that probably ‘ “the women”
and “them” do not refer precisely to the two mentioned by name. Matthew is giving the
detail necessary to convey his message, further elaboration would have been pointless
distraction.’
Luke 24:4 and John 20:12. Vermès (2008, p. 106) complains that Mark 16:5 and Matthew
28:2–5 say that there is one man/angel. However, Mark and Matthew do not say that there
is only one. They probably wanted to focus on the angel that spoke to the women. Shining
the ‘literary spotlight’ in this way is a legitimate narrative device which is used by ancient
historians (see Licona 2016, p. 172; Licona notes that while Luke 24:4 describes ‘two men
in dazzling/ lightning-like clothing,’ Luke has angels in mind, since he goes on to call them
‘angels’ (24:22–23), and ‘white or shining clothing in the New Testament are often the
mark of a heavenly visitation’ (p. 173). One might object that Mark 16:5, Luke 24:3–4,
and John 20:11–12 portray the angels inside the tomb, while Matthew 28:2–6 portrays the
angel sitting on the stone he had rolled away from the tomb. Licona replies that Matthew
28:6 has the angel say, ‘Come! See the place where he was laid,’ which suggests movement
to somewhere else in this context (i.e. movement into the tomb) (ibid.).
Vermès (2008, p. 105) complains that while Mark 16:8 states that the women said nothing
to anyone, Matthew 28:8 says that the women ran to bring his disciples word. In reply,
Hurtado (2016b) argues, ‘said nothing to anyone’ should be understood as said nothing to anyone else on their way back to the disciples, ‘for they were afraid.’ See further,
Chapter 6.
John 20:12.
John 20:11–16.
John 20:19–24. One might ask, ‘According to John’s account Jesus did not appear to
Thomas the first time he appeared to the apostles as a group, but does this not contradict
Luke 24:33–36, which portrays that the Eleven were at the gathering?’ In reply, Bock
(1996, Vol. 2. p. 1921, n. 27, citing Arndt and Plummer) suggests that Eleven is a general
way to refer to the group of apostles without Judas; it does not imply that all 11 apostles
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Crossley (2013, p. 490) objects that according to Luke-Acts, the resurrection appearances and the ascension do not take place in Galilee but in Jerusalem, and he claims that this is contrary to Mark and Matthew. In reply,
although Jesus and the angels had told the women to tell the disciples to go
to Galilee (Mark 16:7, Matt. 28:10), the disciples’ persistent unbelief of the
women’s words—indicated in the text of Luke itself (24:11)—might have
necessitated Jesus appearing to them in Jerusalem first (Luke 24:36–43).
Later they went to Galilee as instructed (Matt. 28:16), but perhaps failing
to see Jesus initially, the disciples, still discouraged and doubtful, went fishing (John 21), after which Jesus appeared to them. Vermès (2008) objects
by claiming that Luke excludes any departure from Jerusalem, citing Jesus’
instruction to them in Luke 24:49 to tarry in Jerusalem. In response, Licona
(2016, p. 177) observes,
In Luke 24:1–53, Jesus’ resurrection, all of his appearances, and his
ascension to heaven are narrated as though having occurred on that
Sunday. That Luke compressed the events in this manner is clear, since
in the sequel to his Gospel, Luke says Jesus appeared to his disciples
over a period of forty days before ascending to heaven (Acts 1:3–9).
Given this, it is possible that the command to tarry (v. 49) was not given
until after they had been in Galilee as instructed (Matt. 28:16) and came
back to Jerusalem from there (Geisler and Howe 1997, p. 400). After all,
Acts (which was written by the same author as Luke) told us there was a
gap of 40 days, but this was not evident in Luke 24. When interpreting the
New Testament, it is important to realize that first-century writers do not
always write in strict chronological order without gaps in between, sadly
this important hermeneutical principle is often ignored by those who claim
that there are contradictions in the New Testament.
In closing, it should be emphasized once again that my argument in this
chapter as well as the main argument of this book does not depend on the
harmonization given being a true account of what happened. Rather, the
harmonization is offered to show that the oft-repeated claim that the discrepancies are irreconcilable is—strictly speaking—false.

2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued for the conclusion that (1.2) there were people
who claimed to have seen the resurrected Jesus shortly after his crucifixion,
and these people included individuals (Cephas, James the brother of Jesus,

were present. Even if Thomas was present earlier in Luke 24:33, it could be that Thomas
left in the middle of Peter and other disciple’s earlier reports while expressing his doubt,
prior to Jesus’ appearance to the group.
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and Paul) and groups such as the ‘Twelve,’ the ‘more than five hundred
brethren,’ and ‘the other apostles.’
The existence of these people are implied by the very early tradition in 1
Corinthians 15:3–11, which lists these people. The alternative hypothesis
(1.1.1) that the list in 1 Corinthians 15:1–11 contains later interpolation is
contradicted by the manuscript evidence and other considerations explained
previously. The alternative hypothesis (1.1.2) that the details in the list contain erroneous information which either originated from Paul or from others who passed the information to him is contradicted by the indications
that Paul and the Corinthians knew these ‘eyewitnesses’ as well as the other
historical considerations mentioned earlier. In particular, I have noted the
importance of the claims of Jesus’ resurrection for the earliest Christians
(e.g. 1 Cor. 15:17–19, 30–32) and the presence of sceptics of bodily resurrection among the audience of the early preachers of the Gospel (1 Cor. 15:12;
cf. Acts 17:32; Luke 24:11; Matt. 28:17; pseudo-Mark 16:11). I have also
noted Bauckham’s (2006, p. 308) observation that the commonsensical idea
of ‘checking out’ the important ‘eyewitnesses’ is implicit in 1 Corinthians
15:6, and I have replied to various objections concerning this point. Paul
assumed responsibility for the tradition which he passed on to the Corinthians, and his tangled correspondences with the Corinthians indicate that he
cared about his reputation as an apostle. Various textual evidence indicates
that Paul knew others (e.g. James, Peter, and other apostles; see Gal. 1–2)
whom he listed as ‘eyewitnesses’ and proclaimers of Jesus’ resurrection in 1
Corinthians 15:1–11, and that he knew that the Corinthians knew them and/
or could check them out too (1 Cor. 1:12, 9:1–5, 15:6). Moreover, the early
Christians were quite mobile, Jewish Christians would have travelled yearly
to Jerusalem for festivals, and a well-attested ‘networking’ among early
Christians existed (Bauckham 2006; Hurtado 2013). Falsification by his
numerous opponents at Corinth and elsewhere would have been easy, and
the costs would have been high. Given these considerations, Paul would not
have made up the list of supposed eyewitnesses or passed on one which was
made up by others and which he himself did not know was correct. I have
also observed that, aside from Paul’s letters, there are other d
 ocuments in the
first and early second century—such as the Four Gospels, Acts, 1 Clement,
Letters of Ignatius, etc.—which also claimed that there were various eyewitnesses of the resurrected Jesus. Thus the credibility of the tradition in
1 Corinthians 15:3–11 is enhanced ‘because it is in part confirmed by the
narrative tradition, which is independent’ (Theissen and Merz 1998, p. 490).
Sceptics might object that (1.1.2) explains the apparent contradictions
in the New Testament concerning the ‘post-mortem appearances,’ which
is often assumed to be irreconcilable. In reply, many of the apparent contradictions can be explained by literary devices which were also employed
by other ancient historians such as Plutarch (Licona 2016). Utilizing the
work of Vincent Taylor (1953), Wright (2003), and recent work on memory
and the historical Jesus by Le Donne (2009), I have argued that each of
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the authors of the Gospels chose from the pool of early traditions those
details which fitted the needs of his audience, and told the stories according to his own style. I have noted that first-century writers (e.g. Josephus)
who intended to tell others what actually happened took for granted that
they were not obliged to mention every event, nor every detail of an event
(Wright 2003, pp. 648–649), and I have argued (with respect to examples
cited by Vermès 2008; Ehrman 2014) that one must be careful not to regard
an apparent contradiction which resulted from the incompleteness of the
relevant accounts as a real contradiction.
I have explained that attempts at reconciling apparently contradictory accounts (e.g. Bock 2002), while widely disparaged by many biblical
scholars today, are in fact utilizing methods recognized in historical studies (Garraghan 1973, p. 314; Conkin and Stromberg 1971, pp. 214–215).
Ehrman’s (2014, pp. 134–135) complaint that ‘that’s probably not the best
way to interpret the Gospels’ confuses (A) ‘interpreting the Gospels’ with
(B) ‘showing that there is no incompatibility between the Gospels.’ These
are two distinct tasks. For (A), one might ask for positive evidence to show
that an idea is what a Gospel author expresses, but for (B) it is perfectly
legitimate to suggest a possible scenario which a particular Gospel author
may not have thought of, as long as the possibility is not contradictory to
what he expressed. Ehrman’s dismissal is based on a misunderstanding of
the intention of (B)—such efforts do not have to be perceived as attempts
to understand what each of the Gospel authors had in mind but rather as
attempts to show that what each of them has expressed is not contradictory to the other. ‘Not being what a Gospel authors had in mind’ is not the
same as ‘contradictory to what a Gospel author expressed.’ We also need
to distinguish (B) from (C) showing that a particular account of reconciling
the Gospels is true. For (C), one would have to provide evidence to show
that a particular account is true. However, for (B) it is sufficient to suggest a
possible (not necessarily actual) scenario that is not contradictory with the
Gospels and then say, ‘for all we know, this is how it could have happened.’
I have offered a possible harmonization which shows the falsity of the claim
that the discrepancies are irreconcilable.
On the other hand, the apparent lack of agreement indicates that the stories were not carefully made up but is what we would expect from first-hand
accounts of a shocking event given very soon after the event (Wright 2003,
p. 612), and they include numerous embarrassing that false accounts would
be careful to avoid (Casteel 1992).
In conclusion, given the aforementioned historical considerations, it is reasonable to conclude with Theissen and Merz (1998, p. 490) concerning the
post-mortem appearances listed in 1 Corinthians 15:3–11 that ‘There is no
doubt . . . they come from people who attest an overwhelming experience.’

3	The earliest Christians
experienced something
which they thought was the
resurrected Jesus

3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, I argued that there were people in mid-first-century
Palestine who claimed to have witnessed the resurrected Jesus. In this chapter, I shall argue that at least some (if not all) of them did witness something
which they thought was Jesus.
As noted in Chapter 1, the no experience hypothesis (these people thought
they had experienced the resurrected Jesus, but none of them had any such
experience) was popular during the Deist Controversy. It was then suggested
that the apostles learned that power and free meals would eventually come
to religious leaders, and therefore they lied by proclaiming that they had
seen the bodily resurrected Jesus in order to start a religion (Allison 2005a,
pp. 207–208). Its popularity declined among scholars after the detailed refutations by William Paley and others. Nevertheless, variations of it can still
be found today. For example, it has recently been proposed that the disciples’ love for Jesus, their loyalty to one another, or their belief that the cause
for Jesus would be a necessary good for all humankind could have made
them proclaim that they had seen the resurrected Jesus and suffer willingly
for it, even though they did not have any such experience.1 Alternatively,
the earliest Christians initially believed in Jesus’ resurrection not because
they had such experiences, but because they ruminated about his traumatic
crucifixion and turned to Old Testament passages such as Isaiah 53 to try
to understand it, by which they came to believe that Jesus was the Righteous One and that God must have vindicated and exalted him. They subsequently thought that if Jesus was exalted, he was no longer dead, and so
they later circulated the stories of his resurrection.2 Although the disciples’
willingness to die for Jesus’ resurrection has been offered as evidence for

1 This suggestion is noted in Carrier (1999, 2005), although he goes on to say that ‘Nevertheless,
I think it more probable that Peter and James, and certainly Paul, maybe several others, saw
something that inspired their faith.’
2 This is adapted from the hypothesis suggested by Ehrman in Craig and Ehrman (2006,
p. 29). Ehrman goes on to suggest, ‘Believers who knew he had been raised from the dead
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their credibility by Origen, Paley, and others, Ehrman has recently objected
by asking what the evidence is that these disciples died for their belief in the
resurrection (Craig and Ehrman 2006, p. 29). After all, it has been argued
that, apart from Peter and James, there is no solid proof that any members
of the Twelve were martyred (Meier 1991–2016, Vol. 3, p. 213), and in
many cases the reason for which the persecutors persecuted Christians was
not the resurrection but other reasons, such as viewing them as posing a
threat to the Temple (Regev 2009).
The case against the no experience hypothesis is therefore not as straightforward as many people think. In order to address the myriads of possible
objections to the underlying assumptions and supporting arguments, it will
be useful if these objections can be essentially reduced to a few known ones,
such that all of them are considered before the conclusion that ‘at least
some (if not all) of these people did witness something which they thought
was Jesus’ is made. By analyzing the structure of the dialectic syllogistically,
I shall now show that this can be done, as follows:
(2.2.1) Either (2.2.1.1) or (2.2.1.2) is true:3
(2.2.1.1) 
Those who claimed to have witnessed the resurrected
Jesus in mid-first-century Palestine were not willing to
suffer for their religion.
(2.2.1.2) At least some (if not all) of those who claimed to have
witnessed the resurrected Jesus were willing to suffer for
their religion, in which case either (2.2.2.1) or (2.2.2.2)
is true:
(2.2.2.1) They did not have any reasons for it.
(2.2.2.2) At least some (if not all) of them had reasons for it, in
which case either (2.2.3.1) or (2.2.3.2) is true:
(2.2.3.1) They did not believe that Jesus resurrected and had other reasons for why they claimed to have seen the resurrected Jesus.
(2.2.3.2) 
At least some (if not all) of them believed that Jesus
resurrected, in which case either (2.2.4.1) or (2.2.4.2) is true:
(2.2.4.1) They believed that Jesus resurrected not because they had
witnessed something which they thought was Jesus—they
did not have such an experience, but they claimed that
they had such an experience.
(2.2.4.2) At least some (if not all) of them had witnessed something
which they thought was Jesus.
I shall assess each of these disjunctions in the rest of this chapter.

started having visions of him,’ and thus his hypothesis cannot strictly be classified as no
experience hypothesis since the disciples did have certain experiences later (i.e. visions).
3 Note that ‘or’ is taken in the exclusive sense in this syllogism as well as the next.
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3.2 At least some (if not all) of those who claimed to have
witnessed the resurrected Jesus were willing to suffer for
their religion
Concerning the disjunction (2.2.1.1) vs (2.2.1.2), as noted earlier the extent
of martyrdom of earliest Christianity has been questioned in recent literature. Nevertheless, it should be noted that it is not required for the objector
of the no experience hypothesis to show that these disciples did die for their
faith, but that they were willing to suffer and die for their faith. Their genuine willingness to give up everything and die for their faith can be inferred
from the following considerations:
First, these disciples knew that their leader (i.e. Jesus) was already vilified
and brutally crucified, and yet they chose to proclaim him knowing that a
similar fate could well befall them for doing that. After all, it was usual to
execute the followers of insurgents alongside them, and it is likely that most
of the followers of Jesus were hiding, in fear of their lives, at the time of his
death (Joanna McGrath 2006, p. 298).
Second, persecutions were indeed meted out against these disciples. In his
letter to the Galatians, Paul admitted that he was persecuting Christians in
his pre-Christian days (Gal. 1:13, 22; see also 1 Cor. 15:9, Phil. 3:6), and
dating back 14 years (Gal. 2:1) from the time Galatians was written, his persecution of Christians took place at the very beginning of Christianity. James
Dunn notes that, from a historical point of view, ‘there is no doubt that Saul
was heavily involved in persecution of the embryonic Christian movement’
(Dunn 2008, p. 335; Dunn summarized the evidence on pp. 335–345). This
shows that, even though there was no ubiquitous empire-wide attempt to
eradicate Christians as in the later centuries (and there is an ongoing scholarly debate over the extent to which early Christians were actually persecuted), there were persecutions directed against the very first Christians
who, of course, would have included these disciples. The portrayal in Acts
8:1 that ‘a severe persecution began against the church in Jerusalem, and all
except the apostles were scattered throughout the countryside of Judea and
Samaria’ does not imply that the apostles were not persecuted, but ‘only
that they did not leave Jerusalem. This may be explained, for example, by
their having taken a lower profile for a while’ (Kankaanniemi 2010, p. 155).
Moreover, Paul, who subsequently became an apostle himself, was persecuted for his belief in Jesus as indicated by his appeals to public knowledge
of his sufferings (1 Cor. 4:11–13; 15:30; 2 Cor. 11:23–26; Phil. 1:7; 1 Thess.
2:2, 9; for the historicity of the persecution of Paul, see Hurtado 2005,
pp. 172–174). Such an admittance to being a persecutor and an appeal to
public knowledge of persecution are reasons to think that the early Christian references to persecution cannot be explained away as merely rhetorically motivated claims. Rather, these references have basis in history, which
is only to be expected given that their opponents bothered to get Jesus crucified (the fact that they persuaded Pilate to crucify Jesus is not only attested
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by all the Gospels, but also by Josephus [Antiquities 18:64] and the Talmud
[Sanhedrin 43a]).
Finally, at least a number of the ‘eyewitnesses of the resurrected Jesus’ did
die from the persecutions against Christians. James, the brother of Jesus,
who was attested to have witnessed the resurrected Jesus (1 Cor. 15:7; see
also Chapter 2), was killed by the Jews as recorded by Josephus (Antiquities, Book 20, chapter 9). The apostle James who was one of the Twelve was
executed by King Herod according to the author of Acts (Acts 12:2), and
Dunn notes that no one doubts the historicity of this report (Dunn 2008,
p. 406, n. 114). The early church fathers unanimously affirmed that Peter
and Paul were publicly executed under Nero’s persecution of Christians
(Habermas and Licona 2004, pp. 56–60, 270–274, n. 46–57). Tertullian
(Scorpiace 15) states that this was in the Roman public record when he
writes,
And if a heretic wishes his confidence to rest upon a public record, the
archives of the empire will speak, as would the stones of Jerusalem. We
read the lives of the Caesars: At Rome Nero was the first who stained
with blood the rising faith. Then is Peter girt by another, when he is
made fast to the cross.
McDowell (2015, p. 91) notes,
If there were no such public records, Tertullian would have automatically
undermined his credibility. His appeal to them indicates his confidence
that they existed and, if examined, would corroborate his testimony.
Therefore, Tertullian was likely relying upon even earlier public records
about the Neronian persecution and the fates of Peter and Paul.
McDowell responds to other objections and concludes on page 91 that
the martyrdom of Peter is ‘the highest possible probability,’ citing John
21:18–19, 1 Clement 5:4–5 (which mentions that this happened ‘in quite
recent time’ and ‘of our own generation’), Ignatius’ Letter to the Smyrneans
3.1–2 and Letter to the Romans 4.3, Apocalypse of Peter 14.4, Ascension of
Isaiah 4:2–3, the Acts of Peter, Dionysius of Corinth, Eusebius Ecclesiastical History 2.25, and Tertullian Scorpiace 15, and noting that ‘lack of any
competing narrative weighs favorably for the traditional view.’
Suetonius (Nero 16.2, ‘punishments were also inflicted on the Christians,
a sect professing a new and mischievous religious belief’) and Tacitus also
noted Nero’s persecution of Christians, the latter observing,
Mockeries were added to their deaths, so that wrapped in the skins of
wild animals they might die torn to pieces by dogs, or nailed to crosses
they were burned to death to furnish light at night when day had ended.
Nero made his own gardens available for this spectacle and put on
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circus games, mingling with the people while dressed in a charioteer’s
uniform or standing in his chariot.
(The Annals 15.44.2–5; for defence of the historicity
of Nero’s persecution of Christians, see Jones [2017];
Van der Lans and Bremmer [2017]; cf. Shaw [2015])

Historian Paul Maier (2013, p. 55) notes, ‘rarely do both friendly and
hostile sources agree on anything, but the persecution of Christians is one
of them.’ The willingness of the earliest Christians to suffer for their religion
can be seen from the fact that they continued their mission even though they
had seen their fellow Christians persecuted and killed for it (Habermas and
Licona 2004, pp. 59–60).

3.3 At least some (if not all) of them believed that Jesus
resurrected
Concerning the disjunction (2.2.2.1) vs (2.2.2.2), some sceptics might object
that people sometimes act without thinking, and the disciples may have been
in a state of frenzy. In response, as noted in Chapter 2 the earliest Christians were rational enough to debate (e.g. Gal. 2:11–21), to think about the
evidence for their faith (e.g. 1 Cor. 15:6), to consider its consequences (1
Cor. 15:14–19)—such as having to face frequent dangers and martyrdom
(1 Cor. 15:30–32)—and to persuade others to hold to their views. Furthermore, after the crucifixion of Jesus, the disciples had time to think about
consequences before they proclaimed the resurrection, and after they began
preaching many of them had many years to reflect on the consequences of
their proclamation. Therefore, we can be quite sure that the disciples had
reasons for which they were willing to suffer for their religion.
Concerning the disjunction (2.2.3.1) vs (2.2.3.2), as noted earlier, some
sceptics have suggested that the disciples might have claimed that Jesus
resurrected without believing it. They might have lied out of self-serving
motives (e.g. desire for free meals) or ‘noble’ ones (e.g. love for Jesus, loyalty
to one another, belief that the cause for Jesus would be a necessary good for
all humankind) in order to persuade others to follow Christianity.
However, these suggested motives would not work. If the disciples lied out
of self-serving motives (e.g. desire for free meals), they would not have been
willing to be tortured and to die for what they knew was a lie. J.P. Moreland
(1998, p. 252) notes, ‘It’s not as though there were a mansion awaiting them
on the Mediterranean. They faced a life of hardship. They often went without food, slept exposed to the elements, were ridiculed, beaten, imprisoned.’
If the disciples wanted to make a name for themselves and be remembered
by posterity, it is unlikely that they would choose a lie that could be easily
falsified (e.g. if one of the many ‘witnesses’ were to let go of the hoax under
persecution). If the disciples had ‘noble’ motives, they would have refrained
from lying, especially so given that the ‘Jesus tradition’ condemned lying

Christians experienced something

73

(Matt. 5:37). While loyalty to one another may have been their consideration, the more basic question they would have asked one another must have
been, ‘Why are we continuing to tell this lie together anyway?’
Moreover, lying about such a fundamental matter concerning their faith
would be inconsistent with their devotion to the God of Israel. For according to their beliefs, to make up Jesus’ resurrection would be judged guilty
as false witnesses and condemned by the God of Israel (1 Cor. 15:15: ‘We
are even found to be misrepresenting God, because we testified of God
that he raised Christ—whom he did not raise if it is true that the dead
are not raised’; see also Lev. 19:11, Prov. 19:5, 21:28). While religious suicide bombers believed that their sacrifice would be rewarded by God after
death, the disciples believed that sacrificing for being false witnesses would
be condemned by God after death. While many people throughout history
would be willing to sacrifice everything (including their own lives) for what
they believe to be true (even though it may not actually be true), no large
group of people would be willing to sacrifice everything for what they do
not believe to be true and be condemned by God after death for being false
witnesses. The earliest Christians’ devotion to the God of Israel can be seen
from their condemnation of idolatry (l Cor. 10:14–22) and their affirmation that the wrath of God is against those who worshiped and served the
creature rather than the Creator (Rom. 1:18–25). Hurtado observes that,
although letters such as 1 Thessalonians and 1 Corinthians are letters sent
to Gentile churches, the religious standpoint is ‘mainly shaped by biblical/
Jewish tradition. . . . So, e.g., the rhetoric of 1 Thess. 1:9–10, about forsaking “idols” (a Jewish word for the gods!) to serve “a true and living God”
(note the combativeness of this phrase); and the hostile and disdainful treatment of pagan religion (in 1 Cor. 8 and 10)’ (Hurtado 2014). Other texts
in the New Testament likewise indicate that the early Christians held the
attitude that worship should be exclusively directed to the one Creator God.
For example, Acts 14:8–18 portrays the people at Lystra wanting to worship Paul and Barnabas as gods after Paul had done a miracle, but Barnabas
and Paul refused, urging them instead to worship ‘the living God, who made
the heaven and the earth and the sea and all that is in them’ (v. 15). It is
evident that the earliest Christians held to the commandment: ‘You shall
have no other gods before me’ (Exodus 20:3). They refused to honour the
pagan gods and refused to call the Roman emperor ‘Lord,’ even in the face
of persecution. If their devotion to YHWH were fake, during times of severe
persecution they would not have evinced genuine piety consistently in the
presence of other Christians and of their persecutors, without letting out the
hoax. Their devotion to God could have been perceived by others in many
ways; for example, it could have been perceived through their worship and
their prayers during times of suffering or the letters they wrote to others
during persecution. If their devotion was not genuine, others who had come
to believe in Jesus based on their testimonies and who were also undergoing
suffering at the same time would have noticed it, and their hypocrisy would
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have been exposed. David Strauss’ sarcastic remarks concerning the hoax
hypothesis remains pertinent:
The apostles are supposed to have known best that there was not one
single word of truth in the news of their master’s resurrection . . . yet
regardless of this, they are supposed to have spread the same story with
a fire of conviction that sufficed to give the world a different form.
(Strauss 1862, pp. 276–277)
Moreover, if the disciples lied about Jesus’ resurrection, it is hard to believe
that during times of severe persecution they would have evinced genuine
conviction that Jesus was resurrected in the presence of other Christians and
of their persecutors, without letting out the hoax. As Pascal observes,
The hypothesis that the Apostles were knaves is quite absurd. Follow
it out to the end, and imagine these twelve men meeting after Jesus’
death and conspiring to say that he had risen from the dead. This means
attacking all the powers that be. The human heart is singularly susceptible to fickleness, to change, to promises, to bribery. One of them had
only to deny his story under these inducements, or still more because
of possible imprisonment, tortures and death, and they would all have
been lost. Follow that out.
(Pensées, 310; in Pascal 1670/1995, p. 97)
It might be asked, ‘How do we know that none of these disciples recanted
when they were tortured?’ To this question it can be replied that if any
of these crucial ‘eyewitnesses of the resurrected Jesus’ recanted when they
were tortured, their persecutors and other opponents of the early Christians
would have made it widely known given that they were evidently motivated
to destroy the Christian movement (Habermas and Licona 2004, pp. 278–
279, n. 63–64; Licona 2010, p. 371). This would have shown the Christian
faith to be ‘in vain’ (1 Cor. 15:17), and it probably would not have survived
beyond the first century. Licona (2010, p. 371) argues,
We may also expect that a recantation by any of the disciples would
have provided ammunition for Christian opponents like Celsus and
Lucian in the third quarter of the second century, the former of which
wrote against the church while the latter wrote of the Christian movement in a pejorative manner.
Carrier (2005a, pp. 179, 227, n. 333) objects that not a single attack of
Christianity was known until the second century. Parson claims that ancient
secular people of the first century were generally not interested in Christianity, and thus most people would not have bothered to refute it even if it
were false (Parsons 2005, p. 439). He argues that there would have been a
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further time lapse before anyone is sufficiently irritated by their preaching to
go and check. The Romans did not care what is preached so long it did not
disturb the peace, while the Jews would have ignored them until they had
a sufficient number of people. Then, instead of scoring debate points, they
would simply persecute the believers (Parsons 2005, pp. 448, 451, n. 43).
Lowder argues that first-century non-Christians had about as little interest
in refuting Christian claims as twentieth-century sceptics had in refuting the
misguided claims of the Heaven’s Gate cult. He notes that Jewish sources do
not even mention the resurrection, much less attempt to refute it, and cites
Martin who says, ‘This hardly suggests that Jewish leaders were actively
engaged in attempting to refute the Resurrection story but failing in their
efforts’ (Lowder 2005, p. 288).
In response, one can agree that the birth of Christianity occurred in a
backwater region of the Roman Empire, and that many Roman historians
would not have bothered much to record down details concerning Jesus’
resurrection, since they dismissed Christianity as a superstition (e.g. Tacitus
calls Christianity ‘a most mischievous superstition,’ Annals 15.44). However, the non-Christian Jews would have been concerned about refuting the
Christians right at the beginning; given that they bothered to get Jesus crucified, they would be interested to refute a sect that proclaims his resurrection,
carries on his teachings, and wins converts. Many hostile eyewitnesses of
Jesus (e.g. the Jewish religious leaders) who were strongly opposed to the
Christian movement would still have been alive and active in mid-first century. As noted previously, varied evidence indicates that persecutions were
indeed meted out by the Jews against the earliest Christians. Concerning
Carrier’s claims that not a single attack of Christianity was known until the
second century and Parson’s claim that the Jews would not be interested in
scoring debate points, the polemic in Matthew 28 indicates that the Jews
were claiming that the disciples stole Jesus’ body in the first century. (There
are additional reasons for thinking that this polemic started right from the
beginning at around AD 30; see the discussion of the guards at the tomb in
Chapter 6).
Sceptics seem to envision Christianity spreading secretly in some quiet
and unknown neighbourhoods like many cults do. This is contrary to LukeActs portrayal that Christianity was preached openly right at its beginning
at public centres such as the Temple and synagogues (the headquarters of
their enemies!) in big cities where Jews from all walks of life gathered, that
the claims concerning Jesus were openly debated (Acts 3:1–4:4, 13:14–48,
17:2–4, 18:28, etc.), and that the things concerning Christianity that Paul
mentions had not been ‘done in a corner’ (26:26). Sceptics would doubt the
historicity of this portrayal. However, Keener (2012, p. 208) observes,
Luke’s narrative arena in Acts contains real geography (often known
to his audience, especially in the Aegean region) in quite recent history,
in contrast to novels. Such settings demanded more accuracy than the

76

Christians experienced something
distant times or exotic locations sometimes featured in other kinds of
works. When Luke speaks of Paul’s conflicts in synagogues of specific
locales, or the behavior of local authorities, or the founding of local
churches, he reports matters that may well be preserved in local memories at the time of his writing. Local churches could dispute his assertions; synagogues could treat what they heard of his reports in the way
they responded to and generated other polemic. Luke could not afford
to get his basic facts wrong if he wished a wide readership, especially
in the regions on which his narrative focuses. And it seems likely that
just as Luke is disposed to quote biblical texts accurately, he would
also wish to communicate accurately the history of his community.
Although the former belonged to the community’s common repository
of information, it appears that some of the latter did as well (Luke 1:4).4

That the use of synagogues was Paul’s missionary strategy for a long time
is confirmed by Paul’s own recollection of how often he suffered under Jewish discipline (five times he had received 39 lashes [2 Cor. 11.24]), for it is
difficult to imagine that Paul would have been punished and persecuted
if he avoided synagogue communities and lived solely as a gentile among
gentile populations (Dunn 2008, pp. 421, 677). That the earliest Christians
were punished by the Jews in public places, as inferred from passages such
as 2 Corinthians 11:24, also implies that the message that they believed and
preached would have been known to the Jews publicly, as these would have
been the cause of their punishment. Citing Horbury’s (2006, pp. 43–66)
study on the disciplinary and expulsion practices of Second Temple Judaism, Kankaanniemi (2010, p. 234) argues that ‘Paul’s punishments in the
synagogues (2. Cor. 11:24) indicate that some sort of official judgement had
been given and thus verbal accusations presented. The Jews hardly whipped
people haphazardly without providing a proper rationalization for the punishment.’ Moreover, it should also be noted that the Jewish community in
a major city was not a small, despised group but of sufficient social status to attract significant numbers of Gentile adherents (ibid., p. 677). It is
unreasonable to think that the people could have heard the proclamation
of the resurrection at the synagogues without having the basic curiosity to
ask about the details (‘what did the disciples see?’ etc.), especially when
what was being proclaimed is so extraordinary and significant. The Jewish
opponents who bothered to get Jesus crucified and punish early Christians
such as Paul would have been interested to investigate the details and refute
the claims of a sect that proclaims his resurrection and carried on his teachings, especially when this sect was winning over their people in their places
of worship! The silence of the early written Jewish sources in refuting the

4 Keener (2012) also replied to other objections against the historical reliability of Acts, for
example its apparent inconsistency with Paul’s epistles; cf. Carrier (2009).
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resurrection can therefore be explained by the fact that they thought they
could not refute it convincingly (it is interesting to note that Jewish polemic
that the disciples stole the body is reflected in Christian sources).
In summary, even if many people in the first-century Roman Empire were
not interested about Christianity, there were certainly a significant group
of people (viz. the religious leaders of the Jews) who were actively trying to
demolish Christianity right from the beginning.
Even if (against the odds) the persecutors had not made any recantation
by the crucial ‘eyewitnesses of the resurrected Jesus’ widely known (if there
were any such recantation), given that the early Christian movement was
a network of close communication and personal contacts with the ‘eyewitnesses’ (see Chapter 2), the news of their recantation would have been
widely known among the Christians anyway. This would have caused them
to suspect that their faith was worthless (cf. 1 Cor. 15:17) and thus to leave
the faith, and Christianity would not have survived further persecutions.
At this point, it might be objected that these disciples’ willingness to suffer for their religion does not necessarily imply their willingness to suffer for
Jesus’ resurrection. Indeed, it might not have been the case that in all cases
of persecution the persecutors persecuted the earliest Christians because
they disliked their doctrine of Jesus’ resurrection, and not for other reasons.
The context of persecution in specific times and places differed from one
another. Many Jews viewed them as posing a threat to the Temple (Regev
2009), while many Romans were disgusted by the early Christians’ refusal
to pay homage to the Roman gods by offering sacrifices, which was seen as
threatening the stability of the state (McDowell 2015, pp. 51–52).
In reply, it should be noted that the doctrine of Jesus’ resurrection was
fundamental to the earliest Christians’ confession of Jesus as Lord (Hurtado 2005, pp. 192–194) and thus to their behaviour as Christians which
resulted in their persecution.
Against this, some sceptics have claimed that the Gnostic Gospels and/or
the Gospel of Thomas5 reflect a diversity of views concerning Christ among
the early Christians. Since Walter Bauer’s influential work on ‘orthodoxy’
and ‘heresy’ (1934/1971), many scholars have emphasized the element of
diversity in early Christianity. For example, building on the earlier work by
Bauer, Robinson and Koester (1971) have proposed a ‘trajectories’ model
of early Christian developments, according to which there were multiple
versions of the Christian movement right from the outset. On the basis that
the hypothetical Q saying source and the Gospel of Thomas are not preoccupied with the resurrection of Jesus, it has been claimed that there were
early Christian communities for which the resurrection of Jesus was not the

5 While some scholars classify the Gospel of Thomas as Gnostic, others object (e.g. it lacks
the distinction between the ‘true God’ and ‘the demiurge’); it is probably best to classify it as
elitist and ascetic (Gathercole 2015).
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central confession (Mack 1988, 1996, 2003; Crossan 1991; Cameron and
Miller 2004, 2011; Kloppenborg Verbin 2000, pp. 363–364; Smith 2010).
To their arguments it might be added that, after all, the Roman centurion
was said to have been convinced that Jesus was the Son of God on the basis
of witnessing Jesus’ crucifixion and death (Mark 15:39; Matthew 27:54
adds that those with him were convinced too); this implies that the belief
that Jesus resurrected was not necessary for that conviction.
However, other scholars have observed that there are reasons for thinking that the Gnostic Gospels and the Gospel of Thomas were written after
the time of the earliest Christians (i.e. later than the mid-first century) and
that they are inferior to the canonical Gospels as historical sources for Jesus
(Jenkins 2001; Hill 2010). Concerning the Gospel of Thomas in particular,
there is evidence that it is dependent on the Gospels of Matthew and Luke
and Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, that it reflects a certain chronological
and cultural distance from the historical Jesus of first-century Palestine, and
that it was probably composed in the mid-second century (Gathercole 2012,
2015). The argument from Q is invalid, for even if there is such a source (the
existence of which remains controversial; see Goodacre and Perrin 2004),
there is no adequate reason to think that the Christian communities that
used Q did not use other documents that emphasized the resurrection (Dunn
2003, pp. 149–152; Jenkins 2001, pp. 73–78). It has also been observed
that the picture of Jesus which Mack and others have constructed based
on Q is so unpolemical and inoffensive that one wonders why such a Jesus
would have aroused sufficient hatred among the Jews that they got him
crucified (Tuckett 2011, p. 1873). The work by Bauer has been credited
for highlighting the element of diversity in early Christianity. Nevertheless,
various scholars have pointed out that his arguments for how ‘orthodoxy’
triumphed are fundamentally flawed. For example, Bauer’s claim that in
several geographical areas theologies later labelled ‘heresy’ were earlier than
‘orthodox’ teaching has been shown to be inconsistent with archaeological and literary evidence (Robinson 1988; Harrington 1980). Others have
demonstrated that Bauer did not pay sufficient attention to the first-century
New Testament evidence while anachronistically using second-century data
to describe the nature of earliest (first-century) Christianity (Köstenberger
and Kruger 2010, p. 33). Likewise, the multiple trajectories model of early
Christian developments proposed by Robinson and Koester (1971) has also
been rejected by many scholars for its problematic analysis of the data (see
Köstenberger and Kruger 2010; Hurtado 2013; Hartog 2015).
While there were elements of diversity in earliest Christianity, there are
also good reasons to think that the gospel Paul preached concerning Jesus’
resurrection was the common message of the earliest Christians. Hurtado
observes that Paul’s letters (written before the Gnostic Gospels and the Gospel of Thomas) were addressed to Christian circles already established in
the AD 50s, they incorporated Christian traditions of belief and practices
from still earlier years, Paul’s associations with Christian circles included
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important Jewish Christian figures such as Peter, James, and Barnabas, and
his acquaintance with beliefs and practices of Christian circles was both
wide and extremely early (Hurtado 2003, pp. 85–86). Hurtado also points
out that, although Paul evinced concern in his epistles to maintain links with
the Jerusalem church, he did not hesitate to disagree with these Christians in
important matters, such as that concerning the terms of conversion of Gentile Christians and Paul’s own apostolic legitimacy and authority (Hurtado
2003, pp. 97, 112, 166). Varied evidence indicates that the earliest Christians did not shy away from disagreements with one another (including
disagreements with influential leaders) in matters of theological importance.
For example, even an apostle as highly respected as Peter was questioned
by those who were circumcised (as portrayed in Acts 11:2) and challenged
by Paul (Gal. 2:11–14) concerning issues related to the acceptance of the
Gentiles. Other forms of ‘gospel’ were condemned (Gal. 1:6–10), and traces
of disagreements and discussions concerning diverse issues like circumcision, the propriety and rules governing Jew and Gentile eating together,
works of the law, and so on can be found in the earliest Christian documents
(Hengel et al. 1999, pp. 59–62; Dunn 2008, pp. 416–494; Wright 1992,
pp. 453–455). Thus, we have good reason to expect Paul to have responded
in his epistles to any serious challenges to what he would regard as fundamentally important Christological matters concerning the person of Jesus
and his resurrection, which he advocated in his churches. Yet, it is extremely
significant that there is a conspicuous lack of evidence of such disagreements
in his epistles (Hurtado 2003, pp. 112, 166). While Paul had to respond to
sceptics of the resurrection in Corinth in 1 Corinthians 15:12, there is no
indication that he had to respond to the Jerusalem Christian leaders concerning Jesus’ resurrection.
On the contrary, Dunn observes that Paul’s writings (e.g. 1 Cor. 15:3,
11) indicate that the gospel of ‘first importance’ concerning Jesus was the
common message, belief, and identity marker of the earliest Christians (see
Dunn 2008, pp. 213, 533, 657). Concerning ‘first importance,’ the fundamentality of Jesus’ resurrection for the earliest Christians can be seen
from Paul’s emphatic statement: ‘If Christ has not been raised, your faith is
worthless’ (1 Cor. 15:17). The relationship between their suffering and their
belief in bodily resurrection, which was grounded in their belief that Jesus
resurrected (1 Cor. 15:3–11), can be seen in verses 30–32:
And as for us, why do we endanger ourselves every hour? I face death
every day—yes, just as surely as I boast about you in Christ Jesus our
Lord. If I fought wild beasts in Ephesus with no more than human
hopes, what have I gained? If the dead are not raised, ‘Let us eat and
drink, for tomorrow we die.’
In addition to 1 Corinthians 15:3–5, other extremely early creedal statements which circulated before their inclusion in various New Testament
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books (e.g. in Rom. 1:3–4; 4:24b—25; 1 Thess. 4:14) also indicate the
centrality of the resurrection in the earliest Christian kerygma (McDowell
2015, chapter 2). As Theissen and Merz remark, ‘In Paul’s view one’s attitude to Jesus’ resurrection is decisive for the meaning or meaninglessness of
faith in Jesus’ (Theissen and Merz 1998, p. 474).
Concerning ‘the common message, belief and identity marker of the earliest Christians,’ Hill points out that Galatians 1:23 and 2:7–9 implies that
they shared the same faith and proclaimed the same gospel; Paul’s epistles
contained earlier Christian traditions that Paul himself received from ‘those
who were in Christ before me’ (Rom. 16:7; e.g. in 1 Cor. 11:23–26 and
15:1–11, esp. 15:11 ‘Whether then it was I or they, so we proclaim and
so you have come to believe’); Paul recognized the authority of the Jerusalem church to validate—or even to invalidate—his gospel (Gal. 2:2), and
assumed the legitimacy of Jerusalem leaders (e.g. 1 Cor. 3:22 and 9:5) (Hill
2007). Given the centrality of Jesus’ resurrection for Paul, all these would
not have been the case if the Jerusalem saints, the ‘more than five hundred
brethren,’ held to a view on Jesus’ resurrection that was contrary to Paul’s.
Thus, the evidence for thinking that Paul proclaimed the same gospel concerning Jesus Christ (even though he voiced disagreements about other matters) implies that Paul’s view concerning the resurrection is also the view
of the Jerusalem Christians led by members of the Twelve. This conclusion
is consistent with other passages in the New Testament which portray the
centrality of the resurrection of Jesus in the apostolic preaching (McDowell
2015, pp. 21–22).6
Hence, even though there was certain diversity among the earliest Christians concerning a number of other convictions, and even though it is possible that a few individuals (e.g. the Roman centurion) might have been
convinced that Jesus was the Son of God prior to the belief that Jesus resurrected (Mark 15:39; Matt. 27:54), there are very good reasons for thinking that the Pauline letters reflect the widely shared convictions between
Paul and other earliest Christians (including those ‘eyewitnesses’; see 1 Cor.
15:11) concerning the resurrection of Jesus.
This conclusion is consistent with the fact that there are different Christological emphases and approaches in the books of the New Testament (Cf.
Neyrey 1985; Tuckett 2001). This conclusion is also consistent with different understandings of Paul by later Christians. Lehtipuu (2015) argues that
among later Christians there was a diversity of views concerning the resurrection and how resurrection beliefs served as an important identity marker
6 Vinzent (2011) has made a creative attempt to question how central resurrection was for the
early Christians, claiming that it was not central for the first 140 years of Christianity, except
in Paul’s writings. However, his book is based on problematic assumptions and dating of
the contents of the relevant texts including the Gospels and Acts (Drake Williams III, 2014)
and ignores the evidence that the resurrection was ‘the common message, belief and identity
marker of the earliest Christians’ noted earlier (e.g. Gal 1:23, 2:7–9; 1 Cor. 15:11).
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and tool for group demarcation, claiming that ‘Paul’s legacy was ambivalent
enough to allow for different hermeneutical solutions’ (p. 204) such as concerning the nature of the ‘spiritual body’ (ibid.; see also Nicklas et al. 2010).
However, regardless of these differences in opinions among later Christians
concerning what Paul meant by resurrection, Paul surely knew what he
meant, and it has been argued previously that Paul affirms a ‘reanimation
or revivification of the corpse’ (Ware 2014, p. 494) and that he implies
that other earliest Christian leaders such as the Twelve affirm the same.
Lehtipuu (2015) also argues, ‘there was a similar controversy about the
gospel story of Jesus’ debate with the Sadducees over resurrection’ (p. 204),
in particular over whether the comparison of those resurrected to ‘angels in
heaven’ meant that there would be no sexual organs or whether these parts
would have different functions in heaven’ (ibid.). Again, regardless of these
differences in opinions concerning the body parts of the resurrected body,
the Gospels clearly affirm a revivification of Jesus’ corpse by portraying an
empty tomb.
In summary, I have shown the inadequacies of the objections against the
conclusion (based on reasons given earlier) that the Pauline letters reflect
the widespread and persistent conviction among the earliest Christians concerning Jesus’ resurrection. It should be noted that I am not claiming that
there was no first-century person who called himself a Christian and who
denied this view. What I have argued is that, regardless of whether every
first-century person who called himself a Christian affirmed this view, there
was widespread agreement among the leaders of the Jerusalem church and
Paul and his co-workers concerning this view, and the origin of this widespread agreement demands an explanation.
Given their common understanding of the fundamentality of Jesus’ resurrection, the cases of persecutions for their religion were directly or indirectly
the result of their doctrine of Jesus’ resurrection. It is therefore not incorrect
to say that these disciples suffered (or were willing to suffer) persecution for
Jesus’ resurrection, even if the resurrection was not explicitly the reason for
which they chose to suffer or the charge directed against them in all cases.
In conclusion, it is reasonable to think that the belief that Jesus resurrected was the fundamental reason for which they were willing to suffer and
die for their faith. It is true that adherents of almost all other religions have
suffered persecution at some point in their history and that this has generally been held to forge a more resilient faith (Bowker 2007, p. 745). Nevertheless, their willingness to sacrifice for their religions only goes to show
that many people are willing to sacrifice for what they think is true, even
though it might not be true. Their willingness to sacrifice does not imply
that they have been in a position to find out whether what they believe is
true, or that other naturalistic hypothesis have been ruled out. For example,
with regards to the Muslim terrorists who attacked the Twin Towers on September 11, McDowell (2015, p. 260) notes that they ‘were not eyewitnesses
of any events of the life of Mohammed. Rather, they lived over thirteen
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centuries later. No doubt the Muslim radicals acted out of sincere belief, but
their convictions were received second hand, at best, from others.’ It might
be objected that followers of cult leaders such as Jim Jones (1931–1978)
and Marshall Applewhite (1931–1997) died for their faith by committing
suicide, and they were eyewitnesses of their leaders. However, the reason
the followers of Jones committed suicide was because they thought that
they should commit ‘an act of revolutionary suicide protesting the conditions of an inhumane world.’7 They are plausible naturalistic explanations
(e.g. their observations of instances of injustice) for why they thought that
the conditions of the world was inhumane. Likewise, in many other cases of
martyrdom, commitment to a moral cause or to their cultures and traditions
may have resulted in the willingness of those martyrs to sacrifice, and these
commitments can have plausible naturalistic explanations. The reason the
followers of Applewhite committed suicide was because they thought that
by killing themselves their souls would be taken to a higher level of existence associated with aliens8; they were not in a position to falsify this belief
before they died. Some people may believe Jones, Applewhite, and other cult
leaders because of the leaders’ persuasive speech which appealed to their
beliefs and desires, but the apostles believed Jesus resurrected not because of
persuasive speech but because they ‘saw’ something which they thought was
the resurrected Jesus, and they were in a position to falsify what they saw.
If those who claimed to have seen the resurrected Jesus did not see anything
but made up the claim that Jesus resurrected, then they knew that what they
claimed was false (i.e. made up by them). It is not reasonable to think that
groups of people would be willing to suffer and die for what they know is
false, and as argued in the rest of this book there are good reasons to rule
out other naturalistic hypotheses.

3.4 At least some (if not all) of them witnessed something
which they thought was Jesus
Concerning the disjunction (2.2.4.1) vs (2.2.4.2), it might be objected that
the disciples’ belief that Jesus resurrected does not necessarily imply that
they witnessed something which they thought was the resurrected Jesus,
because other factors could have caused their belief. Plantinga objects to the
argument for the reliability of the apostles’ testimonies based on their willingness to die as martyrs by arguing that what counts most in such cases is
the firmness of belief, not whether the belief in question constitutes knowledge or is true (Plantinga 2006, pp. 14–16). People sometimes do not wait
for evidence before believing. It has been suggested in Rudolf Pesch’s (1973)
earlier work that the disciples’ belief in Jesus as prophet and prophetic

7 https://jonestown.sdsu.edu/?page_id=29084
8 www.heavensgate.com/
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Messiah prior to Jesus’ crucifixion, together with Jesus’ predictions of his
own violent death, could have caused the disciples to continue believing in
him after his crucifixion. Lindemann (2017, p. 579) claims,
Christian faith started with an interpretation of Jesus’ death as a means
for reconciling humanity with God. The empty tomb and the appearance narratives do not claim to be historical statements, but express
the belief of Jesus’ first disciples, and of later generations, that Jesus is
Messiah and Lord, as he himself explained to his disciples in the Gospel
of Luke.
As noted previously, Ehrman suggests that the earliest Christians’ belief
in Jesus’ resurrection could have been caused by their rumination of his
traumatic crucifixion and meditation of Old Testament passages and not
because they witnessed what they thought was the resurrected Jesus.
Against Ehrman and others, it might be argued that the reason that Paul
gives for believing that Jesus resurrected is that there were people who testified that they had witnessed the resurrected Jesus (1 Cor. 15:3–11). It is true
that Paul affirms that Jesus’ resurrection fulfilled the prophecies of the Old
Testament (1 Cor. 15:4: ‘according to the Scriptures’).9 Nevertheless, the
question ‘how the disciples knew it was Jesus of Nazareth’ and not another
person who fulfilled the prophecies is answered by them based on what were
claimed to be the experiences of the eyewitnesses (e.g. ‘he appeared to me’
[1 Cor. 15:8]). In other words, ‘according to the Scriptures’ in the present
context means an interpretation of the events of Jesus’ death and resurrection by the Scriptures (Theissen and Merz 1998, p. 489). This implies
that the disciples were convinced on other grounds that the events occurred
before they used the Scriptures to interpret them. The statement that Jesus
‘appeared to more than five hundred brethren at one time, most of whom
remain until now’ (1 Cor. 15:6) is clearly intended as testimonial evidence
that is verifiable by his audience so that they might also know that the resurrection appearance really occurred. Paul is saying in effect, ‘a very large
number of the eyewitnesses are still alive and can be seen and heard,’ and
this is provided to address the problem that the Corinthians found resurrection incredible (1 Cor. 15:12) (Bauckham 2006, p. 308). As Theissen and
Merz observe, ‘The references to appearances in chronological order and
the accessibility in the present of many witnesses, only some of whom have
died, supports the understanding of 1 Corinthians 15:3–11 as an attempt to
9 With regards to 1 Corinthians 15:4, Licona (2010, p. 319) notes that a plausible case can be
made that the early Christians had specific scriptural texts in mind, observing that ‘in Acts,
Luke also claims that Christ died and rose from the dead in accordance with the Scriptures
(Acts 3:18; 17:2–3; 26:22–23), and he cites a number of texts in support (Ps 16:8–11 in Acts
2:25–32; Ps 118:22 in Acts 4:10–11; Ps 2:1–2 in Acts 4:25–28; Is 53:7–8 in Acts 8:32–35; Is
55:3 and Ps 16:10 in Acts 13:33–37.’
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prove the resurrection of Christ’ (Theissen and Merz 1998, p. 489). While
the Gospel of John portrays a disciple believed because of the empty tomb
(John 20:8), the earlier tradition in 1 Corinthians 15:3–11 indicates that, for
the majority of the earliest Christians, the proof of Jesus’ resurrection lies in
the experiences of the witnesses (see further, Hurtado 2005, pp. 192–193).
The evidence of the resurrection appearance to Paul himself (1 Cor. 15:8)
was, of course, his own reason for thinking that the resurrection occurred.
However, de Jonge (2002, p. 47) objects that while the claim of appearances of resurrected Jesus soon acquired the function of proof of Jesus’ resurrection in l Corinthians 15, this does not disprove the hypothesis that at the
earliest stage the claim of the appearances was ‘not the foundation of belief
in Jesus’ resurrection, but rather assumed that belief as its basis.’ De Jonge
claims that belief resulted from that ‘which had begun before it in response
to his person, preaching and actions. The history of the church began as a
response on the part of the people whom Jesus won by his preaching during his activity on earth’ (2002, pp. 48–49). De Jonge proposes, ‘thanks to
the boldness and authority with which Jesus spoke out against the religious
authorities of his day, thanks to his attention to the humble and lowly, his
healing of the sick and the exorcisms which accompanied his preaching’
(p. 49), a group of people became convinced that God’s rule was indeed at
hand and that Jesus was the Messiah. This conviction
was so strongly held by some of Jesus’ followers that they could not
abandon it when he died, for the core of their conviction lay in their
belief that God was causing his rule to dawn, and not in their view of
the person or role of Jesus.
(ibid.)
They got over his death, adding the idea that salvation had become possible above all through the death of Jesus (p. 49), and believed in Jesus’
resurrection as an expression of their faith that God had sanctioned the
work of Jesus on earth and as a way of making it easier to imagine the role
which Jesus still had to fulfil as judge and saviour in the coming definitive
breakthrough of God’s rule (pp. 50–51). De Jonge claims that the accounts
of the disciples’ despair and doubt after Jesus’ crucifixion (e.g. Luke 24:11)
were rhetorical devices used by the redactors to contrast the recognition
of the risen Christ with the distrust that preceded it, such that Christ’s
appearances would carry greater conviction for the readers. He concludes,
‘in historical terms we know nothing of any disillusion and disillusionment
among Jesus’ disciples just before and after his crucifixion’ (ibid.). Against
de Jonge, Wright (2003, p. 700) argues that ‘nobody, after all, believed that
the Messiah would be raised from the dead; nobody was expecting any such
thing’ and that there was no Jewish precedent for the expectation of the
resurrection of one man prior to the general resurrection. However, sceptics
might object that Jesus’ ‘prediction’ of his resurrection could have caused
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the expectation (Whittenberger 2011), fuelled by their ‘intensified eschatological expectation’ that Jesus had stoked (Novakovic 2016, p. 153), and
they might argue that the Gospels’ portrayal of the disciples’ initial failure
to understand these predictions are ‘rhetorical devices used by the redactors’
(to use de Jonge’s phrase).
Nevertheless, several problems remain.
First, not all the ‘eyewitnesses’ started off as believers. James and Paul,
for example, were sceptics before they ‘witnessed’ the resurrected Jesus (see
further, Chapter 4).
Second, concerning the Twelve, de Jonge’s claim that the accounts of the
disciples’ despair were rhetorical devices used by the redactors ignores the
context of persecution. It is more likely that, having known how horribly
Jesus had died, at least some (if not all) of these disciples were greatly fearful
of ever mentioning Jesus again, lest they be crucified also.
Moreover, given the fact that the idea that ‘it was failed Messiahs who end
up on crosses’ was so deeply etched in their Jewish consciousness (Wright
1999, p. 276; see next chapter), it is likely that a certain degree of cynicism
concerning Jesus (‘he was just an imposter!’) would have been present in the
minds of at least some of these disciples. While the fact that the disciples
had indeed invested much in the cause of Jesus might have made it difficult
for them to discard their beliefs quickly, it would have been more difficult
to fearlessly proclaim something as difficult for other Jews to believe as a
crucified Messiah and having to face persecution for it.
Furthermore, the idea of someone being bodily alive and well again
in a short time after crucifixion10 is truly an extraordinary one; it is not
something that someone expects to see every day. As noted in Chapter 2,
scepticism about people rising from the dead was clearly present among
first-century people. Contrary to de Jonge, Matthew 28:17 could hardly
be explained away as a ‘rhetorical devices used by the redactors,’ for the
context of Matthew 28:17 does not say that the doubt was overcome by
Christ’s appearances. It is true (as argued earlier) that based on other historical considerations, it can be inferred that if their doubts remained, they
would not have been willing to continue the Christian movement and suffer
and die for it. Nevertheless, the Gospel of Matthew does not say so, and
thus it is difficult to regard Matthew 28:17 as a rhetorical device. The historicity of the disciples doubting Jesus’ resurrection (regardless of whether
Jesus had predicted it), well attested in all the Gospels (Matt. 28:17, Ps.Mark 16:14, Luke 24:36–41, John 20:24–29), is most plausible given that
‘the disciples were not hopelessly and insensibly alienated from the solid
world’ to find out from experience that corpses do not naturally exit tombs

10 As against the swoon hypothesis (see Chapter 5), a half-dead Jesus still suffering from the
wounds of the crucifixion would not have convinced the disciples that he was the risen
Lord of life.
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(Allison 2005a, pp. 246, 305). Parsons (2005, p. 443) expresses incredulity
that the disciples would still be so doubtful after they had seen so many
‘miracles’ which Jesus had done previously. In response, this is not so surprising, considering that seeing someone alive and well again in a glorious
body after the crucifixion was truly an extraordinary event. Moreover, as
Atkins (2019) has argued, doubt and disbelief are consistently condemned
by a wide variety of early Christian authors, ancient Christian texts explicitly indicate that doubt/unbelief is a source of shame, and it made the apostles look stubborn or foolish in their disbelief. Thus the doubt of the apostles
would have been embarrassing in an ancient Christian context; this fits the
criterion of embarrassment and is therefore most likely authentic.
Pesch himself later rejected his earlier view, recognizing that the disciples’
belief in Jesus as prophet and prophetic Messiah prior to Jesus’ crucifixion
would have been insufficient to overcome the crisis of the disciples’ faith and
explain the origination and persistence of their claim that Jesus was truly
divine.11 On the one hand, Jesus’ predictions of his own violent death would
hardly have been sufficient; it would not have been difficult to think of how
someone could cause such a prophecy to be fulfilled upon himself by doing
the kind of thing Jesus did at the Temple. On the other hand, the crisis of
the disciples’ faith is only to be expected, for the crucifixion was the ultimate
form of punishment during Roman times, reserved mainly for slaves and
rebellious subjects (Hengel 1977).
It is true that prior to the rise of Christianity some Jews had already
interpreted passages such as Isaiah 53 as indicating that the Messiah would
suffer (Boyarin 2012, pp. 129–156), and that a few individuals (the pagan
Roman centurion and those with him) were said to have been convinced
that Jesus was the Son of God based on witnessing Jesus’ crucifixion and
death (Matthew 27:54). However, as indicated by the Jewish Trypho in Justin’s Dialogue, it is dubious that the view of a Messiah suffering the worst
form of punishment in the hands of their enemies, instead of delivering them
from their enemies, was what the Jews (including Jesus’ disciples) would
easily accept during Roman times. More importantly, there is no indication that passages such as Isaiah 53 was interpreted as saying that God
the Creator would suffer in the hands of his enemies. It is noteworthy that,
although there were a number of messianic movements between 150 BC
and AD 150, these movements did not survive the violent death of their
founders (e.g. Theudas, Bar Kokhba) in the hands of their enemies (Wright
2003, p. 699). None of their followers applied Isaiah 53 on them and continued the movement, nor was there any evidence that any of them were
worshipped and regarded as truly divine after their deaths. The doctrine
of a ‘crucified God’ would have been regarded by many in antiquity—both
Jews and Gentiles—as ‘a shameless impertinence and absurdity’ (Hengel

11 Pesch holds to objective visions theory; see Pesch (1983); Galvin (1988, pp. 27–35).
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1995, p. 383). However, Jesus was regarded by the earliest Christian leaders to be on the Creator side of the Creator–creature divide (1 Cor. 8:6) and
worshipped by these ancient monotheistic Jews (see Loke 2017a). While 1
Corinthians portrays Christ crucified (‘a stumbling block to Jews and foolishness to Gentiles’—1 Cor. 1:23) as ‘the power of God and the wisdom
of God’ (1:24), the same letter nevertheless emphasizes the verifiability of
the ‘eyewitnesses’ of the post-mortem appearances of Jesus (15:6) and that
‘if Christ has not been raised, your faith is futile’ (15:17). Without people
experiencing what they thought was the resurrected Jesus after his shameful
death, Christianity would not have begun the way it did and won converts.
Third, the earliest Christians were able to distinguish faith and fact: they
regarded faith as worthless if the resurrection of Jesus is not a fact, as implied
by 1 Corinthians 15:17, and they understood Jesus’ resurrection as ‘reanimation or revivification of the corpse’ (Ware 2014, p. 494)—a factual statement about observable physical reality. While the disciples did not observe
this event at the very moment it occurred, they could hardly have come to
the widespread agreement that it had occurred if the corpse was still in the
tomb and no one subsequently observed what he/she thought was the resurrected Jesus. As argued in Chapter 2, 1 Corinthians 15 was written when
many of those who claimed to have seen the resurrected Jesus—including
prominent leaders of the Jerusalem Christians—were still alive and could
be checked by the readers. One still needs to explain the claims of Jesus’
post-mortem appearances (and also the facticity of the empty tomb; see
Chapter 6): how does one get ‘more than five hundred brethren,’ the ‘other
apostles,’ and sceptics like James and Paul to claim to have seen the resurrected Jesus (as established in Chapter 2) if in fact they did not see anything
like that, and to be willing to suffer and die for this religion? Moreover,
as argued earlier, if they did not see anything which they thought was the
resurrected Jesus, during times of intense persecution they would not have
been able to appear genuine and consistent in testifying that they had such
experiences without anyone letting it out that they did not witness anything
like that. It is more reasonable to think that they experienced something
which they thought was the resurrected Jesus, such that they courageously
proclaimed that Jesus resurrected and be willing to sacrifice everything and
to die for it, without fear that they would be judged guilty as false witnesses
(1 Cor. 15:15) and condemned by the God of Israel.

3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued for the conclusion that (2.2) at least some
(if not all) of those people in mid-first-century Palestine who claimed to
have witnessed the resurrected Jesus did experience something which they
thought was the resurrected Jesus.
The alternative hypothesis (2.1.1) ‘these people did not experience anything which they thought was the resurrected Jesus, and they did not believe
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that Jesus resurrected’ is contradicted by the consideration that to claim
to have seen the resurrected Jesus risked suffering and death. While many
people throughout history would be willing to sacrifice everything (including their own lives) for what they believe to be true (even though it may not
actually be true), no large group of people would be willing to sacrifice everything for what they do not believe to be true and be condemned by God
after death for being false witnesses (cf. 1 Cor. 15:15). I have explained that
the disciples devoutly believed that such a God exists and that the disciples’
willingness to die for their religion can be inferred from the fact that they
knew that their leader (i.e. Jesus) was already crucified and yet they chose
to proclaim him knowing that a similar fate could befall them, that persecutions were indeed meted out against the earliest Christians (as Paul admitted in his epistles), and that a number of them were killed (e.g. Acts 12:2,
Josephus Antiquities 20:9). I have also argued that the doctrine of Jesus’
resurrection was fundamental to the earliest Christians’ confession of Jesus
as Lord and thus to their behaviour as Christians which resulted in their
persecution. Moreover, if the disciples lied about the resurrection, it is hard
to believe that during times of severe persecution they would have evinced
genuine conviction that Jesus resurrected in the presence of other Christians
and of their persecutors, without letting out the hoax.
What about the alternative hypothesis (2.1.2) these people did not experience anything which they thought was the resurrected Jesus, and they
had other reasons for why they believed Jesus resurrected? This is ad hoc
because it requires speculations about how former sceptics such as Paul
and James the brother of Jesus came to believe that Jesus resurrected without witnessing what they thought was the resurrected Jesus. Additionally,
I have argued that, if these disciples did not experience anything which they
thought was the resurrected Jesus, during times of persecution they would
not have appeared genuine and consistent in testifying that they had such
experiences. The alternative hypothesis (2.1.2) is also contradicted by considerations concerning the difficulties of accepting and proclaiming a crucified Messiah, popular scepticism about bodily resurrection, the risks of
persecution, and their reverent fear of being judged by YHWH for being
false witnesses. Given these considerations, it is unreasonable to think that
‘more than five hundred brethren,’ the ‘other apostles,’ and sceptics like
James and Paul as well as ‘the Twelve’ could have falsely claimed to have
seen the resurrected Jesus without having seen anything like that and be
willing to be persecuted. It can therefore be concluded that they did experience something which they thought was the resurrected Jesus.

4	The earliest Christians
witnessed an extramental
entity

4.1 Introduction
The intramental hypothesis is the most popular hypothesis among recent
sceptics. Back in the nineteenth century, David Strauss argued that Jesus was
buried in an unknown grave and that the disciples, who found it difficult
to think of Jesus as dead, had hallucinations of Jesus and added in various
details into their accounts of their experiences (Strauss 1994, pp. 742–744).
Strauss concluded, ‘thus the faith in Jesus as the Messiah, which by his
violent death had received a fatal shock, was subjectively restored, by the
instrumentality of the mind, the power of imagination, and nervous excitement’ (Strauss 1879, p. 440).
Since then, many have argued that what the disciples experienced can be
explained by hallucinations. For example, Albert Schweitzer argued that the
impact of Jesus—who had declared himself to be the Messiah, had instructed
strict secrecy, had demanded their total dedication, and had promised that
some of them would not taste death before they saw the kingdom of God
coming with power—would have predisposed a group of Galilean fishermen
to experience hallucinations. The experiences of their highly excited minds
became amplified in the process of word-of-mouth retelling down the years
before they were written in the Gospels (Brabazon 2000, p. 119). Lüdemann
(2004, pp. 173–175) argues that Peter first had hallucinations of Jesus due
to severe grief, and these spread ‘infectiously’ to the rest of the apostles and
to the ‘more than five hundred brethren.’ Vermès (2008) denies the extramental reality of the resurrection appearances by arguing that these appearances to individuals or groups of individuals do not differ from the visions
of mystics throughout the centuries (p. 147). He further suggests,
The tale of the empty tomb and the apparitions of the lost Lord momentarily illuminated their dark despair with a ray of hope. Doubts nevertheless lingered on. However, when under the influence of the Spirit
their self-confidence revived, prompting them to resume their apostolic
mission, and they felt increasingly sure that they were not acting alone,
but that Jesus was with them.
(pp. 150–151)
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Carrier (2005b, p. 387) argues that Jesus’ predictions of his death and
resurrection could have primed the disciples’ expectations and resulted in
them having hallucinations of the resurrected Jesus. The Scriptures were then
searched for confirmation, and subsequently their fervour inspired others to
have similar experiences (Carrier 2005a, p. 193). While Wright (2008, p. 60)
had argued that as Second Temple Jews ‘The disciples were emphatically not
expecting Jesus to be raised from the dead, all by himself in the middle of
history,’ Carrier’s argument implies that Jesus’ prediction could have caused
the expectation and primed them subconsciously. (As noted in Chapter 3,
sceptics might object that the Gospels’ portrayal of the disciples’ initial failure
to understand these predictions are ‘rhetorical devices used by the redactors’;
to use de Jonge’s phrase.) Psychologists have noted how expectations can lead
to hallucinations. For example, Aleman and Larøi (2008, p. 102) note that
the expectation that one is about to see or hear something primes the perceptual system and lowers the thresholds for perception. They cite a study by
Barber and Calverley (1964) who instructed 78 females individually to close
their eyes and hear a recording of White Christmas when no recording was
actually played. As many as 49% of them had individual hallucinations (i.e.
they subsequently affirmed that they had heard the recording clearly), and
5% stated that they also believed that the recording had actually been played.
Moreover, Allison (2005a) argues that many studies in psychology have
shown that those characteristics which we would normally associate with
phenomena caused by extramental entities can be present in hallucinations
as well. For example, many would regard a phenomenon that is perceived by
more than one person as something that is caused by an extramental entity.
However, Allison claims, based on cases in the literature, that group hallucination (i.e. a hallucination shared by more than one person) does happen
across cultures, and that the appearances of ‘Jesus’ could have been one of
these (Allison 2005a, pp. 205, 242–243, n. 175, 269–299). There are various types of group hallucinations: collective hallucination denotes hallucination that is shared by a limited number of individuals (typically two or three)
(Blom 2009, pp. 109–110), whereas mass hallucination or epidemic hallucination denote a hallucination shared by a relatively large number of people
(Blom 2009, p. 176). As an example of mass hallucination, Blom (ibid.) cites
the French chronicler and physician Rigord (c. 1150—c. 1209), who claims,
On the day Saladin entered the Holy City, says Rigord, the monks of
Argenteuil saw the moon descend from heaven upon earth, and then
re-ascend to heaven. In many churches the crucifixes and images of the
saints shed tears of blood in the presence of the faithful.
Psychiatrist Louis West (2017) writes,
If some external object is present but inadequately recognized, an incorrect perceptual engram [i.e. a stored perceptual expectation] may be
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activated to be experienced as an illusion; in the absence of an external stimulus, such an engram is perceived as a hallucination. This may
account for the specificity of collective visions (i.e., those shared by
more than one person). Among lifeboat survivors at sea, for example,
several people who share similar expectancies (mental sets) may see a
non-existent ship projected against the blank screen of empty sea and
sky. Such an experience may persist in some of the people even after a
logical belief in its impossibility has been communicated to all.
Various psychological factors have been suggested as triggers for hallucinations, such as guilt for abandoning Jesus, accumulation of pressures
and anxieties, recent bereavement, psychological contagion, and excitement from initial reports of empty tomb (e.g. John 20:8) and (non-veridical)
sightings (e.g. by the women or Peter) (Goulder 1996, pp. 48–61; Allison
2005a, pp. 269–299; Carrier 2005a; Lüdemann 1994; cf. Aleman and Larøi
2008, pp. 66, 102).
In a similar vein, Carrier argues that hallucinations have been fairly
common. Many have been thought to be real, and many have not been
influenced by drugs. Also, hallucinations have been more common in developing countries, which have more in common with the ancient world than
with developed countries, and they have been more common in times of
bereavement (Carrier 2005a, p. 185, n. 351). He notes that, even today,
many people have reported full-body manifestations of Jesus that involve
conversations, physical contact, as well as physical changes to the environment, and almost all of these experiences were sudden and unexpected. He
suggests that the original ‘resurrection appearances’ to the apostles may
have been something like these, ‘just as unexpected, just as moving, just
as convincing.’ Furthermore, he argues that, in the ancient world, spiritual
experiences were encouraged, and hallucinations thus occurred more frequently (ibid., p. 184).

4.2 Distinguishing hallucination, illusion, delusion,
and vision
Before I address the intramental hypothesis in detail, I shall first discuss
the definition of hallucination and differentiate it from other terms. This
is important, for as Habermas points out, Allison did not make clear distinctions between hallucinations, illusions, and delusions, and on more
than one occasion Allison illegitimately moves between these phenomena
as if they confirm each other. In cases where a real person is taken to be a
different person, these experiences ought to be characterized as misidentifications, but not as hallucinations (Habermas 2008, pp. 303–313). A number of cases which may have been labelled as ‘group hallucinations’ (e.g.
apparitions of Mary) may well be cases of illusions, which is a case of
misidentification.
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To be in line with the intramental hypothesis discussed in this chapter
(misidentifications are discussed in the next chapter), a hallucination should
be understood in the present context as ‘a sensory experience which occurs
in the absence of corresponding external stimulation of the relevant sensory
organ, has a sufficient sense of reality to resemble a veridical perception,
over which the subject does not feel s/he has direct and voluntary control,
and which occurs in the awake state’ (David 2004, p. 108).1 Teeple (2009)
notes that hallucinations can be classified in three types of aetiology: psychophysiologic (arising from alteration of brain structure and function),
psychobiochemical (due to neurotransmitter disturbances), and psychodynamic (arising from intrusion of the unconscious into the conscious mind).
An illusion, however, is defined as perceiving an external entity with the
normal processes of sensory perception, but not as what it is (i.e. there are
other causal factors which distort the perception of the properties of this
entity). A form of illusion is mirage. Blom (2009, pp. 329–330) explains
that a mirage is defined by the American Meteorological Society (AMS) as
‘a refraction phenomenon wherein an image of some distant object is made
to appear displaced from its true position because of large vertical density
variations near the surface; the image may appear distorted, inverted, or
wavering.’ Especially in calm weather, the interface between warm and cold
air near the surface of the ground or water may act as a refracting lens,
bending light rays from the sky and thus producing an image of a distant
object or group of objects.
A delusion is a false belief, while a mass hysteria is a collective delusion.
There have been documented cases of mass hysteria. However, as argued
in Chapter 3, in the case of Jesus’ resurrection there were groups of people who not only believed that Jesus resurrected but also saw something
which they thought was the resurrected Jesus, and we need to explain what
it is they saw, not merely what they believed. We also need to distinguish
between delusions of Jesus’ presence (believing that Jesus was present) versus seeing that Jesus was (trans-) physically present. Thus mass hysteria by
itself is inadequate for explaining away the evidence for Jesus’ resurrection
which involves what those groups of people saw (see the paragraphs below).
(Carnley’s [1987, p. 71] suggestion that the disciples might have had hallucinations caused by mass hysteria is contradicted by the considerations
against hallucinations which I explain in the following sections of this chapter and in Chapter 7)

1 Emphasis mine. Aleman and Larøi explain that David’s definition is to be preferred to Vandenbos’ widely cited definition of hallucination as ‘a false sensory perception that has the
compelling sense of reality despite the absence of an external stimulus’ (Vandenbos ed. 2007,
p. 427), because ‘some hallucinations are triggered by (irrelevant) external stimuli—for
example, patients who start hearing voices when the vacuum cleaner is switched on’ (Aleman and Larøi 2008, p. 15).
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A ‘vision’ may be veridical or non-veridical. A veridical vision is defined
as having an experience of perception of an external entity in the presence
of external causal relation by which that entity is causing that experience
of perception, without utilizing the normal processes of sensory perception
(Copan and Tacelli eds. 200 p. 197). This is a supernatural vision hypothesis, which is discussed in Chapter 8. A non-veridical vision is defined as
having an experience of perception of an external entity in the absence of
external causal relation by which that entity is causing that experience of
perception. Examples would be hallucination and illusion.
Craig (1989, pp. 68–69) argues that the New Testament authors consistently refer to resurrection appearances as involving an extramental
appearing in the real, objective world. They distinguish this understanding of ‘resurrection appearance’ from that of ‘vision,’ a term which they
refer for subjective mental phenomenon. For example, Luke’s comment
that Peter ‘did not know that what was being done by the angel was real,
but thought he was seeing a vision’ (Acts 12:9) illustrates this understanding of vision as being subjective in nature (Wiebe 1998, p. 146). With
regards to Acts 26:19, which refers to Paul’s experience on the road to
Damascus as ‘heavenly vision’ rather than resurrection appearance, Craig
replies this is because Paul’s experience involved subjective elements, such
that his other companions did not perceive the appearance of Jesus (Craig
1989, p. 75)2 and that he alone was converted that day (Chilton 2019,
p. 83). Nevertheless, the experience was portrayed in Acts as involving
extramental events as well; for example, even though his companions did
not perceive the appearance of Jesus, they were portrayed as seeing an
appearance of the light and fell to the ground as a result (Acts 26:13).
Therefore, Paul’s experience can also be deemed as a resurrection appearance, as other parts of the New Testament affirm (see further the response
to Carnley in Section 4.6).
By saying that Jesus appeared to the apostles ‘over a period of forty days’
(Acts 1:3), Luke probably intends to demarcate resurrection appearances
from subjective visions recorded later (e.g. that of Stephen in Acts 7:56 and
Ananias in 9:10). According to the New Testament accounts, only Paul saw
a resurrection appearance after that 40-day period. Paul uses the phrase
‘untimely born’ in 1 Corinthians 15:8, which implies that there must have
been a cessation of the resurrection appearances, and the appearance to Paul
was the exception (Allison 2005a, p. 260). Paul also restricts the period of
resurrection appearances by the phrase ‘last of all’ (1 Cor. 15:8).

2 Because of this, some scholars, for example Keim, Grass, Fuller, and Pannenberg, would
use the word visions to label Jesus’ resurrection appearances. It should be noted that while
Pannenberg (1968, pp. 88–106) uses the word ‘vision’ for Paul’s experiences, he argues that
it has extramental reality and is not imaginary; moreover, contrary to Keim and others, Pannenberg argues for the empty tomb and Jesus’ bodily resurrection.
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Lüdemann (1994) claims that Paul could not distinguish his visual perception from an inner (psychological) versus an external stimulus (physiologic sight), and that Paul used the same Greek word for ‘seeing,’ ōphthē
(horaō), in referring to his own encounter with Jesus, as he did in describing
all the persons mentioned in 1 Corinthians 15:58. Lüdemann generalizes
that Paul and Jesus’ disciples all had similar hallucinatory experiences. Carrier (2005a, pp. 151–153; see also Gant 2019, pp. 198–200) likewise argues
that what Paul meant to convey in 1 Corinthians 15 is that Jesus’ epiphany
to him was normative of the experiences of the other witnesses mentioned
in 1 Corinthians 15:3–11. He notes that the only first-hand account of
Paul’s encounter is in Galatians 1:15–16, which says that he received from
Jesus by revelation (apokalypsis). He argues that apokalypsis usually refers
to a subjective spiritual encounter (e.g. in 2 Corinthians 12:1–4), which
we now know can be purely psychological, even though the person who
encountered it thought it to be real. And since the epiphany to Paul was
normative, what the others experienced could also have been nonphysical.
Ehrman (2014, pp. 207–208) claims that the earliest accounts in Paul portray Jesus resurrected and ascended quickly and appearing from heaven to
people on earth, rather than eating fish on earth as Luke portrayed.
In reply, Licona (2010, pp. 329–333, 400–437) has surveyed more than
a thousand occurrences of ōphthē (horaō) and similar terms in both Paul
and other writers from about the same time and concluded that, while these
terms can indicate nonphysical sight or understanding, it far more commonly signifies normal physiologic sight (cf. Paul’s defence of his apostleship in 1 Cor. 9:1: ‘Have I not seen Jesus’?). Contrary to Carrier, Craig
(1989, p. 81) notes that to argue from apokalypsis would ‘at the most indicate that the appearance had subjective elements, not that it was wholly
subjective.’ Thus, the fact that Paul thought that the revelation of Jesus to
him had personal and interior consequences for himself (‘that is the source
of his reference to the Anointed “living in” him [see Gal 2:20]: the Son was
revealed “in me” [en emoi; Gal 1:16] so that he lived “in me” [en emoi; Gal
2:20],’ Chilton 2019, pp. 83–84) does not imply that it was wholly interior
without an objective external cause. On the other hand, in 1 Corinthians
15, Paul refers to the appearance of Jesus to the five hundred at once (v. 6),
by which he clearly intends to convey an objective appearance as evidence
for Jesus’ bodily resurrection in response to sceptics of bodily resurrection
(see Chapter 2). The word apokalypsis means an unveiling of the things
of God; it does not imply that the mode of unveiling is restricted to nonphysical encounters. Moreover, in 1 Corinthians 15 Paul’s use of the words
soma and anastasis (‘resurrection’) in this passage implies that ōphthē is
referring to the appearance of a physically resurrected body (Gundry 2000,
pp. 116–117). Finally, as noted in Chapter 1, the affirmation that Jesus ‘has
been raised’ (1 Cor. 15.4) provides decisive confirmation that the earliest
Christians believed and proclaimed that Jesus was bodily resurrected (Ware
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2014). It is clear, therefore, that Paul’s account in 1 Corinthians 15, as well
as the accounts in the Gospels and Acts, claim that objective bodily entity
were witnessed rather than merely subjective visions. Wright (2008, p. 156)
observes,
while Paul declares that ‘flesh and blood cannot inherit God’s kingdom,’ (1 Cor. 15:50), he doesn’t mean that physicality will be abolished. ‘Flesh and blood’ is a technical term for that which is corruptible,
transient, heading for death. ‘The contrast, again, is not between what
we call physical and what we call nonphysical but between corruptible physicality, on the one hand, and incorruptible physicality, on the
other.
Wright also suggests the following interesting thought experiment against
the attempts to explain away Jesus’ resurrection by appealing to delusion,
subjective vision, or bereavement experience:
In A.D. 70 the Romans conquered Jerusalem, and they led back to
Rome thousands of captive Jews, including the man they regarded as
the leader of the Jewish revolt, ‘the king of the Jews,’ a man called
Simon bar Giora. He was led into Rome at the back of the triumphal
procession, and the end of the spectacle was Simon being flogged and
then killed. Now, suppose we imagine a few Jewish revolutionaries,
three days or three weeks later. The first one says, ‘You know, I think
Simon really was the Messiah—and he still is!’ The others would be
puzzled. Of course he isn’t; the Romans got him, as they always do. If
you want a Messiah, you’d better find another one. ‘Ah,’ says the first,
‘but I believe he’s been raised from the dead.’ ‘What d’you mean?’ his
friends ask. ‘He’s dead and buried.’ ‘Oh, no,’ replies the first, ‘I believe
he’s been exalted to heaven.’ The others look puzzled. All the righteous
martyrs are with God, everybody knows that; their souls are in God’s
hand; that doesn’t mean they’ve already been raised from the dead.
Anyway, the resurrection will happen to us all at the end of time, not
to one person in the middle of continuing history. ‘No,’ replies the first,
‘you don’t understand. I’ve had a strong sense of God’s love surrounding me. I have felt God forgiving me—forgiving us all. I’ve had my
heart strangely warmed. What’s more, last night I saw Simon; he was
there with me. . . .’ The others interrupt, now angry. We can all have
visions. Plenty of people dream about recently dead friends. Sometimes
it’s very vivid. That doesn’t mean they’ve been raised from the dead.
It certainly doesn’t mean that one of them is the Messiah. And if your
heart has been warmed, then sing a psalm, don’t make wild claims
about Simon.
(Wright 2008, pp. 49–50)
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Wright concludes,
That is what they would have said to anyone offering the kind of statement that, according to the revisionists, someone must have come up
with as the beginning of the idea of Jesus’s resurrection. But this solution
isn’t just incredible, it’s impossible. Had anyone said what the revisionists suggest, some such conversation as the above would have ensued.
(Wright 2008, p. 50)

4.3 Prior mental states of disciples
Given that hallucinations are caused intramentally, expectation is evidently
a relevant factor. Blom (2009, pp. 109–110) notes that, for mass hallucination to occur, having common triggers (e.g. a shared environment suggesting
a shared idea-pattern or percept) is not enough; each of the percipients must
be prone to hallucinatory activity as well. In what follows, I shall argue that
it is unlikely that these conditions are fulfilled in the case of the resurrection
appearances.
One issue is whether all the ‘eyewitnesses’ already had prior belief that
Jesus would rise from the dead. The historical evidence indicates otherwise.
The resurrection appearances occurred to Paul and James, both of whom
were unbelievers; moreover, even among the Twelve there were those who
were initially doubtful, and the likelihood that there might have been those
among the ‘more than five hundred brethren’ who were initially doubtful
cannot be excluded as well. These points shall be elaborated in what follows.
First, it is clear from Paul’s own testimony, as well as the testimony of others, that he was an enemy of the Christian movement prior to his conversion
(Phil. 3:4–6, Acts 9:1–2). The New Testament also records that Jesus’ brothers did not believe in him prior to his crucifixion (John 7:1–5). Nevertheless,
the New Testament claims that both Paul and James witnessed the risen
Jesus (1 Cor. 15:7–8), and that they subsequently became prominent leaders
of the Christian movement (Acts 15:1–21).
Paul’s experience is also portrayed in Acts. Carrier (2005a, pp. 154, 217,
n. 250) dismisses the three accounts in Acts (9:1–9, 22:6–11, and 26:12–18)
concerning Jesus’ appearance to Paul as historically worthless because he
thinks that they are contradictory. In reply, the historical value of the presence of apparent contradictions and the procedure of harmonization has
already been argued for in Chapter 2. The fact that the accounts are apparently contradictory indicates that Luke did not carefully make them up
(Craig 1989, pp. 74–82).3 As Licona (2010, p. 220) observes, ‘if Luke were

3 Carrier (2005a, p. 154) argues further that Acts contradicts Galatians 1:12–2:1 which does
not mention attendants, denies meeting anyone (Ananias), and places his return to Jerusalem
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to set out to compose on his own multiple accounts of Saul’s conversion, we
would have expected the narratives to be somewhat more similar than they
are.’ Moreover, the accounts in Acts can be harmonized as follows: Saul saw
Jesus and heard distinct words, while his companions saw the light accompanying the appearance of Jesus but not Jesus himself, and they heard the
noise of the voice (Acts 9:7)4 but did not hear the distinct words Jesus spoke
to Saul (Acts 22:9)5 (Witherington 1997, pp. 307–313).
Sceptics have claimed that what Paul and James experienced were hallucinations and that they could have had hidden motives or other psychological
reasons that caused them to hallucinate. Price (2005, p. 83) suggests that
James may have had the motive of wanting the honourable leadership role
in the church as the eldest brother of King Messiah. As for Paul, Carrier
(2005a, p. 187) suggests that factors such as guilt in persecuting a people he
came to admire, subsequent disgust with fellow persecuting Pharisees, concern for his own salvation, desire for real purpose in life, physical conditions
such as dehydration and fatigue on the road to Damascus, and underlying
‘happy schizotype’ personality could have predisposed him towards having
hallucination.
In response, it is unlikely that James, who distrusted Jesus even prior to
his crucifixion, would have had secret motives of wanting to lead a group
that follows a crucified Jesus. This is especially so considering that James
would easily have known that he could well be killed also for doing that. As
noted in Chapter 3, the historical evidence indicates that James was indeed
eventually martyred.
Concerning Paul, Habermas observes that it is clear from his own testimony in Galatians 1:13–14 and Philippians 3:4–6 that he was neither guilty
nor fearful of persecuting Christians prior to becoming a Christian himself.

with Barnabas much later and with no suggestion of danger. However, the fact that Gal. 1
does not mention the attendants does not imply that the attendants were not there. ‘I did
not immediately consult with flesh and blood’ (Gal. 1:16) does not mean he did not meet
anyone later, and ‘to reveal His Son’ (v. 16) could have referred to the entire process of seeing Jesus, set free by Ananias, and baptism, after which he immediately went to Arabia and
then returned to Damascus (Acts 9:19; the ‘Damascus–Arabia–Damascus’ duration could
have been considered under the phrase ‘spend several days with the disciples at Damascus’),
where he started preaching the gospel. His going to Jerusalem three years later as indicated
in Galatians does not contradict Acts, for ‘after many days’ in verse 23 could have meant
three years; there was no indication that Acts 9:26 follows verse 25 immediately. Finally, the
fact that Galatians 1 does not mention his escape from danger does not mean that he did
not actually face it. For the compatibility between Acts and Paul’s letters, see further, Keener
(2012, ch. 7), who explains that we should not expect either Acts or Paul’s letters to contain
complete information and that we need to consider the possibility that they offer different
perspectives and emphases which complement each other.
4 Acts 9:7: ‘The men who were traveling with him stood speechless because they heard the
voice but saw no one.’
5 Acts 22:9 ‘Now those who were with me saw the light but did not hear the voice of the one
who was speaking to me.’
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Rather, he was proud of it, being motivated by religious zeal with no misgivings in his efforts to persecute Christians. Other suggestions that Paul
had physical or psychological comorbidities or predispositions towards
hallucinations are without any positive evidence (Bergeron and Habermas
2015). Even if Paul were affected by physical conditions such as dehydration and fatigue or by an underlying ‘happy schizotype’ personality, this
would not explain why he hallucinated a resurrected Jesus rather than
something else. Lüdemann (2004, p. 172) proposes that Paul had subconscious motivations to assume an exalted position in early Christian leadership which resulted in his hallucinations of Jesus. Bergeron and Habermas
(2015) object that there is no record to suggest this, and note that, given
the persecution of early Christians, ‘positions in first century Christian
leadership would not be thought of as means to advance one’s religious
career or social standing.’
Second, it is true that guilt, bereavement, pressures and anxieties, religious
enthusiasm, excitement over initial reports of empty tomb and sightings,
‘influence of the Holy Spirit’ (Vermès 2008, pp. 150–151) and so on may
have been present in various degrees among some members of each group.
Nevertheless, hallucinations involving all the members is still unlikely given
the evidence of the disciples doubting the resurrection, the difficulties of
accepting and proclaiming a crucified Messiah, the risks of persecution,
their reverent fear of being judged by YHWH for acting as false witnesses,
and popular scepticism about bodily resurrection (concerning these considerations, see Chapter 3). It is far more probable that, given the likelihood of
their varying mental states, something extramental and independent of their
mental states removed all the residual doubts from among all of them, such
that hundreds of people were willing to boldly serve as eyewitnesses in the
context of frightening persecution and be willing to suffer shame and even
death as a result.
Sceptics might object that according to Luke the disciples said, ‘The Lord
has really risen’ after the appearance to Peter and before the appearance to
them as a group (Luke 24:34), and this suggests faith in the resurrection
after an initial report. In response (assuming the historicity of this passage
for the sake of the objector’s argument), while this text can be taken to
imply the presence of belief among members in the group, it does not imply
that all lingering doubts had been erased from all members in the group
after an initial report. The presence of lingering doubts is indicated by the
context, which states that when Jesus subsequently appeared, doubts were
still present in their hearts (Luke 24:38, 41).

4.4 Argument against group hallucination
It has been explained earlier that a hallucination is understood in the present context as involving a sensory experience which occurs in the absence
of corresponding external stimulation of the relevant sensory organ (David
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2004, p. 108). It is unreasonable to think that a group of people perceived
the same thing together at the same time when there is nothing there extramentally corresponding to their experiences. For without a corresponding
external stimulation of the relevant sensory organ, the mental states internal
to each person within the group would not agree on various details concerning their experience of the external world.
Cases which have been labelled as ‘group hallucinations’ (such as ancient
and modern reports of ‘visions’ or seeing things in the sky) may have been
cases of illusions, which is a case of misidentification (see next chapter).
Some may also be cases of physical manifestations of real extramental ‘spiritual powers’ (Blom 2009, pp. 109–110), and one must be careful not to
exclude this possibility on the basis of unwarranted anti-supernaturalistic
presupposition (see Chapter 8). Experiences involving more than one sensory organ have occasionally been labelled as hallucinatory (multimodal hallucinations; these however tend to involve simultaneous auditory and visual
hallucinations, Goodwin et al. 1971). Blom (2009, pp. 33–35) observes,
While biomedical models tend to use the terms complex visual hallucination, compound hallucination to denote apparitions, explaining
their mediation by reference to aberrant neurophysiological activity in
cerebral areas and/or the temporo-parieto-occipital junction, parapsychological models tend to combine such biomedical explanations with
hypotheses related to a metaphysical origin of the perceived apparitions, such as the telepathic powers of dead or living agents.
Christians believe that spiritual entities (angels, demons, etc.) exist, and
some of those reports may well be evidence for it. For example, they may
be the result of physical manifestations of evil spirits who masquerade as
the dead. To insist that these are hallucinations rather than physical manifestations of spiritual entities begs the question against the existence of such
entities. Blom (2009, pp. 33–35) notes, ‘To suspend judgement on the issue
of whether apparitions exist or not, it has been proposed to use the neutral term idionecrophany to denote any sensory experience that involves an
alleged contact with the dead.’
Carrier (1999) objects that to assume that these are real is also ‘begging
the question.’ In reply, the argument for extramental reality is not merely
based on assuming this conclusion (if it were so, it would be begging the
question). Rather it is based on epistemological principles: a reflection of
the causal pathways that are required to produce perceptions would reveal
that a consistent unity of perceptions over time concerning a single entity
that involves different people in a group would indicate that such an entity
exists outside of their minds. The conclusion is likewise if multiple sensory
routes (seeing, hearing, touching) are involved, or if that entity is perceived
to have left behind causal effects that persist over time (e.g. the eating of
fish by that entity resulting in the permanent disappearance of the fish). The
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reason is that, since intramental processes by definition occur in the absence
of external causal relations to the putative entity, it is unreasonable to think
that causal mechanisms internal to each person in a group simultaneously
generated similar experiences involving visual, auditory, and tactile senses
that are consistent with those of the others, and remain persistently so over
time in relation to the causal effects that are left behind (a similar point is
made in Wiebe 1998, pp. 209–211).6
A recent study by Bergeron and Habermas (2015) conclude that collective hallucinations are not found in peer-reviewed medical literature,7 and
‘collective hallucination as an explanation for the disciples’ post-crucifixion
group experiences of Jesus is indefensible.’
It is therefore highly remarkable that in the case of Jesus’ resurrection
we have appearances to three different groups of people (the Twelve, the
five hundred, and the other apostles besides the Twelve) in different circumstances over a short period. Given the argument against group hallucination, it is unreasonable to think that all of these events occurred in the
absence of a corresponding external stimulus that resembled Jesus.

4.5 Contextual considerations and fact checking
Novakovic (2016, p. 142) cites Kalish and Reynolds’ (1973) cross-cultural
psychological study of bereavement and ‘post death’ contact and states that
in some cases the interviewees claim that more than one person see the apparition simultaneously. It should be noted, however, that Kalish and Reynolds (p. 219) state that only slightly over 2% of the entire study population
claimed a post-death encounter that was part of the reality of another person present at the time. Moreover, with regards to these claims, the study by
Kalish and Reynolds does not provide details concerning how many other
persons were present and shared in those encounters in each instance (e.g.
were there up to eleven people or five hundred people having an encounter
together at any one time, or were there only one another person?). Neither
does it provide details concerning whether those other persons who were

6 Concerning Carrier’s suggestion that the disciples may have thought they saw the same thing
even if their experiences were inconsistent, see Chapter 7.
7 This is based on Bergeron’s comprehensive data base search of the PubMed and American Psychological Association websites. Citing Nickell (1998, p. 174), retired psychologist
Whittenberger (2011) claims that there were cases of group hallucinations, but his article is
marred by faulty analysis. For example, he writes, ‘Eugene Barbadette, his brother Joseph,
and others saw the Virgin Mary at Pontmain, France, on January 17, 1971.’ Aside from
getting the date wrong (Nickell states the year as 1871), Whittenberger fails to note that
Nickell goes on to say, ‘But there is a clue to the selective nature of the vision. Eugene pointedly identified three stars in the sky and explained to the adults how the stars delineated
the Blessed Virgin’s figure. At least according to some of the accounts of the “miracle,” the
adults were indeed able to see the triangle of bright stars; they just could not see anything
else of significance.’ This is a case of misidentification, not hallucination.
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claimed to be present and shared in those encounters were convinced and
were willing to testify that it was a resurrected body (rather than a ghost
or spirit) that they saw, or was it (say) just a vague sense of ‘feeling the
spiritual presence’ of the deceased person. Without these details, Novakovic
has failed to rebut Craig’s objection that there is no single instance which
exhibits the diversity and multitude of the resurrection appearances over a
short period. It is only by compiling unrelated cases that anything analogous
to the resurrection of Jesus may be constructed by sceptics (Craig 2000,
pp. 190–192).8
Moreover, there are reasons to be sceptical about these reports as well as
the accounts noted in Section 4.1 (e.g. the account by Rigord). For unlike
the case for Jesus’ resurrection, these cases do not
a
b

occur in the context of persecution by authorities who would have challenged their claims (see Chapters 2 and 3) and in which the witnesses
were willing to lose everything and die for what they saw, and
serve as foundational proof of the veracity of a religion, where crucial
fundamental beliefs held by a large number of people concerning eternal
salvation is dependent on the testimonies of available witnesses.

Since there was no fear of persecution and the beliefs were not of crucial importance, the motivation to carefully countercheck the details over a
period of time by other people who were deeply concerned about them would
be lacking. Hence, these cases are more likely to be frauds, or sensationalized
or careless reports of vague or unconvincing perceptions made by impulsive
or excitable ‘witnesses’ (including those who were encouraged by others to
have ‘spiritual experiences’) (cf. Carrier 2005a). Allison himself acknowledges that much of the large amount of literature which he cited are from
popular writings rather than critical investigations. He also notes that there
are numerous examples of collective hallucinations and illusions (i.e. misidentifications rather than hallucinations) in which people claimed to have
seen the same thing but, when closely interviewed, disagreed on the crucial
details (Allison 2005a, pp. 278, n. 297, 318). It is instructive to note Whittenberger’s (2011) mentioning of a supposed case of group hallucination,
Maria Cruz Gonzalez and her three companions also saw the mother
of Jesus in the little village of San Sebastian de Garabandal, Spain, on
July 2, 1961; citing Nickell (1998, pp. 181–182). Whittenberger fails to

8 cf. Allison’s personal anecdote of the ‘appearances’ of his father after his death to his family
members one individual after another (Kris, Andrew, Emily, etc.), which he compares with 1
Corinthians 15:3–11 (Allison 2005, p. 277). However, what is significantly different from 1
Corinthians 15:3–11 (other than the lack of empty tomb, context of persecution, etc.) is that
there is no appearance to groups of people one after another).
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note Nickell’s observation that one of the companions later confessed
that their claims of experiences was not authentic, stating that ‘she and
her companions had used the trances and apparition claims as a means
to get away from the village and play!
(p. 184)

In contrast with the aforementioned cases (and this important factor is
somewhat neglected by sceptics in recent discussions), the claims concerning
post-mortem appearances of Jesus occurred in the context of severe persecution as foundational events proving the veracity of crucial fundamental
beliefs (see Chapter 3). Sceptics object that the New Testament does not
explicitly describe the use of the methodology of modern critical investigations that includes cross-examination and interviewing in isolation of the
witnesses listed in 1 Corinthians 15:3–11 (Allison 2005a, p. 278, n. 297,
318). Nevertheless, it has been shown in Chapter 3 that these witnesses
testified in the context of persecutions and challenges from their opponents
that happened over a number of years, and they as well as their converts
who believed on the basis of their testimonies were willing to lose everything, die, and stake their eternal salvation on the truth of what they saw.
In such circumstances, in the cases of the appearances to the Twelve (1 Cor.
15:5), the five hundred (1 Cor. 15:6), and the other apostles besides the
Twelve (1 Cor. 15:7), at least some of the witnesses would have observed
closely, spoken to one another, and counterchecked with each other afterwards about the details of what they saw together as a group (e.g. ‘Was that
really Jesus?’ ‘What did he look like?’).
Sceptics might ask how we know whether the apostles saw the same thing
and agreed on the details (Allison 2005a, p. 297), and if there had been
disagreement, why would we expect the New Testament to record it? Whittenberger (2011) agrees that in cases of group hallucinations there would
be variations in details, such as ‘what Jesus was wearing, how injured he
looked, what gestures he used, and what he said and did,’ but he claims that
members in the group never compared their individual experiences in any
detail. He argues that there were indeed differences in details of the resurrection appearances when we compare the Gospels’ portrayals. Other sceptics
have claimed that there are contradictions between the Gospels’ portrayals
concerning Jesus’ resurrection which indicate that they did not see the same
thing and thus it was hallucinatory (Carnley 1987, p. 244). Sceptics might
complain that the notion of counterchecking with one another is just an
appeal to what a twenty-first-century author thinks reasonable; it may not
be applicable to first-century men and women.
In reply, it has been shown in Chapter 2 that the claim concerning contradiction is unproven; in particular, it has been explained that differences are
not the same as contradictions. Thus, the differences in details of the Gospels’ portrayals of the resurrection appearances do not imply that the disciples did not countercheck with each other, for as explained in Chapter 2
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the differences can be understood as complementary rather than contradictory. On the other hand, although the worldviews of first-century men
and women were different from our own (Barclay 1996, p. 26), it has been
shown in Chapter 3 that scepticism about people rising from the dead was
clearly present among first-century people, and the evidence indicates that
the disciples doubted the resurrection initially. Furthermore, the speaking of
their experiences of the ‘resurrected Jesus’ to one another—including among
those who were initially sceptical and who would have ‘fact-checked’ with
one another—is most plausible psychologically given the nature and significance of such experiences, and it has multiple attestation (Luke 24:32–35,
John 20:25). Moreover, the ‘commonsensical’ practice of questioning the
identity of the person witnessed when something apparently miraculous has
happened to him or her is evidently present among first-century people (e.g.
John 9:9).9 So too is the ‘basic common sense’ of checking the evidence of
an event that one is sceptical about. This is shown by 1 Corinthians 15:6,
where Paul is saying in effect to the Corinthians who were sceptical of the
resurrection to check out the witnesses for themselves rather than merely
trust what he says, as well as by John 20:25, where Thomas is portrayed to
have wanted to check Jesus’ nail marks and his side.10 Also, the witnesses
listed in 1 Corinthians 15:3–11 would have been asked concerning their
experiences by many other people who lived closely with them over a period
of time, as these people would have been very interested in what they saw
(Habermas 2008, p. 307). Additionally, the polemic reflected in Matthew
28:11–15 indicates that the non-Christian Jews did challenge the disciples’
claim (see Chapter 3), and these opponents would also have been interested
in what they saw and to explain away their experiences if they could.
Moreover, it has been argued in Chapter 2 that various considerations
that would lead to checking with witnesses were present among the earliest
Christians. Given that Paul was writing to an audience sceptical of bodily
resurrection and that such people were present in the early church (1 Cor.
15:12), and given that scepticism and the basic common sense of checking the evidence of an event that one is sceptical about were present, the
earliest disciples would not have been able to satisfy the demand for evidence from their immediate audience if these disciples themselves had not
checked the evidence. Additionally, given the fundamental importance of
Jesus’ resurrection (1 Cor. 15:17), the fundamental importance of the experiences of the witnesses listed in 1 Corinthians 15:3–11, and the context of
persecution (see Chapter 3), it is unreasonable to think that more than one
group of people would have wanted to serve as witnesses and to proclaim
something so incredible as the resurrection prior to the writing of the New

9 Whether this passage is historical or created by first-century Christians, it shows that this
‘common sense’ was present in the first century.
10 See note 9.
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Testament and to maintain that during times of severe persecution, if it
were not evident to the witnesses themselves that members of their group
had indeed seen the ‘same thing’ (i.e. ‘Jesus’) together in the first place.
After all, people at that time were aware of hallucinations, such as ‘seeing
things’ after drinking too much wine (see Section 4.6). Contrary to Vermès
(2008, pp. 150–151), the disciples would not have risked the lives and eternal salvation of themselves and others and started to proclaim something
as unbelievable as a bodily resurrection publicly if, as Vermès thinks, they
still had lingering doubts and were not absolutely sure that Jesus was resurrected (see Chapter 3). It is also unreasonable to think that Paul would have
referred the sceptics of the resurrection (1 Cor. 15:12) to these disciples as
eyewitnesses (1 Cor. 15:3–7; see Chapter 2) if they still had doubts about
what they witnessed.
In summary, the process of counterchecking by the groups of ‘eyewitnesses’ among themselves and by their audiences would have falsified intramental hypotheses such as hallucinations. With regards to hallucinations,
among ‘the five hundred,’ for example, there would be people seeing vastly
contradictory details of ‘Jesus’ due to the intramental nature of hallucinations (e.g. some may ‘see’ Jesus flying up to the sky, others may at the same
time ‘see’ Jesus flying down; some may ‘see’ Jesus wearing white, others may
at the same time see him wearing ‘not-white’). Moreover, the contradictions
in crucial details would be revealed when they reported it to or counterchecked with one another and would indicate to them that they had not
seen the same thing.
It might be objected that the portrayal of Jesus’ resurrection appearance to
Saul in Acts indicates that people did not in fact see the same thing. According to Witherington’s (1997, pp. 307–313) explanation of the accounts
in Acts, while Saul and his companions saw the light accompanying the
appearance of Jesus and fell to the ground, only Saul saw Jesus and heard
distinct words while his companions did not see Jesus himself; moreover,
they heard the noise of the voice (Acts 9:7) but did not hear the distinct
words Jesus spoke to Saul (Acts 22:9).
In reply, there is no indication that Jesus was said to have appeared to
Saul’s companions. They only experienced the effects of Jesus’ appearance
to Saul and fell to the ground, which indicates the objectivity of this appearance, but they did not see the appearance itself. There is also no indication
that they were converted and became Christians who served as eyewitnesses
of Jesus’ resurrection and were willing to stake their lives and eternal salvation on it and to suffer persecution for it. However, Jesus was said to have
appeared to the Twelve, the more than five hundred brethren, and the other
apostles (1 Cor. 15:1–11), and it has been argued previously that these earliest Christians served as eyewitnesses of Jesus’ resurrection and were willing
to stake their lives and eternal salvation on it and to suffer persecution for
it, and that this would not have been the case if they did not in fact see the
same thing.

Christians witnessed an extramental entity

105

Finally, it is noteworthy that scientific studies have indicated that among
those who had hallucinations, many do subsequently achieve insight that
their experience is hallucinatory after the experience has ended. For example, in the study by Barber and Calverly (1964) noted earlier, among the
49% who had individual hallucinations that the recording of White Christmas was played, the vast majority (44%) were aware that the recording
was not played. Thus, if the ‘eyewitnesses’ had hallucinations of the resurrected Jesus and the majority of them achieved insight that their experience was hallucinatory after the experience ended, they would hardly have
been able to persuade themselves and their audiences to accept and proclaim
the difficult belief that they had really seen Jesus’ resurrected body, and be
persecuted for it (see further the discussion of combination hypotheses in
Chapter 7).

4.6 ‘Solid’ evidence would have been required
In addition to the general scepticism about people rising from the dead,
Wright points out that people at that time ‘knew about hallucinations and
ghosts and visions. Ancient literature–Jewish and pagan alike—is full of
such things. It goes back to Homer; it’s in Virgil, it’s all over the place’
(Wright 2007, pp. 210–211, see, e.g. Origen, Contra Celsum 2.60). Wright
(2008, p. 58) explains,
If the disciples simply saw, or thought they saw, someone they took to
be Jesus, that would not by itself have generated the stories we have.
Everyone in the ancient world took it for granted that people sometimes
had strange experiences involving encounters with the dead, particularly the recently dead. They knew at least as much as we do about such
visions, about ghosts and dreams—and the fact that such things often
occurred within the context of bereavement or grief. They had language
for this, and it wasn’t resurrection.
While Renan had suggested that ‘The little Christian society . . . resuscitated Jesus in their hearts by the intense love which they bore toward him’
(Renan 1869, p. 45; see also Renan 1864, p. 296), Wright (2008, p. 62)
notes that the earliest Christians knew that
Lots of people have visions of someone they love who has just died . . .
and they had language for it; they would say, ‘It’s his angel’ or ‘It’s
his spirit’ or ‘his ghost.’ They wouldn’t say, ‘He’s been raised from the
dead.’
In reply to Lüdemann’s intramental hypothesis and Sawicki’s (1994)
suggestion that after Jesus’ death his followers could comfort one another
with the thought that Jesus’ halakhah would survive him, Bryan (2011,
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pp. 162–164) argues that neither in antiquity nor in the present are such
visions or thoughts normally regarded as evidence of resurrection. On the
contrary,
They are taken to be at worst (I suppose) hallucinations, and at best (as
I have taken them to be) genuine communications of comfort about the
departed from beyond the grave. But in neither case are they considered
to be declarations that the departed one has risen from the dead. That,
however, is what the texts claim about Jesus. That is what Peter and
Paul actually say. Why do they do that? Lüdemann’s hypothesis leaves
that question unanswered. Hence, it does not explain what Lüdemann
himself says needs to be explained.
(ibid., p. 164)
Bryan (2011) continues,
If the experience of the first Christians was the kind of experience that
Bultmann, Borg, Sawicki, and Crossan suggest—visionary and internal,
simply the conversion of their hearts to God’s truth and the real meaning of Jesus life and death—then why on earth did they not say so ?
The language to describe such experiences was clearly available, so why
did the first Christians not use it? Why did they choose instead to use
the language of resurrection, words such as egeirō and anistēmi, words
which, as we have noted, were normally used in quite different connections, and whose use here was therefore inviting misunderstanding of
experiences that would, in fact, have been perfectly acceptable to many
in the ancient world who found ‘resurrection’ ridiculous?
(ibid., p. 169)
While it has been suggested (e.g. Marcus 2001, p. 397) that the use of
resurrection language represents a deliberate choice to exploit a term with
an apocalyptic background (cf. Isa. 26:19; Ezek. 37; Dan. 12:2), the disciples would still have required pretty ‘solid’ evidence to persuade themselves
and convince their audience that what they saw was a bodily resurrected
Jesus and not a hallucination, a ghost, or a vision and come to agreement
among themselves that this was the case. Given this, and given the likelihood that the apostles were indeed highly sceptical of Jesus’ resurrection
(Matt. 28:17, Luke 24:37–38, see Chapter 3), a few vague or transient sightings of Jesus or ‘subjective’ individual experiences which did not agree with
one another would not have resulted in a widely held conviction among
the earliest Christians that Jesus was bodily resurrected. (It is noteworthy
that the motif that there were doubts among the apostles even after seeing
‘Jesus’ has multiple attestation in Matt. 28:17 and Luke 24:37–38). What
would have been required were some sort of powerful, multi-sensorial, and
repeated experiences of ‘Jesus’ that convinced them and provided them the
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courage to proclaim the resurrection in the face of powerful opposition
which had crucified their leader.
Such experiences of the physicality of Jesus’ resurrected body are indeed
multiply attested in first-century documents (Luke 24:30–31, Luke 24:36–
43, Acts 1:4, 10:41, John 20:20, 27, 21:12–13, Ignatius Smyn. 3:3). In spite
of the diversity of the details of the resurrection narratives in the Gospels,
there are common elements that are readily discernible in the appearance
traditions which span a considerable portion of their diversity. One of these
is an appearance involving a meal (Dunn 2003, pp. 858–860). The portrayal
of Jesus’ being involved in meals with causal effects left behind and witnessed
by two or more disciples is attested in Luke 24:30–31, 35 (causal effect left
behind: the broken bread, witnessed by two disciples), Luke 24:39–43 (the
eaten fish, witnessed by ‘The Eleven’ and those with them), Acts 1:4, 10:41,
and Ignatius Smyn. 3:311 (the food and liquid eaten and drunk, witnessed
by a group of disciples), and John 21:12–13 (the bread and fish given, witnessed by seven disciples). Likewise, the portrayal of ‘Jesus’ showing the
disciples his hands has multiple attestations (Luke 24:39–40,12 John 20:20,
27). Ignatius’ Letter to the Smyrneans 3.1–2 claims that the reason why
the apostles were willing to die for their faith is that they have physically
touched the resurrected Jesus:
For I know and believe that he was in the flesh even after the resurrection. And when he came to those who were with Peter, he said to them,
‘Reach out, touch me and see that I am not a bodiless daimon.’ And
immediately they touched him and believed, having been intermixed
with his flesh and spirit. For this reason they also despised death, for
they were found to be beyond death.
Sceptics object by claiming that Luke and John invented the details concerning the physicality of Jesus’ resurrected body because they wanted to
combat Docetism. Wright (2008, p. 56) replies that this suggestion is contradicted by Luke and John also speaking of the risen Jesus appearing through
locked doors, disappearing again, sometimes being recognized, sometimes
not, and finally ascending into heaven. Some scholars object by stating that
according to the Bible even angels eat as well (Gen. 19:1–3) (Allison 2005a,
pp. 289–290). However, as Craig (1989, pp. 269–270) notes, Genesis 19 is
actually describing a bodily manifestation of angels, and what Luke intends
to convey here is that what the apostles were experiencing was not something
purely immaterial but a physical body as shown by the real intake of food.
11 ‘After his resurrection he ate and drank with them, as being possessed of flesh, although
spiritually He was united to the Father.’
12 The sentence on the display of hands and feet in v. 40 is a ‘Western non-interpolation’;
it is omitted in some manuscripts, but the wider attestation favours authenticity, as most
scholars now recognized (Dunn 2003, p. 849, n. 98; Bock 2002, p. 400, n. 123).
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Sceptics object by claiming that these accounts in Luke are legendary
embellishments or exaggerated details of rumours. Eisenberg (2016) and
Komarnitsky (2013) cites the case of Alexander the Great and notes that
despite voluminous contemporary recording of his life and deeds, he still
attracted supernatural embellishments during his own lifetime. They claim
that Jesus on the other hand was not a person of significant public interest,
there are no contemporary accounts of his life, and therefore constraints
on embellishments to the historical record about Jesus would have been far
less. Psychological studies indicate that the content of rumours are partly
shaped by group biases, and information is invented, distorted, or ignored
to fit the main theme of the rumour or to convince sceptics (Shibutani 1966,
p. 85).
However, Eisenberg (2016) and Komarnitsky (2013) neglect the fact that,
in the case of Alexander, those who embellished accounts of his life did not
have to suffer persecutions for their belief in Alexander, and the details of
these supernatural embellishments were not of foundational importance.
The opposite is the case for Jesus’ resurrection. In addition, while we do not
have contemporary accounts of Jesus’ life, we have accounts of his resurrection written while the ‘eyewitnesses’ were still alive and can be checked.
While the public interest in Jesus was not as great as that of Alexander, there
were nevertheless hostile people who knew about him and bothered to get
him crucified, and who challenged the claims of the earliest Christians (see
previous chapters). Eisenberg (2016) and Komarnitsky (2013) also neglect
the ancient Jewish monotheistic context of the earliest Christians. While
sceptics claim that the embellishments of Jesus were due to the early Christians being biased towards affirming a divine view of Jesus, the question is
what could have caused the early Christians to be biased towards affirming
a divine view of Jesus in the first place. As I argued in Loke (2017a), given
the ancient Jewish monotheistic context of the earliest Christians, arriving
at a divine view of Jesus (one that regards Jesus to be on the Creator side
of the Creator–creature divide) would have been extremely difficult unless
there was overwhelming powerful evidence of his divinity and resurrection
in the first place, such as those noted in the accounts which the sceptics
claim were embellishment. Concerning rumours, as noted in Chapter 2,
psychological studies have also indicated that people are careful to form
conclusions based on valid evidence when the topic is important, when the
costs of false confirmation are greater, and when people are held personally responsible for what they say and care about their reputation among
sustained relationships with known audiences (DiFonzo and Bordia 2007,
p. 166). Groups characterized by scepticism tend to arrive at more accurate
conclusions, and false rumours are quickly discarded in groups that possess
the ability and motivation to achieve accuracy (DiFonzo and Bordia 2007,
pp. 173–174). It has already been argued in Chapter 2 that these considerations were present in earliest Christianity.
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Moreover, it has been noted that experiences of the physicality of Jesus’
resurrected body are multiply attested in first-century documents. Allison
argues for the importance of observing repeated patterns across various
characteristics and sources as well as focusing on the overall impression
the sources give in making historical claims about Jesus (Allison 2010,
pp. 14–16). As explained earlier, the experiences of the physicality of Jesus’
resurrected body is a repeated pattern. In the midst of diverse details, the
commonality of the detail of Jesus being involved in a meal leaving behind
causal effects further strengthens its authenticity. Such ‘solid’ evidence
of the physicality of Jesus’ body together with evidence of it being able
to come and go through locked doors and so on (see the discussion on
transphysicality in Chapter 5) answers Carnley’s question, ‘how it was
that the Easter visions could be understood as signs of the objective but
heavenly existence of Jesus rather than as mere dreams and psychogenic
delusions’ (Carnley 1987, p. 244). Allison also notes elsewhere that many
scholars regard the Gospels as a subspecies of Greco-Roman biography
(Burridge 2004). He observes that ancient Jewish readers found their past
in the so-called historical books of their Scriptures which were understood
as relating what really happened, and that there is evidence that the early
readers of the Gospels understood them in that way as well (Allison 2010,
pp. 443–445). One might object that conventions of ancient historiography allows for certain flexibility of transmission and a limited inclusion
of non-historical details (e.g. authors creating details of what they think
should have happened) for rhetorical effect, to convey ethical truths, and
so on. I have already replied to this objection in Chapter 1 (see my engagement with Litwa 2019 there). In addition to what I argued there, it should
be also noted that, in the case of details concerning the resurrected Jesus,
Wright argues that these must have been told since the earliest days of
the church as people would surely have asked, and ‘stories as community
forming as this, once told, are not easily modified. Too much depends on
them’ (Wright 2003, p. 611; the issue concerning the apparent discrepancies of the details among the Gospels has already been addressed in
Chapter 2).
More importantly, as argued previously, without the earliest Christians
having such experiences of the physicality of Jesus’ resurrected body, a
widely held conviction among the earliest Christians that Jesus was resurrected bodily could not have started in the first place. Sceptics might object
that some Messianist Chabads came to believe that the rabbi (‘Rebbe’)
Menachem Mendel Schneersohn (1902–1994) resurrected without ‘solid
evidence’ (see Marcus 2001); indeed, there was no tradition of resurrection
appearances, and they believed his resurrection even though his body is in
the tomb. However, unlike the case concerning the resurrection of Jesus,
the resurrection of the Rebbe has not been a widely held conviction among
his followers, many of whom agree that he did not resurrect and are still
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awaiting his resurrection from his tomb13 (for further analysis of this case,
see Chapter 7).

4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued for the conclusion that (3.2) ‘At least some (if
not all) of these ‘experiences of Jesus’ were caused by an extramental entity.’
This is warranted by the conclusion (established in previous chapters) that
there were ‘appearances’ to three different groups of people (the Twelve, the
five hundred, and the other apostles besides the Twelve) in different circumstances over a short period.
The alternative (3.1) ‘All of these ‘experiences of Jesus’ were caused intramentally’ is contradicted by multiple historical considerations:
First, their psychological states were varied. While guilt, bereavement,
pressures and anxieties, religious enthusiasm, excitement over initial reports,
and so on may have been present in various degrees among some members
of each group, there was evidence of doubts and fears of persecution. Moreover, (3.1) is ad hoc because it requires nonevidenced assumptions such as
former sceptic James having the motive of wanting the honourable leadership role in the church (Price 2005, p. 83) and Paul having predisposing
psychological factors such as guilt in persecuting a people he came to admire
and subsequent disgust with fellow persecuting Pharisees (Carrier 2005a,
p. 187), which as explained earlier are inconsistent with the evidence.
Second, without a corresponding external stimulation of the relevant
sensory organ, the mental states internal to each person within a group of
people would not agree on various details concerning their experience of
the external world. Indeed, collective hallucinations are not found in peerreviewed medical literature (Bergeron and Habermas 2015). A number of
cases which have been labelled as ‘group hallucinations’ (e.g. apparitions
of Mary) may well be cases of illusions, which is a case of misidentification
(see next chapter).
Third, scientific studies have indicated that many cases of hallucination do subsequently achieve insight that their experience is hallucinatory
after the experience has ended. Therefore, if the apostles, the five hundred
etc. had hallucinations of the resurrected Jesus, many of them would have
achieved insight or suspect that their experience was hallucinatory after the
experience ended. In that case they would hardly have been able to persuade
themselves and their audiences to accept and proclaim the difficult belief
that they had really seen Jesus’ resurrected body and be persecuted for it.
Fourth, a number of important recent studies have shown that a bodily
resurrected Jesus was what the earliest Christians claimed to have witnessed

13 www.nytimes.com/1998/06/29/nyregion/messiah-fervor-for-late-rabbi-divides-manylubavitchers.html
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(Ware 2014; Cook 2017). ‘Solid evidence’ of the physicality of Jesus’ resurrected body—such as experiences of Jesus being involved in meals with
causal effects left behind and witnessed by multiple disciples—were multiply
attested in first-century documents and would have been required to convince the earliest Christians that that was what they witnessed rather than
Jesus’ angel, spirit, etc.
In conclusion, there are good reasons for thinking that (3.2) ‘At least
some (if not all) of these ‘experiences of Jesus’ were caused by an extramental entity.’ (To address the problems with the intramental hypothesis,
some scholars such as Ehrman and Carrier have tried to combine it with
other hypotheses; their proposals are discussed in Chapter 7. I shall also
explain other considerations against the intramental hypothesis such as the
evidence of suspicion of visions within early Christian sources [Rowland
2002, pp. 272–275] and Keim’s arguments in Chapter 7).

5	The extramental entity was
Jesus who died on the cross

5.1 Introduction
In previous chapters I have shown that there were people in mid-first century CE who claimed that they had seen Jesus alive after his crucifixion,
they truly saw something, and what they saw was not caused intramentally
but extramentally. In this chapter, I shall demonstrate that (4.2) For at least
some (if not all) of these experiences, the extramental entity was Jesus, and
(5.2) Jesus died on the cross.

5.2 Addressing the mistaken identity hypothesis
Cases of misidentifications have been claimed by sceptics to be parallel to
Jesus’ ‘resurrection appearances.’ Examples include stories of sightings of
UFOs, cattle mutilations (Martin 1991, pp. 92–95), and Bigfoot (Goulder
1996, pp. 52–55). Psychologists have noted that what people expect to see
or hear can affect the way they perceive an event (Redman 2010, p. 181),
and factors such as the wording of questions and the suggestibility of the
witness can influence the accuracy of identification (Kassin et al. 2001).
For example, Wells and Bradfield (1999) asked students to observe a video
recording of a robbery, and they were told that the purpose of the study
was to identity the gunman. They were then presented with a five-person
photo spread that did not contain the actual gunman. However, because
the instruction implied that the gunman was in the photo spread, all students selected one photo as the gunman. Perhaps Jesus’ predictions served
an analogous role to the ‘instruction’ in this case to cause the disciples to
misidentify someone else as Jesus.
However, the aforementioned cases are disanalogous to the claims concerning Jesus’ ‘post-mortem appearances’ in a number of important ways.
In particular, these cases, as well as tricks used by illusionists such as Derren
Brown and Uri Geller do not
a

occur in the context of persecution where the people involved were willing to lose everything and die for what the witnesses saw, and
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serve as foundational proof of the veracity of a religion, where crucial
fundamental beliefs held by a large number of people concerning eternal
salvation is dependent on the testimonies of available witnesses.

Since there is no fear of persecution and the beliefs are not of crucial
importance, the motivation to carefully countercheck the details over a
period of time by other people who were deeply concerned about them
would be lacking. Hence, these cases are more likely to be sensationalized or
careless reports or frauds. Allison notes that there are numerous examples
of illusions (i.e. misidentifications) in which people claimed to have seen the
same thing but, when closely interviewed, disagreed on the crucial details
(Allison 2005a, p. 278, n. 297, 318).
In contrast with the aforementioned cases (and this important factor is
somewhat neglected by sceptics in recent discussions), the claims concerning
Jesus’ ‘post-mortem appearances’ occurred in the context of persecution as
foundational events proving the veracity of crucial fundamental beliefs (see
Chapter 3).
Furthermore, unlike the gunman case in which the gunman was a stranger, it is unreasonable to think that the disciples who had been with Jesus
for a while (as well as James, his physical brother) and who were therefore
very familiar with his behaviour could have mistaken another person for
him in a variety of circumstances. Shapiro’s (2016, p. 135) suggestion that
maybe the disciples ‘had drunk too much wine and simply confused a Jesus
look-alike for the real deal’ ignores the fact that there were repeated appearances to different groups in a variety of circumstances. It is unreasonable to
think that all three groups of people, including the ‘more than five hundred,’
mistook another person for Jesus as a result of drinking too much wine.
Moreover, ancient people were well aware that getting drunk would cause
people to be confused and ‘see things,’ in which case they would easily have
suspected whether they truly saw Jesus. If these people did not identify carefully and make sure before the meetings were over that it was Jesus whom
they saw, they would not have proclaimed the resurrection and be willing
to give up everything for it (which they did, see Chapter 3). Therefore, it is
unreasonable to think that three different groups of people (the Twelve, the
five hundred, and the other apostles besides the Twelve) mistook someone
else for Jesus in different circumstances.
Sceptics question why the Gospels narrate instances of the disciples failing initially to recognize Jesus (disciples at Emmaus in Luke 24:16, Mary
in John 20:14–15, and the disciples in John 21:4) (Allison 2005a, pp. 227–
228). If they could fail to recognize him on certain occasions, could they also
have failed to recognize an impostor?
In reply, assuming the historicity of these narratives for the sake of the
sceptic’s argument, the problem of failure of recognition is limited to only a
few cases and is not a universal feature of all their encounters. More importantly, these are all instances of mistaking ‘Jesus’ to be someone else, not
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mistaking someone else to be Jesus (as affirmed by the mistaken identity
hypothesis). The latter would be an indication of how easy it was for the disciples to falsely believe that what they saw was Jesus, the former is not. Thus
these narratives cannot be used by the sceptic to support the hypothesis that
the disciples would have easily mistaken someone else for Jesus.
In accordance with these narratives (the historicity of which is assumed
for the sake of the sceptics’ argument), the temporary failures to recognize
Jesus can be explained by
1
2

3

the fact that the witnesses were overwhelmed with sorrow and disappointment and did not expect to see Jesus,
Jesus/God temporarily keeping them from recognizing him (‘But their
eyes were prevented (ἐκρατοῦντο) from recognizing Him,’ Luke 24:16;
see Bock 1996, pp. 1908–1909;1 to assume that such a concealment is
not possible would be to beg the question against these narratives), or
a combination of these explanations.

It should be emphasized that in these passages the failures of recognition were only temporary, before the appearance was over they were absolutely convinced that it was Jesus whom they saw, such that ‘they went out
fearless facing death because they had not the slightest doubt that He had
conquered death’ (Geisler and Howe 1997, p. 397). Hence, these passages
cannot be used as counter-evidence to my arguments against the mistaken
identity hypothesis.
Sceptics might ask, ‘if Herod and some of his contemporaries could have
mistaken Jesus to be the resurrected John the Baptist as portrayed by Mark
6:14–29, why couldn’t the disciples of Jesus have mistaken someone else to
be the resurrected Jesus?’
In reply, as noted in Chapter 1, those who said that Jesus was John the
Baptist raised from the dead (Mark 6:14) and Herod who thought the
same (v. 16) might not have known that Jesus was a contemporary of John
(Lane 1974), for there is no indication that these people had seen Jesus
before or that they had thoroughly researched Jesus’ background. There
is also no indication that Herod and those contemporaries had seen Jesus
directly; all that is stated is that they had heard that there was a person
known as Jesus who had done some remarkable things (v. 14). However,
the disciples of Jesus were familiar with Jesus, and as argued in previous
chapters they claimed to have seen the resurrected Jesus and indeed had

1 One might ask whether Luke 24:36–39 implies that the two disciples yet again failed to recognize Jesus (I thank Hong Liang for raising this question). In reply, Luke 24:36–39 does not
portray only the two disciples at the scene; there were other disciples as well, among whom
some may have doubted whether it was Jesus or (if it was) whether it was his spirit, hence
Jesus went on to convince them that it was him and that he was physically present.
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direct experiences of an extramental entity whom they thought was the
resurrected Jesus.
A particular form of mistaken identity hypothesis, the twin brother
hypothesis, has been proposed by some sceptics. For example, Ehrman mentions that the Syrian tradition and Acts of Thomas record that Jesus had a
twin brother and claims that the disciples could have mistaken him for Jesus
(Craig and Ehrman 2006, p. 25). Robert Greg Cavin (1995, pp. 361–379)
suggests that the twin brother removed the body of Jesus and faked the
resurrected Jesus to the disciples. This hypothesis has also been proposed by
Shapiro (2016, pp. 133–134) and bestselling author Philip Pullman (2010).
The historical value of the sources Ehrman cites, however, is extremely
dubious (they are dated from the second and third centuries, as Ehrman
observes).2 Hence, there is no good evidence at all to think that such a
twin brother existed. On the other hand, if there were a twin brother, Jesus’
family members (especially his mother Mary!) would have known about
his existence. In that case, they would have suspected (or been warned by
other family members to suspect) that the ‘resurrection appearances’ were
sightings of this twin brother, and it would have been implausible that they
would join the early church (1 Cor. 9:5, Acts 1:14) and suffer persecution.
This is especially so given the unbelief of Jesus’ family members prior to
his ‘post-mortem appearances’ (see Chapter 4). One might suggest that it
was a hoax involving these family members (i.e. they knew about this twin
brother, and he was presented to other unsuspecting disciples after Jesus’
crucifixion). However, it is hard to believe that they would be willing to die
for what they knew was false, or that during times of intense persecution
they would have evinced genuine faith in Jesus’ resurrection consistently
without letting out the hoax (see Chapter 3). Cavin (1995) speculates that
the twin was switched with another baby when he was very young such
that, unknown to Jesus’ family, there was another person who looked identical to Jesus. However, in the absence of any evidence that Jesus had a twin
and that such a switch occurred, this is ad hoc.
Moreover, even if (against the odds) there were such a twin brother, he
must somehow have managed to avoid any contact with other people prior
to Jesus’ crucifixion such that others including the disciples would not have
suspected that it was the twin whom they saw, and somehow be willing to
engage in such an extremely dangerous and stupid hoax of pretending to
be Jesus after knowing the horror of his crucifixion and risk suffering the
same fate as his brother (instead of fleeing far away immediately, which
would be a much safer option). Furthermore, twins may look alike but
2 Ehrman himself thinks that this hypothesis is unlikely (Craig and Ehrman 2006, p. 25). He
is right about this, of course; he is wrong in thinking that any hypothesis (however unlikely)
is more likely than the resurrection, as Craig demonstrates in the debate (pp. 14–17; see
further, Chapter 8).
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behave differently. A twin brother (or anyone else) would not have been
able to behave consistently like Jesus over a period of time in a variety of circumstances, to the extent that he could persuade those who had lived with
Jesus for years, including the doubting disciples and Jesus’ family members
(e.g. James) who were cynical towards Jesus even prior to his disgraceful
crucifixion,3 to accept and be willing to die for the very difficult belief that
Jesus resurrected.
Finally, it is most plausible that Paul’s theology in 1 Corinthians 15 concerning the resurrected body as ‘spiritual body’ comes from the fact that the
body of ‘Jesus’ was not experienced by the witnesses listed in 1 Corinthians 15:1–11 as merely ‘naturally physical’ but rather evinced ‘transphysicality’ (to use Wright’s terminology) (Wright 2003, pp. 608–615), and
a twin brother (nor anyone else) would not have been able to fake that
naturalistically.
In relation to ‘transphysicality,’ Bryan (2011, pp. 37–39) notes that the
earliest New Testament witnesses already speak of the Risen Jesus to be in
a different category of life: he is ‘in power’ (Rom. 1:4 19) and ‘we know
that Christ, being raised from the dead, will never die again; death no
longer has dominion over him’ (Rom. 6:9–10). This is the ‘better resurrection’ (Hebrews 11:35) already explained in Chapter 2. Bauckham (2011,
pp. 107–108) observes that the early Christians
did not think that Jesus had been resuscitated, like the dead people Jesus
himself was reported to have brought back to life. Those people, such as
the son of the widow of Nain, simply returned to this mortal life, very
much like people resuscitated after ‘clinical death’ in modern hospitals.
Bauckham goes on to explain,
But Jesus was not like that. He appeared to people at will, and they
do not seem to have wondered where he was when he was not making one of these relatively few appearances. While he took part, fleetingly, in ordinary human situations, he was evidently different. They
believed he was raised to a new sort of bodily life, eternal life. Such a
notion of transformed bodily existence was certainly not unknown to
Jews of the time, who called it resurrection. God, it was widely believed,
was going to raise all the dead to new life at the end of history, when
God abolishes evil and death and renews his whole creation. The first
Christians thought that was what had happened to Jesus—but with the
extraordinary qualification that it had happened to Jesus already, ahead

3 The prior unbelief of Jesus’ family members fits the criteria of embarrassment and multiple
attestation (Mark 3:21, 31–35, John 7:1–10) and thus it is most likely authentic (Licona
2010, pp. 440–455).
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of everyone else. There was no precedent in the Jewish tradition for
claiming that this had happened to anyone else.
(ibid.)
Given the lack of precedent in the Jewish tradition, and given the likelihood that the apostles were indeed highly sceptical of Jesus’ resurrection
(see Chapters 3–4), a few vague or transient sightings of Jesus would not
have resulted in a widely held conviction among the earliest Christians that
Jesus was bodily resurrected in such a transphysical way, a conviction which
was of fundamental importance for a faith for which they were prepared to
give up everything. Rather, it must have been some sort of repeated experiences of the transphysical powers of Jesus’ resurrected body that convinced
them.
Such experiences are indeed multiply attested in first-century documents.
While the Gospels and Acts portray Jesus’ resurrected body as physical (see
Chapter 4), it also ‘comes and goes through locked doors; it is not always
recognized; and in the end it disappears into God’s space, that is, “heaven,”
through the thin curtain that in much Jewish thought separates God’s space
from human space’ (Wright 2008, p. 55; see Luke 24:31, 36; 50–53; John
20:19, 26; Acts 1:1–11). Sceptics would object by questioning the credibility
of these details in the Gospels (e.g. by claiming that these were legendary
embellishments). In reply, the reliability of the Gospels’ portrayal of such
details has already been defended in previous chapters. The main argument
here is that, without such experiences of the powers of Jesus’ resurrected
body, a widely held conviction among the earliest Christians that Jesus was
bodily resurrected in a transphysical way would not have started in the first
place.

5.3 Addressing the swoon hypothesis
The swoon hypothesis (Jesus swooned on the cross, survived the crucifixion, exited the tomb, and showed himself to the disciples later) has been
popularized among laypeople by novelist Dan Brown’s The Da Vinci Code
(2003). However, it has been widely rejected by scholars since David Strauss
refuted it in the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, it is mentioned by Barbara
Thiering (1992), who speculates that Jesus merely passed out after being
administered snake poison. Duncan Derrett (2005, pp. 397–400) argues
that the disciples realized that the proclamation of the resurrection would
help business and attract rich followers, and on the reappearance of the
swooned Jesus after the crucifixion the question the disciples had would be
‘how would this be of benefit to us?’ He postulates that Jesus then conveniently died of gas gangrene, and the disciples cremated the corpse and later
reported that he had ascended.
To evaluate the swoon hypothesis, consider first the brutality of Roman
flogging and crucifixion. The Romans normally carried out brutal flogging
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before crucifying a victim (Hengel 1977, p. 29). Ancient sources report of
people whipped to the bone (Josephus, Jewish War, 6.304), whipped till
their intestines were exposed (ibid., 2.612), and whipped till their ‘veins and
arteries’ became visible (The Martyrdom of Polycarp 2.2).
While the Romans did not invent crucifixion, they made it into one of
the most barbarous forms of cruelty (Bauckham 2011, p. 95). Nailing was
the preferred method of securing the victim on the cross (Hengel 1977,
pp. 31–32, n. 25; several texts indicate that Jesus was nailed to the cross;
John 20:25; Acts 2:23; Col. 2:14; Gos. Pet. 6:21; Justin Dial. 97), and while
hanging there victims were tortured in various gruesome ways such that
Josephus (Jewish War 7.203) would refer to crucifixion as ‘the most pitiful
of deaths.’ The flogging, beatings, and nailing to the cross would have left
Jesus suffering from severe blood loss, dehydration, inadequate respiration,
and strenuous physical exertion, eventually resulting in cardiovascular collapse which was the probable cause of death in Jesus’ case (Edwards et al.
1986).
Sceptics might object that Josephus mentioned a case of survival after
crucifixion. In his autobiography, he recalls successfully pleading with Titus
to take down three of his crucified friends; they were treated by Roman
physicians and one of them survived (Josephus, Life, 420).4 Vermès (2008,
p. 145) observes that according to Mark’s portrayal Jesus remained on the
cross for such a short time that Pilate wondered whether he was truly dead
when Joseph of Arimathea asked for his body (Mark 15:44), and Vermès
speculates that the piercing of his side by one of the executioners was a
later invention introduced by John (19:34) to dispel doubts as to whether
Jesus was dead. It might be objected that in the case of Josephus’ report, his
friends were taken down with the intention of sparing them, while in the
case of Jesus’ crucifixion there was no intention of sparing him, and those
who crucified him would have ensured that he was dead. However, sceptics
might suggest the possibility that the Centurion and those with him who
had earlier confessed ‘Truly this man was God’s Son!’ (Matthew 27:54)
might have wanted to save Jesus if they were to discover Jesus alive, and
they might have conspired to keep silent about Jesus’ survival to protect
him.
Nevertheless, in the case of Josephus’ report, it should be noted that even
with treatment two out of three friends died. Moreover, even if Jesus did not
die, he would have been half-dead. The swoon hypothesis does not explain how
a half-dead Jesus still suffering from the wounds of whipping and crucifixion

4 ‘I saw many captives crucified, and remembered three of them as my former acquaintance.
I was very sorry at this in my mind, and went with tears in my eyes to Titus, and told him of
them; so he immediately commanded them to be taken down, and to have the greatest care
taken of them, in order to their recovery; yet two of them died under the physician’s hands,
while the third recovered.’
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could have persuaded the ‘Twelve,’ the ‘more than five hundred brethren,’ and
‘the other apostles’ that he was the risen Lord of life (Strauss 1879, p. 412)
and to testify that they had witnessed the resurrected Jesus, which is the fact
established in previous chapters that required to be explained. Seeing a halfdead Jesus would not have convinced them to worship him as the divine Creator of the universe who has overcome death (which they did; Loke 2017a);
it would only have convinced them that he needed urgent medical attention.
Contrary to Derret’s suggestion, if the disciples were not convinced that Jesus
resurrected, they would not have risked their lives proclaiming Jesus’ resurrection and be willing to sacrifice for it (see Chapter 3).
Moreover, the idea that Jesus would want to be involved in an easily
refutable hoax about his resurrection and risk sacrificing the integrity of his
teachings and his reputation is implausible. Finally, Jesus would not have
been able to naturalistically cause his own body to manifest ‘transphysicality’ (see Section 5.2).

5.4 Addressing the escape hypothesis
The escape hypothesis proposes that Jesus had secretly escaped prior to the
crucifixion, somebody else (whom everyone else thought was Jesus) was
crucified in his place, and Jesus showed himself to the disciples later and
convinced them that he was resurrected. For Jesus’ substitute one might
suggests a twin brother or a friend who was either persuaded to sacrifice for
him or an imbecile who was manipulated by him to do so.5
Against the escape hypothesis, it is unlikely that all the onlookers failed
to recognize that it was not Jesus who was crucified in public. The enemies
of Jesus who bothered to crucify him would have bothered to identify him
correctly. Those who had been involved in Jesus’ ministry and knew him
intimately would not have failed to recognize that he was not crucified.
The arguments against the twin brother hypothesis have been mentioned
previously in Section 5.2. The idea that Jesus would want to be involved
in an easily refutable hoax about his resurrection and risk sacrificing the
integrity of his teachings and his reputation is implausible. Finally, Jesus
would not have been able to naturalistically cause his own body to manifest
‘transphysicality’ (see Section 5.2).

5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued for the conclusion that (4.2) for at least some
(if not all) of these experiences, the extramental entity was Jesus. For anyone

5 Gnostic and Islamic escape hypotheses, which propose that God did a miraculous act to
cause someone to be crucified in Jesus’ place, are supernatural hypotheses discussed in
Chapter 8.
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else would have not have been able to behave consistently like Jesus over
a period of time in a variety of circumstances, to the extent that he could
persuade those who had lived with Jesus for years, including the doubting
disciples and Jesus’ family members (e.g. James) who were cynical towards
Jesus even prior to his disgraceful crucifixion, to accept and be willing to die
for the very difficult belief that Jesus resurrected.
While psychological studies have indicated that misidentifications can
happen (e.g. Kassin et al. 2001; Wells and Bradfield 1999), I explain that
these studies are disanalogous to Jesus’ ‘resurrection appearances’ which
occurred in the context of severe persecution as foundational events proving
the veracity of crucial fundamental beliefs, and that (unlike the misidentification of [say] a gunman who was a stranger) the disciples had been with
Jesus for a while. Given the context of persecution in which the enemies of
Jesus wanted to kill him, it is implausible that anyone would want to pretend to be Jesus.
Sceptics often point to the Gospels’ portrayal of a small proportion of
instances in which the disciples failed to recognize Jesus initially (e.g. Luke
24:16, John 20:14–15, 21:4). Assuming the historicity of these narratives
for the sake of the sceptic’s argument, these can easily be explained (e.g. by
Jesus temporarily keeping them from recognizing him); it should be noted
that before the appearance was over they were absolutely convinced that it
was Jesus.
In this chapter, I have also argued for the conclusion that (5.2) Jesus died
on the cross.
Against the swoon hypothesis, it is unlikely that Jesus survived the crucifixion. Even if Jesus did not die, a half-dead Jesus still suffering from the
wounds of the crucifixion would not have convinced the disciples that he
was the risen Lord of life.
Against the naturalistic escape hypothesis, it is unlikely that all the
onlookers failed to recognize that it was not Jesus who was crucified in public. The enemies of Jesus who bothered to crucify him would have bothered
to identify him correctly. Those who had been involved in Jesus’ ministry
and knew him intimately would not have failed to recognize that he was not
crucified. It is implausible that Jesus would want to start an easily refutable
hoax about his resurrection.
Finally, against the mistaken identity hypothesis, the swoon hypothesis,
and the naturalistic escape hypothesis, no mere human being would have
been able to naturalistically cause his own body to manifest ‘transphysicality’ (see Section 5.2).
In conclusion, there are good reasons for thinking that (4.2) for at least
some (if not all) of these experiences, the extramental entity was Jesus, and
that (5.2) Jesus died on the cross.

6	What happened to Jesus’
physical body?

6.1 Introduction
The historicity of Jesus’ crucifixion under Pilate has already been established
in previous chapters. The question is what happened to his body after the
crucifixion. As noted in Chapter 1, these are the following possibilities:
(7) Either (7.1), (7.2), or (7.3) is true:
(7.1) Jesus was not crucified (escape hypothesis).
(7.2) Jesus was crucified and he was not buried (unburied hypothesis).
(7.3) Jesus was crucified and he was buried, in which case either (8.1)
or (8.2) is true:
(8.1) The body of Jesus remained buried (remain buried hypothesis).
(8.2) The body of Jesus did not remain buried, in which case either
(9.1) or (9.2) is true:
(9.1) The body was removed by non-agent(s), e.g. earthquakes (Allison
2005a, p. 204), animals, etc. (removal by non-agent hypothesis)
(9.2) The body was removed by agent(s), in which case either (9.2.1)
or (9.2.2) is true:
(9.2.1) Others removed the body, either
(9.2.1.1) Friends of Jesus (removal by friends hypothesis),
(9.2.1.2) Enemies of Jesus (removal by enemies hypothesis), or
(9.2.1.3) Neither friends nor enemies, e.g. tomb robbers
(removal by neutral party hypothesis).
(9.2.2) 
Jesus himself removed his body, in which case either
(9.2.2.1) or (9.2.2.2) is true:
(9.2.2.1) Jesus did not die on the cross: he swooned on
the cross and exited the tomb later (swoon
hypothesis), or
(9.2.2.2) Jesus died on the cross, rose from the dead, and
exited the tomb (resurrection).
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The escape and swoon hypotheses have already been discussed in previous chapters, leaving the following alternatives to the Resurrection: unburied, remain buried, removal by non-agent, removal by friends, removal by
enemies, and removal by neutral party.

6.2 Unburied hypothesis
Crossan (1991, pp. 392–394, 1994, pp. 152–158) proposes that Jesus’ dead
body was either left on the cross or thrown into a shallow grave and subsequently eaten by dogs.
Against this unburied hypothesis, Evans points out that the Jews would
have wanted to take down the body of a hanged man and bury him on the
same day of his death to prevent defiling the land in accordance to the Torah
(Deut. 21:22–23; a crucified victim would have been considered a ‘hanged
man,’ cf. Paul’s reference in Gal. 3:13). While Ehrman (2014) objects by
claiming that it is the common Roman practice not to allow someone crucified to be buried but to let the body rot on the cross, Evans argue that the
probability that the Romans would allow a crucified victim to be buried
during peace time is not unlikely (Evans 2005, 2014; Magness 2006). Summarizing the views of other scholars, Eisenberg (2016) notes that in 1968,
The remains of a crucified man from the first century were found in a
cave northeast of Jerusalem, with a nail still embedded in the heel. The
circumstances of this find suggest the man’s body was taken down soon
after death because of the wealth and influence of his family (Crossan
and Reed 2001, pp. 3–4, 246–247; Lowder 2005, p. 264). The discovery of this man’s remains, and the reported timing of Jesus’ crucifixion and involvement of the high-status Joseph figure, make the story of
Pilate’s early release of the body plausible.

6.3 Remain buried hypothesis
In 2007 the controversial film The Lost Tomb of Jesus was produced claiming that the bones of Jesus, Mary, Mary Magdalene, and others were found
in a tomb discovered in 1980 in Talpiot, Israel. However, this claim has been
widely rejected by scholars. As Craig (2007b) explains, first, it’s not even
clear that the name on the ossuary is ‘Jesus, son of Joseph’ as claimed by
the filmmakers. One only needs to look at the photo of the ossuary1 to realize that the name ‘is like a child’s scrawl with a crayon on the wall’ (ibid.).
It is no wonder that other scholars have commented, ‘I cannot be even
10 percent conclusive about anything else in this inscription other than the

1 See www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/question-answer/supposed-discovery-of-jesus-familytomb
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name “Joseph” ’ (Caruso); ‘It’s more likely the name ‘Hanun’ rather than
Jesus’ (Pfann); and ‘the scribbling is not an inscription, it is sloppy graffiti’
(Charlesworth) (Habermas 2008, pp. 26–27). Second, even if the scribbling
was not forged and even if it was an inscribed name that was truly ‘Jesus,
son of Joseph’ and not (say) ‘Hanun, son of Joseph,’ it may not be referring
to Jesus of Nazareth because Jesus and Joseph were very common names in
Judea. Craig (2007b) observes, ‘It’s been reckoned that one out of every 79
males during that time was named Jesus, son of Joseph! Similarly, “Maria”
was the most common Jewish name for women at the time; one out of every
four women was named Maria.’ Craig goes on to note that ‘Third, Mary
Magdalene was not called “Mariamne” or “Mariamenon” (the name on
the ossuary); her name was Maria. Not until the forged apocryphal Acts of
Philip 400 years after Christ is “Mariamne” possibly used of her’ (ibid.).
Because of the above reasons, most scholars have concluded that the filmmakers’ case is unconvincing.2
Other sceptics have argued that Jesus’ body was buried in a poorly identified place, such as a graveyard for multiple persons (Becker 2007, p. 248),
and it remained undiscovered and buried there. Some supporters of this
theory argue that Acts 13:29 portrays that the same people who ask Pilate
to crucify Jesus were also the same people who buried Jesus, and since these
were enemies of Jesus they would have buried Jesus shamefully in a public
graveyard (Kirby 2005, pp. 247–248; Parson 2005, p. 445). They support
this hypothesis by noting that according to the Secret Book of James (5), the
Jews buried Jesus ‘in the sand.’
In response, the word ‘they’ in Acts could be referring to the Sanhedrin as a
whole group; it does not necessarily imply that it was exactly the same members in that group that both crucified Jesus and buried him. Indeed, Luke,
who wrote Acts 13:29 cited by sceptics, claims in his Gospel that Joseph,
who was one of their members, did not consent to the crucifixion and that he
buried Jesus (Luke 23:51) (Allison 2005a, p. 357). As for the Secret Book of
James, it survives in only a single copy written in Coptic no earlier than the
second century (Evans 2006, pp. 52–77) and its historical value is dubious.
Regarding the Gospels’ accounts that Jesus was buried by Joseph of Arimathea, some sceptics claim that Joseph of Arimathea could be a fictional
figure because the location of Arimathea has not been located, and that the
name could be a pun on ‘best disciple’ ari(stos)mathe(tes) invented by the
Gospels’ authors to highlight the fact that Joseph was acting as the best disciple of Jesus in burying him while the rest of the disciples fled (Kirby 2005,
pp. 237–238). Parson (2005, p. 446) claims that Joseph’s role in the burial
was represented in increasingly positive tone from Mark to Luke to John,
which suggests legendary embellishment.

2 See https://web.archive.org/web/20080127132945/http://www.ptsem.edu/NEWS/talpiot
tombsymposium.php
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However, the fact that an ancient city has not been located does not mean
it did not exist, and the pun on ari(stos)mathe(tes) is just speculation. Contra Parsons, the inclusion of more details by later Gospels authors ‘could
simply be a matter of a later writer adding new and truthful traditions that
were known to his own community, purposely filling in the gaps’ (Habermas 2013, p. 477). On the other hand, it is implausible that the Gospels’
authors would invent a figure who was supposed to be a member of a wellidentified group of their opponents (the Sanhedrin) and who could therefore
be easily falsified by their opponents and thus discredit their own writings.
Craig argues that Jesus’ burial is one of the best-attested events in Jesus’ life,
found in the extremely early tradition cited by Paul in 1 Corinthians 15:3–5
and also in all four Gospels and Acts. The differences between the Gospels
indicate multiple independent sources; for example, Matthew and Luke’s
agreeing in their wording in contrast to Mark (e.g. Matt. 27.58 = Lk. 23.52
‘This man went in to Pilate and asked for the body of Jesus’) indicate that
they both probably had another source in addition to Mark. Craig adds that
the writers would have little reason to invent the story that the tomb was
owned by a member of the Sanhedrin. The aforementioned considerations
imply that Jesus’ burial place was known (Craig 2009). Thus, if the women
had gone to the wrong tomb as suggested by Lake (1907), Jesus’ opponents
(e.g. members of the Sanhedrin) would have no problem going to the right
one and bringing out the body when the disciples started proclaiming Jesus’
resurrection. Moreover, the fact that the organizer of the burial was well
known and could have easily been asked for strongly militates against the
theory that the person in charge of the burial place moved the body of Jesus
to another available tomb (Vermès 2008, pp. 142–144).
Other sceptics object that Joseph was not a sympathizer of Jesus but
merely a pious Jew desiring to see God’s law carried out, and therefore he
would not have buried Jesus favourably but in a common grave reserved for
condemned blasphemers (Lowder 2005). Carrier and Lowder suggest that
Joseph buried him temporarily in his tomb and reburied him later in a common grave. Carrier (2005b, p. 382) notes that the Mishnah records that it
was forbidden to bury on the first day of festival (Passover Friday) and on
Sabbath, so Joseph probably took the body down and tucked it away as the
law required to await burial at the earliest opportunity.
However, if Joseph was not a sympathizer, it is implausible that the Gospels’ authors would portray him as such, because such a portrayal involving
the prominent Sanhedrin could easily be falsified by their opponents if it
were untrue. Given that Joseph was a sympathizer, he would have treated
Jesus as a righteous man and buried him properly, and he would not have
reburied him in a common grave later. Additionally, even though we now
know that reburial was common in ancient Palestine, the typical practice of
reburial is that the body was buried for a year until only bones remained,
and then the bones are removed and placed in an ossuary (Davis 2006,
p. 55); this is not a reburial in two days that Carrier and Lowder suggest.
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Finally, Joseph could easily have enlisted the help of Gentile servants to bury
Jesus and thus avoided desecrating himself on Passover Friday. Raymond
Brown (1999, p. 1218) asks why the women did not cooperate with Joseph
when he buried Jesus and why they came back on Sunday without him. In
reply, the women could have been too overcome with grief, confused, and
frightened to have offered help to Joseph in the burial and to ask him or
others to help them move away the large stone on Sunday morning. Sceptics
claim that the women going to the tomb to anoint the corpse presuppose
that the body was not properly buried, which contradicted the account of
Joseph and Nicodemus putting spices on the body (John 19:39) (Parsons
2005, p. 446). However, what the women may have intended was merely to
use aromatic oils and perfumes that could be rubbed on or simply poured
over the body as an act of devotion, and the practice of observing where
the body was laid and coming back three days later to anoint and mark the
body was in keeping with Jewish burial custom (Evans 2005, pp. 245–246;
Craig 1989, pp. 201–205).3
Kirby (2005, pp. 244–246) argues that it is implausible that Pilate would
agree to Joseph giving Jesus a burial, as this would be tantamount to admitting that Jesus was crucified without just cause. However, this objection begs
the question against the narrative in Matthew which portrays that Pilate did
in a sense admit that Jesus was crucified without just cause by his washing
of hands before the crowd, which conveyed the message that the responsibility for Jesus’ death rested on the Jews who wanted him dead (Matt.
27:11–26).4 The Matthew narrative also portrays that the Jewish leaders
did not oppose the burial of Jesus inside Joseph’s tomb or insist that Jesus be
buried in a common grave. Instead, they requested a guard (for this historicity of this account, see the next section). This is not difficult to understand,
for their overriding concern was to falsify Jesus’ messianic claim, and they
thought that falsifying Jesus’ prediction to rise from the dead would put
an end to the ‘Jesus movement’ after his shameful crucifixion. Given this,
the Jewish leaders would have desired to be able to locate Jesus’ body after
three days to falsify his predictions, and allowing the body to be placed

3 Craig (1989, pp. 184–185) also notes that when Gamaliel died in AD 50, his follower burned
80 pounds of spices and commented, ‘Gamaliel was better than 100 kings’ (B Ebel Rabbathi
8.6). Thus it is not implausible that Nicodemus used 75 pounds of spices for Jesus’ burial as
John stated, if he thought that Jesus had been unjustly condemned and crucified as King of
the Jews.
4 Dunn (2003, pp. 775–777) argues that the depiction that Pilate was being bullied by the Jews
into such an act was ‘almost certainly’ due to the Christians’ political motivation to excuse
the Romans. However, Dunn himself notes, ‘Roman history shows from many examples
that provincial governors were vulnerable to complaints of unjust government,’ and HE cites
Pilate’s eventual disposal due to complaints from Samaritans (Josephus, Antiquities, 18–89)
as an example. It is likely that Pilate wanted to avoid a revolt, and therefore he acceded to
the Jews’ request.
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inside Joseph’s tomb would have made it easier to locate and identify the
body compared to burial among other corpses in a common grave. Placing
guards at the tomb would not only prevent theft, but it would also prevent
veneration at the tomb.

6.4 The guards at the tomb
Whether there were guards at the tomb is of significance because, as
explained later, their presence would (together with other considerations)
rule out all the naturalistic hypotheses concerning Jesus’ body. There are
reasons for accepting the historicity of Matthew’s account.
First, in view of the circumstances leading up to Jesus’ crucifixion, putting a guard would seem to be a natural precaution to prevent the body
from being stolen (Swinburne 2003, pp. 178–179). Carson (1984, p. 586)
notes, ‘The chief priests and the Pharisees would not necessarily be defiling
themselves by approaching Pilate on the Sabbath, provided they did not
travel more than a Sabbath day’s journey to get there and did not enter his
residence (cf. John 18:28).’ Given Pilate’s agreement with the Jewish leaders
to crucify Jesus, it is plausible that he would have agreed to the request to
guard the tomb as well.
Second, if the story was invented by Christians, it is more likely that they
would have said that the guards were placed on Friday rather than Saturday,
which leaves a period between Friday night and Saturday morning during
which the disciples could have stolen the body (Craig 1984, who compares
the account in the Gospel of Peter which claims that the guards were placed
on Friday). The author of Matthew does not explicitly say that the guards
checked that the body was inside the tomb before sealing it, and although
one may argue that it is reasonable to think that they did (see later), the
point here is that it is likely that the author of Matthew would have made
the story more fool proof, as did the author of the Gospel of Peter if he were
freely creating apologetic stories.
Third, in Matthew 28:11–15, the author gives a piece of information
which his intended readers—i.e. the Jews (it is widely agreed that Matthew
is a very Jewish Gospel written for a Jewish Christian church)—could easily have falsified if it were not true. Lindemann (2017, p. 566) objects by
claiming,
The background for it is probably not an otherwise ‘unknown’ polemical Jewish story against the message of Jesus’ resurrection, but rather
late Christian apologetics, perhaps stemming from the evangelist himself, to make the story and the message of Jesus’ resurrection ‘more
plausible’ for Christians themselves.
In reply, Matthew 28:15b, Καὶ διεφημίσθη ὁ λόγος οὗτος παρὰ Ἰουδαίοις μέχρι
τῆς σήμερον ἡμέρας (literally ‘and widely spread this story among the Jews
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until this day’) implies a continuity. In particular, μέχρι (‘until’) implies a
continuity from the past (from the time they reported to the chief priests,
took the money, and did as instructed; according to Matthew, this happened very soon after Jesus’ crucifixion; thus Matthew was referring to the
period around AD 30) to the present (when Gospel of Matthew was written,
say, around AD 70–100). Even though the Gospel of Matthew was written
after AD 70 and probably not in Jerusalem or Judea, the Jews in the Jewish
Christian church in AD 70–100 were descendants of the Jews in AD 30.
Many of them would have already been born before AD 70, and they would
either have been converted from non-Christian Jews or interacted with nonChristian Jews whom they tried to convert. This continuity with their past
and interaction with others would have enabled them to know whether the
story had been widely spread among the Jews from the past till AD 70–100,
and thus to easily falsify it if such a story was not widely spread.
Now Matthew evidently had an apologetic purpose for writing this story;
this purpose implies that the story was of significant interest to the Jewish Christian readers who, as explained earlier, would have been able to
falsify it easily if the information were not true. The author of Matthew’s
Gospel would not have committed a ‘credibility suicide’ by inventing an
easily falsifiable story for his apologetic purpose. The claim made by Matthew was easily open to refutation unless, as it must have been the case, he
and his audience knew that it was correct. This implies that the story originated early at around AD 30, during the period when people could have
easily known whether there were really guards at the tomb and whether
the guards really did say, ‘His disciples came during the night and stole
him away while we were asleep.’5 The strength of this argument is further
enhanced by other considerations supporting the historical reliability of the
Gospels which have been discussed in previous chapters, such as the considerations which imply that the first-century readers of the Gospels were
concerned about truth and that this was known by the Gospels’ authors (see
my engagement with Litwa’s argument in Chapter 1).
The presence of guards at the tomb is also mentioned in the Gospel of Peter
(verses 30–33)6 which probably dates from the second century. Whether the

5 A similar argument was used by Abaddie, who notes that Matthew reports it as an already
public rumour and argues, ‘the widespread story that the disciples stole the body while the
guards slept cannot be accounted for if in point of fact the guard had never been set’ (Craig
1985, pp. 215–218, citing Abaddie’s Traité de la vérité de la religion chrétienne, volume 2).
6 Gospel of Peter 30–33: ‘ “Give over soldiers to us in order that we may safeguard his burial
place for three days, lest, having come, his disciples steal him, and the people accept that he is
risen from the death, and they do us wrong.” But Pilate gave over to them Petronius the centurion with soldiers to safeguard the sepulcher. And with these the elders and scribes came
to the burial place. And having rolled a large stone, all who were there, together with the
centurion and the soldiers, placed it against the door of the burial place. And they marked it
with seven wax seals; and having pitched a tent there, they safeguarded it.’
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text is dependent on the canonical Gospels or on an older passion narrative
which preceded the gospel is debated by scholars. One might ask whether
the Gospel of Peter’s (47–48) portrayal that Pilate ordered the guards to say
nothing contradict Matthew’s account that the guards were commanded to
say something, that is, the disciples came and stole the body while they were
sleeping. In reply, in the Gospel of Peter’s account ‘to say nothing’ could be
referring to ‘to say nothing of what they have seen’; it does not imply they
were forbidden to say something about what they did not see, that is, the
disciples stealing the body.
Many critical scholars claim that the story of the guards at the tomb
is a fiction invented by Matthew (Allison 2005a, p. 311). They argue it
is unlikely that only Matthew would mention it if it is historical (Carrier
2005b, p. 358). Before Matthew 28 was written, there was no indication
that anyone, Christian or non-Christian, was interested in the historical
question of any guards watching the tomb; no one apparently has written
anything about that.7
However, this is an invalid form of the argument from silence, and it fails
for the following reasons. Craig (1984) notes that the evangelists often inexplicably omit what seem to be major incidents that must have been known
to them (e.g. Luke’s great omission of Mark 6:45–8:26) so that it is dangerous to use omission as a test for historicity. The author of Matthew’s Gospel
had reason to include this because his Gospel was written specifically to
the Jews, among whom this rumour was widely spread, whereas such a
need is not present among the audience of the other Gospels (Wilkins 2004,
p. 943). As argued in Chapter 2, 1 Corinthians 15:3–8, which contains an
early tradition, must have been a summary of traditional resurrection narratives which were told in fuller forms elsewhere (Allison 2005a, pp. 235–
239). That is, Paul knew that these details were already in circulation in
the form of various traditional narratives which were known to his audiences (e.g. the Corinthians), therefore he did not see the need to mention
them. As I explained earlier, Matthew 28:11–15 implies that it contains one
such tradition which was passed down from around AD 30 to AD 70–100.
Against critical scholars who argue that the redactive words used in Matthew’s account imply his free creativity, Kankaanniemi (2010, p. 94) argues
that the actual number of Matthean words and expressions in the guard
story has been overestimated; moreover, ‘Matthean redactional expressions
do not imply creativity, but are regularly added to a source which is otherwise followed rather conservatively.’
It might be objected that it is implausible that the guards, who supposedly saw the angel descended and who did not leave until after the women
left (Matt. 28:11), did not challenge and oppose them when they arrived.
In reply, there are two possibilities: (i) the guards were so frightened when

7 I thank Professor Andreas Lindemann for raising this objection.
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the angel was there that they did not oppose the women or (ii) Matthew
28:4–11 did not say that the guards were still there while the angel spoke to
the women, and it also did not say that the guards left the tomb only after
the women left. The guards could have fled (between verses 4 and 5) and
verse 11 continues their story.
It might be also objected that it is implausible that the guards should have
told to others that they were asleep on duty, as they would have been punished if that were the case. In reply, on the one hand, Kankaanniemi (2010,
p. 18) observes,
If the guards were given a task, defined by the priests to perform, and
those same priests told the governor that the guards had done what
was required of them, it is fully plausible that they were not punished
by Pilate. It was the chief priests who decided whether the task was
accomplished or not.
On the other hand, Craig (1984) notes that if the guard did not exist, the
logical Jewish counterargument would be to retort that there were no guards
rather than saying the guards slept.8 Instead, Matthew’s story has the Jewish
side using the weak ‘but the guards were asleep when the theft occurred’
argument, suggesting the Jews of the time knew guards had been placed.9
Against Craig’s argument, Carrier (2005b, p. 359) objects that most Jews
(by then) would be in no position to know whether there were guards, so
a denial would be risky; rather ‘they stole the body’ is a safe response, far
more typical of a polemical sceptic, since this would throw the resurrection story in doubt. However, I have argued earlier that most Jews by then
would still have known whether the story have been widely spread among
them from earlier days as claimed by Matthew, so Carrier’s objection does
not work.10

8 Kankaanniemi (2010, pp. 240–242) argues that the story was not invented by Christians
but by non-Christian Jews to posit witnesses that the disciples had actually stolen the body.
Kankaanniemi thinks this explains why the guards were said to be posted only on Saturday
instead of Friday (the Jewish inventors wanted to avoid the plausible falsification of the
rumour by those watching Jesus’ burial on Friday). In reply, the guards were not said to
have witnessed it but were said to be sleeping, and the posting of guards on Saturday can be
explained by the Jewish leaders coming to know about Jesus’ prediction only on Saturday.
9 If the guards were to be asked ‘how do you know the disciples stole the body since you
were sleeping’, the guards might have replied ‘We were asleep, the body was stolen, who
else could have been but the disciples?’ (Kankaanniemi 2010, p. 15). However, naming the
exact disciples responsible for the accused theft would still have been difficult if none were
actually witnessed to have stolen the body; this might explain why there was no record that
the disciples were punished for tomb raiding (ibid., p. 19).
10 There is dispute concerning whether the guards were Roman or Jewish. For discussion see
Kankaanniemi (2010, pp. 10–11, favouring Roman guards).
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Lowder suspects Matthew’s story because he thinks it involves reporting
secret conversations between the priests and the guards which no Christian source would likely be privy to (Lowder 2005, p. 284). In reply to
this, Davis (2006, p. 56) cheekily asks how Lowder learned that. There
are several possible ways by which Christians could have discovered what
had been said. For example, one of the guards may have repented years
later as he reflected on the incident of seeing the angel—such a repentance
would not have been implausible given such an experience! He could then
have told this to one of the disciples in contact with Matthew, who would
plausibly have refrained from revealing this source of information in his
Gospel in order to protect him. (This could also have been a possible source
for the account concerning the appearance of the angel to the guards who
‘became like dead men’). Lowder (2005, p. 291) asks why the polemic is
not recorded in any contemporary non-Christian Jewish documents. In
response, it has already been noted in Chapter 2 that ‘Jewish writers were
in the main unwilling to engage polemically with Christianity in their extant
writings’ (Paget 2001, p. 615) and that their silence could have been illustrative of their embarrassment about Christianity (e.g. they thought they could
not refute them convincingly).
One might ask why the guards did not repent immediately. In reply, it
could be that they accommodated what they had seen to their own religious framework rather than associating it to any ‘christological system’
(Kankaanniemi 2010, p. 17, commenting, ‘in their mindset what happened
at the tomb would probably have been only one manifestation of the same
unexplainable world of magic as exorcisms and healings’). Kankaanniemi
also notes that some Jews interpreted Jesus’ miracles as being done by someone empowered by Beelzebub; this can explain why the Jewish leaders did
not repent but explain the ‘evidence for Jesus’ resurrection’ as ‘a continuation of the magical tricks of the crucified impostor. Knowing the appeal this
kind of phenomenon would have had on the crowds, the attempt to silence
any possible report of it sounds very credible’ (ibid.).
Against Matthew’s account, Vermès (2008, p. 143) objects, ‘if the closest
associates of Jesus did not expect him to rise, it is hard to imagine that outsiders were aware of a prediction, uttered by Old Testament prophets or by
Jesus, about his resurrection shortly after his death.’ In reply, this objection
begs the question against the narrative in Matthew which portrays that both
Jesus’ disciples and outsiders came to know about Jesus’ prediction, the
disciples did not believe and did not expect him to rise, while the outsiders
took the necessary precautions anyway.
Against the reliability of Matthew, Crossley (2013) claims that Matthew
27:52–53 ‘The tombs also were opened, and many bodies of the saints who
had fallen asleep were raised. After his resurrection they came out of the
tombs and entered the holy city and appeared to many’ is fictional, arguing it is unlikely that contemporary non-Christian figures such as Josephus
would not have recorded such a spectacular event. In reply, Josephus also
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did not mention that there were people who claimed to have witnessed the
resurrected Jesus, a fact which is well established by the evidence (see Chapter 2). As explained in Chapter 2, the silence of non-Christian authors could
have been illustrative of their embarrassment about Christianity (e.g. they
thought they could not explain away the events convincingly), and thus
they chose not to write about them. Thus the silence in this case is not a
valid argument against historicity.11 Alternatively, it has been suggested that
Matthew 27:52–53 can be interpreted non-literally as the ‘special effects’
of an apocalyptic symbolic imagery typical of Jewish apocalyptic writings
to convey how ‘earth shattering’ a literal event (in this case, Jesus’ death)
was (Licona 2010, pp. 548–553, 2016, p. 252, n. 120). Even if the details
in Matthew 27:52–53 are intended to be taken literally and are inaccurate,
this does not imply that all the details in all the Gospels are inaccurate; we
would need to assess case by case and consider the reasons given for each
case, and I have already explained that there are good reasons to think that
there were guards at the tomb (see earlier).

6.5 The empty tomb
Since the tomb was guarded, it must have been empty soon after, for the
earliest Christians would not have come to the widespread agreement that
Jesus resurrected and be willing to suffer persecution for proclaiming this
if the guards were still guarding the body inside the tomb. Moreover, if
that were the case, the opponents of Jesus who bothered to crucify him
would surely say, ‘Jesus’ body is still in the tomb’ when the earliest Christians started proclaiming his resurrection, and the Christians would hardly
have been able to win converts given this and the context of persecution.
Habermas (2013, p. 478) notes the location of the empty tomb proclamation as Jerusalem, and observes, ‘this was absolutely the last place for this
message unless the tomb was indeed unoccupied, for an occupied sepulcher
would completely refute the message.’
Furthermore, many scholars have argued that if the Gospels’ authors
invented the empty tomb and its witnesses, it is unlikely that they would
choose women to be first witnesses. The reason is that in ancient Jewish
society, women’s testimonies were regarded as virtually worthless (Lapide
1984, pp. 95–97 cf. Josephus ‘From women let no evidence be accepted,
because of the levity and temerity of their sex’ Ant. 4.219). Thus the only
plausible reason why this is stated in the Gospels (Mark 16:1–8, Matthew
28:1–7, Luke 24:1–8, John 20:1–2) is that it did happen (Craig 2008).

11 Crossley (2013) also asks why only Matthew’s Gospel mentions it, and Crossley also
argues from the apparent contradictions and ‘legendary embellishments’ in the Gospels
accounts of Jesus’ resurrection; these issues have already been addressed in Chapter 2 and
elsewhere in this book.
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Against the argument based on women’s testimonies, Crossley (2013)
objects that the argument is not as strong as it seems because we are not
dealing with a court of law in Mark 16:1–8. Moreover, the Gospels indicate the prominent role of women in the ministry of Jesus, which suggests
women could play a significant role for certain Christians at least, just as
Esther and Judith were remembered as significant figures in Jewish tradition. ‘All it takes is for one section of earliest Christianity to have had an
interest in the prominence of women for this story to have been generated.’
In any case, in narrative terms, the first known witness in Mark is not the
women but the man dressed in white who may have provided all the authority Mark’s audience required.
In reply, the man dressed in white is irrelevant because he was not the
one who testified about the empty tomb to those who were not at the
scene. Even though the Gospel of Mark does not portray a court of law,
it is evidently written with an evangelistic purpose to persuade people to
believe. While among Christian circles there might be some who recognize
the significance of women, Habermas (2013, p. 479) notes that Crossley
misses the main point here that the message was being taught to a larger
Mediterranean world, many of whom did not share this perspective. The
early Christians recognize this such that they did not mention women in
the official lists of ‘resurrection appearances’ in 1 Corinthians 15 and the
Acts sermons. Vermès (2008, p. 144) likewise notes the attitude of male
superiority adopted by the apostles on hearing the report of female witnesses about the empty tomb (Luke 24:11: ‘But these words seemed to
them an idle tale, and they did not believe them’). The reason why they
did not also remove the women from the Gospels is that ‘the memory of
their role was so persistent that it could not be removed’ (Osiek 1993,
p. 106).
Additionally, Habermas (2013) notes that the empty tomb of Jesus
enjoyed multiple, early, independent attestation:
Scholars find that, including Mark, there are either three or four independent accounts here. Many scholars recognize that Mark utilized an
earlier passion tradition that included the empty tomb account. The last
two reasons especially show that Mark did not invent this story.
(p. 478)
Many scholars date the earlier passion tradition no later than the AD 40s
(Bauckham 2006, p. 243). The early pre-Pauline creed in 1 Corinthians 15:4
also implies an empty tomb (Habermas 2013; Ware 2014).
Finally, the early Jewish opponents of Christians admitted that the tomb
was empty; they only offered an alternative explanation for the empty tomb
by claiming that the disciples stole the body (The opponents’ explanation is
reflected in Matthew 28:11–15; Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho, 108,
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‘His disciples stole him by night from the tomb, where he was laid when
unfastened from the cross, and now deceive men by asserting that he has
risen from the dead and ascended to heaven’; Tertullian, De Spectaculis, 30).
As O’Collins (2011, p. 148) observes, no one disputed that the tomb was
empty; the only dispute was why it was empty.
Sceptics question how we know that accounts concerning the resurrection have multiple attestations, claiming that the different authors of these
accounts could have copied from different parts of the account of one
faulty ‘witness.’ It has been claimed that Mark’s empty tomb account was
influenced by Hellenistic stories in which the bodies of heroes were often
removed (Yarbro Collins 1992, 1995). It has also been claimed that different accounts of the empty tomb all depend on Mark’s, who made up the
empty tomb (see also Crossan 1994; Kirby 2005, p. 300). Vermès (2008,
pp. 105–106) complains that while Mark 16:8 states that the women said
nothing to anyone, Matthew 28:8 says that the women ran to bring his
disciples word. Sceptics argue that, since it is inconceivable that Mark
could have believed the silence of the women to be temporary without
continuing the narrative from 16:8, the women must have been silent for
a long time and thus the empty tomb story was probably of recent origin
in AD 70 (Goulder 2005, p. 192; Kirby 2005, pp. 239–240). Kirby also
claims that the round stone covering Jesus’ tomb as portrayed by Mark
was common after AD 70 but rare in Jesus’ day, and suggests that the
story is retrojected from AD 70 into Jesus’ day (Kirby 2005, pp. 242–243,
258, n. 27).
In response, alleged parallels with Hellenistic stories have been debunked
for ignoring significant differences. In particular, in the Hellenistic stories
the ‘empty tomb’ merely serves as a focal point for the hero’s cult while the
hero’s un-resurrected body is at some other known physical location, while
those who were believed to be immortalized (e.g. Romulus, Apollonius)
usually did not die (hence no tomb) but ascended straight to heaven (Bolt
1996; he notes two exceptions in which heroes were apparently translated
into heaven after they died: (1) the version of Achilles’ end in the Aithiopis
and (2) the story of Herakles in Diodorus Siculus, and he points out that in
these cases the body never made it to the grave and the translation happens
at the moment of the funeral).
Craig argues that different strands of narratives can be seen in the resurrection accounts in different Gospels by noting the ‘sporadic and uneven
agreement’ among them. This indicates that there is more than one source,
and he cites Borg who argues, ‘if the tradition appears in an early source and
in another independent source, then not only is it early, but it is also unlikely
to have been made up’ (Copan and Tacelli 2000, p. 167). In particular, he
notes that John’s account of the empty tomb is so different from Mark’s
that it is most likely that John’s account is independent from Mark’s (ibid.,
p. 167, n. 5). In addition, it is implausible that for 30 years no one at the
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Jerusalem church inquired about the tomb if the women had kept silent all
the while (ibid., p. 177). Hurtado argues,
Mark 16:8 does not depict the women as disobeying and failing to do
what they were told to do—to go to Peter and the Twelve with news
of Jesus’ resurrection. Instead, ‘they said nothing to anyone’ should be
read as meaning that they said nothing to anyone else on their way back
to the disciples, ‘for they were afraid.’
(Hurtado 2016b)
Bryan (2011, p. 79) compares this passage from elsewhere in Mark’s narrative. Mark 1:40–45 portrays Jesus healing a leper and instructing him, ‘Say
nothing to anyone, but go your way, show yourself to the priests, and offer
for your cleansing the things which Moses commanded, for a testimony to
them’ (1:44). Bryan notes, ‘in this case Mark’s understanding of “say nothing to anyone” is clearly not exclusive of communication with anybody at
all but rather implies a preparation for, or concentration on, communication with the right people—in this case, “the priests.’’’ Although a round
stone for a tomb was scarce in Jesus’ day, it was available for the rich,
such as members of the Sanhedrin (Copan and Tacelli ed., p. 169n9); this
is consistent with the Gospels’ accounts that Jesus was buried by Joseph of
Arimathea, who was a member of the Sanhedrin. Even if the stone was the
more common square ‘cork-shaped’ stone, Von Wahlde points out,
it may very well be that people rolled the ‘cork-shaped’ stones away
from the tomb. Once you see the size of a ‘stopper’ stone, it is easy to
see that, however one gets the stone out of the doorway, chances are
you are going to roll it the rest of the way.12
Carrier (2005a, pp. 105–232) objects by claiming that what the earliest
Christians believed about the resurrection of Jesus was that he was given a
new body while the old body remained in the tomb. It has been noted in
Chapter 1 that this two body view has been refuted by Ware (2014), who
has shown that when used with reference to the physically dead (as in Jesus’
case), the term egeirō refers unambiguously to the reanimation or revivification of the corpse. I shall now reply to other arguments Carrier offers for
his position.
Carrier argues that the analogy from the sowing of seed (v. 36–37) implied
discontinuity of body as the shell is cast away as the plant grows up (Carrier 2005a, p. 146), and he claims that in verses 44–54 Paul avoids saying
one body becomes another, but emphasizes their distinctness instead (ibid.,

12 www.biblicalarchaeology.org/daily/biblical-sites-places/jerusalem/how-was-jesustomb-sealed/
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p. 132). However, it should be noted that in sowing the seed, the same dormant plant inside the seed that goes into the soil comes out of it (Geisler
2006, p. 60). Although the seed and the plant are qualitatively different,
they are numerically the same because there is continuity between them: the
dormant plant that goes into the soil grows by incremental measurable and
observable steps into the plant; the second is a new stage of the first (Davis
2006, p. 57). In other words, what comes out from the soil is continuous
with what goes into it, i.e. the dormant plant. Paul does not describe resurrection as an event in which x (the present body) is sown, but y (a body
discontinuous with the present body) is raised, but in which ‘a single x (the
present body) is sown a perishable x, but raised an imperishable x’ (Ware
2014, p. 486; Ware responds to other objections in his article). The distinctness emphasized in verses 44–54 concerns the different characteristics of the
two stages of the one continuous thing and does not imply their discontinuity. Concerning 1 Corinthians 15:44, ‘It is sown a natural (psychikon) body.
It is raised a spiritual (pneumatikon) body. If there is a natural body, there is
also a spiritual [body],’ Wedderburn (1999, p. 66) had claimed that Paul is
contrasting between our present material bodies with the future resurrected
immaterial bodies, and that this implies that Jesus’ resurrected body was
immaterial. However, Licona (2010, pp. 407–408) has surveyed the use of
psychikon and pneumatikon in all of the extant literature from the eighth
century BC through the third century AD, and concluded that psychikon
never referred to something as material. Thus this verse does not justify the
view that a Christian’s material body is buried but an immaterial body is
raised.
Carrier (2005a, p. 134) argues from Paul’s statement, ‘Christ is a lifegiving spirit’ (v. 45), and citing verse 47, he claims that while Adam’s body
is made of earth, Christ’s body is not; it comes from heaven. In reply, verse
45 can be understood as emphasizing the spiritual aspect of the resurrected
Jesus, but this does not deny that the resurrected Jesus had a physical body.
On the contrary, the view that Jesus’ resurrected body had both spiritual
and physical properties is already affirmed by other texts, as noted in the
discussion on transphysicality in Chapter 5. By ‘life-giving spirit’ Paul could
also be identifying Jesus with the Spirit on the level of Christian experience
(2 Cor. 3:17) and/or Paul might be comparing Jesus with God’s life-giving
breath in Genesis 2:7 (Wright 2003, p. 355). ‘The second man from heaven’
(v. 47) is referring to Jesus’ second coming and not the discontinuity of his
resurrected body with his old physical body (ibid.).
Carrier (2005a, p. 135) argues that ‘Flesh and blood cannot inherit the
kingdom of God’ (v. 50) contradicts Luke’s Jesus’ resurrected body having flesh and bones (Luke 24:39) and that ‘Food is for the stomach and
the stomach is for food, but God will do away with both of them’ (1 Cor.
6:13) contradicts Jesus eating fish (Luke 24:42–3) (ibid., p. 210, n. 151). In
response, it should be noted that the second half of verse 50 viz. ‘nor does
the perishable inherit the imperishable’ explains, in Hebraic parallelism,
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that ‘flesh and blood’ is a way of referring to ordinary, corruptible, decaying present human bodies (Wright 2003, p. 359). From the study of Luke’s
writings, it is evident that he is not wedded to the special Pauline terminology in which ‘flesh’ always designates that which is corruptible and often
that which is rebellious. For Luke, flesh and bones is simply a way of saying
‘physical’ (ibid., p. 658). As for 1 Corinthians 6:13, the food that had been
eaten and the stomach will indeed be done away with through the decomposition of the present body after death (as decreed by God), and Paul mentions ‘God will do away with both’ to emphasize the transient nature of the
present desires so that the reader may be exhorted to live for the Lord (v.
13b) in view of eternity (v. 14), but these verses do not imply that the resurrected body will not have the ability to eat.
Carrier (2005a, pp. 139–147) next argues for the two body doctrine from
2 Corinthians 4:16–5:8. He first claims that it is the future spiritual body
that Paul is referring to in 4:18. While this is true, this does not imply that
Paul means that it is discontinuous with the present body. The subsequent
verses can be understood as follows: Verse 1: the body in its present state
will be destroyed at death, but the supernatural, transformed body in the
heavens will last forever. Craig (1989, pp. 150–151) argues that ‘eternal
in the heavens’ does not imply that the new building is already waiting in
heaven for Christians or that it has existed from eternity past, but it implies
that Christians are certain to possess it and that it endures forever. Verses
2–4: Paul and others long to put on the supernatural body at the resurrection without the necessity of dying, so that there would be no interval of
separation of soul from body, that is, no interval of nakedness (Craig 1989,
pp. 152–157). Verse 5: God has given them assurance that he will give them
the resurrection body by having given them the Holy Spirit. Verses 6–8: even
though they desire to possess the resurrection body without the necessity of
dying, yet dying and being with the Lord in the form of disembodied spirit
is better than living in this present body (ibid.). They trust the Lord for the
future which they do not see now. This exegesis shows that this passage is
consistent with the view that, when the present body dies, the soul will leave
behind the body and be ushered into the presence of the Lord, who at the
Last Day will resurrect the body which had been left behind and transform
it into a glorious body which will last forever.
Carrier notes the use of the word skenos instead of soma in 2 Corinthians
5:1, 4 and 2 Corinthians 4:7 and argues from Jeremiah 19: 1113 that ostrakina skene refer to clay pots which are beyond repair once broken (Carrier 2005a, pp. 142, 213). However, what Jeremiah 19:11 indicates is that
the nation of Israel would be destroyed such that no human can have the
power to put it back together again; it does not say that God does not have

13 Jeremiah 19:11a: ‘and say to them, “Thus says the LORD of hosts, ‘Just so will I break this
people and this city, even as one breaks a potter’s vessel, which cannot again be repaired.’ ” ’
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the power to repair it if he wants to. Similarly, what 2 Corinthians indicates
is that the present body is destroyed at death and no humans nor any natural process can put it back together again, but that does not mean that God
cannot resurrect the old body supernaturally.
Carrier (2005a, p. 126) claims that because of Paul’s ‘strange’ two body
doctrine in 1 Corinthians 15, later Christians had to invent a third letter
to the Corinthians to give arguments which they thought Paul should have
made. In response, it should be noted that this third letter has never been
widely accepted by Christians. An over-zealous Christian may have forged
this document in order to make what he personally thought was a stronger
case against the Gnostics, but this does not imply that the doctrine of bodily
continuity cannot be discerned by a careful study of 1 Corinthians 15, as
shown earlier.
Carrier attempts to show that other passages in the New Testament contradict the body-continuity doctrine. He claims that Mark 14:58, ‘I will
destroy this holy residence made by hands, and in three days build another
house not made by hands,’ implies a two body doctrine (ibid., p. 156).
However, Mark portrays this statement as given by false witnesses whose
testimonies do not agree. It is interesting to note that John 2:19 portrays
that what Jesus really said was, ‘Destroy this temple, and I will raise it
again in three days,’ which implies the body-continuity doctrine. Carrier
argues that while Peter of Acts says that the flesh of Jesus is immune to
decay, Peter of the epistles says that all flesh is like grass and subjected
to decay (1 Peter 1:24), and that Jesus was put to death in the flesh but
made alive in the Spirit (1 Peter 3:18) (Carrier 2005a, p. 148). However,
the context of 1 Peter 1:24 is referring to our present corruptible bodies.
This does not include Jesus’ resurrected body, which is the archetype of our
future resurrected bodies. 1 Peter 3:18 does not imply that Jesus became a
spirit at resurrection. Rather, it means that he was made alive by the Spirit
(Wright 2003, p. 469).
Carrier (2005a, p. 126) argues that the post-apostolic father Clement
asserts the two body doctrine in 1 Clement 25, where he uses the analogy
of the resurrected phoenix which carried its own bones home. In response,
one can argue that Clement’s analogy is a poor one which is not analogous
to what he explicitly affirms in 1 Clement 50: ‘For it is written, “Enter into
thy secret chambers for a little time, until My wrath and fury pass away; and
I will remember a propitious day, and will raise you up out of your graves,” ’
which clearly implies the body-continuity doctrine.
Finally, Carrier (2005a, p. 179) asks, if there was an empty tomb, why
is there no veneration of it? In reply, the Jewish authorities would not have
allowed Christians to turn the tomb into a shrine (Hays 2006, p. 283).
In conclusion, Carrier’s analysis of 1 Corinthians 15 and other texts is
flawed and fails to refute the conclusion (established earlier) the earliest
Christians affirmed a body-continuity understanding of the resurrection of
Jesus, and hence the empty tomb.
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6.6 Removal by friends hypothesis
The hypothesis that the friends of Jesus removed Jesus’ body was part of
the Jewish polemic reflected in Matthew 28:11–15. Stealing the body would
have been risky, especially given the presence of guards at the tomb (see earlier). Why would anyone do it? Throughout the centuries various motives
have been suggested by sceptics. Carrier argues that some friends or secret
admirers could have stolen the body with the purpose of faking the resurrection to inspire faith in the good teachings of Jesus and to make people think that his good name has been vindicated by God (Carrier 2005b,
pp. 351–352). The number of conspirators could be small; among the Seventy Disciples, for example, at least one or two of them might have been
willing to undertake such a plot (Carrier 2005b, p. 352). Perhaps some
among the numerous people whom Jesus had healed in his ministry may
have attempted theft. The other disciples could have been ignorant of the
theft and thought that Jesus really resurrected, thus they were willing to die
for their belief (Kankaanniemi 2010, p. 244). Ehrman suggests that maybe
Jesus’ family members wanted the body buried in the family tomb (Craig
and Ehrman 2006, p. 29). Carrier suggests that the guards could have taken
a bribe from the thieves (Carrier 2005b, p. 358). Alternatively, an admirer
such as Joseph of Arimathea could have set up a secret mechanism inside
the tomb that removed the body. One might also suggest that perhaps the
pagan Roman centurion, who was already convinced that Jesus was the Son
of God on the basis of witnessing Jesus’ crucifixion and death as portrayed
by Mark (15:39), stole the body to fake the resurrection because he wanted
more people to believe in Jesus. Perhaps the guards themselves were secret
followers of Jesus and risked capital punishment by removing the body and
then reported the resurrection.
However, the suggested motives would not work. If the friends had selfserving motives, they would not have been willing to risk their lives for
what they knew was a lie (see Chapter 3). If the friends had ‘noble’ motives,
they would have refrained from creating a lie concerning Jesus’ resurrection,
especially so given that the multiply attested ‘good teachings’ of the Jesus
tradition condemned lying (Matt. 5:37, John 8:44). Creating a lie about
such a fundamental matter concerning their faith would also be inconsistent
with their devotion to the God of Israel which Jesus himself also affirmed,
and against their belief that the God of Israel will punish liars (see Chapter 3). It is unlikely to find anyone willing to risk suffering and die for what
he knows is a lie and to be punished by God for it in the afterlife. The friends
would have tried other safer ways to promote Jesus’ ‘good teachings’ and
his ‘good name.’ If Jesus’ family members stole Jesus’ body to bury it in their
family tomb, they would have known that Jesus did not resurrect, and given
the prior unbelief of Jesus’ family members (see Chapter 4), it would have
been implausible that they would later join the early church (1 Cor. 9:5, Acts
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1:14) that worshipped Jesus (Loke 2017a) and be willing to suffer for what
they knew was untrue.
Moreover, regardless of the motives, removing the body without being
caught by the guards or discovered by others would still have been a problem. As for the possibility that the Roman centurion and the guards were
secret admirers, they would have known that the purpose of placing a guard
in the first place was to falsify Jesus’ prediction of resurrection. (‘Sir, we
remember what that impostor said while he was still alive, “After three days
I will rise again,” ’ Matthew 27:63—the historicity of this purpose is tied to
the historicity of the guards at the tomb which I have defended previously.)
Thus if he did not resurrect they would have known that he was indeed an
imposter; in that case, it would have been unlikely that they would retain
any secret admiration (if they had any) for such an imposter and risk capital
punishment for his cause by removing the body.

6.7 Removal by enemies hypothesis
It is even more unreasonable to think that Jesus’ enemies took the body,
because they would have brought out Jesus’ body and refuted his followers
when they started proclaiming his resurrection. A Jewish work dating from
the fifth century, the Toledoth Yeshu, claims that the Jewish leaders did drag
Jesus’ corpse through the streets of Jerusalem, but this account lacks historical credibility because of the late date of writing.
Allison suggests that perhaps Jewish authorities removed the body and
quietly disposed of it because they did not want it to be venerated, and having dumped the body unceremoniously, they were then unable to reproduce
it several weeks later when the disciples start proclaiming the resurrection.
They then accused the disciples of stealing the body (Allison 2005a, p. 302).
In response, in such a scenario it would have been much simpler and convincing to say ‘we dumped the body,’ even if they cannot reproduce it, than
to ask some guards to say that they were guarding the tomb and that the
body was stolen when they were sleeping.
Allison (2005a, p. 319) also suggests that, alternatively, perhaps the Jews
knew that even if they could parade the rotting corpse of Jesus through the
streets for all to see, it would not succeed in demolishing Christianity, as
more than one explanation could be offered by Christians for whatever
they found, so there is no point for doing it. But surely the Jews would
recognize that refuting the resurrection (e.g. by parading the corpse) would
shatter people’s confidence in what the apostles’ preached at their synagogues, and it would at least persuade those who were sitting on the fence.
It would also have been more persuasive than to claim that the disciples
stole the body. Since they had already gone through so much trouble to
kill Jesus, why wouldn’t they be willing to show that he remained dead if
they could?
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6.8 Removal by neutral party hypothesis
Sceptics note that tomb robbery was a problem in first-century Judea as
indicated by the Nazarene inscription of an edict of Caesar that mandates
capital punishment against this. The body parts/nails would have been considered as useful for necromancers, and the thieves had two nights to do it
(Carrier 2005b, pp. 350–352). If Jesus was buried in an expensive tomb,
the tombs of the rich were always prime targets for robbers (Gant 2019,
p. 238). If there were guard, the guard was not placed until Saturday, and
between Friday and Saturday there was time for the theft (Carrier 2005b,
p. 353).14 Other financial motivations have been suggested. For example,
the Toledoth Yeshu claims that a gardener named Juda took Jesus’ body and
later sold the body to the Jewish leadership. Tertullian (De Spectaculis, 30)
noted a suggestion that the gardener removed the body so that his lettuces
might not be harmed by the crowds of visitants to the body.
In reply, it is unlikely that the guards did not check that the body was still
inside before they sealed it. Hays (2006, p. 251) notes,
the reason that Pilate posted the guard was to prevent grave-robbery, so
the soldiers would naturally check the tomb and report back to Pilate
if it were already ransacked. Otherwise, they would be charged with
dereliction of duty if it were found to be empty on their watch.
Considering the gravity of the situation concerning Jesus’ crucifixion and
the presence of guards, it is hardly likely that any neutral party would have
adequate motivation (financial or otherwise) to risk getting caught for
attempting to remove the body, let alone be successful at carrying it out. (As
noted earlier, the Toledoth Yeshu lacks historical credibility because of the
late date of writing.) Keener (1999, p. 713) writes, ‘Graves . . . were often
robbed . . . but not with guards posted (at least not without subduing the
guards, normally fatally) . . . nor could they have rolled away the massive
stone without waking the guards.’

6.9 Removal by non-agent hypothesis
Allison (2005a, p. 204) notes that some scholars have suggested that perhaps the earthquake mentioned in Matthew 28:2 swallowed Jesus’ body and
rolled back the stone. However, it is unreasonable to think that the Jewish
authorities, on seeing the destruction of the tomb caused by the earthquake,

14 Concerning Craig’s argument that acts like this usually brought to light, Carrier objects
that there is rarely any difficulty for one or two persons to keep quiet, and it is possible that
perhaps the thief died shortly after dumping the body in an unknown place. He notes that
even nowadays with modern technology, detectives hot on trial must accept many crimes
will never come to light.
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would not have thought that the body was buried somewhere beneath the
destruction.

6.10 Conclusion
Against the evidential value of the empty tomb, it has been asserted by Welker that ‘the stories of the empty tomb alone are not sufficient to evoke
belief in the resurrection’ (Welker 2007, p. 467). Ehrman (2014, p. 185)
likewise states, ‘if someone was buried in a tomb and later the body was not
there, this fact alone would not make anyone suspect that God had raised
the person from the dead.’ He claims,
our first Gospel is Mark; it records the ‘fact’ that the tomb was empty,
but strikingly, no one is said to come to believe that Jesus was raised
because of it. . . . The same view is advanced in the Gospel of John.
Ehrman, however, neglects John 20:8: ‘Then the other disciple, who reached
the tomb first, also went in, and he saw and believed.’ While Welker dismisses John 20:8 as ‘cryptic’ (Welker 2007, p. 467), it is clear from the
context of John 20 (see verses 25, 27, 29) that the ‘believe’ spoken of in
verse 8 refers to believe that Jesus resurrected (Keener 2003, p. 1184, citing
Hoskyns). While Carrier (2009, p. 350) objects that there is no mentioning
of the checking of the empty tomb throughout Acts, he ignores that LukeActs were written by the same author who had already claimed that Peter
checked the empty tomb in Luke 24:12. It is true that most of the earliest
Christians believed based on the resurrection appearances as argued in previous chapters, but this does not deny the evidential value and the importance of the empty tomb.
In this chapter, I have evaluated the naturalistic hypotheses concerning
the outcome of Jesus’ body. In addition to mentioning various considerations against these naturalistic hypotheses, I have replied to various objections against the historicity of the guards, offered an argument for it, and
explained that their presence would (together with other considerations)
rule out all the naturalistic hypotheses concerning Jesus’ body. In particular,
the presence of guards at the tomb would imply that Jesus was buried in a
well-identified place (contrary to unburied hypothesis). The early Christians
would not have come to the widespread agreement that Jesus resurrected
and be willing to suffer persecution for proclaiming this if the guards were
still guarding the body inside the tomb (contrary to remain buried hypothesis). The presence of guards would also make it unreasonable to think that
friends, enemies, or a neutral third party would risk getting caught stealing
the body for any reason and did so successfully (contrary to removal by
friends/enemies/neutral party hypotheses). Contrary to the removal by nonagent hypothesis, it would be unreasonable to think that animals or earthquakes removed Jesus’ body without the guards preventing or suspecting it.
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Contrary to the swoon hypothesis, a severely wounded Jesus would hardly
have been able to overcome the guards and escape from the tomb, while the
escape hypothesis has been refuted in the previous chapter. I conclude that
no naturalistic hypothesis reasonably accounts for what happened to the
body of Jesus on the first Easter morning.

7	Combination hypotheses

7.1 Introduction
It has been shown in previous chapters that all the naturalistic hypotheses concerning the claims of Jesus’ post-mortem appearances, viz. legend
hypothesis, no experience hypothesis, intramental hypothesis, mistaken
identity hypothesis, swoon hypothesis, and escape hypothesis, fail the criteria for historicity. Likewise, in previous chapters I have ruled out all the
naturalistic hypotheses for the empty tomb, viz. escape hypothesis, unburied hypothesis, remain buried hypothesis, removal by non-agent hypothesis,
removal by friends hypothesis, removal by enemies hypothesis, removal by
neutral party hypothesis, and swoon hypothesis. But could it be that each of
these hypotheses is implausible only in isolation, and that a combination of
a number of them, each covering the weaknesses of the other, would explain
away the resurrection of Jesus?
In what follows, I shall summarize a number of such proposals in recent
literature. I will then explain a number of considerations which render such
proposals unreasonable.

7.2 Examples of combination hypotheses
Ehrman (2014) proposes a combination of unburied hypothesis, intramental hypothesis, and legend hypothesis. He argues that Jesus’ body was
unburied after the crucifixion, and suggests that perhaps only a few (three
or four) disciples ‘saw’ (hallucinated?) Jesus and told others, some of whom
did not believe (this accounts for the tradition of doubting which is found
in the Gospels). Sceptic psychologist Whittenberger (2011) had previously
argued that the tradition of doubting in Matthew 28:17 indicates that there
probably was a mixture of opinion about the appearance of Jesus among
the disciples, and it could be that some did not have the hallucination that
others had, or they did have a hallucination but realized it was not Jesus.
Whittenberger thinks,
if the resurrection hypothesis were true and Jesus was really standing
among his disciples, it is very unlikely that some would doubt. On the
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other hand, if one or two disciples experienced a hallucination of Jesus
and the others did not, then it is very likely that some would doubt.

Likewise, Ehrman (2014, pp. 191–192) thinks that the doubt traditions and
the failure of recognition traditions (e.g. Luke 24:13–31; John 20:14–16;
John 21:4–8) might be evidence that others in fact did not see what some
people saw and that only perhaps three or four people (e.g. Peter, Paul,
Mary, James) saw something and most of their close associates believed
them and came to think that Jesus was raised from the dead but some others did not. ‘As the stories of Jesus’s “appearances” were told and retold, of
course, they were embellished, magnified, and even made up; so soon, probably within a few years, it was said that all of the disciples had seen Jesus,
along with other people’ (p. 192).
Eisenberg (2016) has combined a variation of the swoon hypothesis
and the remain buried hypothesis together with the intramental hypothesis and the mistaken identity hypothesis. The key question asked by Eisenberg is this: what would have happened if those who retrieved Jesus’ body
found that he was still alive? Eisenberg suggests the following scenario:
Jesus survived the crucifixion and was discovered to be barely alive by the
few followers (e.g. Joseph) who retrieved him. Hoping that Jesus would
survive, and fearful that the Romans would discover he had illegally rescued a condemned man, Joseph faked the burial of Jesus (by having his
slaves go to an available tomb, carrying a corpse-shaped bundle of burial
cloth, placed it inside, and then sealed the tomb) while trying to revive
Jesus. However, Jesus expired soon after, and was buried quietly in an
anonymous grave. Nevertheless, rumour of his survival reached his followers and the Romans, who opened the tomb and discovered the body
missing. To sooth their grief the disciples seized on the rumour of Jesus’
survival and encouraged each other to hear the voice and see the image
of Jesus in other people, which later became interpreted as a physical
resurrection.
Eisenberg thinks that the earliest Christians including Paul hold to a Two
Body doctrine, and that the one-body physical resurrection as claimed in
the Gospels evolved later. Eisenberg interprets the account of initial misidentification and subsequent vanishing of Jesus in Luke 24:15–32 as seeing
a hallucination of Jesus on others which subsequently vanished. Eisenberg thinks that his combination of intramental hypothesis and mistaken
identity hypothesis fits the Gospel reports of misidentifications, and that
reports of feeling the presence of a post-crucifixion Jesus in another person
would have been readily accepted by disciples given the fact that people
of the first century commonly believed in possession by demons or spirits,
visitations by gods, and the transmigration of souls, and given that Jesus
predicted his own resurrection. He adds ‘if modern believers can see an
image of Jesus in a piece of toast, it isn’t hard to imagine that the first disciples believed they felt the person of their master in other people’ (p. 9).
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Other sceptics have responded to the problems concerning the group hallucination hypothesis (see Chapter 4) by suggesting various combinations of
no experience, intramental, and mistaken identity hypotheses which involve
hallucinations, cognitive dissonance, memory distortion, and confirmation
bias.
Komarnitsky (2009) suggests a combination of remain buried, intramental, and legend hypotheses using the idea of cognitive dissonance, which
is a form of rationalization or believing in spite of evidence. Komarnitsky
(2009, chapter 2) claims that Jesus’ body was buried in a location unknown
to his followers. The disciples believed Jesus’ resurrection because of cognitive dissonance, and they searched the Hebrew Scriptures for confirmation
of their beliefs (p. 80). This led to Peter having a hallucination of the resurrected Jesus (ibid., chapter 4). He shared his experience with other disciples
which may have strengthened their belief, and this triggered them to have
individual hallucinations, followed by collective ‘spiritual experience’ of
experiencing Jesus’ presence. He writes,
Anticipating the yet to be realized return of Jesus and experiencing the
normal feelings associated with the absence of a recently deceased loved
one, Peter had a hallucination of Jesus that he interpreted as a visitation
of Jesus from heaven. . . . Still others heard Jesus speak to them, felt his
presence, and shared in group ecstatic experiences (perhaps like a spirited Pentecostal gathering today). Jesus’ followers immediately turned
to their Jewish scriptures to find scriptural confirmation for their beliefs.
Interaction with their scriptures, most likely Psalm 16:10, led Jesus’ followers to conclude that it was ‘on the third day’ that Jesus was raised
from the dead. . . . As the years and decades passed, the above experiences, beliefs, and traditions gave birth to legends like Jesus’ burial in
a rock-hewn tomb, the tomb being discovered three days later, his corporeal post-mortem appearances to individuals and groups described in
the Gospels, and his appearances to over five hundred in Paul’s letter to
the Corinthians. Eventually Jesus was deified. . . . [T]here was a swirl of
rationalizations, individual hallucinations, collective enthusiasm, designations of authority, and scriptural interpretations.’
Having already believed in Jesus’ resurrection, the rest of the Twelve may
have vested interests in claiming that they had seen Jesus so that they could
be designated as authoritative leaders of the community. The ‘Twelve’ therefore did not visually see Jesus together at the same time, but for the earliest
Christians such inaccuracies would have been inconsequential given that
they genuinely believed Jesus was raised from the dead (p. 94). The so-called
appearance to the ‘more than five hundred brethren’ may have been a ‘spiritual experience’ that was later interpreted or developed into an account of
an appearance (p. 96). Alternatively, the appearance to the ‘more than five
hundred brethren’ was a legend due to Paul’s error. When the Corinthians
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checked with other church leaders who knew Paul was passing false info,
they may have just let it pass as a minor issue (given they knew the group
was sceptical of resurrection).
Atheist philosopher Hermann Philipse also suggests the possibility of cognitive dissonance concerning the claims of Jesus’ post-mortem appearances.
He writes,
A habitual smoker will experience cognitive dissonance when hearing
about the severe health risks of this habit . . . people often attempt to
reduce this unpleasant tension by using or inventing stories that mask
the incompatibility, by adapting their behavior, or by attempting to convince other people of their beliefs.
(Philipse 2012, pp. 178–179)
Philipse argues that since the disciples had invested so much in the cause of
Jesus (e.g. quit their jobs and abandoned their possessions), they were so
deeply committed to their beliefs that they could not discard them quickly,
thus they engaged in the process of collaborative story telling (Philipse 2012,
pp. 180–182). Philipse has suggested that the disciples could have thought
that they did experience the ‘resurrected Jesus’ due to memory distortion.
In this case they did not lie intentionally, neither did they need to have any
such experiences of Jesus after his crucifixion (intramental or extramental,
see later). Rather they could have interpreted their vivid memories of the
pre-crucified Jesus as experiences of their resurrected leader and reinforced
one another’s ideas through the process of collective story telling. Philipse
explains,
Since human memory functions as an updating machine, which often
retains info without also retaining knowledge about its source, people
may think that what they remember stems from their own experience,
whereas in fact they rely on communication by others . . . in some cases
the suspect of a murder may honestly confess under the influence of
protracted and suggestive interrogations by the police, although in fact
someone else committed the crime.
(Philipse 2012, pp. 178–179)
In an influential article on memory distortion, Schudson (1997) argues
that, since memory is invariably and inevitably selective, distortion is inevitable. He suggests four factors that contribute to the distortion of memory
and history: (1) distanciation: memories tend to become vaguer and details
forgotten with the passage of time; (2) instrumentalization: memories tend
to be reinterpreted to better serve present interests; (3) conventionalization:
memories tend to conform to socio-typical experiences; and (4) narrativization: an effort not only to report the past but to make it interesting.
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Ehrman claims that psychologists have discovered that ‘when a group
“collectively remembers” something they have all heard or experienced,
the “whole” is less than the sum of the “parts” ’ (2016, p. 75). People can
even erroneously believe they are remembering events that, in fact, they only
imagined (p. 94). While it has been argued against the classic form-critical
model that collective memories usually are resistant to outright fabrication
(McIver 2011), Ehrman objects against the reliability of collective memory
by arguing,
If one person—say, a dominant personality—injects into the conversation an incorrect recollection or ‘distorted memory’ that others in the
group do not remember, they tend to take the other person’s word for it.
As one recent study has shown, ‘The misinformation implanted by one
person comes to be shared by the group as a whole. In other words, a
collective memory could become formed around misinformation. Misinformation shared by one person may be adopted by the rest.’
(pp. 75–76)
Applying memory studies to the study of historical Jesus, some scholars
(e.g. Crook (2013b, pp. 101–102) have argued that memory can be wildly
creative and that it can be difficult for people to distinguish between a wildly
creative and a factually reliable memory. Crook cites the case of the Luddites, various groups of nineteenth-century workers who protested against
the use of machinery. While the ‘groups and sub-groups had a variety of
grievances, disparate goals, different ideologies, and conflicting methods . . .
they were united by one thing: they protested in the name of Ned Ludd,
and thus became known collectively as Luddites’ (Crook 2013a, 67–68).
He claims,
The collective memories about Ned Ludd were manufactured across
several diverse strains of the movement, and have no grounding in the
life of a real Ned Ludd. People believed and perpetuated these memories, such that a movement developed and cohered around a founder
who never existed.
(Crook (2013b, 101–102)
In response to Le Donne (2013), who objects that such fabrications were
eventually corrected by collective counter-memory and historians in social
discourse, Crook (2013b, p. 102) replies that the fact that scholarship later
came to the conclusion that the Luddite stories were fabrication
in no way negates the point that collective memories were manufactured,
that they were maintained for a long time, nor the more troubling point
that there is no qualitative difference between real and manufactured
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memories. Scholarly debunking does not contradict people’s willingness
to hold and pass on manufactured memories.

Concerning confirmation bias, DiFonzo and Bordia (2007, p. 223)
explain,
Confirmation bias is the tendency to conform incoming, contradictory
data so that it does not challenge existing biases (Nisbett and Ross
1980). Confirmation bias in this case discounts evidence contradictory
to the first impression. . . . Confirmation bias also acts here to selectively interpret concurrent information (reactions to false feedback) so
as to bolster impressions (Ross et al. 1975). Once formed, impressions
become relatively autonomous, that is, independent of the evidence on
which they were founded. ‘The attributor doesn’t ‘renegotiate’ his interpretations of the relevance or validity of impression-relevant information’ (Ross et al. 1975, p. 890). Thus, at least on paper, it is easy to see
how impressions become immune to logical challenges. In addition . . .
people are likely to engage in motivated reasoning to hold on to or
legitimize cherished beliefs.
Utilizing the notion of confirmation bias and memory distortion together
with hallucination, Carrier (2014, pp. 132–133) argues,
‘Mass hallucination’ occurs in various cults not in the sense that everyone objectively hallucinates exactly the same thing, but in the sense that
everyone subjectively hallucinates what they believe is the same thing.
And that can occur when a whole congregation simultaneously engages
trance-inducing triggers and a common experience is sought—perhaps
at the behest of a charismatic leader anchoring everyone to the same
experience through the power of suggestion. They don’t check every
detail, because if they report the same things in rough outline, then the
differences (if any are even reported) will be overlooked (as a result of
our innate tendency toward verification bias) or even adopted by others
through memory contamination, such that experiences are remembered
as even more similar the more they are discussed. This contamination
can occur even during the process of hallucination, as what one member, especially an anchoring leader, says then influences others to have
the same experience.

7.3 Evaluation of previous proposals
First, the outcome of Jesus’ body is not well accounted for. Ehrman’s (2014)
unburied hypothesis and Komarnitsky’s (2009) remain buried hypothesis
have already been refuted in Chapter 6. As for Eisenberg’s (2016) suggestion
that Joseph faked the burial of Jesus (by having his slaves go to an available
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tomb carrying a corpse-shaped bundle of burial cloth, place it inside, and
then seal the tomb), it is unlikely that the guards did not check carefully
before sealing the tomb, and that after they opened the tomb and discovered
the body missing from the same corpse-shaped bundle they did not suspect
a ruse but risked their integrity by saying that they slept while the disciples
stole the body.
Second, with respect to the doubt traditions noted by Ehrman and Whittenberger, as argued in previous chapters, the disciples did not start believing but doubting. On the one hand, Matthew 28:17 does not say the doubt
was due to seeing different details; it is more likely that ‘the disciples were
not hopelessly and insensibly alienated from the solid world’ to find out
from experience that corpses do not naturally exit tombs (Allison 2005a,
pp. 246, 305).1 Initial doubts would have been natural even if Jesus were
really standing there. On the other hand, while ‘Matthew does not say
whether the doubts of some of the disciples were ever overcome’ (Lindemann 2017, p. 566), it can nevertheless be inferred that, if some members of
the Twelve, the five hundred, and the other apostles did not ‘see’ anything or
did not agree on the details of what they ‘saw’ and that their doubts remain,
they would not have been willing to suffer and die for continuing the Christian movement, which they did (see Chapter 3).
Concerning the failure of recognition traditions, the relevant passages
portray the failures of recognition as only temporary. ‘Before the appearance was over they were absolutely convinced that it was the same Jesus’
(Geisler and Howe 1997, p. 397). Likewise, if these portrayals were merely
embellishments and those people and other members of the Twelve, the five
hundred, and the other apostles did not ‘see’ anything or did not agree on
the details of what they ‘saw,’ then as argued in Chapter 4 they would not
have been willing to claim that they saw the bodily resurrected Jesus and
be willing to suffer and die for continuing the Christian movement, which
they did.
Third, Ehrman’s suggestion that the claim that all of the members of the
Twelve had seen Jesus was an embellishment and Komarnitsky’s (2009) suggestion that the appearance to the ‘more than five hundred brethren’ was a
legend due to Paul’s error ignores the fact (established in Chapter 2) that the
early Christians were quite mobile, Jewish Christians would have travelled
yearly to Jerusalem for festivals, and a well-attested ‘networking’ among
early Christians existed. These considerations imply that verification with
the members of the Twelve and with the ‘more than five hundred brethren’
and the falsification of embellishment or legend would have been easy. It is
also unreasonable to think that when the Corinthians checked with other

1 It should be noted that the argument here does not depend on showing that all the witnesses
referred to in 1 Cor. 15:3–11 were critically minded, but only on showing that ‘at least some
of the disciples’ would have been critical.
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church leaders (including members of the Twelve) who knew that Paul was
passing false info, the church leaders would have let it pass, given that falsification would have been easy and the costs would have been high for them
as well (for other criticisms of Ehrman’s proposal, see below.
Komarnitsky (2009) offers an alternative suggestion that the church leaders may have corrected Paul’s report and the legend died right there, which
explains why it did not show up in other parts of the New Testament (p. 97).
In reply, on the one hand, as explained in Chapter 2, there are other
explanations for why the ‘more than five hundred brethren’ did not show
up in other parts of the New Testament. On the other hand, Komarnitsky’s
suggestion does not explain the lack of costly consequences that this would
have on Paul. As argued in Chapter 2, knowing that the costs of falsification would be high, Paul would not have passed on information which he
himself did not know was correct.
In sum, many members of the Twelve, the five hundred, and the other
apostles were still around and can be verified when 1 Corinthians 15:1–11
was written. Additionally, if most of them did not actually ‘see’ the resurrected Jesus but made up the claim that they did, it is unreasonable to think
that none of them leaked out the hoax when they were persecuted. Thus,
as argued in Chapter 2, it is unreasonable to think that the account that all
of them saw Jesus was the result of embellishment, magnification, or madeup stories (see further the refutation of Ehrman’s telephone game analogy
later).
Fourth, Komarnitsky’s (2009) cognitive dissonance theory ignores the fact
(established in Chapters 3 and 4) that many among the disciples were likely
doubtful and fearful of persecution, and that James and Paul were sceptics.
As argued in Chapter 4, individual hallucinations and spiritual experiences
would not have convinced the Twelve or ‘more than five hundred brethren’
that Jesus was resurrected bodily, and neither would it have convinced their
audience. It is also unreasonable to think that the distortions and inaccuracies remained unexposed and (if exposed) remained inconsequential when
the disciples faced persecution.
Eisenberg claims that to soothe their grief the disciples seized on the
rumour of Jesus’ survival and encouraged each other to hear the voice and
see the image of Jesus in other people, which later became interpreted as a
physical resurrection. However, rumour of Jesus’ survival is not the same as
rumour of his resurrection; a Jesus who survived but who was still suffering
from the wounds of the crucifixion would not have convinced the disciples
that he was the risen Lord of life (Strauss 1879, p. 412). Moreover, Eisenberg’s claim that the earliest Christians including Paul held to a two body
doctrine has already been shown to be false in Chapter 6. Concerning Eisenberg’s claims concerning feeling the presence of a post-crucifixion Jesus in
another person, believing the possession by demons or spirits, visitations by
gods, and the transmigration of souls, and modern believers seeing an image
of Jesus in a piece of toast, these are all different from bodily resurrection.
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The experiences suggested by Eisenberg would not have convinced the disciples of Jesus’ bodily resurrection but (at most) a spiritual encounter with
Jesus.
With regards to Philipse’s theory, while in some cases an isolated suspect of
a murder may suffer from faulty memory under the influence of protracted
and suggestive interrogations by others, in the case of Jesus’ resurrection the
disciples could have checked with one another (and their listeners could also
check with them too, see Chapter 4) whether they did see anything together
and remembered correctly what they ‘saw,’ if someone among them were to
enforce or reinforce any idea.
With regards to memory distortion, it should be noted that Schudson
(p. 361) himself denies that this implies an agnosticism or relativism towards
memory or history. On the contrary, he argues,
If interpretation were free-floating, entirely manipulable to serve present interests, altogether unanchored by a bedrock body of unshakable
evidence, controversies over the past would ultimately be uninteresting.
But in fact they are interesting. They are compelling. And they are gripping because people trust that a past we can to some extent know and
can to some extend come to agreement about really happened.
(ibid.)
He notes that even the most ardently relativist scholars cry out ‘distortion’ at the fringe group of Holocaust revisionists (p. 361).
Ehrman’s citations of psychologists are problematic. Reviewers of Ehrman’s book have noted his misunderstanding of the scholars he cited.2 For
example, Rodríguez (2016) observes that Ehrman’s understanding of the
term ‘distortion’ does not reflect how the term is used in memory studies.
He explains that while ‘memory itself is subject to processes of selection,
interpretation, communication, contestation, and evaluation,’ ‘these are
also the forces that preserve and transmit memory across generations.’ For
example, ‘the selection of Jesus’ crucifixion as a meaningful event preserves
traces of events that, otherwise, would be completely lost to us, as are, for
example, any crucifixions that took place on the following Passover).’ He
notes that Le Donne has called these ‘refractions’ instead of ‘distortions,’
and for good reason. ‘We read distortion pejoratively. . . . But in memory
studies, distort doesn’t necessarily have these negative connotations. Some
distortions obscure, yes. But other distortions, like those perpetrated by the

2 See Rafael Rodríguez’s (2016) review on Jesus blog which concludes after extensive documentation of Ehrman’s misunderstandings, ‘In the end, I cannot endorse or recommend
this work as an engagement of memory scholarship for New Testament research. . . . I
do not think he has accurately grasped even the current state of memory and the New
Testament. . . . This book is flawed in its historical and exegetical judgments.’
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lenses of a telescope, provide clarity and focus.’ Moreover, as Kirk (2017,
pp. 91–92) observes,
‘Memory distortion’ research has come in for criticism from cognitive
scientists, philosophers, and from experimental psychologists themselves, who have pointed out that distortion experiments typically are
de-contextualized from the natural social environments in which actual
remembering occurs. Most feature randomly selected, isolated subjects
recollecting unrehearsed, non-salient information in lab environments.
The focus of these experiments is usually quantitative—on how much
is remembered rather than on the qualities of what is remembered.
Collaborative remembering experiments similarly feature nominal
groups constituted ad hoc of individuals with no social connection to
each other and tasked with remembering materials of no salience to
the group or its individual members. One might therefore question
the extent to which research of this sort has any relevance for understanding the operations of memory in the formation and transmission
of a foundational tradition. Furthermore, experiments studying memory distortion contrive to manufacture it, making use of deception,
lures and misleading questions, false information introduced by the
researcher, false accusations, false corroboration by confederates posing as members of the subject group, and the like. Of course there is
nothing perverse about producing an effect in the lab in order to study
it, but the effect is to blow memory’s proneness to distortion out of
proportion.
Ehrman himself acknowledges, ‘I am decidedly not saying that all of our
memories are faulty or wrong. Most of the time we remember pretty well’
(2016, p. 143).
With regards to the Luddite movement, it should be noted that, unlike
the case of Jesus’ resurrection, the Luddite movement was not based on
whether Ludd really existed or whether he did resurrect; the figure of Ludd
is merely symbolic. Moreover, as argued in Loke (2017a), given the Jewish
background of the earliest Christians, if Jesus was not perceived by a sizeable group of them to have claimed and shown himself to be truly divine
(i.e. on the Creator side of the Creator-creature divide), the earliest Christians would not have come to the widespread conviction that he was, but
they did.
Ehrman (2004, p. 115) has used the analogy of the telephone game, which
illustrates how quickly messages can be distorted if they are passed on serially from one individual to another. He writes,
We all know from personal experience how much news stories get
changed in the retelling (not to mention stories about us personally) just
in a matter of hours, let alone days, weeks, months, years, and decades.
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Were the stories about Jesus exempt from these processes of alteration
and invention that we ourselves experience all the time?
(Ehrman 2016, p. 11)
Other scholars have pointed out that the ‘telephone game’ is an awful
analogy either for oral or textual transmission of the early Christian proclamation. Unlike a telephone game, the latter case does not transmit in a
linear fashion, rather there were multiple communities involved in remembering, hearing, telling, and retelling (Le Donne 2011, p. 70). Psychologist
David Rubin (1995, pp. 129, 154, 228) notes that factors which have been
experimentally shown to be important in improving long-term retention
include communities in which transmissions do not occur down ‘chains’
of individuals but along complex ‘nets,’3 and numerous intermittent repetitions by different members of the group and recitations in performance
mode. In particular, ‘The main advantage of a net over a chain is that if the
version transmitted by one singer omits parts or introduces changes that are
outside the tradition, then other versions can be substituted for these lapses’
(ibid., p. 134).
Ehrman objects, ‘when testimonies are recited frequently, because of the
vagaries inherent in the oral mode of transmission, they change more often
than when recited only on occasion’ (2006, p. 191). Citing the noted oral historian Jan Vansina in support, Ehrman comments that the reciters of a tradition
are telling the stories for a particular reason to a particular audience
and ‘the amount of interest [the reciter] can arouse . . . largely depends
on the way he tells the story and on the twist he gives it.’ As a result,
‘the tradition inevitably becomes distorted.’ Moreover, since the story
is told from one person to the next and then to the next and then to the
next, ‘each informant who forms a link in the chain of transmission creates new variants, and changes are made every time the tale is told. It
is therefore not surprising to find that very often the original testimony
has disappeared altogether.’
(Ehrman 2016, pp. 191–192, citing from
Vansina 1965, pp. 43, 109)
However, as Kirk (2017, pp. 94–95) observes, Ehrman omits Vansina’s
very important qualification: ‘In fact the only kind of hearsay testimonies
that lend themselves to distortions of this kind are personal recollections,
tales of artistic merit, and certain kinds of didactic tales,’ whereas ‘in the

3 The difference between a chain and a net is as follows: ‘For a single individual, the chain
[model of transmission] would have a single line leading in and a single line leading out. In
contrast, for a single individual, the net would have an indefinite number of lines leading in
and out’ (Rubin 1995, p. 134).
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transmission of traditions, the main effort is to repeat exactly what has been
heard’ (Vansina 1965, p. 109).
While Ehrman often emphasizes the length of the transmission (‘decades’)
from originating eyewitnesses to the writing of the Gospels, Vansina notes,
‘with regard to reliability, there is no doubt that the method of transmission
is of far greater importance than the length of time a tradition has lasted’
(Vansina 1965, p. 53). Ehrman also ignores Vansina’s observation that the
transmission of culturally foundational traditions typically is subject to
controls, and such tradition inheres, not in individuals, but in social structures (Vansina 1985, pp. 41, 47, 96–98, 116–119). Its mode of transmission
is not individual-to-individual, but in performance to audiences (Vansina
1985, p. 149). Vansina writes,
This examination of the instruction given concerning oral traditions, of
the controls exercised . . . brings out the fact that the traditions were
often transmitted from one generation to the next by a method laid
down for the purpose, and that in many societies without writing particular attention was paid to careful preservation and accurate transmission of these traditions.
(Vansina 1965, p. 36; see also pp. 28, 31, 36, 40)
Moreover, the message about Jesus coming to life again and that he was
truly divine would have been utterly shocking to its initial audience (Jews
living in the first century). Redman (2010, pp. 182–183) notes that psychological studies indicate that an event that a witness considers insignificant is
often inaccurately and incompletely remembered compared to one to which
a witness attaches significance and who would be motivated to bring the
selective process of paying attention fully to bear on those events to remember the prominent or salient details. Redman also notes that events that are
very surprising and have a high level of importance or emotional arousal
(e.g. September 11) give rise to flashbulb memories—memories that are
especially vivid and appear to be frozen in time, as though in a p
 hotograph,
and that the experiences of those who claimed to have witnessed the resurrected Jesus would be expected to have formed flashbulb memories of these
events.
While the greatest loss of memory usually occurs soon after an event,
‘flashbulb’ experiences are crucial in preventing early loss of detail (McIver
2011). Redman qualifies that research indicates that, like other memories,
flashbulb memories deteriorate over time and may develop as one takes into
consideration what is learned from discussion with others (Redman 2010,
p. 184). However, as argued earlier, transmissions along complex ‘nets’ in
communities with numerous intermittent repetitions by different members
of the group would have helped to prevent deterioration of individual memories. Moreover, Stanton (2004, pp. 179–191) has argued that the earliest
Christians used ‘notebooks’ to record the words and deeds of Jesus at an
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early point and transmitted these alongside oral traditions, and these notebooks which aided the preservation of memory eventually contributed to
the text of the New Testament.
Redman (2010, p. 186) likewise notes that psychological studies indicate that ‘if someone mentions some facet of an event to another witness,
that facet is more likely to be remembered subsequently,’ and that ‘group
memory appears to be more stable over time than individual memory.’ She
nevertheless raises the concern that sometimes
things that did not happen may be incorporated because one person
in a group made a mistake. If one eyewitness talks about the event in
a confident way, this confidence can influence other witnesses to agree
with her/him even if his/her perception is incorrect.
(ibid.)
Moreover,
in a situation where a witness feels pressured to produce a definitive
answer, s/he may guess and then, over time the guess may be remembered more confidently as the witness remembers previous interpretations of the event rather than the event itself. This is likely to happen if
the witness has not effectively encoded how certain s/he was about the
answer first given.
(ibid., p. 187)
Additionally, ‘in conversation, speakers may well wish to catch and maintain the interest of their audience or to justify their actions, and they will
alter their accounts accordingly’ (ibid., p. 188). Errors can subsequently
become ‘frozen’ in the memory (ibid., p. 187).
To address these concerns, I have argued that in the case concerning Jesus’
resurrection, the astonished ‘eyewitnesses’ would have repeatedly counterchecked with one another to make sure that they got the facts right (see
Chapter 4); it is after all a message that meant life and death for the earliest
Christians. Moreover, there were strong Jewish opposition with countermemories if the disciples misremembered certain details (e.g. if they claimed
that there was a guard at the tomb and there wasn’t). There were hostile
and sceptical non-Christian Jewish witnesses who could (and did) challenge
the Christian claims, for example by claiming that they stole the body (see
Chapter 2), and who would challenge the distortions they hear if there were
any. These factors would have serve to correct misinterpretations of the
events.
Additionally, in their society the ‘eyewitnesses’ of Jesus would have served
as an authoritative control over the transmission of traditions, so it is unreasonable to think that the Gospels were a false representation of what the
eyewitnesses really saw and heard (Bauckham 2006, pp. 290–318). There
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would have been multiple lines of communications bringing the proclaimed
message from and back to the initial proclaimers who could verify what was
proclaimed originally. While non-eyewitnesses would also have shared stories about Jesus and they might have distorted them as they shared (Ehrman
2016, pp. 78–84), Kruger (2016) points out that the early Christians would
have had a source (the initial proclaimers) to which they could turn to find
reliable and authoritative versions of what Jesus said and did.
Ehrman (2016, chapter 2) claims that the eyewitnesses could not have
controlled the transmission because they stayed in Jerusalem while other
evangelists proclaimed the gospel elsewhere and the gospels were written elsewhere. However, Ehrman ignores the consideration (established in
Chapter 2) that early Christians were quite mobile, Jewish Christians would
have travelled yearly to Jerusalem for festivals, and a well-attested ‘networking’ among early Christians existed (Bauckham 2006; Hurtado 2013).
Ehrman (2016, pp. 78–84) also argues that, while eyewitnesses might
hear a distorted version and correct it, there is no guarantee that everybody
would have heard the correction and shared the corrected version from then
on. Kruger (2016) notes that stories of ‘distorted memories’ of Jesus circulating in the early church alongside accurate memories may in fact explain
why we have books like the Acts of Peter and the Gospel of Nicodemus,
which are evidently historically unreliable. However, this does not imply
that all the books about Jesus are unreliable.4 As noted in other parts of
this book, there are indications that the early Christians who authored the
New Testament accounts of Jesus’ resurrection valued history far more than
the Gnostics who authored books such as the Acts of Peter and the Gospel
of Nicodemus.
To elaborate, ancient societies and traditions do make distinctions
between tales and accounts, and history is valued more in some societies
than in others (Bauckham 2006, pp. 273–274). That the early Christian
societies (including those to which the Gospels’ authors belonged) valued
history can be argued from the fact that they already had a written body of
authoritative scripture which took history seriously. In the Old Testament,
God’s faithfulness is manifested in historical events, and such historical
events are used as the basis for encouraging faithfulness in believers (ibid.,
pp. 274–275). Early Christians were concerned about salvation, Jesus was
understood as the source of salvation, and this salvation was understood
within the thoroughly Jewish context of Christian origins (ibid., p. 277).
It was the fulfilment of the promises made by the God of Israel, a new
and decisive eschatological chapter in God’s history with his people and the

4 Ehrman has offered other arguments to try to show that the Gospels are historically unreliable, such as claiming that the Gospels contain contradictions. Other scholars have responded
to these arguments, such as arguing that these contradictions are only apparent but not
genuine contradictions. See, for example, www.ehrmanproject.com/.
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world, and thus the events of Jesus’ history were charged with all the history-making significance of the activity of Israel’s God (ibid.). As Bauckham
argues, ‘At the deepest level, it was for profoundly theological reasons—
their understanding of God and salvation—that early Christians were
concerned with faithful memory of the real past story of Jesus’ (ibid.). Since
the early Christian societies valued history, they would have wanted to get
closer to the eyewitness sources if possible, since such sources were widely
regarded in the ancient world as the best (Eddy and Boyd 2007, p. 286;
Keener 2003, p. 21).
It might be objected that, once the tradition diffused into the social framework of the early communities and became publicly available and authoritative, there would be little reason for the early Christians (e.g. the Gospels’
authors) to search out individual eyewitness informants for their materials
(Kirk 2017, p. 108). However, Paul’s mentioning that most of the ‘more
than five hundred’ witnesses of one of Jesus’ resurrection appearances were
still around (1 Cor. 15:6) shows that historical eyewitnesses continued to be
valued even while the authority of the tradition is conveyed; he is saying in
effect, ‘If anyone wants to check this tradition, a very large number of the
eyewitnesses are still alive and can be seen and heard’ (Bauckham 2006,
p. 308).
Therefore, the individuals (Cephas, James) and groups (the Twelve, ‘more
than five hundred brethren,’ the apostles) who were said to have witnessed
the resurrected Jesus by the very early tradition in 1 Corinthians 15:3–11
must have been very important to the early church. Since the early Christian societies were concerned to consult eyewitness sources if possible, they
would have checked out these individuals and groups, as most of them were
still alive when 1 Corinthians 15:3–11 was circulated. Additionally, Luke
1:1–4 indicates that ‘eyewitnesses’ of Jesus did not merely start traditions
concerning Jesus and withdraw from view but remained for many years the
known sources and guarantors of these traditions (Bauckham 2006, p. 30).5
Could the disciples have continued to believe that Jesus resurrected even
when counterchecking with and among the ‘eyewitnesses’ failed, as a result
of confirmation bias and/or self-deception? For example, some people might
have wanted to believe so much in the afterlife that they ignored any logic or
evidence to the contrary, and only ‘cherry picked’ that evidence which seems
to support his preconceived conclusion.6 A disciple’s own subjective religious experiences might have strongly biased his assessment of the evidence
for and against Jesus’ resurrection. Whittenberger (2011) proposes that
leaders of the group such as Peter or John had individual hallucinations, and
‘most of the others would have gone along with them. Heightened emotion,

5 For further arguments, in particular rebuttals to arguments by form critics, see Bauckham
(2006, pp. 240–357) and Eddy and Boyd (2007, esp. pp. 274–275).
6 I thank Harold Leong for raising this objection.
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pressures to conform, group loyalty, and wishful thinking would have facilitated the adoption of the resurrection belief by most of the group.’
In reply, belief in the afterlife was already present among first-century
people, and thus the earliest Christians would not have required the resurrection of Jesus to persuade them of this. On the other hand, as explained
in Chapter 2, there were sceptics of bodily resurrection within the Christian communities (1 Cor. 15:12) and that the cost of falsification would
have been high. Additionally, as argued in Chapters 3 and 4, the earliest
Christians believed that if they were false witnesses they would misrepresent
God and face judgment in the afterlife, their faith would been in vain and
they would be ‘of all people most to be pitied’ (1 Cor. 15:17–19). Given
this context, it would have been practically impossible to get three different
groups of people involving hundreds of people to hallucinate and to deceive
themselves in wishful thinking and yet being able to persist as ‘eyewitnesses’
for decades in the context of persecution without letting out the deception.
Concerning subjective experiences and group loyalty, as noted in Chapter 2, varied evidence indicates that the earliest Christians did not shy away
from disagreements with influential leaders in matters of theological importance. Christopher Rowland observes that within Jewish and early Christian
sources there was considerable suspicion of claims to authority via dreams,
visions, or other charismatic experiences (Rowland 2002, pp. 272–275). It
is true that some such experiences were seen as fulfilment of Joel’s prophecy
and were expected as well as encouraged in Pauline congregations, but this
does not imply that these experiences were to be accepted without challenge in those communities. On the other hand, there was evidence of warning against dreams (Sirach 34:1–8), the exhortation to judge the sayings of
prophets (e.g. 1 Cor. 14:29) and to test everything (l Thess. 5:19–22). While
Paul frequently refers to his own revelations, this evidently did not secure
the widespread agreement of other Christians concerning Paul’s views. On
the contrary, there was evidence of discussions and disagreements concerning Paul’s views and interpretations of biblical texts related to diverse
issues, such as the propriety and rules governing Jews and Gentiles eating
together, dietary habits, circumcision, and works of the law. Given these
considerations and the evidence of initial doubts among the earliest Christians concerning Jesus’ resurrection (see Chapter 3), if the experiences of the
‘eyewitnesses’ were hallucinatory experiences that involved only one or a
small number of Christians at a time and/or if counterchecking failed, those
who did not have such experiences would not have agreed to just go along
and face persecution.
With regards to heightened emotion, one might object that psychological
studies have indicated that collective excitement may increase suggestibility
(distortion of perception) and diminish critical ability, causing people to
set aside their critical set, their scrutiny of information, and their desire
to verify, or enhance the development of less stringent norms of verification (DiFonzo and Bordia 2007, p. 170). Nevertheless, DiFonzo and Bordia

Combination hypotheses

159

(2007, p. 175) go on to observe that distortion is reduced when people are
allowed to verbally interact. The apostles were proclaiming the gospel to
outsiders in open groups; they and their audiences had years to reflect on
what they proclaimed, and their hearers heard them first-hand.
Moreover, the collective excitement scenario does not fit well with the
full scope of historical evidence of earliest Christianity. While sceptics might
claim that incidents such as that portrayed in Acts 2 indicate group ecstasy,
Keim (1883, p. 352) observes, ‘there is still more of calm consideration
and sober reflection to be seen in the action of all the Apostles, and most
conspicuously in the friction between the Pauline and the Jewish-Christian
missions.’ The defender of the intramental hypothesis would have difficulty
explaining how (in the words of Keim)
the violent agitation of men’s minds—which discharged itself in visions,
and by visions created for Christianity its first expression, its first
confession—so very soon afterwards found its completion or indeed its
termination in conditions marked by clearness and soberness of mind.
(ibid.)
Keim sarcastically remarks,
Not one of the five hundred repeats the ecstasy, and all the cases of
ecstasy irrevocably end with the fifth vision. What a contradiction of
high-swollen enthusiasm and of sudden ebb even to the point of disappearance! Just when fervid minds are beginning to grow fanatical, the
fanaticism absolutely and entirely ceases. It might be possible that a
few less ardent natures, though perhaps not Peter, rather James, would
quickly recover their mental equilibrium; but in the greater number of
the twelve and of the five hundred a movement which had burst the
dams would certainly not be stayed in an instant; and yet the narrative
says nothing of a third vision to the twelve and nothing of a second to
the five hundred.
(Keim 1883, p. 356)
Against apologists who have argued that hallucinations would not have
inspired radical transformations of character in the apostles such that they
were willing to die for their faith, Carrier (1999) objects that this is absurd
since the nature of hallucination is such that the apostles most likely would
not have been aware that they were hallucinating. However, as noted in
Chapter 4, scientific studies have indicated that, among those who had hallucinations, many do subsequently achieve insight that their experience is
hallucinatory after the experience has ended. For example, in the study by
Barber and Calverly (1964) discussed in Chapter 4, it is noteworthy that
among the 49% who had hallucinations that the recording of White Christmas was played, the vast majority (44%) were aware that the recording was
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not played. The soberness of mind noted by Keim, the evidence of the disciples doubting Jesus’ resurrection initially (see Chapter 2), and the failure of
fact checking would have led to this insight.
Against fact checking, Carrier claims that early Christians were more
concerned about other things than facts: joining Christian communities at
that time provided various benefits, such as offering a company of morally
sincere members which distributed material resources more fairly than most
other social institutions of the day, yielding an immense, shared emotional
satisfaction and sense of belonging. Other benefits included receiving aid in
bad times and nursing when sick and dying, and enjoying a far more secure
family life for women (Carrier 2009, pp. 142–143).
In reply, Hurtado points out that there were also strong reasons not to
become a Christian in the early centuries. These include detrimental judicial,
political, and social consequences. For example, one could become a Mithraist, an Isiac, and so on and continue to take part in the worship of one’s
inherited deities of household, city, and nation. However, if one became a
Christian, one would be expected to desist from worship of all other deities.
That would have made it difficult for one to function socially and politically
given the ubiquitous place of the gods in all spheres of social and political
activity (Hurtado 2016a). Thus, while different people may have converted
for different reasons, it isn’t the case that there were clear-cut social benefits
which would have obliterated the motive for fact checking. On the contrary,
the earliest Christians evidently thought that if Jesus did not resurrect, then
Christianity would have been falsified and they would have suffered for
nothing (1 Cor. 15:17f)—this shows that the earliest Christians were concerned about the factuality of Jesus’ resurrection.
Carrier (2009, p. 201) claims that most people in the first century did in
fact reject Christianity, and he contests the claim that the few who converted
did so because they checked the facts. Carrier argues, ‘None of that evidence, whatever it was, persuaded Paul at all. So it could not possibly have
been “irrefutable.” Paul had to see God himself to be convinced!’ (ibid.,
p. 336).
In reply, there is no evidence that those who rejected Christianity in the
first century did so because they falsified the claims of Jesus’ resurrection. It
is true that those who converted might have done so because of various reasons. However, my argument is that fact checking is highly plausible given
the considerations I mentioned previously, and that if fact checking failed,
those who had converted would have left the faith given that it would have
been shown to be in vain (1 Cor. 15:17) and given the context of persecution. In Paul’s case, there was no indication that prior to his conversion he
was already aware of all the evidence for Jesus’ resurrection (e.g. the appearance to ‘more than five hundred brethren’). On the other hand, it is easy to
explain their rejection—including the rejection by the pre-conversion Paul
(= Saul)—as a result of the Christian doctrine of a ‘crucified God,’ which
would have been regarded by many in antiquity as a shameless impertinence
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and absurdity’ (Hengel 1995, p. 383). Given the Jews’ strongly held notion
of divine transcendence and their widespread expectation of a Messiah who
would deliver them from foreign powers, it is easy to explain why the claim
that a person shamefully crucified by the Romans was the Messiah and was
truly divine would have been extremely difficult for these Jewish opponents
to accept. This is shown by the fact that, although there were a number
of messianic movements between BC 150 and AD 150, these did not survive after the violent death of their founders in the hands of their enemies
(Wright 2003, p. 699). Although the followers of these messianic figures
had invested much in their cause, in none of these cases was there successful
attempts to rationalize away their deaths. Additionally, in no other case is
the Messianic figure worshipped as Creator, unlike the case of Jesus (Loke
2017a). Given this cultural context, in which the Jews would have been
highly cynical of ‘predictions’ about the Messiah’s death and resurrection, it
would have been easier for the disciples to leave the group and find another
job or another Messiah. As Wright (1993, p. 63) argues concerning the
other messianic movements,
In not one single case do we hear the slightest mention of the disappointed followers claiming that their hero had been raised from the
dead. They knew better. Resurrection was not a private event. Jewish
revolutionaries whose leader had been executed by the authorities,
and who managed to escape arrest themselves, had two options: give
up the revolution, or find another leader. Claiming that the original
leader was alive again was simply not an option. Unless, of course,
he was.

7.4 Comparative case studies
Ehrman (2016, pp. 95–100) claims that the transmission of stories of
Jesus is analogous to the transmission of stories of the Ba’al Shem Tov (the
‘Besht’; c. AD 1700–1760), known as the founder of Hasidism, a Jewish
mystical movement. Written accounts of his life claim access to eyewitness
testimonies of his miracles including raising the dead. The earliest account
of such stories was Shivḥé ha-Beshṭ, written by his disciple Dov Baer in
1814, 54 years after his death.
However, Kirk (2017, pp. 98–99) observes that unlike the case of Jesus,
where there were communities passing on the traditions (including that of
Jesus’ own resurrection) right from the beginning, as attested by the letters of Paul written around 20–32 years after Jesus’ death, in the case of
Besht there was no such community with a distinct collective identity at
the beginning. Hasidism coalesced as a distinct movement only two generations after the Besht (Rosman 2013, pp. xxx–xxxi, 121–126, 169–174).
In this case, the transmission of traditions is not by communities but by
individuals, which is susceptible to the kind of ‘telephone game’ distortion
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that Ehrman described. Moreover, in the case of Jesus’ resurrection, there
were multiple early sources mentioning Jesus’ resurrection as foundational
for earliest Christianity and for which the followers stake their lives here
and thereafter, and where multiple ‘eyewitnesses’ were known to the readers
(e.g. the Corinthians) and can be checked by them because many were still
alive (1 Cor. 15:6; see Chapter 2). Whereas in the case of Besht there is only
one major source written 54 years after his death and there is no evidence
that it was the ‘miracles’ (rather than, say, the mystical teachings) that was
foundational for the movement from the beginning.
For an example of cognitive dissonance in new religious sects, Komarnitsky (2009, pp. 76, 80) cites the case concerning Sabbatai Zevi, a seventeenthcentury Jewish teacher who claimed to be Messiah but who converted to
Islam after he was captured by hostile Muslim forces. Instead of abandoning their beliefs, a number of Zevi’s followers rationalized how he had only
‘temporarily converted’ or was ‘destroying Islam from within.’
However, Habermas (1989) notes that most of his followers admitted that
they had been mistaken. While for Sabbatai’s death in 1676 there were some
who claimed that he resurrected or did not die but only appeared to do so,
there were apparently no claims that Sabbatai appeared alive afterwards. By
contrast, there is no indication that the earliest Christians (e.g. the Twelve,
James, or Paul) admitted that they had been mistaken. On the contrary, as
argued in previous chapters there was evidence of widespread and persistent
agreement among them that he was Messiah, truly divine, and resurrected,
and that he appeared alive to various individuals and groups.
Komarnitsky (2014) also cites the case which has the most striking parallels with Jesus: the case of Menachem Mendel Schneersohn (1902–1994),
an outstanding rabbi (‘Rebbe’) and popular leader of the Chabad-Lubavitch
movement. A personality cult grew around him, and a proportion of his
followers exalted him as the Messiah (‘Moshiach’) who would usher in the
End Times apocalypse. His death in 1994 caused cognitive dissonance for
the messianists. Instead of abandoning their beliefs, a number of followers
sought to overcome this dissonance by denying that he is dead; some even
rationalize and speak of his ‘resurrection’ in the context of religious ridicule
and scepticism and think of him as even more powerfully at work than
before (Marcus 2001, p. 396).
In reply, Marcus (2001, p. 397, n. 74) observes that ‘there is not (yet?) in
Chabad messianism a tradition about a well-defined series of resurrection
appearances of the Rebbe, including collective appearances, comparable to
the narratives at the ends of the Gospels or in 1 Cor 15.5–8.’ This is disanalogous to earliest Christianity, in which such resurrection appearances
began soon after Jesus’ death and generated belief in his resurrection (see
Chapter 2). Moreover, the source of belief in the Rebbe’s resurrection could
have been influenced by Christianity. As Marcus (2001, p. 382) observes, ‘it
is possible that some of these parallels are not “pure”, i.e. they may reflect
not just a comparable messianic excitement reacting upon a similar base of
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Jewish tradition, but rather the influence of Christianity on Chabad—even
though Lubavitchers vociferously deny this possibility.’7 There was also no
comparable persecution of the Chabad messianists either or expectation of
similar persecution, for unlike the earliest Christian’s Messiah, the Chabad’s
Messiah did not die in the context of persecution. More importantly, unlike
Christianity, the belief that the Rebbe is the Messiah, resurrected or divine,
is not widely held by the leaders of his followers after his death. On the
contrary, many of them acknowledge that he did not resurrect and are still
awaiting his resurrection from his tomb.8 Schneersohn’s emissaries have
fiercely defended the views of Schneersohn himself by criticizing those who
exalted his status (Skolnik and Berenbaum 2007, Vol. 18, p. 149). In a
statement issued by the Central Committee of Chabad-Lubavitch Rabbis in
United States and Canada on February 19, 1998, the highest-ranked leaders
of the movement condemned the deification of any human being as ‘contrary to the core and foundation of the Jewish faith,’ and they mentioned,
‘The preoccupation with identifying [the deceased] Rebbe as Moshiach is
clearly contrary to the Rebbe’s wishes.’ By contrast, there is no indication
that the strict monotheistic Jewish leaders of the earliest Christian movement (i.e. the Twelve, James, or Paul) condemned the deification of Jesus
as ‘contrary to the core and foundation of the Jewish faith,’ and there is
no indication that they mentioned that ‘the preoccupation with identifying
the deceased Jesus as Messiah or as truly divine is clearly contrary to Jesus’
wishes.’ On the contrary, there was evidence of widespread agreement that
he was Messiah, truly divine, and resurrected (Loke 2017a).

7.5 Other possible combination hypotheses
It has been shown that the aforementioned combination hypotheses do not
work. Could there be other combinations of hypotheses which may work?
To evaluate this possibility, it should first be noted that a number of naturalistic hypotheses are so unworkable, as have been shown in previous
chapters of this book, that they will not be able to contribute anything in

7 Marcus nevertheless goes on to insist, ‘But even if the possibility of Christian influence on
Chabad messianism cannot be totally discounted, it is still instructive to see the ways in
which messianism can express itself in a Jewish arena that in some ways parallels that in
which Christianity arose. Such a study does not definitely show us what did occur in the first
century, but it does open our eyes to what might have happened—and warns us against overconfident assertions about what is and is not possible within a Jewish environment.’ In reply,
Marcus’ arguments for what might have happened on the basis of the Chabad movement is
contaminated by possible Christian influence on the movement, whereas there was no such
genuine analogies or precedents to the worship of Jesus (Hurtado 2003; Loke 2017a) or to
the resurrection of Jesus (Wright 2003) that could have influenced the origin of Christianity’s
doctrines concerning these.
8 www.nytimes.com/1998/06/29/nyregion/messiah-fervor-for-late-rabbi-divides-manylubavitchers.html
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combination with other hypotheses. These dead ends include the legends
hypothesis in view of the very early date of the tradition in 1 Corinthians
15:3–11 (as well as other considerations discussed in Chapter 2), the no
experience hypothesis in view of the consideration that the ‘eyewitnesses’
would have leaked out the truth that they did not experience anything when
persecuted (as well as other considerations discussed in Chapter 3), the
swoon hypothesis which would have convinced no one of Jesus’ resurrection but only of his need for medical attention, and the escape hypothesis
in view of the unreasonableness of thinking that the enemies and friends of
Jesus all failed to recognize that he was not crucified.
What about the remaining two hypotheses? The best combination of the
intramental and mistaken identity hypotheses which the sceptic can postulate is as follows. The sceptic can claim that the intramental hypothesis
explains the experiences of only one group of people (the Twelve) as well
as the experiences of Peter, James, and Paul individually, while the mistaken
identity hypothesis explains the experiences of the five hundred and the
other apostles besides the Twelve (1 Cor. 15:6–7). The reasons why the latter two groups misidentified ‘Jesus’ could be (a) they were not as familiar
with Jesus as were the Twelve and James, and/or (b) their experiences of the
‘resurrected Jesus’ were vague (due to circumstances such as seeing ‘Jesus’
from a faraway distance, for example). Sceptics might suggest that the disciples came up with the notion of ‘spiritual body’ by combining experiences
which (unknown to them) were caused by mistaken identity and hallucinations. This combination is the best, because other possible combinations
would involve postulations which (in view of the considerations explained
in previous chapters of this book) face intractable problems, such as group
hallucinations one after another, misidentifications by those who had lived
with Jesus for a while (i.e. the Twelve, including Peter, and James), or an
appearance of a ‘naturally physical Jesus’ to Paul.
Nevertheless, this combination still faces serious difficulties.
First, it does not explain how the tomb of Jesus became empty. Other
naturalistic hypotheses would have to be added to explain the empty tomb,
and I have argued previously that they can be ruled out if there were guards
at the tomb (and I have argued that there were).
Second, this combination as well as others which have been discussed
previously would still require nonevidenced assumptions such as Paul having psychological factors which predisposed him to hallucinate Jesus (see
Chapter 4), and it is thus ad hoc.
Third, the postulation of a group hallucination of the Twelve is unworkable given the likelihood of its members’ varying mental states and the argument against group hallucination explained in Chapter 4 (i.e. without a
corresponding external stimulation of the relevant sensory organ, the mental
states internal to each person within the group would not agree on various
details concerning their experience of the external world). A perception of
something extramental and independent of their mental states would have
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been required to remove all the residual doubts from among all of them,
such that they were willing to die for Jesus’ bodily resurrection (Chapter 3)
and to worship him as truly divine.
Indeed, as argued in Chapter 4, the Twelve would have required pretty
‘solid’ evidence—such as repeated, multi-sensorial experiences of ‘Jesus’—
to persuade themselves and their audience that what they saw was a bodily
resurrected Jesus and not a hallucination, a ghost, or a vision (cf. Wright
2007, pp. 210–211) and to come to agreement among themselves that this
was the case. Multi-sensorial experiences involving the Twelve such as conversing with ‘Jesus,’ touching him, and eating with him (this would have
left behind causal effects when ‘Jesus’ was gone) are widely attested in firstcentury documents (Luke 24:30–31, Luke 24:36–43, Acts 1:4, 10:41, John
20:20, 27, 21:12–13, Ignatius Smyn. 3:3), and I have argued for the historicity of such experiences in Chapter 4.
Fourth, as argued previously, the process of counterchecking by the
groups of ‘eyewitnesses’ among themselves and by their audiences, together
with other considerations, would have rendered unworkable the hypothesis
that the claims of Jesus’ post-mortem appearances were the result of hallucinations, exaggerations, memory distortion, and/or confirmation bias.
Finally, given the critical importance that Paul attaches to the resurrection
and to the witnesses (1 Cor. 15:3–11, 17), Paul would not have suggested to
the Corinthians who found the idea of bodily resurrection unbelievable to
check out the witnesses (1 Cor. 15:6, 12), if vague or unconvincing descriptions of ‘Jesus’ were what they testified. Furthermore, given the context of
persecution and the general scepticism about people rising from the dead,
it is unreasonable to think that more than one group of people (the five
hundred, the other apostles besides the Twelve) would have wanted to serve
as crucial witnesses and be able to persuade their sceptical audiences of
Jesus’ resurrection, if what they experienced were vague or unconvincing
perceptions of Jesus in the first place. Therefore, given these circumstances
it is unreasonable to think that more than one group of people misidentified
Jesus.

7.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have shown that combination hypotheses have failed to
refute the conclusions established in the previous chapters. It can therefore
be concluded that the historical evidence indicates that the tomb of Jesus
was empty and that there were people in mid-first century CE who claimed
that they had seen Jesus alive after his crucifixion, they truly saw something, what they saw was not caused intramentally but extramentally, and
the extramental entity was not anyone else but the same Jesus who died on
the cross. Therefore, Jesus resurrected.

8	Problem of miracles

8.1 Introduction
For many people, one of the greatest difficulties for accepting the conclusion
that Jesus resurrected is undoubtedly its apparently miraculous nature. On
the other hand, New Testament scholar Graham Twelftree observes that
there has been an increased interest in the study of Jesus’ ‘miracles’ in contemporary historical Jesus scholarship. This is contributed by numerous factors, which include ‘the failure to show that miracles originated outside the
Jesus tradition’; ‘the increased confidence in the historical reliability of the
gospel traditions’ (Twelftree 2011, pp. 2518–2519); ‘an increasingly rigorous philosophical and theological defense of the possibility of miracles’; and
the ‘recognition that the miracle traditions have not arisen in an entirely
credulous world’ (ibid., n. 10). In this chapter I shall address the problem of
miracles with respect to the resurrection of Jesus.

8.2 Are miracles impossible?
A number of philosophers and scientists have rejected miracles, claiming that
they ‘contradict the order of creation’ (Reimarus) or are impossible a priori
(Monod) (Morrison 2001). Following David Hume’s (Hume 1748/2000)
definition of a miracle as ‘a violation of the laws of nature,’ Stephen Hawking claims that the laws of nature ‘should hold everywhere and at all times;
otherwise they wouldn’t be laws. There could be no exceptions or miracles’
(Hawking and Mlodinow 2010, pp. 29, 34, 171).
In reply, one should note the distinction between laws of logic and laws
of nature/order of creation. Laws of logic (e.g. the law of non-contradiction)
are necessarily true and inviolable (illustration: there cannot be a shapeless
cube in any universe; ‘shapeless’ and ‘cube’ would cancel each other out
and there would be nothing), and this impossibility can be known a priori.
Laws of nature, however, can be ‘violated.’ In fact, scientists have argued
that certain laws of nature break down at the Big Bang and that there can
be different laws of nature in different universes. Miracles relate to laws of
nature rather than laws of logic. One response therefore is to argue that the
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Creator of the laws of nature can violate them. Another response is to argue
that miracles do not violate laws of nature, only their universality (Colwell
1983). Yet another response is to argue that, instead of understanding a
miracle as ‘a violation of laws of nature,’ it can be understood as ‘an event
which would not have been produced by the natural causes operative at a
certain time and place’ (Moreland and Craig 2003, pp. 566–568). In other
words, a miracle is ‘an act by some power external to the natural world’
(Bartholomew 2000, p. 81). Using the analogy of the law of arithmetic,
Lewis writes,
If this week I put a thousand pounds in the drawer of my desk, add
two thousand next week and another thousand the week thereafter, the
laws of arithmetic allow me to predict that the next time I come to my
drawer, I shall find four thousand pounds. But suppose when I next
open the drawer, I find only one thousand pounds, what shall I conclude? That the laws of arithmetic have been broken? Certainly not!
I might more reasonably conclude that some thief has broken the laws
of the State and stolen three thousand pounds out of my drawer. One
thing it would be ludicrous to claim is that the laws of arithmetic make
it impossible to believe in the existence of such a thief or the possibility
of his intervention. On the contrary, it is the normal workings of those
laws that have exposed the existence and activity of the thief.
(Lewis 2001, p. 62)
J.L. Mackie notes,
The laws of nature . . . describe the ways in which the world—including,
of course, human beings—works when left to itself, when not interfered
with. A miracle occurs when the world is not left to itself, when something distinct from the natural order as a whole intrudes into it.
(Mackie 1982, pp. 19–20)
Unless we assume that causes other than natural causes do not exist (which
would commit the fallacy of begging the question against Theism), we
should not regard miracles to be impossible.
Historian Brad Gregory (2006, pp. 137–138) notes,
Any conviction that precludes in principle the possibilities that transcendent, spiritual reality exists, that divine revelation is possible, that
divinely worked miracles occur or have occurred, that there is an afterlife, and the like, cannot itself be demonstrated a posteriori, in our
present or in any realistically foreseeable state of knowledge. To verify
such a conviction with respect to miracles, for example, would among
other things require observation of all natural occurrences at all times
and places, including those in the past—a patent impossibility. The
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undeniably fruitful a priori assumption of metaphysical naturalism in
the natural sciences is not and cannot be a proof that in fact, for example, no miraculous events of the sort described in the Hebrew Bible or
the New Testament have ever occurred. Since it is impossible to verify
that none of them occurred, it is possible that some of them might have
occurred. Therefore to assert that none of them could have occurred is
to assert a metaphysical belief about reality, to pass from the postulate
to the dogma of metaphysical naturalism (emphasis in original).

The point here is that a historian qua historian should not beg the question for or against the possibility that Jesus resurrected miraculously. Behe’s
example and Licona’s thought experiment noted in Chapter 1 nicely illustrate how methodological restriction can hinder one from finding out what
happened in the past, and that history involves humans but should be open
to the possibility of human interaction with non-human persons. If a historian were to exclude a priori the possibility that Jesus’ resurrection was
miraculously caused by God, it would also import unwarranted theological
and philosophical assumptions into his/her judgment. As an example of
such unwarranted importation, Troeltsch (1898/1991) claims that the same
kinds of causal laws and natural processes operative today were operative in the past (the principle of analogy), and that the universe is a closed
system of natural antecedents and consequences (the principle of correlation). Thus miraculous intervention by God in history is excluded on the
grounds that such events are not observed today and the assumption that
the universe is causally closed. In reply, the background assumptions of
Troeltsch’s principles of analogy and correlation beg the question against
the existence of a God who would cause miraculous events in history only
in certain unusual circumstances in order to reveal himself through these
events. What we do not see now does not imply it did not happen in the
past. As Evans explains,
Many religious believers have thought that God would only perform
miracles in quite unusual circumstances. If one believed that the incarnation of Jesus was a historical event that made possible the redemption of
humanity and the whole created order, one might reasonably believe that
miracles might accompany that event even if they do not occur today.
(Evans 1996, p. 198)

8.3 Are miracles improbable?
Sceptics might argue that even if miracles are possible, we have overwhelming evidence against believing their occurrence. Hume writes,
A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle,
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from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined.
(Hume 1748/2000, pp. 86–87)
Referring to the resurrection of Jesus, Hume writes,
But it is a miracle that a dead man should come to life; because that has
never been observed, in any age or country. There must, therefore, be a
uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event
would not merit that appellation.
(ibid., p. 87)
One might object that Hume is begging the question by assuming that
‘unalterable experience’ and ‘uniform experience’ are against every miraculous event. As C.S. Lewis writes,
No, of course we must agree with Hume that if there is absolutely
‘uniform experience’ against miracles, in other words, they have never
happened, why then they never have. Unfortunately, we know the experience against them to be uniform only if we know that all the reports
of them are false. And we know all the reports are false only if we know
already that miracles have never occurred. In fact, we are arguing in a
circle.
(Lewis 2001, p. 162)
To avoid the charge of begging the question, a sceptic might modify
Hume’s argument such that, instead of assuming that our experience against
miracle is unalterable and uniform, s/he cites multiple experiences of (say)
people who have not experienced miracles, and concludes that we have overwhelming evidence against believing their occurrence. A sceptic might argue
that rationality requires that we believe what is most probable and that
our experience indicates that miracles are the least probable events. Ehrman (2003a, pp. 228–229) argues that because historians can only establish
what probably happened and a miracle is highly improbable, the historian
cannot establish that a miracle occurred.’
One might challenge Ehrman’s assumption that the probability of a miracle is very low. Licona (2010, pp. 196–197) asks,
But how does the nontheist historian know this? Testimonies of God’s
intervention in history occur with every claim to answered prayer.
Although many claims of God’s intervention could in reality be coincidence, many claims of coincidence could in reality be God’s intervention.
Plenty of people have claimed to have experienced miracles such as divine
healing even today (Keener 2011, pp. 264–768). A recent publication by
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Harvard University Press notes a survey which indicates that 73% of US
medical doctors think that miraculous healing occurs today; the publication
also notes that there have been documented cases of tumours disappearing
and the blind healed after prayer (Brown 2012). Sceptics would need to
assess these cases carefully rather than dismissively make sweeping claims
such as ‘uniform human experience is characterised by an absence of miracles.’ While one might not have experienced a miracle oneself, one should
consider the experiences of others as well as the evidence for Jesus’ resurrection with an open mind. A reasonable person should be willing to let his/her
presuppositions be challenged by the evidence (McKnight 2005).
More fundamentally, Ehrman’s reasoning is flawed, for he fails to ‘distinguish between the probability of a miracle claim considered apart from
the evidence and the probability of the claim given that evidence’ (McGrew
2013). Ehrman assumes that the former is very low. However, the latter
may be high given the specific evidence for that particular miraculous claim.
Craig explains this using the Bayesian calculus.1
Pr
(R/B&E) = Pr (R/B) × Pr (E/B&R)
________________________________________________
Pr (R/B) × Pr (E/B&R) + Pr (not-R/B) × Pr (E/B& not-R)
First, Craig explains that Ehrman’s argument that the resurrection is
improbable (i.e. the Pr (R/B&E) is very low) solely because the background
information that miracles are improbable (i.e. the Pr (R/B) is very low) is
misconceived, as it completely ignores all the other relevant factors such as
the probabilities of the naturalistic alternatives. Thus, even if the Pr (R/B) is
very low, the probability for the resurrection Pr (R/B&E) could still be very
high if the probabilities concerning the naturalistic alternatives (Pr (not-R/B)
× Pr (E/B& not-R) are very low (Craig and Ehrman 2006, pp. 14–16). Craig
goes on to say that while the Bayesian approach is helpful for illustrating
the error of Hume, Ehrman, and others, he has reservations about using it
to argue for Jesus’ resurrection because of the difficulty with assigning a
numerical value for the prior probability of Jesus’ resurrection. Thus, he
uses the approach of inference to the best explanation to argue for Jesus’
resurrection. I discuss the difficulty concerning prior probability at the end
of Section 8.4).

1 As used by Craig in Craig and Ehrman (2006, pp. 14–16). He explains, ‘B = Background
knowledge; E = Specific evidence (empty tomb, postmortem appearances, etc.); R = Resurrection of Jesus. Then Pr (R/B) is called the intrinsic probability of the resurrection. It tells
how probable the resurrection is given our general knowledge of the world. Pr (E/B&R)
is called the explanatory power of the resurrection hypothesis. It tells how probable the
resurrection makes the evidence of the empty tomb and so forth. These two factors form
the numerator of this ratio. Basically, Pr (not-R/B) × Pr (E/B& not-R) represent the intrinsic
probability and explanatory power of all the naturalistic alternatives to Jesus’ resurrection.’
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Ehrman’s error is similar to that committed by Rachels and Rachels
(2012, p. 50). They ask us to think of a situation in which someone tells you
that a dead man came back to life. They then argue,
We have to ask which is more likely: (a) That a dead man came back to
life (b) That the report is mistaken. Of course it is more likely that the
report is mistaken. We know that often people get things wrong, make
mistakes, exaggerate, and even lie. These are common occurrences. On
the other hand, we have never known someone truly dead to return
to life. Therefore, a reasonable person will conclude that the report is
probably mistaken.
(ibid.)
The problem with Rachels and Rachels’ argument can be illustrated by
thinking about another situation: suppose you and your community grew up
in a hot jungle and have never seen ice, and someone from Europe visited you
and told you that water can be frozen. If you say, ‘Of course it is more likely
that the report is mistaken. We know that often people get things wrong,
make mistakes, exaggerate, and even lie. These are common occurrences. On
the other hand, we have never known that water can be frozen. Therefore, a
reasonable person will conclude that the report is probably mistaken’—you
would be wrong! The moral of this story is that Rachels and Rachels’ argument
is too sloppy; it fails to consider the specific evidence for the particular case in
question. While there have been many mistaken reports, we should consider
the evidence that is specific to the particular case of Jesus’ resurrection.
Second, why think that the Pr (R/B) for the resurrection is very low? We
can certainly grant that the Pr (R/B) for ‘Jesus rose from the dead naturalistically’ is extremely low, but the Pr (R/B) for ‘Jesus rose from the dead supernaturalistically’ must be 1 if an omnipotent God wants to raise Jesus from
the dead! One can only assert that the intrinsic probability for the resurrection is very low if one can show that it is probable that:
a
b
c

God never exists, or
God had ceased to exist, or
even if He exists, it is probable that God would not want to raise Jesus
from the dead.

Due to lack of space it is impossible in this chapter to go into a discussion on the probability of God’s existence. Others and myself have argued
elsewhere that there are good independent reasons (viz. the cosmological,
teleological, and moral arguments) for thinking that a God who can act
supernaturally (e.g. by creating our universe) exists (Loke 2017b, 2019,
forthcoming; Craig and Moreland, eds. 2009).
Alvin Plantinga has objected that the case for Jesus’ resurrection suffers
from the problem of dwindling probabilities. Plantinga argues that to reach
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the conclusion for the truth of the resurrection and incarnation and other
‘great claims of the gospel’ on historical grounds, one would require a chain
of propositions, starting from our background knowledge K for the existence of God (T), followed by
A: God would want to make some sort of revelation to humankind;
B: Jesus’ teachings were such that they could be sensibly interpreted
and extrapolated to G, the great claims of the gospel (including the
incarnation);
C: Jesus rose from the dead;
D: In raising Jesus from the dead, God endorsed his teachings; and
E: The extension and extrapolation of Jesus’ teachings to G is true.
Plantinga argues that, even if we were to assign generous values (say,
0.9) for the probability of T, A, B, C, and D, when we calculate the probability of E by multiplying the conditional probability of one proposition
on another or a set of others (e.g. 0.9 × 0.9 = 0.81, 0.81 × 0.9 = 0.729,
0.729 × 0.9 = 0.656, etc.), the probability dwindles to a minute value (note
how the numbers in italics get smaller with each successive step). He therefore concludes that the historical argument is insufficient to support serious
belief in doctrines such as the resurrection and incarnation (Plantinga 2000,
pp. 268–280, 2006).
In response to this problem, McGrew points out that Plantinga’s blunder
lies in falsely assuming that the probabilities of the background propositions are fixed. The fact of the matter is that, while background beliefs such
as theism are premises for the resurrection (and for the incarnation), the
resurrection can also serve as a premise for background beliefs such as theism. Thus, the probability of theism should be updated after considering the
evidence for the resurrection (McGrew 2009, pp. 644–648).
McGrew gives the following analogy. Consider these two propositions.
A: Alvin Plantinga exists.
B: Alvin Plantinga sent me an email on March 3, 2007.
McGrew explains,
Let us suppose that, on the morning of March 3, 2007, you have never
heard of Alvin Plantinga as a real person, never read any of his books or
articles, and have no other specific evidence regarding his existence. Suppose that we attach to the name ‘Alvin Plantinga’ a Russellian definite
description like ‘A philosopher of religion, presently teaching at Notre
Dame, who is known for his development of a school of thought known
as Reformed Epistemology.’ You might be able, with effort, to come up
with a probability for A based on extremely general considerations such
as whether the first and last names are common or uncommon, how
many philosophers there are in the world and at Notre Dame, and the
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like, but this is all. . . . But on the evening of March 3, you sit down at
your computer, access your email, and up comes a note from someone
introducing himself as Alvin Plantinga, describing himself more or less
as in the definite description . . . it would be a terrible blunder if you
actually took as P(A) on total evidence the probability it had in the
morning and treated that as an upper bound on the probability for B.
This would be flatly wrong, for both A and B must now be reevaluated
on the strong evidence supporting B directly and A indirectly.
(ibid., pp. 649–650)
McGrew points out that in most of our interactions with ordinary people, our strongest evidence for their existence is the direct evidence for the
things they have done and said—for what we might call their revelations of
themselves. Similarly, the incarnation and resurrection, supported by historical evidence, must be considered as revelations of God, and hence as
additional evidence for God’s existence. Thus the probability of background
beliefs such as the probability of theism (this probability is based on the
independent reasons mentioned earlier for thinking that God exists) cannot
be regarded as fixed, but must be updated in light of the additional evidence
for the incarnation and resurrection (ibid.).
A number of sceptics of the resurrection have attempted to show that,
even if God exists, it is probable that he would not want to raise Jesus from
the dead. Voltaire (1764/1901, p. 273) famously argued that ascribing miracles to God would indicate a lack of forethought:
It is impossible a being infinitely wise can have made laws to violate
them . . . if He saw that some imperfections would arise from the nature
of matter, He provided for that in the beginning; and, accordingly, He
will never change anything in it.
However, McGrew (2013) notes that Paley (1794/1859, p. 12) and others
replied that God in his foresight would have wanted to set up a universe
with regularities that no mere human could abrogate and then suspended
them so as to authenticate a revelation.
Martin objects that the intrinsic probability would be small even if God
exists, because
1

2
3

Miracles have detrimental effects of impeding scientific progress as it
is a violation of scientific laws, and great difficulties and controversies
arise in identifying miracles. Since God would be able to achieve his
purpose without these detrimental effects, he would not use miracles.
Even from a theistic perspective, violations of natural laws are relatively
rare.
Even if God wants to send his Son to die for sinners and resurrect him,
he could have done so on many other possible occasions, and therefore
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the probability of God resurrecting his Son on this particular occasion
must be low.
Both theists and non-theists agree that most alleged miracles later turn
out to be false (Martin 2005a, pp. 46–52).2

In response, first, as noted earlier, rather than defining a miracle as ‘a violation of scientific laws,’ a miracle can be understood as ‘an event which would
not have been produced by the natural causes operative at a certain time
and place’ (Moreland and Craig 2003, pp. 566–568). Given that the Christian’s claim that Jesus resurrected is that he was raised super-naturalistically,
that it is a claim about a single event rather than regular events, and that it is
not a claim about how the universe normally works, it does not impede any
scientific research about naturalistic events and how the universe normally
works.
Second, miracles are identifiable; in particular, with respect to the resurrection of Jesus, the evidence for the event (e.g. the tomb was empty, the
disciples claimed to have seen Jesus alive after his crucifixion), together with
the exclusion of the naturalistic alternatives and the presence of a relevant
religious context, will entail sufficient epistemic justification for the conclusion of a miraculous resurrection.
Naturalistic alternatives are of two kinds: first, there are naturalistic alternatives to the resurrection event; i.e. Jesus did not rise from the dead; rather,
the disciples stole the body and made up the claim to have seen him alive,
or the disciples hallucinated, or Jesus did not die on the cross, etc. This kind
of naturalistic alternatives have already been considered and excluded in
previous chapters. Second, there are naturalistic alternatives for the resurrection event; i.e. Jesus did rise from the dead but it was not caused miraculously; rather it was caused naturally; e.g. it was a scientific anomaly or it
was caused by aliens that are yet unknown to us. This kind of naturalistic
alternative will be discussed later.
Third, factors such as the rarity of miracles, the many other possible occasions for God to resurrect his Son, and the fact that most alleged miracles
turn out to be false does not imply that the probability that God resurrected
Jesus on this particular occasion would be low, for these factors may well be
irrelevant to God concerning whether he wanted to resurrect Jesus on this
particular occasion.
In particular, it should be noted that the objection against the reasonableness of miracles based on the apparent infrequency of miracles does not
2 Martin has offered other arguments against the intrinsic probability of the resurrection
(Martin 2004, 2005b). In response, Martin’s arguments (e.g. Jesus’ approval of slavery is
immoral, Jesus’ argument that one is saved by following a strict moral code contradicts
Swinburne’s atonement view, etc.) are cited from his own Atheism, Morality, and Meaning
(Martin 2002), a work which has been criticized for ignoring much of what has already been
written in commentaries, journal articles, and monographs (Copan 2004).
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work. When evaluating rare hypotheses, infrequency is not the main consideration; the main consideration is the reason for the infrequency. In the case
of evaluating natural impersonal causes, infrequencies can help us exclude
natural impersonal causes and naturalistic alternatives to Jesus’ resurrection
given that natural causes are supposed to act in predictable and law-like
ways. For example, by thinking about the law-like causal pathways that
are required to produce perceptions, we can determine that, without a corresponding external stimulation of the relevant sensory organ, the mental
states internal to each person within a group of people would not agree
on various details concerning their experience of the external world. Given
this reason it is no wonder that a recent study by Bergeron and Habermas (2015) concludes that collective hallucinations are not found in peerreviewed medical literature. However a miraculous event is supposed to be
caused by a supernatural personal free agent, and it is not unreasonable to
think that an infrequent event happened as a result of a personal agent freely
choosing to act in a certain unique way only on a special occasion.
Licona (2010, p. 175) asks us to suppose,
when my son was very young I completely supported his weight by
holding his hands above his head and walked along side of a swimming
pool while he walked on the water. The fact that billions of people have
not walked on water does not influence the probability that my son did.
Indeed, because the experiences of those billions of people does not affect
our understanding of the causal pathway involved in the event of Licona
freely choosing to hold up his son. Thus infrequencies cannot help us exclude
miracles given that a supernatural personal agent might freely choose to
act in certain ways only on rare occasions. As philosopher Stephen Davis
observes concerning the objection from rarity with regards to the resurrection of Jesus, the rarity of resurrections cannot be equated with improbability. He explains,
What is being ignored here is the fact that the Resurrection hypothesis
involves the free choice of an agent, viz., God. This is why the rarity of
Resurrections (which everyone will grant) cannot be equated with improbability. Suppose I want to buy a car, and I enter a lot where there are a
thousand cars for sale, of which only one is red. Now what is the probability that I buy the red one? Clearly, that probability is not just a function of the infrequency of red cars in the sample. This is obviously because
my selection of a car might not be entirely random as to colour. Indeed,
I might freely choose to buy the red car precisely because of its uniqueness.
(Davis 1999, p. 59)
The objection from infrequency of miracles begs the question against a
God who may well choose to cause miraculous events only occasionally
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in religiously significant contexts, for example, to confirm what certain
religious leaders (such as Jesus) proclaimed has divine origin and to reveal
himself through these events. Hence, the lack of frequency of bodily resurrections is not an adequate reason against the hypothesis that ‘Jesus rose
from the dead super-naturalistically’ given that there is good evidence for
this event, that all other naturalistic hypotheses can be reasonably excluded,
and that a religiously significant context is present.
Martin objects that because God could have become incarnate and resurrected on an innumerable number of other occasions, it is unlikely that
the incarnation and resurrection would have taken place in first-century
Palestine. He gives the illustration that it is unlikely that a mother who has
decided to pay her child’s debt and who could do this on an innumerable
number of other occasions would (suppose we know of no reason why the
parent might act at one time rather than another) settle her child’s debt on a
particular day, say July 8 this year (Martin 2011, pp. 288–289).
But what if the child sees the money coming in on July 8? It would be
ridiculous for him to doubt it just because his mother could have paid on
other days. This illustrates that we should assess the evidence (‘seeing money
coming in on July 8’) rather than objecting the way Martin did. The fact that
there are many other possible occasions for the parent to pay ought not be
taken to imply that the probability that she would pay on this particular day
would be low, because there might be reasons why she would want to pay
on this particular day, reasons that are perhaps unknown to us. In that case,
the probability that she pays on this particular day is not just a function of
the number of other days available. For Martin to justify his objection, he
would have to bear the burden of proof to read the omniscient mind of God
so as to ensure that there is no reason why God would want to incarnate
and resurrect Jesus in first-century Palestine, and this he has failed to do.
Martin might object, ‘But doesn’t the Christian have to bear the burden
of proof to show that God has good reason to incarnate and resurrect Jesus
in first-century Palestine, rather than, say, in the second century, third century, etc.?’ No, just as the child does not need to bear the burden of proof
to show that his mother has good reason to pay on July 8 (rather than
July 9, July 10, etc.). Given the evidence for the payment (e.g. ‘seeing money
coming in on July 8’) and evidence against the alternative hypotheses (e.g.
there is evidence against him having a hallucination of money coming in on
July 8), he can reasonably conclude that his debt was paid on July 8. Likewise, given the evidence for Jesus’ resurrection (‘post-mortem appearances,’
‘empty tomb’) and evidence against all the possible naturalistic hypotheses
(as argued in previous chapters), it can reasonably be concluded that Jesus
resurrected.
Understanding a miracle as a counter-instance to natural law, Antony
Flew (1976) argues that there can never be stronger reasons for accepting
the report of a non-repeatable counter-instance to a natural law because
the evidence for it is weaker than the evidence for the natural law. The
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latter is highly confirmed by a large number of people and can be tested
by anyone at any time, with the result always the same: the dead stay
dead, whereas reported counter-instances to natural laws are supported
only by personal testimonies of a relatively smaller number of people
from the past. Shapiro (2016, pp. 133–134) objects that the resurrection
hypothesis ‘asks us to believe something that is completely beyond what
we know to be true about how the world works,’ whereas a naturalistic
hypothesis such as a twin brother hypothesis asks us only to believe that
someone had a dishonest twin. He thinks that we ought to accept the
second hypothesis for the same reason we ought to look for alternative
explanations to a person who claims alien abduction as an explanation
for her recent absence.
In reply, Flew’s assumption that the dead always stay dead begs the question against the resurrection of Jesus. One still needs to explain the reports
for Jesus’ resurrection, and I have already argued that the naturalistic explanations can be ruled out. Moreover, Flew should not compare the evidence
for the natural law with the evidence for Jesus’ resurrection, for the former
only goes to show that ‘the dead stay dead in the absence of supernatural
intervention,’ which does not exclude the plausibility of the latter occurring
by divine intervention. ‘What we know to be true about how the world
works’ (Shapiro) is true about the world when it is left to itself, but it does
not render it unreasonable to believe that there is something beyond which
can interfere with the world. As McGrew observes,
Christians no less than their atheist friends believe that there is a way
that the universe behaves when it is left to itself. In the ordinary course
of events, virgins are not pregnant and dead men stay dead. The central Christian claims are not attempts to contest these generalizations;
they presuppose them. That is why the Christians have been shouting
from the rooftops for nearly twenty centuries that the resurrection was
a miracle. The evidence for how the universe behaves when it is left to
itself, be it ever so strong, must not be mistaken for evidence that it
always is.3
On the other hand, as noted in previous chapters we have reasons to rule
out naturalistic hypotheses such as the twin brother hypothesis. It is true
that we need to consider alternative explanations to the alien abduction
hypothesis just as we need to consider alternative explanations to Jesus’
resurrection. However, in the case of Jesus’ resurrection we have evidence to
rule out the alternative explanations as demonstrated in previous chapters,
but this has not been demonstrated in the case of supposed alien abduction.
Thus we should accept the former, but not the latter.

3 www.theopentableblog.com/single-post/2018/06/11/Is-the-Resurrection-Unbelievable
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8.4 Objection: an extraordinary claim requires
extraordinary evidence
A sceptic may concede that miracles are possible and that the argument
against the plausibility of miracle based on infrequency fails, but still insist
that we do not have sufficient evidence to establish a miracle. He/she may
cite Hume’s maxim:
That no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous,
than the fact, which it endeavours to establish: And even in that case,
there is a mutual destruction of arguments, and the superior only gives
us an assurance suitable to that degree of force, which remains, after
deducting the inferior.
(Hume 1748/2000, p. 87)
This maxim lies behind the oft-repeated claim that ‘an extraordinary
claim requires extraordinary evidence.’ Hume illustrates this maxim by
applying it to the claim of resurrection:
When anyone tells me, that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself, whether it be more probable, that this
person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact, which he
relates, should really have happened. I weigh the one miracle against the
other; and according to the superiority, which I discover, I pronounce
my decision, and always reject the greater miracle. If the falsehood of his
testimony would be more miraculous, than the event which he relates;
then, and not till then, can he pretend to command my belief or opinion.
(Hume 1748/2000, pp. 87–88)
In this passage Hume says that he is in principle willing to believe in a
miracle if the evidence for it is so extraordinarily strong that a denial of it
would require a greater miracle.
In reply, Hume’s idea of ‘greater miracle’ and ‘mutual destruction of
arguments’ is flawed. Hume is assuming that a greater miracle is an event
that is less probable, and as noted in the previous section Hume assumes
that an event that is less probable is one which is contrary to our frequent
experiences. However, as explained previously we should think in terms of
causal pathways instead of frequencies, in which case there is no mutual
destruction of arguments. The empty tomb and the claims of Jesus’ postmortem appearances require a causal explanation: which causal pathway
explains them? On the one hand, as explained previously we should not use
infrequency to rule out a personal cause resurrecting Jesus which explains
the empty tomb and the claims of Jesus’ post-mortem appearances. On the
other hand, given the arguments in previous chapters we should rule out
the naturalistic alternatives and conclude that Jesus resurrected. The empty
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tomb and the claims of Jesus’ post-mortem appearances must have been
caused by something, and if we can rule out the alternative explanations we
should embrace the conclusion.
Others have replied that one must be careful not to exaggerate the sensible requirement that ‘an extraordinary claim requires extraordinary evidence’ into an insuperable epistemic barrier, as it would lead to absurdities
and the destruction of common sense instead. McGrew explains,
The Humean objection has also been vigorously contested as destructive not only of miracle stories but of common sense as well. The 19th
century saw a proliferation of satires in which Humean scruples about
accepting testimony for extraordinary tales were applied to the events
of secular history, with consequences that are equally disastrous and
humorous. . . . Whately’s satire, which is the most famous, ‘establishes’
on the basis of many historical improbabilities that Napoleon never
existed but was a mythic figure invented by the British government to
enhance national unity.
The lesson is that while one may legitimately require more evidence for
an extraordinary story than for a mundane story, one must be careful not to
exaggerate this sensible requirement into an insuperable epistemic barrier,
for this would result in a standard that cannot be applied without absurdity
in any other field of historical investigation (McGrew 2013).
To avoid the absurdities, one should not require the evidence for ‘an
extraordinary claim’ to be extraordinary in the sense of forming an insuperable epistemic barrier which would prevent us from recognizing extraordinary individuals and events, but rather in the sense of being sufficient
for demonstrating the unreasonableness of alternative hypotheses. Thus,
if someone claims that he saw an aeroplane, one could easily believe the
person without demanding evidence that would demonstrate the unreasonableness of alternative hypotheses, but if the person claims he saw an
alien, than one would need to be more careful that one has such evidence.
While we do not at present have adequate evidence to rule out alternative
explanations (e.g. hoaxes, misidentifications) with regards to claims about
aliens—and indeed in many of these cases we do have adequate evidence
to show that it is probably a hoax, misidentification, etc.—what is extraordinary about the evidence for the resurrection of Jesus is that, as argued in
previous chapters, we do have adequate evidence to rule out the alternative
explanations in this case. Moreover, the historical testimony for Jesus’ resurrection is extraordinary in the sense that, compared to (say) the death of
Socrates, we have more eyewitnesses, more lines of ancient testimony, and
a large number of witnesses who were willing to die for their testimony4

4 I thank Mark Boone for this point.
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(see Chapter 3). To do history properly, one must allow for the possibility
of exceptions involving extraordinary persons, and the exception in this
case is well justified by the evidence.
In Part 2 of Hume’s essay ‘Of Miracles,’ Hume makes four claims in his
attempt to show that no claim of miracle (including Jesus’ resurrection) has
ever been established by sufficient evidence. I shall consider three of these
claims in this section, the fourth will be considered in Section 8.8.
First, Hume claims,
There is not to be found, in all history, any miracle attested by a sufficient number of men, of such unquestioned good sense, education,
and learning, as to secure us against all delusion in themselves; of such
undoubted integrity, as to place them beyond all suspicion of any design
to deceive others; of such credit and reputation in the eyes of mankind,
as to have a great deal to lose in case of their being detected in any falsehood; and at the same time attesting facts, performed in such a public
manner, and in so celebrated a part of the world, as to render the detection unavoidable: All which circumstances are requisite to give us a full
assurance in the testimony of men.
(Hume 1748/2000, p. 88)
However, contrary to Hume, it is not the case that all the considerations
he lists are necessary. For example, the considerations explained in Chapter 3 are already sufficient to show that the earliest Christians who were
persecuted would not have been willing to lose everything for what they
do not believe to be true and be condemned by God after death for being
false witnesses. This point holds regardless of whether they were ‘of such
credit and reputation in the eyes of mankind,’ and it would suffice to rule
out ‘all suspicion of any design to deceive others.’ Moreover, as argued in
previous chapters, the earliest Christians were rational enough to debate,
to think about the evidence for their faith, to consider its consequences
such as having to face frequent dangers and martyrdom, and to persuade
others to hold to their views. Regardless of whether all of them were of
‘such unquestioned good sense, education, and learning,’ they already possessed sufficient characteristics to rule out delusion of Jesus’ resurrection
caused by naturalistic alternative hypotheses. For example, the groups of
people who claimed to have witnessed the resurrected Jesus were already
of sufficient number to rule out delusion caused by hallucination (see
Chapter 4), and they included members familiar enough with Jesus to rule
out delusion caused by mistaken identity (see Chapter 5). Finally, even
if the earliest Christians did not attest facts ‘performed in such a public
manner, and in so celebrated a part of the world, as to render the detection
unavoidable,’ nevertheless based on considerations established in previous
chapters it can still be shown that they claimed that they had seen Jesus
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alive after his crucifixion, they truly saw something, what they saw was
not caused intramentally but extramentally, and the extramental entity
was not anyone else but the same Jesus who died on the cross. Therefore,
Jesus resurrected.
Second, Hume claims that people tend to believe in miraculous stories
because of the passion of surprise and wonder. He argues,
If the spirit of religion join itself to the love of wonder, there is an end of
common sense; and human testimony, in these circumstances, loses all
pretensions to authority. A religionist may be an enthusiast, and imagine he sees what has no reality: He may know his narrative to be false,
and yet persevere in it, with the best intentions in the world, for the
sake of promoting so holy a cause: Or even where this delusion has not
place, vanity, excited by so strong a temptation, operates on him more
powerfully than on the rest of mankind in any other circumstances; and
self-interest with equal force . . .
The many instances of forged miracles, and prophecies, and supernatural events, which, in all ages, have either been detected by contrary
evidence, or which detect themselves by their absurdity, prove sufficiently the strong propensity of mankind to the extraordinary and the
marvelous, and ought reasonably to beget a suspicion against all relations of this kind.
(Hume 1748/2000, p. 89)
Hume fails to note the evidence of the earliest Christians doubting the
resurrection (see Chapters 3 and 4) as well as audiences of the earliest
Christians doubting the resurrection (1 Corinthians 15:12; Acts 17:32,
see Chapter 2). The evidence indicates a soberness of mind rather than an
easy acceptance of miracle in this case. Additionally, the severity of the
threat of persecution facing those who would believe and proclaim Jesus’
resurrection would have ruled out any easy acceptance and spreading of
tales of surprise and wonder in this case, as well as vanity and self-interest
as motivations (see Chapters 3 and 4). Moreover, if the earliest Christians
had ‘the best intentions in the world, for the sake of promoting so holy
a cause’ as Hume suggests, then contrary to Hume they would not have
persevered in their narrative if they knew that it was false, because it
would be inconsistent with their devotion to the God of Israel, as argued
in Chapter 3. While there have been many instances of forged miracles,
etc., it would be a false generalization to conclude that all claims of miracles are forged. The reason why it would be a false generalization is that
the case of Jesus’ resurrection is of vastly different character compared to
the cases of forged miracle (see further, Section 8.8). As shown in previous chapters, there is good evidence to think that Jesus resurrected, and
as explained earlier the case cannot be reasonably explained away by
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Hume’s suggestion of ‘the strong propensity of mankind to the extraordinary and the marvelous.’
Third, Hume claims that reports of miracles ‘are observed chiefly to
abound among ignorant and barbarous nations’ (Hume 1748/2000, p. 90).
McGrew (2009, p. 653) replies,
But to call first-century Judaism ‘ignorant and barbarous’ would be
itself historically ignorant, and to suggest that this absolves us of taking the testimony of the eyewitnesses seriously is a classic example
of trying to dismiss evidence without doing any actual argumentative
work.
Again, Hume fails to note the evidence of the earliest Christians doubting
the resurrection (see Chapters 3 and 4) as well as audiences of the earliest
Christians doubting the resurrection (1 Corinthians 15:12; Acts 17:32, see
chapter 2). The evidence indicates that despite their ignorance of modern
science, first-century people knew that dead people do not rise naturally
and they would not have believed any such thing easily. In such circumstance, the question of what caused the earliest Christians to believe that
Jesus resurrected and to stake everything on it (1 Cor. 15:17) still needs to
be answered, and it has been shown in previous chapters that the answer is
that Jesus was truly resurrected.
Shapiro (2016, pp. 63–68) offers another argument against miracles based
on the base rate fallacy, which is essentially as follows: Suppose a person is
tested positive for a rare disease X, the test is 99.9% reliable (only one in a
thousand who tests positive doesn’t really have the disease), yet because the
disease is so rare (1 in 10 million), the chance of the person having X is still
very low (1 in 10,001). To ascertain that the person really has X, a more
reliable test would be needed. This illustrates that an extraordinary claim
requires extraordinary evidence.
Shapiro applies this to the case of Jesus’ resurrection: suppose a group
of people claimed to have seen the resurrected Jesus, the testimony of the
group was 99.9% reliable, yet because resurrection (if it happens) would be
so rare, the chance of the group having seen the resurrected Jesus would still
be very low. Citing Shapiro, Shermer (2017, p. 78) writes, ‘of the approximately 100 billion people who have lived before us, all have died and none
have returned, so the claim that one (or more) of them rose from the dead is
about as extraordinary as one will ever find.’
In reply, the case of rare disease mentioned by Shapiro is disanalogous
to Jesus’ resurrection. In the former case the probability is calculated based
on the assumption that it is a random sample, i.e. the chance of randomly
finding a person who is tested positive and has the disease. However, in the
case of Jesus’ resurrection, the probability is not that of randomly finding
someone claiming to have seen a resurrected person and that the person
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resurrected. One needs to consider the extraordinary religious context concerning the claim that Jesus resurrected (see later).5
Moreover, with regards to testing for a rare disease X, saying that ‘the
chance of the person having X is still very low (1 in 10,001) even though the
test is positive’ is too superficial. One should ask the deeper question of why
the test would give a false positive in 0.1% of cases. What are the specific
alternative explanations for a positive result? One possible explanation is that
there could be other things (e.g. other proteins in the blood) which can also
cause a positive result. If such alternative explanations can be excluded, then
no matter how low the base rate of X is, as long as the test shows a positive
result, the person has X. Likewise, one can eliminate the alternative explanations to Jesus’ resurrection, such that, no matter how low the base rate is, we
can conclude that it happened. The moral of the story is again the exclusion of
alternative hypotheses, and this has been accomplished in previous chapters.
Shapiro (2016, p. 130) objects that we have less historical evidence for
Jesus’ resurrection compared to the historical evidence we have for events
such as the destruction of Pompeii, the sinking of the Titanic, or Lincoln’s
assassination. He claims,
Because miracles are far less probable than routine historical events (volcanic eruptions, sinking ships, assassinations), the evidence necessary to
justify beliefs about them must be many times better than that which
would justify our beliefs in run-of-the-mill historical events. But it isn’t.
The evidence for Jesus’ resurrection is simply not as good as that which
historians normally require of events that happen with greater frequency.
In reply, Shapiro’s argument confuses the evidence we have with the
evidence that is required. We have more evidence for (say) Lincoln’s

5 In personal correspondence, Dr Timothy McGrew explains, ‘The base rate fallacy is the
fallacy of ignoring the base rate—ignoring, that is, what you know about the statistical
distribution of the feature of interest in your reference class. If you know that you’re dealing
with a disease that is very rare among Asian women, and your patient is an Asian woman,
and you have no other information relevant to her having that disease, then the base rate is
low and it will take a great deal of evidence for you to come to a rational belief that she has
the disease. But if you know that she has three female relatives who all have the disease, your
reference class will be different. If there were a population that formed a clear appropriate
reference class, and our only means of evaluating the probability were by direct inference
from the frequency of resurrections within that class, then the base rate would be relevant to
P(R|B). But what would that reference class be? Living organisms? Human beings? Human
males? Human males whose lives uniquely fulfil millennia of messianic prophecy? The latter
seems to be a great fit. Unfortunately, the number of members in that reference class is . . .
one. And that’s the one about whom we’re trying to reason. So the reference class approach
isn’t very good.’ The consideration concerning reference class illustrates that religious context should not be ignored.
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assassination, and even more evidence for (say) the wedding of Prince
Charles and Lady Diana in 1981 which was watched live by millions. Assassinations are less frequent than weddings. Yet we do not reject Lincoln’s
assassination simply because the evidence for it is not as good as the evidence we have for the wedding of Prince Charles and Lady Diana, because
the evidence we have in the case of Lincoln’s assassination is already sufficient to rule out alternative hypotheses and to establish that it happened.
Likewise, even though the evidence for Jesus’ resurrection is less than the
evidence we have for Lincoln’s assassination, as argued in previous chapters
the evidence we have in the case of Jesus’ resurrection is already sufficient to
rule out alternative hypotheses and to establish that it happened.
A sceptic might object that, even if each of the naturalistic alternatives
to the resurrection is improbable, their disjunction is not improbable.6 For
example, consider the outcome of rolling a fair die. Even if the probability
of each of the alternatives to 6 (i.e. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) is rather low (i.e. 1/6), their
disjunction is not improbable (i.e. 5/6).
In reply, first, the die example assumes that each outcome has a nonnegligible probability: 1/6 (= 0.166 . . .) is non-negligible and we often do
see the outcome of (say) 3 happening naturally. However, it has been argued
in previous chapters that each of the naturalistic alternatives is not the case
and thus has negligible probability (far lower than 0.001; in cryptography,
negligible probability is typically assigned a value of less than 1/2128). It
might be objected that mistaken reports concerning miraculous claims have
non-negligible probability and we often do see them. In reply, while the
probability of a mistaken report in general is not low (I discuss some cases,
e.g. concerning Bodhidharma, in Section 8.8), it would be false to conclude
on this basis that the probability for the specific case that Jesus resurrected
is low. The reason is because the Bayesian analysis discussed in Section 8.3
has shown that one should ‘distinguish between the probability of a miracle
claim considered apart from the evidence and the probability of the claim
given that evidence’ (McGrew 2013). Therefore, while there have been many
mistaken reports in general, one should consider the evidence that is specific
to the particular case of Jesus’ resurrection and think about the possible
ways by which the reports concerning Jesus’ resurrection appearances could
have been mistaken, and these ways have all been excluded by the considerations explained in the previous chapters. For example, it has been argued
in Chapter 4 that mistaken reports due to hallucinations, i.e. the intramental
hypothesis—widely regarded by sceptical scholars as the most plausible naturalistic alternative to Jesus’ resurrection—would not work because of multiple considerations against it, one of which is that, without a corresponding
external stimulation of the relevant sensory organ, the mental states internal
to each person within a group of people would not agree on various details

6 I thank Andrew Brenner for helpful discussion concerning this objection.
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concerning their experience of the external world; indeed, collective hallucinations are not found in peer-reviewed medical literature (Bergeron and
Habermas 2015). Thus the intramental hypothesis has negligible probability or ‘vanishingly small probability’ (to use McGrew’s term for his evaluation of the hallucination hypothesis; see McGrew 2009, p. 626). Given that
the six logically possible ways (i.e. the legends, no experience, intramental,
mistaken identity, swoon, and escape hypotheses) by which the reports concerning Jesus’ resurrection appearances could have been mistaken have all
been excluded as shown in the previous chapters, it can be concluded that
the reports are not mistaken in stating that Jesus resurrected.
Second, in the case of rolling a fair die it can be shown that the outcome
of 6 has equally low probability to each of the non-6 alternative outcomes.
However, it has been argued earlier that while it has been shown that each
of the naturalistic alternatives has negligible probability, it has not been
shown that the resurrection of Jesus has equally negligible probability. In
particular, it has been explained in Section 8.3 that infrequency of resurrections is not a good reason to think that ‘God raised Jesus from the dead’ has
negligible probability.
The die example however is analogous to the case of Jesus’ resurrection
in this sense: the probability of each of the logical alternatives must add
up to 1 (1/6 + 1/6 + 1/6 + 1/6 + 1/6 + 1/6 = 1). Likewise, the probability of
each of the seven possible categories of explanations concerning the claims
of Jesus’ post-mortem appearances—viz. legends, no experience, intramental, mistaken identity, swoon, escape, and resurrection—must add up to
1. Since each of the six naturalistic alternatives has negligible probability
and that the probability of the disjunction of six negligible probabilities
is negligible, it can be concluded that the resurrection of Jesus happened
(i.e. the probability of Jesus’ resurrection has negligible difference from the
probability of 1).
The last sentence illustrates how a difficulty often mentioned against the
Bayesian approach to prove Jesus’ resurrection against naturalistic hypotheses may be avoided, namely the difficulty of assigning prior probability
for Jesus’ resurrection. My argument by exclusion—based on the logically
exhaustive list of hypotheses formulated in Chapter 1—can lead to the conclusion that Jesus resurrected without having to first assign a number for
the prior probability of Jesus’ resurrection, which is a tricky thing to do.
In particular, it avoids the objection that ‘we cannot prove the resurrection
because we do not know how to read the mind of God to know what is
the probability that God would intervene in this case.’ While this difficulty
is not necessarily insurmountable—Swinburne (2003, 2013a, 2013b), for
example, has offered plausible reasons (based on arguments from natural
theology, religious context, etc.) for thinking that God had revealed his
intentions—the difficulty is entirely avoided by my approach. Using the
argument by exclusion, one does not need to argue what the probability is
that God would intervene in this case; one only need to show that there is
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no good reason to think that it is improbable and that to think otherwise
would be to import unwarranted philosophical assumptions into his/her
judgements.
Finally, it should be noted that, in order to demonstrate the reasonableness of the conclusion that Jesus resurrected, it is not necessary to claim
‘negligible probability’ for each of the naturalistic alternative hypotheses,
even though I have argued that this is in fact the case. Even if one disagrees
with my assessment that each of the naturalistic alternative hypotheses has
‘negligible probability’ or ‘vanishingly small probability’ (to use McGrew’s
term), one can still say that each of these naturalistic alternatives has been
shown to be very improbable. For example, even if one assigns to each of
the six naturalistic alternatives a probability of one in a thousand (which is
very generous and much higher than the vanishingly small probability calculated by McGrew), that still leaves the resurrection with a probability of
99.4%.7 This should warrant assent from a reasonable person.

8.5 Could it be a scientific anomaly?
Could the resurrection of Jesus be a scientific anomaly? The scientific anomaly hypothesis is evidently fantastically improbable: we have enough understanding of natural laws to know that people do not rise from the dead
naturally. It is unreasonable to think that it only naturally happened once
so far in human history out of the billions of deaths which have occurred.
Likewise, with regards to Shapiro’s (2016, p. 115) suggestion that the body
in the tomb disappeared as a result of extremely rapid decomposition, we
have enough understanding of the natural world to know that bodies do not
disappear as a result of decomposition within a few days naturally.
Regarding the religious context in which the claims of Jesus’ resurrection
occur, the historical evidence indicates that the earliest Christians perceived
that Jesus’ ministry was marked by ‘miracles,’ that he taught them about
God’s purposes with a divine authority, that he manifested an extraordinary
standard of moral behaviour, and that he thought of himself as truly divine
(i.e. on the Creator side of the Creator–creature divide) (Loke 2017a, chapter 6). Additionally, Licona argues that Jesus predicted that his violent and
imminent death would be followed shortly afterward by God’s vindication of
him via resurrection (Licona 2010, 2014). The occurrence of Jesus’ coming
back to life three days after his death by crucifixion, together with this context, demands an explanation. It is contrived to think that this event, out of
billions of deaths which have occurred, happened as a scientific anomaly and
is associated by chance with a person’s claim to be divine and/or with the person’s prediction of it. On the other hand, the miraculous resurrection of Jesus
is not contrived given this context. One might object that such a religious

7 I thank Andrew Brenner for this comment.
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context would also increase the probability that the disciples had hallucinations and delusions of Jesus’ resurrection, but these hypotheses have already
been ruled out based on other considerations discussed in previous chapters.

8.6 Would future scientific discoveries explain away Jesus’
resurrection?
Science only describes the natural world when it is left on its own, whereas
a miracle is supposed to describe what happens when the natural world is
not left on its own. Therefore, there is no contradiction between miracle
and science (cf. Gant 2019, p.3). This does not mean we should believe in
every miraculous claim; indeed, many such claims (e.g. the Chinese goddess
Chang-e who was said to have flown to the moon) are superstitions with no
historical basis. Neither does it mean we should not believe in any miraculous
claim; we need to be open minded and consider the reasons and evidence.
It should be noted that the argument for Jesus’ resurrection is not based
on gaps in our knowledge; hence it is not an argument from ignorance.
Rather, it is based on reasons and evidence. It is because there are reasons
and evidence (discussed in previous chapters) for thinking that (I) many people claimed to have seen the resurrected Jesus shortly after his crucifixion,
(II) they did not make baseless claims but had some kind of experiences, (III)
what they experienced was not caused intramentally but extramentally, (IV)
the extramental entity was not another person but the same Jesus who died
on the cross, therefore (V) Jesus resurrected. Concerning inferring a supernatural cause for Jesus’ resurrection, Licona (2014, p. 122) argues,
virtually all of historical inquiry, and certainly all that concerns antiquity, involves inference, since the past and all of its causes are forever
gone. If natural explanations cannot come close to explaining the relevant historical bedrock when they appear in a historical context that is
charged with religious significance, historians are justified in employing
inference and positing a theoretical entity, even a supernatural or divine
agent, in order to explain the relevant historical bedrock.
Licona thinks that the fulfilment of the aforementioned criteria for identifying a miracle is important, since it places a check on those led by credulity
from employing a ‘God-of-the-gaps’ argument where one supplies a divine
agent for a cause presently unknown to us.
Sceptics might object that it still amounts to God of the gaps, for there
could be natural causes for Jesus’ resurrection that are still unknown to us.
Sceptics might object that the argument for the conclusion that God raised
Jesus from the dead is based on
1

Excluding naturalistic alternatives according to our current understanding of nature.
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However, there could be
Naturalistic alternatives beyond our current understanding of nature,
such as undiscovered natural laws or aliens.
Supernatural alternatives other than God, e.g. angel, demon.

It must be admitted that there have been many religious believers throughout history who commit the ‘God-of-the-gaps’ fallacy. For example, when
people in the past did not understand certain natural phenomena (such as
lightning and thunder), they thought that these are caused directly by the
gods (e.g. by the god of thunder). As scientific understanding progresses,
however, these explanations are replaced by scientific ones. Nevertheless,
the fact that many events which were previously thought to be explained by
a divine cause can now be explained by science does not imply that every
event which is thought to be explained by a divine cause can be explained
by science. The reason why this would be a false generalization is that the
events in question could be of vastly different character. In order to avoid
false generalization, the correct way to proceed is to assess, on a case-bycase basis, which explanation is the best for each case. I have argued in Loke
(2017b) that giving an account of how lightning occurs as a result of natural
causes is very different from giving an account of what is the ultimate explanation for the natural causes, that the question of ultimate origins can only
be answered by a Divine First Cause, and that it is not a God-of-the-gaps
answer.
It is true that the progressive nature of science indicates that our current
understanding of nature is limited. However, this does not imply that our
understanding of nature is totally unreliable. We need to examine the purported items of knowledge case by case, and assess how strong the evidence
is for each case. The National Academy of Sciences (2008) notes,
Many scientific theories are so well-established that no new evidence
is likely to alter them substantially. For example, no new evidence will
demonstrate that the Earth does not orbit around the sun (heliocentric
theory), or that living things are not made of cells (cell theory), that
matter is not composed of atoms, or that the surface of the Earth is not
divided into solid plates that have moved over geological timescales (the
theory of plate tectonics).
Likewise, our scientific knowledge of natural laws indicates that dead
people do not naturally rise.
Even if the resurrection of Jesus has a natural explanation which is yet
unknown to twenty-first-century scientists, we still need to ask how could it
have been known and utilized to raise Jesus in the first century and vindicate
his claim to be truly divine. Such a knowledge and ability to manipulate
natural laws would still require a supernatural agent in any case.
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Many atheists insist that one should try to find scientific explanations for
every event rather than inferring God as an explanation, which they regard
as intellectual laziness. For example, Lüdemann claims that real historical
work cannot rest content with a past event which cannot be fully explained
by social science (Lüdemann 1994, p. 80).
In reply, Padgett (1998, p. 305) asks,
But why not? Is social science, rather than God, now omniscient? With
prejudices and confusions like these, Lüdemann’s book provides an
excellent example of the way the myth of a purely historical Jesus leads
to both bad history and bad theology.
We need to ask why we seek explanations in the first place. Are we just
seeking explanations for the sake of seeking explanations? No, we seek
explanations for the purpose of understanding the truth of the matter.
Unless we have already assumed beforehand that the truth of the matter is
that God did not act—this would be a circular argument against miracles.
Otherwise, if we have good reasons—after doing the hard work of a ssessing
the evidence—to think that the truth of the matter is that an event was
caused by God, we should accept this explanation. It would make a bad
detective to exclude possible answers beforehand by way of a circular argument, without due consideration of the arguments for those answers. The
statement that ‘we should only accept a scientific explanation for a past
event’ is a philosophical statement about science and reality rather than a
scientific statement. It is a bad philosophical statement, for it presupposes
that all events must have purely natural explanations, which begs the question against divine action. In order not to beg the question, we have to
remain open to the possibility that certain events might indeed be caused by
God and examine the reasons which have been given.

8.7 Can we infer God as the cause of Jesus’ resurrection?
In his more recent writings, Ehrman (2014, p. 149) has conceded, ‘it is in
theory possible even to say that Jesus was crucified, and buried, and then he
was seen alive, bodily, afterward.’ However, he insists,
What is not a plausible historical conclusion is that God raised Jesus
into an immortal body and took him up to heaven where he sits on a
throne at his right hand. That conclusion is rooted in all sorts of theological views that are not widely shared among historians, and so is a
matter of faith, not historical knowledge.
Can we infer God as the cause of Jesus’ resurrection? One might ask what
reasons there are to think that the agent who raised Jesus is God rather
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than (say) aliens, psychic powers, false prophets with supernatural powers,
evil spirits (Cavin 2005, pp. 34–36), multiple gods, or an ‘Almost God’
(‘one enormously powerful but not quite omnipotent being’) (Shapiro 2016,
pp. 46–47).8
In reply, alternative hypotheses such as aliens, psychic powers, false
prophets with supernatural powers, evil spirits, and so on are ad hoc,
because there is no independent reason for thinking that such entities (if
they exist) have the powers to resurrect the dead. However, we have independent reasons (viz. the cosmological, teleological, and moral arguments)
for thinking that there exists a God who can act supernaturally by creating
our universe with its natural laws (Loke 2017b, forthcoming; Craig and
Moreland, eds. 2009). We can infer that such a God who created the natural
laws would also have the power to raise the dead. Believing in one God is
more reasonable than believing in multiple gods, for it is consistent with the
widely accepted scientific principle (Occam’s razor) that causes should not
be multiplied beyond necessity (Craig and Sinclair 2009, p. 192).9
Given these reasons, the demonstration that there is good historical evidence for thinking that Jesus claimed to be truly divine (i.e. to be on the
Creator side of the Creator–creature divide and of equal ontological status
as God the Father; see Loke 2017a) would—together with historical evidence for his resurrection—be a good reason to believe Jesus’ claim that
his coming back to life was an act of God the Creator and a vindication
of Jesus’ claim to be God incarnate (for defence of the incarnation against
other objections, see Loke 2014a, 2017a). Thus, we have reasons to think
that the Creator of the universe had revealed himself in history in the person
of Jesus. Given that Jesus regarded the Scriptures of Israel as divine revelation (Moyise 2011) and given that the Scriptures affirmed God the Creator
as all-powerful rather than as an ‘Almost God,’ we can therefore also conclude that the Creator of the universe affirmed this as well.10 Shapiro (2016,

8 One might argue that we have independent reasons for thinking it is the God of Israel who
raised Jesus, since the unusual event occurs in Jerusalem where biblical prophecies has
hinted at a saviour from the line of David. However, the sceptic might reply that aliens,
‘almost God,’ etc. could also have originated these biblical prophecies by masquerading as
the God of Israel or as angels.
9 It should be noted that this argument does not exclude the possibility that we could have
other reasons (e.g. historical evidences of divine revelation) for thinking that the single
‘First Cause’ is a tri-unity of persons, i.e. a single First Cause in which there are three persons). See Moreland and Craig (2009, pp. 575–596).
10 The scriptural data concerning omnipotence has been subjected to two different interpretations (Brink 1999, pp. 139–144). The minimizing interpretation tends towards the conclusion that God is in fact not presented as all-powerful in the Scriptures (Geach 1973). By
contrast, the classical interpretation concludes that the scriptural data affirms that God is
all-powerful. Proponents point out that the scriptural data includes not only God’s actual
reign (i.e. ‘power over’) over humanity and the universe, but also his unlimited capacity for
action, as shown by the frequency with which phrases like ‘all things are possible for God’
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p. 44) objects by claiming that God’s intention to do a miracle is simply not
available to us. In reply, God’s intention can be understood by considering
what is spoken by a person who claims to be a prophet and whether his/her
claim is confirmed by an act which only God the Creator can plausibly be
regarded as having the power to do.
Sceptics might object by noting the claim that some of the experiences
noted in Chapter 4 may be evidence of physical manifestations of evil spirits
who masquerade as the dead. They might therefore suggest the possibility that, even if there is no evidence that they could resurrect the dead,
evil spirits could have caused visions of the resurrected Jesus and faked the
resurrection.
In reply, the supernatural vision hypothesis (whether the vision is caused
by God or angel or demon) does not explain the empty tomb; other explanations would need to be given for the removal of the body from the tomb so
as to fake the resurrection of Jesus. Moreover, in order to avoid the charge
of making an ad hoc claim to explain away the evidence for Jesus’ resurrection, the suggestion in Chapter 4 concerning the possibility of experiences
being caused by physical manifestations of evil spirits would need to be
proven against other possibilities, but the sceptic has failed to demonstrate
that. On the other hand, we have independent reasons (viz. the cosmological, teleological, and moral arguments) for thinking that there exists a God
who created the universe (Loke 2017b, forthcoming; Craig and Moreland,
eds. 2009). One can argue (as Swinburne does) that the God who created
the universe would not have permitted such a massive deception in the
case of Jesus. On the contrary, there are reasons for thinking that such a
God would interfere in history by becoming incarnate, and that it is highly
improbable that we would find the evidence we do for the life and teaching of Jesus, as well as the evidence from witnesses to his empty tomb and
later appearances, if Jesus was not God incarnate and did not rise from the
dead (Swinburne 2003, 2013a, 2013b; cf. Cavin and Colombetti 2013; for
discussion on the evil-god hypothesis, see also Hendricks 2018). The fact
that we do not have similar claims together with comparable evidence for
the resurrection of other religious figures (see Section 8.8) is also evidence
against the existence of evil spirits who could simply fake the resurrection
and would be permitted by God to do so.11
One might ask whether God could have done a miraculous act to cause
someone to be crucified in Jesus’ place; this is the Islamic escape hypothesis

appear in virtually all layers of the biblical literature—Gen. 18:14, Jer. 32:17, Job 42:2, etc.
(Brink 1999, pp. 139–144). Furthermore, the Scriptures affirm that God does whatever he
pleases (Ps. 115:3, 135:6, Dan. 4:35), and this carries with it the sense of freedom from
limitations or restraints (Erickson 1998b, p. 168). Overall, the classical interpretation,
more than the minimalist, does justice to the totality of the scriptural testimony (Brink
1999, p. 141; contra Geach 1973).
11 Concerning Divine Agency and replies to other objections to miracles, see Larmer (2013).
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often attributed to the Quran (Surah 4:157–8) and Gospel of Barnabas
217. Habermas and Licona (2004, pp. 184–185) object that both of them
were written centuries after the time of Jesus and thus are of dubious worth
as historical sources concerning Jesus. Craig objects that the hypothesis is
theologically untenable, for it implies that, by misleading the disciples into
thinking that Jesus was risen from the dead, Allah himself is to blame for
foisting the religion of Christianity on the world, resulting in hundreds of
millions rejecting Islam (Craig and Ally 2009). Moreover, the earliest Christians were evidently concerned about passing on the traditions of Jesus’
teachings and to reinforce the authority of these traditions in the churches
(for the importance of these early traditions, see Dunn 1998, pp. 188, 649–
658), and one of these traditions states, ‘this is my body that is for you. Do
this in remembrance of me,’ and ‘this cup is the new covenant in my blood.
Do this, as often as you drink it, in remembrance of me’ (1 Cor. 11:23–26
cf. Mark 14:22–25 parr. (Hengel and Schwemer [1997, Section 6] note that
Paul could have obtained these traditions during the period he spent with
the apostles in Jerusalem [Gal. 1:18]). This early tradition indicates that
Jesus himself taught his sacrificial death.

8.8 What about claims of resurrection in other religions?
Sceptics claim that the resurrection of Jesus is just one among many folktales claiming resurrection from the dead or people taken to heaven. Such
tales abound in various ancient cultures; examples include tales concerning
Osiris, Romulus, and Asclepius (Carrier 2009, pp. 87–88). In the Buddhist
tradition the sixth-century monk Bodhidharma was said to have been seen
carrying his sandals and walking home after he died and was buried, and
when his disciples opened up his grave the body was supposed to be missing.
Additionally, there are various similarities (virgin birth, resurrection, etc.)
between the stories of Jesus and the deities of other religions such as Mitra,
Krishna, etc., even though these religions affirm different theologies from
Christianity. Hume (1748/2000) famously claims that accepting as of equal
credit the reports of miracles in various opposing religions would cancel
each other out.
In reply, the presence of stories of incarnation and resurrection in other
religions can be explained by the widespread longing among humankind
for a divine saviour and for transcendence over death. This longing for
deliverance could have caused people to fantasize and invent various deities
and stories of resurrection. However, this does not exclude the possibility
that God the Creator could indeed have chosen to fulfil the human longing
through the person of Jesus. In contrast with the claim that Jesus resurrected, we do not at present have adequate evidence to rule out alternative
explanations (e.g. legend, hoax, misidentifications) with regards to claims
about resurrection in other religions. Concerning non-historical (or chiefly
mythical) persons who were reportedly apotheosized or raised from the
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dead (e.g. Osiris [see Chapter 1], Romulus, Asclepius, Mitra, and Krishna),
Habermas (1989) notes,
in each of these cases we find numerous problems such as a decided lack
of historical data, reports that are far too late (e.g. Ovid and Livy wrote
about 700 years after Romulus was supposed to have lived) or stories
about mythical personages who never lived.
While there were ancient scholars who claimed cases of resurrection of historical individuals (e.g. Apuleius reports a resurrection performed by Asclepiades) (Carrier 2009, p. 88), there are workable naturalistic alternative
explanations for these cases (e.g. another ancient scholar, Aulus Cornelius
Celsus, objects that Asclepiades merely recognized that a man who was
being carried out to burial was actually still alive [De Medicina 2.6.15]). In
the case of Bodhidharma, we do not have evidence to exclude all of these
naturalistic explanations; for example, we do not have evidence to show
that the story of Bodhidharma’s resurrection was not a legend that was disseminated many years after the purported event, and neither do we have
evidence to render it improbable that it was a deception.12 Likewise cases of
Marian apparitions have workable naturalistic explanations (e.g. hallucinations, illusions) (O’Connell 2009).
Other claims about historical persons either apotheosized (snatched up to
heaven and divinized) or raised from the dead have been well assessed in an
article by Habermas (1989). For example, consider the case of Apollonius of
Tyana, a first-century neo-Pythagorean philosopher whom Ehrman (2014,
chapter 1) claims is similar to Jesus in many ways. Litwa (2019, p. 183)
observes,
According to Philostratus, Apollonius was seen in the cities of Smyrna
and Ephesus at the same time. Apollonius was later arrested and put on
trial in Rome. In his trial, Apollonius electrified bystanders by disappearing from the courtroom and reappearing to his followers several
miles outside the city.
However, Habermas (1989) notes that there is only one surviving biography of Apollonius written over 100 years after the end of Apollonius’ life
shortly after 217 CE, and that he was commissioned to write his work by
Julia Domna, wife of Roman Emperor Septimius Severus, ‘as a counterblast to Jesus,’ which indicates that similarities with Jesus are more than
coincidence.

12 According to tradition, he is a sixth-century monk who established Chan Buddhism in
China; after his death many legends concerning him arose (‘Bodhidharma’, in Keown
2003).
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Litwa 2019 discusses a range of cases in mythic historiography which he
argues resembles the Gospels’ depiction of the resurrected Jesus. He claims,
the gospel accounts of Jesus’s translation and reappearances have the
form of a historical report that mentions real places in apparently real
time. If in a general way the Gospels’ authors were influenced by Greek
mythography, then they were specifically imitating those who put it into
historical form.
(p. 173)13
For example, in relation to the gospel of Luke’s portrayal of Jesus eating fish
to prove his materiality, Litwa quotes the ‘historical’ account of a maiden
named Philinnion. Six months after her death, ‘she visited a lover over the
course of three nights. She dined and drank with him—and even had sex
with him (leaving her bra behind)’ (p. 184). The account is from Phlegon of
Tralles, Mirabilia 1, and Litwa states,
the story of Philinnion is presented in the form of a letter written by a
public official who stands ready to have the facts of his account checked
and reported to a ‘king.’ From the later résumé of Proclus, we learn that
the king is probably Philip II, father of Alexander the Great.
(p. 257, citing Morgan 2013)
Morgan however notes that the compiler of Phlegon’s (the freedman of
Hadrian) work lived in the second century CE, a few hundred years after
Philip II (382–336 BC). The epistolary context indicating a readiness to
report to the king14 may well have been fictitious (p. 306), added to make
the story look authentic (p. 320). Centuries later the story was misread as
a real account by the compiler of Phlegon’s Mirabilia (second century CE)
and later on by Proclus (fifth century CE) (p. 318). Accounts attesting to ‘the
resurrection of Aesop’ in the early second century CE (e.g. by the historian
Ptolemy Chennus) mentioned by Litwa (2019, p. 167) were likewise written
several hundred years after Aesop supposedly ‘came back to life and even
fought with the Greeks in the battle of Thermopylae (480 BCE)’ (ibid.). Similarly, ‘writers who imitated historical—supposedly “eyewitness”—reports

13 Litwa also mentions cases from the genres of myths and plays; for example, in relation to
Jesus’ resurrected body passing through walls, he cites Greek mythoi portrayal of ‘The god
Hermes was able to pass into a room through the keyhole’ and ‘the playwright Euripides’
example of Dionysus passing over walls (p. 181). However, since the genres of myths and
plays are disanalogous to the historiographical biographies of the Gospels, I shall ignore
such examples and focus on cases from historiographies which Litwa mentions.
14 ‘So if you decide to write to the King about these things, send me a letter too, so that I can
send you some of the persons who provide detailed accounts. With best wishes’ (Morgan
2013, p. 305).
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(Philostratus, Heroicus)’ (p. 173) of the resurrected Achilles were written
centuries later: ‘the oldest stone dedication to Achilles comes from the 400s
BCE’ (p. 172), while Philostratus’ Heroicus was written in the third century
CE. Likewise, Herodotus’ report (Histories 4.13–16; written around 440
BC) of Aristeas’ (seventh century BC) supposed resurrection mentioned by
Litwa (2019, pp. 181–182) was written centuries later.
Contrast these accounts with Luke’s account which was written within
the lifetimes of eyewitnesses or those who knew the eyewitnesses of the
‘resurrected Jesus’ and who could verify the details with them, and the other
considerations in favour of its historicity explained in previous chapters
(e.g. Chapter 4). In view of these considerations supporting the historicity
of Luke’s account which were absent from the accounts cited by Litwa, the
resemblances noted by Litwa should not be understood as Luke’s imitation.
Rather, they should be understood as the resurrected Jesus demonstrating
the reality of his resurrection in accordance with the expectations of his
intellectual culture; for how else would Jesus prove his physicality if he truly
resurrected?
Litwa claims, ‘if readers of the tale were theologically invested, they
would presumably give it the benefit of the doubt’ (Litwa 2019, p. 183). In
support of his claim he cites Iamblichus’ (c. 242–c. 325) comment,
All the Pythagoreans are disposed to believe the stories told about
Aristeas of Proconnesus. . . . They believe all such things were done
and themselves attempt many of them, and keep in memory the stories
that seem mythical . . . not disbelieving anything that might lead to the
divine.
(Iamblichus, Pythagorean Way of Life, 138)
However, Litwa fails to note that those Pythagoreans of Iamblichus’ era
lived centuries after Aristeas and therefore could not check with eyewitnesses, and lacking the means to falsify or verify the stories they gave them
the benefit of the doubt. The first readers of the New Testament’s accounts
of resurrected Jesus, however, could check with the eyewitnesses (or people
who knew the eyewitnesses) who were willing to sacrifice for the truth of
what they saw, and for whom the truth of Jesus’ resurrection was foundational to their ‘theological investment.’15
Sceptics have objected that modern technology (which was not available
in the past) has exposed many miraculous claims as frauds (Allison 2005a,
pp. 308–310; Carrier 2005a, pp. 172–177). In reply, the lack of modern

15 For other replies to the objection from claims of miracles in other religions, such as (for
example) the case of Vespasian which Litwa (2019, pp. 150–151) mentions, see McGrew
(2009) who (for example) provides various arguments to show that the claim that Vespasian did miracles is probably a fraud.
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technology in ancient days does not excuse us from considering the evidence
that we do have. As explained in previous chapters, there is good historical
evidence for thinking that all the naturalistic hypotheses concerning Jesus’
resurrection can be excluded. It needs to be emphasized that the quality of
the historical evidence for the resurrection of Jesus is such that it allows for
a serious academic debate, unlike the case of Bodhidharma, Mitra, Krishna,
etc. The lack of evidence in other cases does not imply the lack of evidence
in this case. In other cases the stories either originated many years after
the events, were based on hearsay rather than eyewitness testimonies, or
lacked attestations by groups of eyewitnesses who were in a position to
know whether what they claim was true, and who were willing to lose everything and die for the miraculous claim. What is unique about the case
of Jesus’ resurrection is that the truth concerning Jesus’ resurrection was
regarded as foundational for their religion by the earliest Christian leaders,
for their motivation to persuade others to believe and for their willingness
to suffer and die. In fact, they made it very clear that if the resurrection were
not true, then it was dangerous for them and for others to believe it (1 Cor.
15:14–19). Moreover, the event was verifiable by them: they were in a position to know whether they did or did not have evidence to think that their
belief was true (Moreland 1998, pp. 247–248). Applying these and other
considerations, it can be concluded that the case for the resurrection of Jesus
is far stronger than claims of resurrection in other religions and that it can
withstand scrutiny.

8.9 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have discussed the objections to Jesus’ resurrection based
on its miraculous nature. Contrary to Hume’s definition of a miracle as ‘a
violation of scientific laws,’ a miracle can be understood as ‘an event which
would not have been produced by the natural causes operative at a certain
time and place’ (Moreland and Craig 2003, pp. 566–568).
Unless we assume that causes other than natural causes do not exist
(which begs the question against Theism), miracles should be regarded as
possible.
Ehrman (2003a, pp. 228–229) objects that, because historians can only
establish what probably happened, and a miracle is highly improbable,
the historian cannot establish that a miracle occurred. However, Ehrman
fails to ‘distinguish between the probability of a miracle claim considered
apart from the evidence and the probability of the claim given that evidence’ (McGrew 2013). Moreover, the objection against the reasonableness
of miracles based on the apparent infrequency of miracles does not work.
While infrequencies can help us exclude certain naturalistic explanations
given that natural causes are supposed to act in predictable and law-like
ways, a miraculous event is supposed to be caused by a supernatural personal free agent who might freely choose to act in a certain unique way only
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on a special occasion in religiously significant contexts. For example, to
confirm what certain religious leaders (such as Jesus) proclaimed has divine
origin and to reveal himself through these events. While Plantinga (2006)
has objected that the case for Jesus’ resurrection suffers from the problem of
dwindling probabilities, McGrew points out that Plantinga’s blunder lies in
falsely assuming that the probabilities of the background propositions are
fixed (McGrew 2009, pp. 644–648).
Concerning the claim that ‘an extraordinary claim requires extraordinary evidence,’ I have replied that one should not require the evidence to be
extraordinary in the sense of forming an insuperable epistemic barrier, which
would prevent us from recognizing extraordinary individuals and events,
but rather in the sense of being sufficient for demonstrating the unreasonableness of alternative hypotheses. Thus, if someone claims that he saw an
aeroplane, one could easily believe the person without demanding evidence
that would demonstrate the unreasonableness of alternative hypotheses, but
if the person claims he saw an alien, then one would need to be more careful that one has such evidence. While we do not at present have adequate
evidence to rule out alternative explanations (e.g. hoax, misidentifications)
with regards to claims about aliens—and indeed in many of these cases we
do have adequate evidence to show that it is probably a hoax, misidentification, etc.—what is extraordinary about the evidence for the resurrection of
Jesus is that, as argued in previous chapters, we do have adequate evidence
to rule out the alternative explanations in this case and that the reports of
Jesus’ resurrection occur in the relevant religious context of his claim to be
divine (Loke 2017a). I have discussed the claims of resurrection in other
cultures cited by sceptics and argued that they have workable naturalistic
explanations and are thus disanalogous to Jesus’ resurrection.
I have argued that miracles are identifiable; in particular, with respect
to the resurrection of Jesus, the evidence for the event together with the
exclusion of the naturalistic alternatives and the presence of a relevant religious context will entail sufficient epistemic justification for the conclusion
of a miraculous resurrection. Naturalistic alternatives are of two kinds:
first, there are naturalistic alternatives to the resurrection event; these have
already been considered and excluded in previous chapters. Second, there
are naturalistic alternatives for the resurrection event; that is, Jesus did rise
from the dead but it was not caused miraculously, rather it was caused naturally, for example it was a scientific anomaly or it was caused by aliens that
are yet unknown to us.
The scientific anomaly hypothesis is evidently fantastically improbable:
we have enough understanding of natural laws to know that people do not
rise from the dead naturally. It is contrived to think that this event, out of
billions of deaths which have occurred, happened as a scientific anomaly
and is associated by chance with a person’s claim to be divine and/or with
the person’s prediction of it. On the other hand, the miraculous resurrection
of Jesus is not contrived given this religious context. Even if the resurrection
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of Jesus has a natural explanation which is yet unknown to twenty-first-
century scientists, we still need to ask how it could have been known and
utilized to resurrect Jesus in the first century and vindicate his claim to be
truly divine. Such a knowledge and ability to manipulate natural laws would
still require a supernatural agent in any case.
Alternative naturalistic causes such as aliens or alternative supernatural
causes such as demons are ad hoc, because there is no good independent
reason for believing that an alien or a demon who had such powers to resurrect the dead exists. However, there are good independent reasons (viz. the
cosmological and fine tuning arguments) for thinking that there is a God
who created the universe with its laws of nature (Loke 2017b, forthcoming; Craig and Moreland 2009); a God with such powers would have no
difficulty raising the dead. There are also reasons for thinking that such a
God would interfere in history by becoming incarnate and that it is highly
improbable that we would find the evidence we do for the life and teaching
of Jesus, as well as the evidence from witnesses to his empty tomb and later
appearances, if Jesus was not God incarnate and did not rise from the dead
(Swinburne 2003, 2013a, 2013b; cf. Cavin and Colombetti 2013).
Given these reasons, the demonstration that there is good historical evidence for thinking that Jesus claimed to be truly divine (i.e. to be on the
Creator side of the Creator–creature divide and of equal ontological status
as God the Father; see Loke 2017a) would—together with historical evidence for his resurrection—warrant the conclusion that his coming back to
life was an act of God the Creator and a vindication of his claim.

9	Conclusion

The resurrection of Jesus is of fundamental importance to traditional Christian faith. Despite disagreements about various aspects of the New Testament, there is widespread consensus among historical-critical scholars that
(1) Jesus died due to Roman crucifixion, (2) very soon afterwards, a number
of people had experiences that they believed were appearances of the risen
Jesus, and (3) the body of Jesus was missing (Habermas 2005, 2013). In this
monograph, it has been shown that the case for the resurrection of Jesus
has not been disproved; on the contrary, there are good reasons for thinking that the best explanation for (1), (2), and (3) is that God has revealed
himself through miraculously raising Jesus from the dead, thus vindicating
his claims to be divine and confirming the salvific work that he has accomplished on the cross.
In reply to the objection that historians should not presuppose whether
God acted and should try to explain the claims of Jesus’ resurrection appearances and empty tomb in other (naturalistic) ways (Carnley 2019, p. 231),
I have explained in Chapter 1 using an original analytical framework that
these other naturalistic ways can in principle be excluded by the historian
based on historical evidence and that the historian can in principle reason
from empirical evidence to Jesus’ resurrection. In particular, it has been
shown in Chapters 2 to 7 that the historical evidence indicates that the tomb
of Jesus was empty and that no naturalistic hypothesis reasonably accounts
for what happened to the body of Jesus on the first Easter morning. The historical evidence also indicates that there were people in mid-first century CE
who claimed that they had seen Jesus alive after his crucifixion, they truly
saw something, what they saw was not caused intramentally but extramentally, and the extramental entity was not anyone else but the same Jesus who
died on the cross. Therefore, Jesus resurrected. I replied to the problem of
miracles in Chapter 8 and concluded that, since Jesus’ resurrection occurred
together with his claim to be truly divine (Loke 2017a), there are good reasons for thinking that a miracle of the greatest possible significance occurred
on that first Easter morning.
Would this conclusion be overturned by the discovery of more evidence
in the future? Sceptics have objected to the historical argument for the
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resurrection of Jesus by noting that the historical record we have today is
incomplete (Allison 2005a, p. 337). In ancient times, very little was recorded
in writing, and of that, very little came down into the hands of later writers, and of that, very little survived for two thousand years (Carrier 2005a,
p. 177). Surely many records must have been lost, or perhaps destroyed by
Christians, all early written attacks on Christianity were destroyed by the
church and are known only in the quotations of Christian authors who
rebutted them, and there were many other critiques that were written which
we don’t know about. How different would it be if we had all the records of
the first century (Carrier 2005a, pp. 179, 180–181)? In a similar vein, MacCulloch (2010, p. 112) writes,
We have to remember that the vast majority of early Christian texts
have perished, and despite many new archaeological finds, there is a
bias among those that survived towards texts which later forms of
Christianity found acceptable. One expert on the period has recently
estimated that around 85 per cent of second-century Christian texts of
which existing sources make mention have gone missing, and that total
itself can only represent a fraction of what there once was.
MacCulloch (2010, pp. 120–121) adds,
One has always to remember that throughout the New Testament we are
hearing one side of an argument. When the writer to Timothy insists with
irritating fussiness that ‘I permit no woman to teach or to have authority
over men; she is to keep silent’, we can be sure that there were women
doing precisely the opposite, who were probably not slow in asserting
their own point of view. But their voices are lost, or concealed in texts
modified much later. Up to the end of the first century, it is virtually impossible to get any perspective on the first Christian Churches other than that
of writings contained in the New Testament, however much we would
like to have a clearer picture of why and how conversions took place.
There is a silence of about six crucial decades, during which so many different spirals of development would have been taking place away from
the teachings of the Messiah, who had apparently left no written record.
Furthermore, there is also the problem of under-determination: just as
one can draw any number of curves through a finite set of points to create
a thousand pictures, one can come up with many possible hypotheses with
the limited evidence (Allison 2005a, p. 339).
In response, O’Collins (2017, pp. 500–501) notes, ‘it misconstrues historical judgments to claim that “all historical judgments are open to revision” ’
(contra Novakovic 2016, pp. 128–129, 155).
It is historically certain that Napoleon was finally defeated at Waterloo,
even if some secondary details of the event can be open to revision.
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While certainty in history is not established in the way certainty can
be reached in mathematics, chemistry and other disciplines, there are
innumerable cases of historical certainty.
(O’Collins 2017, pp. 500–501)
For each of these historical certainties, it would be unworkable to try
to explain away the contents of all the documentary evidence which indicates its occurrence by postulating the existence of another naturalistic
cause X, because X would entail consequences which are false. For example, one might postulate X: a conspiracy which changed all the historical
documents to indicate that Napoleon was finally defeated at Waterloo
when in fact he wasn’t, but such an act would have been noticed by others
and left behind detectable traces, which we do not find. It is the entailment of such false consequences that prevent us from coming up with
plausible naturalistic alternative hypotheses to the historical certainties,
even though we can come up with many possible alternative hypotheses.
Since any discovery of more evidence in the future that might naturalistically overturn the conclusion that ‘Napoleon was finally defeated at
Waterloo’ requires the existence of X which entails false consequences, it
is unreasonable to think that any such future discoveries would overturn
this conclusion.
The crucial consideration, therefore, is the evidence that supports the historical conclusion in question, and whether there could be another X that
could explain away this evidence without entailing false consequences. Now
I am not claiming that demonstrating Jesus’ resurrection as a case of historical certainty is necessary for the historical argument or for believing that
Jesus resurrected—demonstrating that Jesus’ resurrection is at least as good
as (or better than) the currently available alternative naturalistic hypotheses
would have sufficed to show the rational permissibility (or reasonableness)
of believing that Jesus resurrected (It has been shown in Chapter 8 that
Jesus’ resurrection has a probability of at least 99.4%, which is far higher
than the alternative naturalistic hypotheses). Nevertheless, I do think that
the evidence for Jesus’ resurrection is stronger than that, and that the conclusion that Jesus resurrected as a case of historical certainty is defensible.
For the case of Jesus’ resurrection, it has been argued in previous chapters that we have good documentary evidence for its occurrence, and that
attempts to explain away the contents of these documents naturalistically
would not work. For example, it has been shown in Chapter 2 that, given
the substantial manuscript evidence, it is unreasonable to think that (X)—all
the relevant passages in the Epistles (e.g. 1 Corinthians 15), the Gospels, the
church fathers’ quotations, their citations of non-Christians, and so on—
were interpolated by later Christians (even if they did interpolate a passage
like Mark 16:9–10), for such an act would have been noticed by others and
left behind detectable traces (as illustrated, for example, by the traces in the
manuscript evidence which has enabled us to detect Mark 16:9–20 as an
interpolation).
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Concerning Carrier’s and MacCulloch’s point about loss of ancient manuscripts, it has been noted in Chapter 2 that one reason why many of the
non-Christian writings did not survive is that no one actively promoted the
copying and preservation of their writings as their adherents died off (see
Gamble 1995, p. 127). In the case of the Gnostic writings, as explained in
previous chapters, their historical reliability were demonstrably inferior to
(say) the Four Gospels, thus it is understandable why the early Christians who
recognized this did not preserve them. Even if many records have been lost or
destroyed by Christians (Carrier) and we only hear one side of the argument
for the first six decades of Christianity (MacCulloch), it has been argued in
Chapter 2 that nobody in the late first–early second century would have had
the power and authority to alter all the copies of (say) 1 Corinthians possessed
by different communities of varying (sometimes even opposing) theologies
without leaving a trace in the surviving manuscripts from diverse places across
the Mediterranean, as well as all the copies of other documents in the first
and second century—such as the Four Gospels, Acts, 1 Clement, Letters of
Ignatius, etc.—which also attest various eyewitnesses of the resurrected Jesus.
Likewise, as argued in the previous chapters, the following considerations
are well established despite the incomplete record we possess:

Historical considerations
1 Jesus’ crucifixion in around AD 30.
2 Individuals (including former unbelievers Paul and James) and groups of
people (including Jesus’ apostles who were familiar with him) claimed
to have seen the resurrected Jesus shortly after that.
3 The threat of persecutions against them and their willingness to die for
their religion.
4 The importance of the claim of Jesus’ transphysical bodily resurrection
for the earliest Christians.
5 The reverent fear of being judged by YHWH for being false witnesses
were present among them.
6 The scepticism of bodily resurrection were present among them and
their audiences.
7 The commonsensical idea of ‘checking out’ the ‘eyewitnesses’ were present among them.
8 The mobility and ‘networking’ among the earliest Christians.
9 The author of Matthew’s account of the guard of Jesus’ tomb would not
have committed a ‘credibility suicide’ by inventing an easily falsifiable
story for his apologetic purpose.

General considerations:
10 No group of people would be willing to sacrifice everything for what
they do not believe to be true and be condemned by God after death for
being false witnesses.
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11 Without a corresponding external stimulation of the relevant sensory
organ, the mental states internal to each person within a group of people would not agree on various details concerning their experience of
the external world.
12 Many cases of hallucination do subsequently achieve insight that their
experience is hallucinatory after the experience has ended.
13 No mere human being would have been able to naturalistically cause his
own body to manifest ‘transphysicality.’
14 A half-dead person still suffering from the wounds of the crucifixion
would not be able to convince people that he was the risen Lord of life.
Any future discovery which is claimed to refute Jesus’ resurrection would
require another X (e.g. hallucination hypothesis) to explain away these (and
perhaps other) considerations taken together without entailing false consequences, but this would not work as shown in previous chapters (e.g. see the
refutation of the hallucination hypothesis in Chapters 4 and 7). It is therefore not surprising that claims of discovery of (say) Jesus’ body have turned
out to be bogus (see, for example, the supposed discovery of Jesus’ family
tomb at Talpiot discussed in Section 6.3).
With regards to the problem of under-determination, it has been shown in
this book that the number of hypotheses concerning the resurrection can be
reduced to only a few, and that all the naturalistic alternatives can be eliminated once the historical considerations summarized in each chapter and
listed earlier are established. While the historical record we have is incomplete and limited, a ‘lack of complete access to the past is not the same
as a complete lack of access to the past’ (Keith 2011), and the amount of
evidence we have is already sufficient to establish those historical considerations, as demonstrated in the previous chapters. We do not need to possess
all the historical records of the first century or to know all the details of the
events in order to show that the naturalistic hypotheses are unworkable. All
that is required is to establish those historical considerations, given which
none of the naturalistic hypothesis is workable as a historical explanation
for the beginning of Christianity, as explained in previous chapters. While
new hypotheses or new combinations of hypotheses may be suggested in the
future, each of them can be classified under one of the logically exhaustive
categories stated in this book, and the considerations against that category
which have been explained in this book will be used against it. Since it is
unreasonable to think that any X can explain away the multiple lines of
evidence supporting the case for Jesus’ resurrection without entailing other
consequences which are false, one does not need to worry that any future
discoveries would support a naturalistic hypothesis that would overturn the
conclusion that Jesus resurrected.
The conclusion that Jesus’ resurrection is a case of historical certainty is
further supported by the fact that, despite intense scrutiny over the centuries by so many sceptics, the case for Jesus’ resurrection has stood the test
of time and that ‘no modern historian has come up with a more convincing
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explanation’ (Wright 2003, abstract). The eminent historian of Buddhism
Paul Williams (2002, pp. 134–135) explains his conversion from Buddhism
to Christianity as follows:
It does not seem to me that any other religion or spiritual teaching has
anything so dramatic or convincing as the resurrection from the dead—
a resurrection that still seems plausible two thousand years later—to
support its claims. Buddhists (and others) sometimes talk about the
wonders their spiritual heroes and heroines have done and can do. But
nowhere is there a case so clearly and plausibly demonstrated as the
resurrection. That, it seems to me, is a fact. . . . Such a plausible case of
resurrection from the dead by a great spiritual teacher—the only such
case—when combined with the historical survival of Christianity and
the palpable goodness and wisdom of many Christians, is enough for
me at least to take the leap and accept Christianity.
(2002, pp. 134–135, emphasis mine)
The conclusion of this book has a number of significant implications for
humanity and for theology, in particular the doctrines of revelation, God,
Christ, salvation, church, and eschatology.
First, concerning the doctrine of revelation, theologian Wolfhart Pannenberg (1987, p. 135) concludes,
The historical solidity of the Christian witness [to the resurrection]
poses a considerable challenge to the conception of reality that is taken
for granted by modern secular history. There are good and even superior reasons for claiming that the resurrection of Jesus was a historical
event, and consequently, the Lord himself is a living reality. And yet
there is the innumerable repeated experience that in the world the dead
do not rise again. As long as this is the case, the Christian affirmation
of Jesus’ resurrection will remain a debated issue, in spite of all sound
historical argument to its historicity.
While I agree with Pannenberg’s conclusion that ‘there are good and even
superior reasons for claiming that the resurrection of Jesus was a historical
event, and consequently, the Lord himself is a living reality,’ one can question to what extent should it matter for our assessment of Jesus’ resurrection
that ‘and yet there is the innumerable repeated experience that in the world
the dead do not rise again.’ For as explained in Chapter 8, these innumerable
experiences only indicate that, left on their own, the dead do not rise, but
these experiences do not rule out the possibility that there might be someone
out there in the universe (e.g. an alien with advanced technology) or beyond
the universe (e.g. God) who has the power to raise the dead. Moreover, what
we do not observe nowadays does not imply it didn’t happen in the past—
we still need to consider the evidence we have. For example, no scientist
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has ever observed a Big Bang happening nowadays, but almost all scientists
believed that a Big Bang event happened in the past because of the evidence of its occurrence. Likewise, one should believe that Jesus resurrected
because of the evidence, for it has been shown in the previous chapters
that the historical evidence indicates that (I) there were people who claimed
to have seen Jesus shortly after his crucifixion, (II) they had some kind of
experiences, (III) what they experienced was not caused intramentally but
extramentally, and (IV) the extramental entity was not another person but
the same Jesus who died on the cross. Therefore, Jesus resurrected. Thus,
it is ‘the conception of reality that is taken for granted by modern secular
history’ that needs to change. Furthermore, I have explained in Chapter 8
that after the historian has established the conclusion that Jesus resurrected,
the philosopher and theologian can proceed to argue that the most reasonable cause of this event is God. Thus, we have good reasons for thinking
that God has revealed himself in history by raising Jesus from the dead. The
truth of the resurrection of Jesus therefore ‘calls for a new conception of history and of God’s involvement in the world’ (Rae 2005, p. 84).
Second, with regards to Christology, Jesus’ resurrection indicates that he
was not merely a human figure. As noted previously, Jesus claimed to be
truly divine in the context of Jewish monotheism (Loke 2017a). Since there
is evidence for thinking that Jesus was bodily resurrected after his crucifixion and that such a significant and miraculous event indicates that his ministry and claims were divinely vindicated, there are good reasons for thinking
that Jesus was not only truly human, but also truly divine—in other words,
God incarnate.
Third, with regards to eschatology and soteriology, the resurrection of
Jesus is proclaimed as evidence of divine judgment in the Scriptures. ‘Because
he [God] has fixed a day in which he will judge the world in righteousness
through a man whom he has appointed, having furnished proof to all men
by raising him from the dead’ (Acts 17:31). The God who raised Jesus from
the dead will one day raise all people, ‘some to everlasting life, and some
to shame and everlasting contempt’ (Dan 12:2). The resurrection of Jesus is
also a divine confirmation of Jesus’ claim to have given his life as a ransom
for many (Mark 10:45).1 Therefore, the Scripture declares, ‘if you confess
with your mouth Jesus as Lord, and believe in your heart that God raised
him from the dead, you will be saved’ (Romans 10:9). The resurrection of
Jesus is the basis for the glorious hope that those who believe in Jesus will
be with him forever, which is far better (Phil 1:23).
But we do not want you to be uninformed, brothers and sisters, about
those who have died, so that you may not grieve as others do who have

1 As noted in Chapter 8, the early tradition in 1 Cor. 11:23–26 cf. Mark 14:22–25 indicates
that Jesus taught his sacrificial death.
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no hope. For since we believe that Jesus died and rose again, even so,
through Jesus, God will bring with him those who have died.
(1 Thess. 4:13–14)

Finally, concerning ecclesiology, the resurrection of Jesus is the basis for
thinking that he is the Lord of the church and that those who obey him as
Lord and serve him faithfully would find ultimate fulfilment in life. ‘Therefore, my beloved, be steadfast, immovable, always excelling in the work of
the Lord, because you know that in the Lord your labour is not in vain’ (1
Cor. 15:58).
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